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ABSTRACT 
This thesis describes how the implementation of quality management methods in local 
government organisations have affected the inter-related issues of the public-service 
labour process and collective bargaining arrangements. 
A series of interviews with managers and union officials, and questionnaire surveys of 
trade union members attitudes at four disparate local authorities pursuing quality 
management was conducted over two and a half years. 
The findings indicate that the nature and outcomes of quality management 
implementation are contingent upon pre-existing employment relations within the 
organisation - particularly relating to trade union entrenchment and activity. The 
implementation of quality management, however, does have a subsequent effect on 
the labour process and collective bargaining. 
While there are considerable differences between authorities, evidence of increased 
worker 'commitment' as a result of quality management is inconclusive, though 
workers do perceive net increases in work-rates. Workers also perceive a net decline 
in trade union influence over working practices. 
It is concluded that unions need to address the issue of quality management in a 
critical manner in order to be able to adequately protect the interests of their members 
and to retain the long term legitimacy in the workplace. 
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Section I 
IntrodUction 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with quality management and local government employee 
relations. Based upon research conducted in, predominantly, four local authorities 
between 1995 and 1997, it addresses the issues of how quality management initiatives 
affect the labour process (the effort bargain, work regulation, work intensification work 
standardisation) and collective bargaining (management-union relations, management- 
worker relations and union-worker relations). In doing this, consideration is given to 
the competing forces of, on the one hand, the increasing standardisation of managerial 
decision-making in public sector organisations and, on the other hand, the inherent 
complexity of the local authority organisation - making the outcomes of any managerial 
strategy contingent upon the precedents of local historical developments in political, 
organisational and union-management relations. 
Quality management methods pose certain short-term challenges to the legitimacy of 
trade union organisation within the workplace. However, the challenges posed should 
be viewed within the context of an overall decline in trade union bargaining power at 
the national level. While the attempt to individualise work by unitarist managerial 
strategies like total quality management (TQM) may indicate a manifestation of the 
general shift in management-worker relations, it does not indicate any permanent shift 
from collectivism to individualism in employment relations. It is therefore considered 
that the eventual outcomes of quality management initiatives within local government 
workplace will depend upon the dynamics of the interaction of managers and workers - 
both individually and collectively. In short, the intended outcomes predicted in 
prescriptive management texts should not be assumed to be the actual outcomes of 
managerial decision-making. 
Background 
The permeation of quality management into local government reflects the broader 
issues concerning the reformulation of the public sector (Kirkpatrick & Martinez-Lucio 
1995b). In the late 1990s, public administration is dominated by an entrenched 
managerialist orthodoxy initially formulated around the moral and economic 
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assumptions of the new right critique of the welfare state in the 1970s and 1980s. This 
consensus is manifested in the reformulation of the structures and mechanisms that 
underpin local government, and by ideological parameters that govern what is Possible 
and desirable in local public service provision. Firstly a number of structural 'reforms' 
now determine how public services operate - the use of 'quasi-markets', performance 
monitoring, compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) and cost-centre based accounting 
practices. Secondly these mechanisms have been used in conjunction with an 
ideological imperative that has shifted attention away from the output of public services 
to the processes involved - the focus is increasingly concerned with the need to improve 
the 'value-for-money' pqrformance of public sector organisations. In turn, the 
championing of consumer choice, competition and entrepreneurship has been used to 
justify the 'exposure' of public service workers to the 'customers' of services. Here, 
managers are seen as neutral arbitrators of efficiency, equity and public accountability. 
Thirdly, then, 
, 
this 'new consensus' in public service provision has required that 
workers are not insulated from 'new and innovativF' ways of working by the 'vested 
producer interests' that constitute public service trade unions. 
Enter quality management. The 'quality' issue encapsulates all of the above issues. 
Tbrough the conflation of 'quality' and 'management' honorific status is ascribed to a 
managerialist agenda. The quality management agenda is ideally suited to the vertical 
disintegration of public sector organisations into purchaser and provider agencies; is 
fully compatible with consumerist ideology; and as a unitarist managerial package 
developed in the private sector, has a track record in the broad arena of industrial 
relations. As the introduction to a recent critical account of quality management in the 
public sector put it: 
For us, quality is not a politically neutral objective to which all parties are equally 
committed. On the contrary, it is intensely political and has been used to promote a range of 
new forms of management control and restructuring of traditional working practices, as well 
as genuine efforts to improve service delivery. (Kirkpatrick & Martinez-Lucio 1995a p8) 
There has been an increased interest in the impact of quality management methods in 
public sector organisations in recent years, yet most are either prescriptive in nature 
(Sanderson 1992; Skelcher 1992; Morgan & Murgatroyd 1994), or are concerned with 
the content of the agenda itself (Cochrane 1994; Warde 1994; Walsh 1995). While both 
of these issues are perfectly legitimate, there remain some gaps concerning the 
Introduction 4 
perceptions of 'the managed'. The intention, here, is to address the outcome of 
implementing policies inspired by the described agendas, in terms of employees. It is 
recognised here that managerialism has had an important affect on how the labour 
process is now viewed by managers in public services. It is also recognised, however, 
that managers do not always achieve their objectives, that managers perceptions of 
what has been achieved may be different to what employees may perceive and that 
managers actual behaviour may be different to their stated intention. This adds 
complexity to a number of contingencies already present in the local government 
organisational setting; the non-commercial nature of public services, the strong 
presence of public service trade unions and the organisational complexity of local 
authorities (in terms of decision-making channels and the diversity of work and skills 
involved across the range of services). 
The presence of trade unions in the local authority is not a small issue. Where quality 
management has been introduced in the commercial sector, it has been associated with 
non-union firms in the US and 'enterprise-union' firms in Japan. Where quality 
management has been introduced into strongly unionised sectors in the UK (the motor 
industry) the relationship between trade unionism and quality management has been 
uneasy (Starkey & McKinlay 1989). Introducing quality management into local 
government will not only be affected by the prior presence of trade unions, then, but the 
operation of quality management, through the managerialist agenda by which it is 
legitimised, will also affect collective bargaining arrangements in local government. 
Structure of Thesis 
The thesis is subdivided into thematic sections, section one being the introductory 
section. In Section 2, the background issues involved in introducing quality 
management into local government are discussed. Here, chapter 2 traces the origins of 
managerialism in local government from its roots in the new right critique - of the 
welfare state, trade unions and political decision-making - through to the assimilation of 
managerialism into New Labour's consumer-centred approach to citizenship in the 
1990s. Chapter 3 identifies the origins of quality management in the commercial sector 
and traces its permeation into local government in the 1990s - both in terms of why 
Introduction 
quality management is seen as applicable and the extent to which it has been 
(nominally) adopted by local authorities. 
Section 3 is concerned with quality management and employment relations in local 
government. Here, chapter 4 discusses the background issues surrounding trade in-lion 
involvement in local government and the issues raised for trade unions in introducing 
quality management. Chapter 5 discusses the issues raised for the organisation of work 
when introducing quality management into the non-commercial environment of local 
government. 
Section 4 discusses the methodological issues involved in researching the effects of 
management initiatives on the workplace. Chapter 6 considers how the workplace 
should be considered in light of recent debates about the present nature of work in the 
labour process debate and describes how issues relating to the managerial re- 
organisation of work in the labour process debate are intrinsically linked to issues 
concerning collective bargaining. Chapter 7 describes the methods used and case- 
studies identified for the study of the research. 
Section 5 outlines the findings of research conducted in four local authorities operating 
quality management policies. Chapter 8 is an authority-by-authority description of the 
findings on key themes through interviews with managers and trade union 
representatives. Chapter 9 and 10 describes the findings of a survey of Unison members 
conducted at the four authorities: chapter 9 providing a description of the survey 
population and chapter 10 describing the opinions on a range of issues relating to 
quality management, work and trade unions. 
In section 6, the theoretical concerns raised in sections 2 and 3 are integrated with the 
empirical findings of section 5 and discussed. In chapter 11 the implications of 
introducing quality management into local government are discussed. in relation to the 
impact on the labour process. Here, the local government labour process is re-assessed 
in light of what aspect of the labour process is attempted to be controlled by quality 
management. Differences emerge according to the strength of the policy being pursued 
-a factor contingent upon the political, demographic, management and industrial 
relations background in each case - and between different types of work in each 
authority. In chapter 12 the impact of quality management is assessed in relation to the 
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position of the trade union. This is assessed in terms of the union's collective 
bargaining relationship with the authority management and in terms of its legitimacy 
with the workers in the local authority. A number of dangers for trade unions are 
highlighted here and some strategic choices are offered regarding unions' possible 
responses to the introduction of quality management. 
Section 11 
Managerialism and Local Government 
CHAPTER 2 
THE RiSE OF MANAGERIALISM IN LoCAL GOVERNMENT 
This section provides the background to the development of quality management in 
local government. In this chapter, the background issues shaping the developments in 
local government are discussed while chapter 4 discusses the' background to the 
'quality' phenomenon'. 
The nature and outcomes of employment changes that are the focus of this thesis have 
been underpinned by a more general shift in the nature of the public sector as a whole. 
Over the past two decades a profound shift has occurred in the way that public services 
are organised. Although there are wider economic factors involved in these changes, the 
manner in which these economic issues haveý been dealt with has been based upon 
discretionary political interests. Amid the general attack upon the legitimacy of the 
welfare state (Mishra 1984) a new consensus has been built, based upon the 
reorganisation of public services on a new 'managenWist' agenda: 
... the transfer, during the last decade or two, of managerialism from private-sector 
corporations to welfare-state services represents the injection of an ideological 'foreign body' 
into a sector previously characterised by quite different traditions of thought. (Pollitt, 1990a: 
p1l) - 
This chapter will define the concept and characteristics of managerialism in local 
government and trace its political origins in the new-right and its implementation by 
successive Conservative governments; and in the creation of a managerialist consensus 
by the political convergence that has occurred by the Labour Party. 
Managerialism 
The term managerialism is, perhaps, a rather broad concept. Indeed, it is not being 
suggested that management per se has not been a concern of all governments and local 
authorities, particularly since the advent of the welfare state itself. The broad concept of 
managerialism being used here is the one defined by Pollitt: 
Managerialism is a set of beliefs and practices, at the core of which bums the seldom-tested 
assumption that better management will prove an effective solvent for a wide range of 
economic and social ills (PoIlitt 1990a: pl) 
Managerialism and Local Government 
Managerialism, for Pollitt, is an ideology underpinned by the belief that social progress 
is obtained through rising productivity; that productivity is achieved through the 
application of technology (including organisational techniques); that to achieve these a 
disciplined workforce is required; that the management of an organisation is the means 
by which this should be achieved and that management is a separate and distinct section 
of the organisation and that, therefore, the management prerogative should be 
unimpinged. As a process it has encompassed the restructuring of state institutions, the 
redefining of relations between institutions. It has involved change implemented 
through direct control and through more subtle means (the use of consultants, advisors 
and the education system as support functions). 
For Pollitt managerialism is deeply flawed through its lack of coherence and realism, 
its impact on power structures and through its very value system. Pollitt's critique is 
based upon his examination of the health and civil services in the UK and the US. 
While this forms a useful basis for an examination of UK local government in this 
study, there are a number of distinctions. Pollitt's analysis is, first, a critique of a 
relatively uniform 'neo-Taylorist' managerialism, whereas what is attempted here is an 
investigation into what Pollitt would term 'culture management'. Second, because local 
government is relatively autonomous of central government (and often exhibiting 
conflicting party political interests) a more complex relationship between the motives 
and outcomes of managerialism is evident. While broadly adhering to Pollitt's 
definition, then, the concept of managerialism used here is a broader one which 
incorporates the broad array of ideological, political, cultural and structural 
relationships that have affected the organisation of public services in the 1990s (Clarke 
and Newman 1997).. 
Pollitt correctly identifies the managerialist agenda as part of the political project of the 
new-right from the 1970s, being put into practice by successive Conservative 
governments in the 1980s and 1990s. In the sphere of local government, however, 
managerialism's increasing legitimacy in the 1990s can also be. traced to an increasing 
incorporation of managerialist ideology within the Labour Party. It is important, then, 
to identify *the origins of both of these trends, as both have informed the agenda within 
local government. 
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Managerialism and the New Right 
The stated agenda of post 1979 government policy on local government has been 
inspired by a number of, often inconsistent, New Right beliefs about the nature of the 
public sector, the 'problem' of organised labour and of their relationship with each 
other. Despite these inconsistencies, there has remained a coherent ideological hostility 
towards organised labour and the (welfare oriented) public sector: the rhetoric being 
'giving managers the right to manage' and 'rolling back thefirontiers ofthe state'. 
a) The New Right 
The New Right consists of elements of conservatism and neo-liberalism leading to 
some of the tensions of its coherence (Gamble 1994). Conservatism, in its own terms, is 
not hostile to the notion of 'the state' - indeed it is in favour of a strong state. It is the 
through the state's authority the prevailing social order may be preserved. Conservatism 
is in favour of free market capitalism and of (moral and fiscal) restraint. Change, for the 
conservative, should be incremental rather than rationalist. Neo-liberalism, in contrast, 
is in favour of a minimalist state, and of individual freedom determined by unfettered 
free market rationality. It is anti-pluralist, and anti-equality. The ambiguity that this 
leaves the new-right in, particularly with regard to the nature and role of the state, can 
be seen in the following passage from Hayek with regard to the problem of how to 
redeploy labour (after WWII): 
There will still be many people who, if they are paid according to what their services will then 
be worth to society, would under any system have to be content with a lowering of their 
material position relative to that of others. 
If, then, the trade unions successfully resist any lowering of the wages of the particular groups 
in question, there will be only two alternatives open: either coercion will have to be used, i. e. 
certain individuals will have to be selýcted for compulsory transfer to other and relatively less 
well paid positions, or those who can no longer be employed at the relatively high wages they 
have earned during the war must be allowed to remain unemployed till they are willing to 
accept work at a relatively lower wage. (Hayek 1944 pp 1534) 
The New Right gained credibility during the economic crises of the 1970s and became 
the 'unofficial' ideology of the Conservative Party from 1979 onwards. The politics of 
the New Right were developed around two main themes. First, by the perceived failures 
and humiliation of the 1970-74 Heath government - back-tracking on the Industrial 
Relations Bill, 'U-turning' on the nationalisation of Rolls-Royce, and the humiliating 
defeat in the 1973 miners strike. Second, by the perceived crisis being faced by the 
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1974-9 Labour government - the breakdown of prices and incomes policies, the 'Winter 
of discontent' and the IMF loan. Political priorities for the incoming Conservative 
administration were, then, 'tarning the unions', curbing inflation, and 'de-nationalising' 
some of the most recently nationalised industries. The Conservatives' economics were 
basically anti-Keynesian; its constituent parts traceable to monetarism, the 'Bacon and 
Eltis thesis', public choice theory and supply-side economics. These will be described 
below. 
The first major influence on Conservative policyý was that of monetarism. Monetarism 
was not 'new', but began to find new adherents following the publication of Milton 
Friedman's 'The role of monetary policy' (1968) which, when viewed retrospectively, 
seemed to offer an explanation to the stagflation of the mid 1970s. Monetarism argued 
that the artificial stimulation of the economy through government deficit financing was 
ultimately doomed to failure. This was due to wage expectations of workers, aided by 
'monopolistic' trade unions, continually forcing the price of labour above the rate of 
productivity: this creating a continuous cycle of inflationary pressure within the 
economy. 
The solution, for monetarists, was for the cycle to be broken. Government was to focus 
exclusively (in terms of economic policy) on ensuring that monetary supply matched 
(and did not exceed) economic growth. Within this zero-sum scenario, people would be 
expected to behave according to 'rational expectations': employers would be curtailed 
from being able to pay the demanded wage increases and inflation would fall; falling 
inflation would then ftirther curtail the demand for wage increases. 
It is clear from the above, that monetarism directly challenged the position of organised 
labour in the economy. In 1979 the new Conservative government aimed to put 
monetarism. to the test and The Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) was 
launched. While the MTFS did not achieve its stated aims (it failed to achieve any of its 
monetary targets and its central role in controlling inflation was doubtful), it did 
achieve an upward shift in the 'long run Phillips curve' (Friedman ibid. ) creating 
significantly higher levels of structural unemployment in the UK economy. 
Monctarism's biggest role in taming organised labour's wage demands through 
6 rational expectations', then, was through more through fear of unemployment than 
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through confidence in price stability. Significantly, however, the MTFS re-introduced 
the balanced budget as a central tenet of economic policy - in piactice meaning the 
fiscal constraint of the public sector. 
Allied to monetarism, at this time, was 'supply-side' economics - meaning the 
emphasis on the problems of labour supply in the economy, to the exclusion of demand. 
A reason given for the monetarist experiment causing, rather than curing, 
unemployment was the rigidity of the labour market. Unions and employment 
regulations created over-employment in some sectors of the economy and kept the price 
of labour artificially high. Unemployment benefits were deemed as being too high, 
proving to be dis-incentives for the unemployed to work. Supply-side economics, then, 
provided the 'economic theory' by which trade unions could be attacked directly. It 
also, in some of its guises, argued for a reduction in the general tax burden. While some 
of this could be considered compatible with monetarist thinking, it often contradicted it. 
Taffer-curve' predictions of optimising government expenditure by reducing direct tax 
rates was bizarely reminiscent of Keynesian deficit financing but found favour in the 
New Right experiment, being clos ely associated with 'Reaganomics' and the 'Lawson 
boom'. 
The Bacon and Eltis thesis (1976), as it became known, was an early economic 
rationale for 'rolling back the frontiers of the state' in the 1980s. Bacon and Eltis, 
beginning with a series of articles in the Times in the early 1970s, developed the theory 
that Britain's economic problem was that the state sector of the economy was 
'crowding out' the more efficient organisations in the private sector, raising the overall 
price of capital and thus lowering levels of investment. The problem, for Bacon and 
Eltis, centred on the 'non-marketable' sector of the state - in practice the various 
institutions of the welfare state. 
Perhaps the most important influence on New Right thinking on the public sector has 
been public choice theory. Public choice suggests that the state acts as an inefficient 
allocator of resources because its decision-making is driven by 'bureau-maximising' 
tendencies within the state who broker political interests competing for resources. This 
is often exacerbated by the electoral cycle whereby macroeconomic policy is geared to 
produce short term reductions in unemployment and taxation, only to manifest 
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themselves later, in reversal and in increased inflation. For public choice, such 
discretionary decision-making powers should be removed from Public bureaucracy and 
political interests and placed within the sphere of consumer sovereignty where 
competition tempers such wasteful behaviour. Public Choice, then, provides the New 
Right with its central rationale for privatisation and deregulation. 
b) Government policy and managerialism 1979-1996 
Seen retrospectively, post 1979 government policy was managerialist in two important 
and intertwined directions. Government policy aimed to shift the scale and scope of the 
state's role in the economy and to change the nature and internal culture of the 
organisations of the state. Managerialism has also been inexorably tied-up with 
government's industrial relations policy as a whole, as will be discussed in chapter 3. 
In the case of the role of government policy in shifting the scale the state activity, key 
policies included direct privatisation - in local government this including tenants' right- 
to-buy of local authority housing and bus privatisation; 'opt-outs' - including Housing 
Action Trusts, grant-maintained status for schools and higher education opt-outs 
through incorporation. The government also displaced local government through the 
setting-up of 'quangos' such as the Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) and 
Training and Enterprise Councils - and Local Enterprise Councils in Scotland. Finally 
the government used compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) as a means by which 
local authority services, would be subject to bids from the private sector. The degree of 
intervention into the affairs of local government by central government over this period 
was almost unprecedented. Table 2: 1 shows the extent of Conservative legislation 
associated with major local government changes. 
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Table 2: 1: Local Government Legislation 1979 - 19951 
Act Significance 
Local Government Planning & Land Act 1980 0 Set Rate Support Grant as central 
government determined amount. 
0 Creation of DSOs and introduction of 
CCT for DSO's 
Local Government (Miscelaneous Provisions - a Allowed Secretary of State to cap local 
Scotland) Act 1981 authority expendeture 
Local Government ... Act 1982 0 
Legitimised grant penalties 
0 Prohibited authorities from levying 
additional rates 
Local Government Finance Act 1982 0 (Part I 11) Set up the Audit Commission 
0 Compelled I-As to monitor specified 
performance targets 
Local Government (interim Provisions) Act 1984 a Set up abolition of metropolitan 
counties 
Rates Act 1984 0 Introduced rate capping 
Local Government Act 1985 * Abolished metropolitan counties 
Local Government Act 1986 0 Curtailed the use of 'political' publicity 
by councils 
Local Government Act 1987 0 Made changes to education finance 
Local Government Finance Act 1987 0 Made changes to the rate support 
grant 
Local Government Act 1988 a introduced Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering 
Local Government Finance Act 1988 Introduced the Community Charge 
(Poll Tax) 
Local Government & Housing Act 1989 (Part 1) Changes to staff recruitment 
Local Government Finance ... Act 1991 
Financial reporting 
Local Government Act 1992 introduced Citizen's Charter 
Local Government Finance Act 1992 Introduced the Council Tax 
Local Government (Wales) Act 1994 Setting up new Unitary Authorities to 
replace County/Districts in Wales 
Local Government etc. Act (Scotland) 1994 Setting up new Unitary Authori 
EEI 
replace Regional/Districts 
In the case of altering the culture of public sector institutions into more 'commercial' 
operations, this has been a more consistent project of the government over the period. It 
was this and denationalisation (not privatisation), which was the stated agenda in the 
Conservative Party manifesto in 1979: 
1 This list covers major legislation affecting local government autonomy and is not exhaustive. Between 1979 and 1994 
210 Acts of Parliament affecting local government were passed (Source: Labour Party: Renewing Democracy, 
Rebuilding Communities WWW source) 
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We will offer to sell back to private ownership the recently nationalized aerospace and 
shipbuilding concerns, giving their employees the opportunity to purchase shares... 
We want to see those industries that remain nationalized running more successfully and we 
will therefore interfere less with their management and set them a clearer financial discipline 
in which to work. (Conservative Party Manifesto 1979) 
Civil Service practice had been identified as ripe for reform since the Fulton Report in 
1968. The New Right agenda that underpinned the 1979 Thatcher government, 
however, aimed more specifically to introduce a more commercial ethos into Civil 
Service working practice to replace the generalist, committee oriented decision-making 
processes that existed. 
The first formal initiative to achieve this was the setting up of the Rayner Scrutinies. 
This ongoing series of investigations aimed to identify the means by which a more 
'business-like' approach could be introduced - Rayner was seconded from Marks and 
Spencer. It resulted in 100,000 Civil Service jobs being lost by 1984 (Elcock 1991). 
This initiative was complemented by the Financial Management Initiative (FMI) for all 
Civil Service departments in 1982, being developed from Michael Heseltine's MINIS 
system. The FMI was designed to restructure departments into a series of cost centres 
from where 'inefficient' practices could be readily identified and eliminated. 
In 1988 the cost centre ethos expanded through the recommendations of the Prime 
Minister's Efficiency Unit (J'he Ibbs Report'). The outcome of Ibbs was the 'Next 
Steps' initiatives which were aimed at splitting each government department into 
executive/policy roles, and functional roles. From this, the principle of allowing core 
government functions_ to be administered by arms-length agencies, through a formal 
contract relationship, came into being and it became possible for core functions of the 
state to be offered for private sector involvement through 'market-testing'. 
While these initiatives did not pass through the Civil Service without internal 
resistance, it was not faced with party political opposition from the controlling 
hierarchy of the organisations being 'reformed' - as was often the case with local 
authorities. The means by which the government attempted to force its 'cultural 
changes' onto the operation of local government were often tied up with its general 
state restructuring programme. This was often crude and opportunist - as was the case 
with the abolition of the GLC and Metropolitan Councils in 1986. The other means it 
used, however, was through the use of proxy measures whose effects were incremental. 
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They included the setting up of arms-length institutions such as the Audit Commission 
(and the Accounts Commission in Scotland) in 1983 with a remit of monitoring the 
financial performance of local authorities and health authorities. Other financial 
constraints imposed by central government included ratecapping - whereby local 
government spending was given a ceiling regardless of local preferences; the re- 
allocation of rate support grants; and by the imposition of financial ring-fencing in 
areas where responsibilities were transferred from central government to local 
government (e. g. Care in the Community). All of these measures had the effect of 
removing the scope for policy discretion from local authorities, which in itself is a 
managerialist objective: to re-focus the agenda of the organisation away from what the 
organisation does in favour of how it does it. 
This agenda was to have been completed with the Community Charge (Poll Tax) in 
1988. The Poll Tax aimed to replace the property based local taxation that funded local 
government with a flat rate taxation levied on all residents in the borough. It would 
thus, it was assumed, focus local voters' minds as to the spending activities of local 
authorities. It was, of course withdrawn in 1992 after great unpopularity, organised 
opposition and non-payment made the whole system untenable. 
In terms of changing the 'culture' of local government, probably the most significant 
influence throughout the 1980s and 1990s has been CCT. Initially touted in the 1980 
Local Government Planning and Land Act, CCT forced local authorities to re-organise 
the various intermeshed functions into distinct purchaser and provider units in order 
that the provider functions could be tendered for private bids. The principle was partly 
based on orthodox New Right economics of the inherent efficiency savings that could 
be gained by competition, but also on some newer economic theory based on hybrid 
organisational forms of 'quasi-markets' (LeGrand 1990). It also had private sector 
precedent in the 1980s, however, in the form of large organisations opting to but-source 
previously in-house functions to lower paying sub-contractors - often greatly eased 
where they held monopsony power over contractors. In CCT, purchaser discretion was 
substituted with guidelines (ultimately to the Secretary of State's own definition) 
prohibiting contract selection on any basis other than cost. 
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Figure 2: 1: New-Right Influences on Managerialism 
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C) Managerialism and the new suburban right 
-- 
The New Right push for managerialism did not come exclusively from central 
government. It was assisted with the help of Conservative 'flagship' authorities keen to 
display how the implied models could work when actually promoted at the local level. 
Such authorities have been described by Holiday (1991) as 'New Suburban Right' 
(NSR) authorities. The NSR, for Holiday, has been more of a tendency than a formal 
grouping, holding coherence through a general adherence to 'value for money', the 
minimalist state and anti-socialist rhetoric; tending to be populist and dogmatic in their 
politics; and promoting' the values of 'individual responsibility', the 'creative 
competitor' and 'necessary diversity' (inequality). Such a definition should not be taken 
to imply that the NSR represented any challenge to standard municipal Tory values - 
the protection of vested property interests through the use of sectarian and racist 
symbolic politics (Butcher et al 1990). The NSR definition does, however, provide a 
usefull distinction made by explicitly 'Thatcherite' local authorities. The most notable 
example of these NSR authorities has been Wandsworth and Westminster in London, 
but has also included Kent County Council during the 1980s (Holiday ibid. ), Bradford 
for a brief spell and Brent between 1990 and 1996. In all of these cases a positive 
attitude to out-sourcing public services was pursued, along with the aim of keeping 
local taxation to a minimum. 
Managerialism and the Left 
It has been the job of New Labour's architects to translate their understanding of the 
customer into offerings he or she was willing to pay for. "And then, and only then, to 
convey to potential customers the attributes of that offering through all the different 
components that make up a successsful brand - product positioning, packaging, advertising 
and communications. Politics is no different. " (Peter Mandelson on New Labour. Guardian 
30 April 1998) 
The rationale for local government restructuring and reform has not been exclusively 
from the political right. There has been a marked shift in the language and policy of the 
left throughout the 1980s towards what could be viewed as tacit support for much of the 
new-right agenda. This is manifested in three ways. First, following a series of political 
defeats, municipal socialism and the 'new urban left' (NUL) agenda went into retreat, 
creating a vacuum of ideas. Second, there was a corresponding growth in influence of 
spost-left' type politics and debates within Labour Party circles - primarily those 
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associated with 'post-Fordism'. Third, from the Labour Party at the national level, there 
was an increasing desire to distance the Party from the NT-JL for electoral reasons. 
a) Managerialism and the New Urban Left 
The first factor, the retreat from (and of) the NUL should be seen in the context of its 
own ascendancy. The NUL grew in the mid to late 1970s out of frustration with the 
complacency of the local Labour Party. Invigorated by many of the new social 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s, activists aimed to challenge local fiefdoms and 
open up local government (Livingstone 1987; Lansley, et al 1989). The NUL 
comprised of an array of left activists; communitarians, women's groups, black activists 
and gay activists, to Trotskyists - particularly Militant, Socialist Organiser, and 
umbrella groups such as London Labour Briefing. Initial activities of the NUL were in 
inner London - and particularly Lambeth - but this spread after the success of the late 
1970s to a large number of councils, including the GLC itself, most of the urban county 
councils; urban districts such as Liverpool, Sheffield, Lothian, Manchester, Bradford, 
St. Helens; and district councils such as Bristol, Basildon, Leicester, Norwich, Brighton 
and Southampton (Lansley et al ibid. ). The NUL, as a coalition of factions and 
interests, did not have a coherent programme per se although there was broad 
agreement on core issues. Along with mainstream socialist concerns about poverty, 
class, worker and trade union issues, the NUL put more emphasis on issues such as 
anti-racism, anti-sexism, gay rights, attacking bureaucracy and of single-issue themes 
such as environmentalism and the anti-nuclear movement. 
The retreat of the NUL occurred partly as a result of the inevitable conflict with central 
government - and in particular, of how the NUL responded, and partly as a result of the 
ambiguous nature of the reforms that were being attempted. The conflict between the 
NUL and the Thatcher government has been well documented resulting, variously, in 
ratecapping, surcharging and abolition. 
During this period, NUL councils were often faced with resistance from council trade 
unions and this, to some extent, highlighted some of the ambiguous nature of the 
reforms being implemented. Conflict occurred here for three main reasons (Heery 
1987). First, the unions were likely to be strong in the areas where the NUL were also 
strong. Second, financial pressure forced by government was forcing NUL councils to 
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cut staff, and/or wages. Ironically, because NUL councils tended to have promoted 
more favourable conditions, the effects tended to be worse - causing conflict. Third, 
many of the organisational innovations pursued by NUL councils challenged existing 
working practices. 
Inevitably the uneasy coalitions that made up the NTJL began to subside once their 
initial objectives were achieved. Facing direct confrontation with the Government often 
tested these alliances, as did tactics and priorities when faced with budgetary decisions 
of their own. The rump of the NUL ceased to be a coherent entity by the 1990s. The 
key protagonists had either moved into national politics (e. g. Livingstone, Corbyn, 
Blunkett), single issue politics, or left the scene. Some remained, with newer 'post-left' 
activists and retained only a small element of the NUL agenda - and often only its 
rhetoric. Anti-racism and anti-sexism - at the time vilified by national press - became 
equal opportunities (in the workplace) and was seen as good management practice even 
in the private sector. Anti-racism and anti-sexism in housing and education became 
issues of equity and easily became a management issue when tied-up with the use of 
performance evaluation. Management, then, has come to be seen as more of an ally to 
the post-NUL agenda than have the trade unions. 
b) The Post Fordist agenda 
The Post-Fordist agenda was popularised through the journal Marxism Today from the 
mid to late 1980s up to its final demise in 19911. Marxism Today had long been seen as 
part of the wider influences on left Labour Party thinking. Post-Fordism basically 
asserts that, through the total transformation of the global production regime, the nature 
of organisations, economics and politics have also been transformed. While there 
remain, sometimes fiercely contested, distinctions between specific models of 
regulationism, and Post Fordism (Hirst & Zietlin 1991) the post-Fordist analysis is 
derived from merging the regulationism associated with Michel Aglietta and Piore and 
Sabel's flexible specialisation. 
Drawing from regulationist analyses of capitalist development (Aglietta 1979), the Post 
Fordist assertion is that the present socio-economic condition has been arrived at 
2 Key figures within Marxism Today have since formed Demos, an 'independent', 'Post-left' think-tank advising, among 
others, the Labour Party on social policy matters. 
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through a paradigmatic shift to the structure of the regime of accumulation. Rooted in 
Marxism, regulationism defines the socio-economic structure as being based in the 
regime of accumulation which is tied directly to a mode of regulation which evolves as 
a means by which to contain structural contradictions inherent in capitalist 
development. The Fordist mode of regulation emerged as the response to crises at the 
early part of the twentieth century and developed into its 'golden age of intensive 
accumulation' (DeVroey 1987) following world war two. Fordism required mass 
production, a Taylorised labour process for the organisation of work, managed mass 
consumption to accommodate growth, and managed international macroeconomic 
regulation - with the US economy as its vanguard. The regulationists, assert that during 
the 1970s this entire structure had reached a terminal crisis through the internal 
contradictions upon which it was founded. The point of departure with Post Fordism 
from regulationism, however, is that the regulationists defined the response to the crisis 
of Fordism as remaining based upon an antagonistic class relationship: 
Capitalism can escape from its contemporary organic crisis only by generating a new 
cohesion, a Neo-Fordism. This cohesion must be compatible with the wage relation, the 
principle of invariance of the capitalist mode of production. (Aglietta 1979 pp385) 
Post Fordism, in contrast, assimilates the regulationist interpretation of the crisis of 
Fordism, yet removes the underlying basis for the crisis. It is strongly implied, then, 
that a Post Fordist condition has been arrived at, that the condition is stable and 
developing and that the condition has certain characteristics that mitigate against the 
adoption of Fordist strategies of regulation, politics and economic management. 
The nature of Post Fordism is defined by the incorporation of flexible specialisation 
(Piore and Sabel 1984) as the core model of regulation. Piore and Sabel found 
6exceptional success' in the "re-emergence of the craft paradigm amidst the crisis [of 
mass production]"(ibid. p205) Evidence for this was found in the 'Third Italy', the 
Salzburg area of Austria and the Baden-Wurtemberg area of Germany. Piore and Sabel 
argued that whilst satisfying luxury niche markets was an historically familiar pattern in 
unstable economic times the present shift represented, through chance, a more 
successful industrial paradigm than mass production: 
This model stands the regnant paradigm of production on its head. Dominant sectors of the 
established system were subordinated, subordinate ones dominated. As in any revolution, it 
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was the reversal of roles - and the revelation of surprises in familiar structures - that disconcerted participants and observers. (ibid. p206) 
The emergence of this new paradigm is not, it is claimed, temporary; it is the emerging 
dominant paradigm. The information technology revolution has facilitated the creation 
of flexible manufacturing systems which favour short-run production. Here, job shops 
will be automatic, design will be integrated with manufacturing systems and product 
life cycles will be shorter. Furthermore, technology is seen as being able to 
revolutionise work itself: 
The advent of the computer restores human control over the production process; machinery 
again is subordinated to the operator. (ibid. p261) 
There are four core 'faces' to what Piore and Sabel admit to be a hazily mapped-out 
flexible specialisation future. Its first guise is in the form of regional conglomeration 
whereby regions are bound as a combine of similar sized firms working in competition 
and co-operation with each other using binding local institutions such as guilds, 
affiliations, unions and co-operatives. Evidence form Tuscany is cited where the locally 
strong Communist controlled unions were aligning with local entrepreneurs. The 
second 'face' of flexible specialisation is in the creation of 'federated enterprises' on 
the interlocking directorship model not dissimilar to the Japanese keiretsu. The third 
and fourth 'faces' are concerned with the vertical structure of firms. Piore and Sabel 
propose 'solar' firms and 'workshop factories' whereby a network of workshop 
specialist suppliers operate as partners or collaborators in ventures with core businesses 
and are able to share the benefits of welfare services offered to core workers of the main 
business. 
Piore and Sabel's flexible future is characterised by new forms of regulation: firstly, as 
its name implies, it is about flexibility and specialisation - the flexibility in production 
allows specialism in the product; secondly it is characterised by limited entry so as to 
ensure cohesion; thirdly it is characterised by a consensus encouraging competition and 
innovation; and fourthly it also needs to place lirhits on competition so as wage and 
price competition do not break the consensus down. 
Regulationism remains an influential model in its'own right and some care needs to be 
made not to confuse some regulationist definitions of Neo-Fordism. and Post-Fordism 
with the Marxism Today variety. However, The broad Post-Fordist synthesis of 
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regulationism and flexible specialisation uses a determinist logic to assert what was 
intended to be a heuristic model for what is essentially, a pluralist model of industrial 
democracy. In doing this, all forms of economic and political organisation associated as 
being Tordist' become inappropriate. Murray makes the distinction between the two 
epochs' clear. Fordism. was marked by 
... its commitment to scale and the standard product (whether it is a Mars bar or an episode 
of Dallas); by authoritarian relations, centralised planning, and a rigid organisation built 
round exclusive job descriptions. (Murray 1988 p9) 
Fordism was consistently challenged, Murray asserts, through the mass party and on the 
shop floor. Post-Fordism, however, is different: 
In Post-Fordism, the worker is designed to act as a computer as well as a machine. (ibid. 
p1l) 
In line with the logic of regulationism Post-Fordism asserts the need to react to the 
change in production appropriately. An interpretation of Gramscian strategy is used 
here; what is needed is a 'war of position' not a 'war of manoeuvre'. Because Fordist 
forms of political participation are anachronistic in Post-Fordist 'new times' what is 
needed is adaptation: 
What is needed is for the labour movement to shift the whole focus of policy, from money 
and markets to production ... it is the way in which the labour movement addresses 
restructuring which should be at the centre of economic debate. (Murray 1989 p57) 
Post-Fordist production is marked by flexible specialisation in the work-place which 
manifests itself in new consumption patterns, it is alleged. The market is now deemed 
to be determined by product diversity, style and quality and people's identity is shaped 
now by fragmented group allegiances and not by class or other work-based group 
allegiances. Because Fordism. determined the political strategies for both right and left 
(Taylorism, the mass political party, class politics, the large bureaucratic state), Post- 
Fordism. determines the nature of political strategies in the present (the politics of 
identity, consumerism, niche markets, flexibility). It is this rationale which allows the 
protagonists of Post-Fordism to assert that 'Thatcherism' was a new-right response to 
the Post-Fordist condition. The 'old left' in the Labour Party and trade unions were 
seen as inappropriately clinging to a strategy based upon an extinct battleground. 
The empirical validity of the Fordist/Post-Fordist dichotomy (including the Piore and 
Sabel mass production/flexible specialisation variant) has been subject to lengthy 
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criticism (Williams et al 1987; Clarke 1990; Sayer 1989) and this is again endorsed 
here. 
The critique of Post-Fordism is based upon its credibility both theoreticaly and 
empiricaly. Regulationism, has a strong tendency to be teleological. Because capitalist 
development is packaged into rigid regimes of accumulation/modes of regulation, 
historical events are retrospectively fitted into these periods as factors of that regime. In 
this scenario all events which may be reactions against, such a regime are seen to be part 
of the regime (Bonefield 1987). Here, then, mass collective action is seen as 'part of the 
problem' rather than a reaction to it. The model is also technologically determinist 
(ibid). Technology is seen as independent, objective and inevitable rather than being 
shaped by the social relations in which the particular technology is developed and how 
it is applied. This is particularly the case with flexible specialisation Williams et al 
1987). Here, while the human aspects of resistance are seen as being captured by the 
system, technology is seen as somehow being able to develop outside these constraints 
and, further, be partly responsible for the 'crisis'. 
Apart from these methodological problems Post Fordism is problematic empirically as 
well. Part of the acusation of tautology stems from the unclear empirical distinctions 
between Fordism and Post-Fordism. Even in the 'golden years' of Fordism flow-line 
production employed a minority of the work-force (Sayer op cit). Conversely, 1990s the 
just-in-time production line is arguably hyper-Fordist, rather than 'post' Fordist. Henry 
Ford's vision of Fordism was certainly not its outcome. If Ford's model of production 
was a very crude model of mass production then it was superseded by the innovations 
involved in 'Sloanism' associated with General Motors (Clarke op cit. ) whereby variety 
was added to the mass production paradigm. Even here, however, the caricature of 
Fordism underestimates the 'flexibility' that Ford placed within his production regime 
(Williams et al 1992). This further highlights the teleological nature of Post Fordism: 
no empirical criteria are used to discern between Fordist and Post Fordist production 
regimes, as Williams et al (1987) note 
Piore and Sabel provide no criteria for discriminating between fundamental difference and 
trivial styling variation which they admit is commonplace in both flexible specialisation and 
mass-production. (Williams et al 1987 p416) 
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In terms of indfistrial relations the Fordist regulation systems were also not uniform 
over time and place. Perhaps Aglietta may be excused on the time factor, as the period 
of Henry Ford's staunch opposition to unions could be placed in his transitional phase 
of extensive accumulation. This is not the case for location, though: industrial relations 
systems, internationally, were as different as state responses to trade unions; as different 
as the patterns of development in different countries were; and as different as the 
political outlooks and strategies of the differing labour movement were in different 
countries (Hyman 1989). Definitions of Fordist/Post-Fordist production regimes, then, 
are based upon retrospectively fitting the empirical reality of a particular workplace 
within the historically predetermined mode of regulation. No matter that ownership and 
control patterns of automotive producers - not to mention product range - seems to be 
ever diminishing in the 1990s; or that the increasing dominance of global brands 
(McDonalds, Nike, Coca Cola) seems to contradict the notion of flexible specialisation. 
As Clarke notes: 
The model of Post-Fordism merely concatenates a number of superficial observations of 
contemporary society without specifying the theoretical relation between the various 
elements of the supposed Post-Fordist regime, let alone subjecting them to any critical 
examination. (Clarke op cit p75) 
The important point here, then, is that there seems to be no conclusive evidence that we 
are currently in a transition phase to the end of mass-production. The distinction being 
made between Fordist and Post-Fordist production and consumption patterns, is largely 
a matter of definition. More importantly than this however is that, as a political project, 
how desirable is Post-Fordism? As Clarke notes, such a strategy 
.;. retains the worst elements of the old industrial strategy in providing indiscriminate 
subsidies to capitalist enterprises, while abandoning any commitment to the social- 
democratic principles of central coordination and political accountability. (Clarke op cit p79) 
The relevant issue here is the prevailing influence of the post-Fordist models on 
contemporary mainstream Labour Party thinking and the likely effect of this influence. 
In its final issue, Marxism Today published its Manifestofor the Public Sector in 1991. 
In it, through the logic the Post-Fordist guiding principles, it argued for the 
restructuring of the welfare state. This included more private/public partnerships, more 
out-sourcing of non-st 
' 
andard, services and, in tones reminiscent of the 1979 
Conservative Manifesto, it argued for more effective management: 
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Strategic management, to develop a service, needs to be distinguished from operation 
management of the day-to-day service. Decisions about policy goals and the regulatory 
framework for a service should be separated from detailed decisions about its provision 
(Marxism Today May 1991 p20) 
It ftu-ther called for increased monitoring of public service provision - aided by more 
performance indicators; for the enhancement of internal markets accompanied with a 
'disaggregation of the state' - on the grounds that it would be in line with current 
successftil private sector out-sourcing trends. Many of these recommendations have 
been subsequently adopted, in principle, by New Labour. 
C) New Labour 
South London's best established example of the competitive spirit in local government is in 
[Labour controlled] Lewisham' (FT 8/1/96) 
Concerted efforts have been made to lose the 'loony-left' image associated with the 
New-Urban-Left agenda of the 1980s. As early as 1987 the national party was'making 
strenuous efforts to dissociate itself from, and condemn, the activities of the 'loony left' 
for fear of the electoral backlash against the party in a general election (Goodwin 
1992). Following the ascendancy of Blair to the Party leadership, however, the shift in 
the agenda switched from reactive to pro-active. 'New Labour' now wishes to be seen 
as the financially responsible party and has embraced the concept of consumer rights as 
a key focus of local governance. Issues such as equity, consumer rights - remnants of 
number of policies pursued in 1980s 
It is widely accepted that it was Labour which provided the idea of Tharterism' that 
the Conservatives based the Citizen's Charter on 3. In Labour's discussion document on 
the setting up of a 'Quality Commission' it is recommended that: 
[R]esidents will receive customer contracts setting out the standard of service to expect; when 
and how the service will be delivered; meaningful figures on how much the service costs; 
what to do and who to contact if things go wrong; a firm timetable and procedure for dealing 
with complaints and, where appropriate, paying compensation. (Labour Party 199 1: p3) 
As will be seen, this 'new public management' is wholly compatible with the content of 
trends in 'culture management' in the private sector - particularly TQM. Labour also 
supports the use of certain proxy measures to maintain some forms of external control 
over local authorities. While Labour remains opposed to CCT, it does favour the 
tendering process and market testing in some areas of public service provision. It also 
For example York City Council's 'Quality Street' initiative 
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now favours broadening the remit of the Audit Commission (and Accounts 
Commission in Scotland) to areas beyond mere financial accountability: 
... we 
believe that the Commission's duties should extend beyond ensuring value for money. 
We envisage a new, more dynamic role in promoting quality and levering up the standards in 
Scottish local government, with greater emphasis on promoting best practice. (Scottish Labour 
Party 1996, p14) 
Fig. 2: 2: Managerialism and the Labour Party 
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Managerialism and the 'post New Urban Left' 
Three of the "loony left" councils so often casti-ated by the Conscrvatives are to be awarded 
John Major's highest accolade for efficiency and outstanding public service, the charter mark 
(Guardian 27/11/95 
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'Post New Urban Left' refers, here, to those Labour authorities running the former NUL 
councils of the 1980s. It is not being asserted that there is a 'ideas vacuum' here, rather 
that the agenda being pursued, with some variations in style, is managerialist. For the 
most part the service outputs of such policies remain uncontentious (the above press 
cutting probably best exemplifies this). In at least one case, however, the post-NUL 
agenda has provoked controversy: Walsall. Walsall provoked attention through the 
intention of the incumbent Labour administration to restructure the entire council with 
the style and rhetoric reminiscent of NSR Wandsworth: 
Local Government in a lot of instances fails to meet the needs of its local citizens. We aim to 
change all that. We've dismantled it. Gone is the bureaucracy, hierarchy, ivory towers. And in 
its place there are going to be 55 neighbourhoods, all to be run by local people controlling 
their own budgets. Some might say this is radical. We see it as the way forward (Walsall 
MBC Advertisement August 1995) 
Part of this 'radical' agenda was significant staff reductions and redeployment. This 
inevitably provoked hostility and then direct opposition from council unions. The 
controversy was picked up on by the Conservatives who asserted the return of the 
'loony left. Ultimately the Labour Party NEC reigned-in the Walsall local party. This 
was somewhat ironic, as the following observation makes clear: 
... if [the Labour Group leader] and his allies had had no previous association with the Labour left, and had dressed in sharp suits and hired a public relations firm, they could have sold their 
policies as an act of ultra-Blairite modernisations (Observer 15/8/95) 
Summary: Managerialism and Local Government in the 1990s 
The combination of the general political trends discussed here produce a backdrop by 
which local government management practice in the 1990s should be viewed. Effective 
and efficient management of resources is now seen as a substitute for policy discretion: 
how well services are delivered are increasingly being seen as the issue by which an 
administration can be judged, rather than what level (or the quantity) of services are to 
be delivered (Gray & Jenkins 1993). Local authorities have been seeking-out better 
m eans of achieving these limited goals under a financial regime of shrinking budgets. 
While the rhetorical justifications for this broad shift has varied from giving local tax- 
payers more value for money, to empowering consumers, to 'living within our means'. 
the consistent element throughout has been the taming of labour. The assumption 
within the managerialist conception of the public sector is that public sector workers 
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cannot be trusted because of their monopoly power. Public service professionals are 
viewed suspiciously as seeking to maximise status and preserving sectional interests at 
the expense of the public good and unionised blue and white collar workers are seen as 
protecting vested interests in the form of labour market rigidities, again, against the 
common interest. 
The managerialist solution to these problems has been based upon two assumptions. 
First, it is assumed that the public sector can be remodelled to simulate market 
conditions. A consistent policy trend here has been a continuous agenda of introducing 
increasing levels of labour market insecurity into public sector employment. CCT has 
been crucial here. In labour-intensive areas of public service dealing with merit goods, 
this has enabled private-sector contractors to use wages and conditions of employment 
as the easiest input variable to bid against local authority Direct Service Organisations 
(DSO's) as Crabbe (1992) has demonstrated. %ile employment protection through the 
European Aquired Right Directive, in the form of Transfer of Undertakings (Protection 
of Employment) (TUPE) has provided some protection on this, the general effect of 
CCT has been to legitimise the downward pressure on wages and conditions in effected 
services - even where contracts have remained in-house. These issues will 
be discussed 
further in chapters 4 and 5. A second major assumption in the managerialist agenda has 
been that while it is apparently impossible to entrust the organisation of public services 
to the influence of public sector. trade unions and the vested interests of public service 
professionals, the newly empowered managerial class are apparently to be seen as being 
neutral and rational. It aiso implies that this new cadre of managers will necessarily 
wish to develop different types of management practice into place into the public 
sector. Given the origins and agenda of managerialism, such new methods are 
increasingly likely to be those which have gained credibility in their use in the private 
sector. This is where the interest in quality and in quality management has come in and 
this is the subject of chapter 3. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE QUALITY PHENOMENON AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
The previous chapter examined the background political issues that have underpinned 
changes to local government in the 1980s and 1990s. This chapter will describe the 
quality management phenomenon. It will examine its origins in private sector 
management and highlight the influences of Taylorism, 'Japanisation', the quality 
gurus and TQM. It will then outline the managerialist drive for importing quality 
management into local government and examine the effect to which this adoption has 
taken place. The content of quality management and the workplace implications arising 
from this will be more fully examined in chapter S. The purpose here is to examine the 
rationale, from a management point of view, for importing quality management into 
local government. 
The Origins and Development of Quality Management 
The term quality management is being used here to encompass a number of disparate 
management methodologies dealing with the broad issue of quality. While these 
methodologies vary by their origins, approaches and methods, style and dependent 
prerequisites, they are unified, however, by a number of key factors. Firstly, they are all 
rooted in unitarist conceptions of management control of the organisation. Second, and 
rather obviously, they are all concerned with the issue of quality. Third, they have all 
been developed around the private-sector organisation, and primarily the private sector 
manufacturing organisation. 
While quality became a particularly prominent theme for management in the 1980s, 
quality has always been a concern for management in one form or another. The recent 
growth in the prominence of quality could partly be attributed to the superficial value of 
its marketing potential within a commercial environment where corporate image has 
become increasingly important. This may be underestimating the nature of quality 
management but, even if this is an important motivator in its take-up, as a consequence 
has been an attempt to re-define quality within the language and ideology of consumer 
sovereignty (Tuckman 1995). In the name of quality, major re-definitions of 
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organisational structure, working methods and employee relationships have been 
justified (this issue will be discussed fin-ther in chapter 5). 
The development of quality management has been, if not linear, then through a series of 
progressive stages (Legge 1995; Dale et al 1990): from quality being based upon 
reactive inspection-based methods, to the use of process control methods based upon 
in-process monitoring, to the use of statistical process control (SPQ methods to predict 
and prevent non-conformance, to holistic TQM approaches, with its focus on 'culture'. 
a) Taylorism and quality 
While quality per se was not a specific concern for Taylor, it was an issue in that 
quality affected output and it was an issue of control. Quality control really became an 
organisational concern with the application of Taylorist scientific management in 
flowline production. Taylor's approach to work organisation centred around the sub- 
division of labour into discrete tasks and, as such, its application on the mass 
production assembly-line was through the departmentalisation of the quality control 
function. Inspection departments were delegated responsibility for verifying in-process 
product quality through patrol inspection personnel and through the use of statistical 
sampling plans. 
The advent of market saturation in an increasing number of industries led, however, to 
an increased focus by organisations on product differentiation and of brand loyalty. In 
addition, the issue of quality was also increasingly seen to have productivity 
implications: quality problems at one stage of a manufacturing process cause delays in 
production in downstream manufacturing operations. Improving quality could therefore 
be seen as a means by which to increase revenues and reduce costs. In this climate, 
crude departmentalist solutions to the issue of quality and productivity were 
increasingly being seen as ineffective and alternative approaches were being sought. 
While Taylorism is often used to symbolise the way in which management used to 
operate, in opposition to the best practices of newer forms of management, Taylorist 
logic still forms the basis of most quality management now (this will be further 
discussed in chapter 5). An example of this can be found in the popularity of the BS 
5750. ISO 9000 quality system standard approach to quality in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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b) The Influence of Japan 
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In the 1970s and 1980s, the way in which the above issues needed to be addressed were 
increasingly being influenced by 'the Japanese economic miracle'. From the 1970s 
Western industry was facing increasing pressure from macro-economic crises, falling 
demand through market saturation and an undermining of market share in domestic and 
foreign markets to non-UK based competition. Although the causes of this were often 
complex, one solution was seen to be for Western management to search for the 
formula used by successful competitors. The most spectacular success, at this time, was 
to be seen in Japan. Interest was related to the comparative superior performance of 
Japanese industry in general, and the Japanese motor industry in particular. This 
success was, to a greater or lesser extent, attributed to the development of just-in-time 
(JIT) in Japan. Through the impact of its apparent success, interest in Japanese methods 
had initially seen JIT as an inventory policy: as a move to achieve the performance of 
the Japanese, JIT was heralded as a tactical operational tool to improve stock-turns. 
This had followed interest in other elements such as quality circles in the 1970s. This 
emphasis shifted into one of seeing JIT as part of a more holistic management system. 
In this holistic form, Japanese management has been seen as capable of integrating 
operational issues such as inventory control, quality assurance and work design with 
strategic issues such as product development, supplier co-ordination and demand 
management through the use of heightened interdepenoency created by the removal of 
buffers throughout the prod! iction system. The aim here, then, is creating customer- 
supplier chains within as well as hetween organisations. This factor is important as it 
highlights an important structural difference between Japanese industry and their 
western counterparts: the Japanese management model utilises net dependency more 
effectively (Oliver 1991; Oliver & Wilkinson 1992). This has meant an enhanced 
ability of Japanese companies to maintain control over external suppliers in a manner 
that was at least as effective as controlling its internal operations. So JIT seemed to 
offer the possibility of being able to outsource certain operations while guaranteeing 
quality and maintaining a greater degree of pressure on prices. Here, then, quality is 
tied to the inter-organisational relationships. In turn quality and cost do not trade off 
directly because quality can be maintained through contract arrangements with 
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suppliers, yet these suppliers are also removed from the higher wages (including the 
4 social wage') paid to workers at core manufacturer (Kaplinski 1988). 
Interest in wishing to emulate Japanese methods into UK companies was boosted by the 
increasing penetration of Japanese transplants into the UK economy in the 1980s, 
coupled with the associated impact that this had on UK supplier companies and 
domestic competitors (Ackroyd 1988; Garrahan & Stewart 1992; Oliver & Wilkinson 
op cit. ). Having a model to control suppliers (in terms of quality and prices) has led to 
great increases in outsourcing in the European and North American motor industries 
(EIU 1990). Although the phenomenon of 'Japanisation' (Oliver & Wilkinson op cit.; 
Ackroyd op. cit. ) is largely confined to the motor industry, and even here it has been 
uneven, the scale and size of this industry remains an important influence on 
management trends as a whole. Outsourcing, on the same basic model as this, became 
the basic managerialist justification for compulsory competitive tendering in the public 
sector in the 1980s. 
C) The Quality Gurus 
Another important influence on the increasing importancd played by quality as a 
management issue was through the prescriptive remedies to industrial decline offered 
by the so called 'quality gurus'. Though, in the main, these gurus are consultants, each 
with their somewhat sycophantic 'disciples' and adherents, they have also been very 
influential within management circles. Arguably the influence of the quality gurus was 
due to the ýyork conducted in Japan in the immediate post war period, although viewed 
retrospectively during the period of Japanese industrial pre-eminence in the 1970s and 
1980s. 
The quality gurus made significant redefinitions of quality. The stated intention of their 
endeavour was to demystify the concept so as to provide a rational definition that could 
be used by management. The basic redefinition was that the quality of a good or service 
was the totality of features that a paying customer considers to be appropriate for their 
needs - at the price offered. Quality, itself, is defined as 'fitness for purpose' as defined 
by the customer. It comprises of positive and negative features (Juran 1988); th6 
positive being the features that a customer likes about a product and the negative being 
the features with which the customer has been disappointed. The function of 
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management is to, first, eliminate all the negative quality features, and then strive to 
enhance positive quality. Negative quality, or defects, could be seen as waste and, as 
such, improving quality becomes a cost-saving exercise (Deming 1986; Crosby 1979). 
Similarly, achieving higher positive quality could be seen as adding value to a product. 
The enhancement of quality within a product or service can be seen, thus, as an 
enhancement of value for money - which is fully in line with the 3Es philosophy being 
pursued in the public sector as a whole. 
Probably the most influential quality guru is Deming. Deming began his career as a 
statistician and moved into the area of quality control as an advisor in the US 
armaments industry during VAVIL After the war he was sent by the US Government to 
advise Japanese companies involved in re-industrialisation. Deming proved influential 
in this and is still recognised in Japan through 'Deming Awards' awarded to companies 
for quality. Deming's themes, as is the case with most of the quality gurus are 
articulated in the form of a set of core rules, commandments, or in this case 'fourteen 
points'. Deming's points, in summary, focus on the need for management leadership 
and commitment to the quality cause, and of the key importance of measurement - and 
particularly of the use of Statistical Process Control (SPQ as the tools by which 
management should achieve quality. There are 'Deming Associations' world-wide, 
including a British Deming Association. 
Juran is almost as well known as Deming and shares some similarities. Like Deming, 
Juran was also sent to Japan as an advisor after W. W. 11, returning to the US to advise 
US Corporations. Juran's main points are the importance of management (again) and in 
the importance of clear proceduralised systems by which roles and responsibilities can 
be distinguished. 
Crosby, being later to start but being the first to be widely known as a guru, stressed, as 
his main focus, the importance of employee awareness and management's role of 
transmitting the quality message in a unified fashion. 
A number of other names could possibly be included in a list of quality gurus (Taguchi 
for example), and there are still other influential management consultants gurus (Peters, 
for example) whose status in this area probably blurs with those of the quality. 
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Some differences and disagreements between the quality 'gurus' have been summarised 
by Oakland (1989) The Deming style, for example, is very much a missionary 
approach, focusing on the 'cultural' prerequisites of leadership and commitment, but 
with a strong focus on monitoring and measurement. Juran's approach is more system- 
oriented; management's primary role is to- provide the framework and procedures by 
which quality can be built into. Crosby's approach is a step-by-step programme, while 
Taguchi is concerned chiefly with methods. It also seems that there could be some 
differences in emphasis which seem to signal disagreement. For example, all versions 
emphasise the importance of employee motivation but differ in their approach: some 
(Juran/Crosby) favour the rewarding of quality achievements while others (Deming) 
feel this is divisive; some feel that a quality programme should be widely publicised 
through a 'zero defects day' (Crosby) while others warn against the use of 
4sloganeering' (Deming). Some stress the importance of single-sourcing external 
supplies to achieve maximum co-operation and 'constancy of purpose' (Deming), while 
others stress the importance of being able to select the best sources through competition 
(Juran). Despite some of these apparent differences and inconsistencies, however, it is 
the assumptions and assertions made by the gurus which have been incorporated into 
the more generic quality management models of the 1980s and 1990s. 
d) Total Quality Management (TQM) 
Inspired by the quality gurus and by their perceived role in Japanese management 
development, TQM, despite the arrival of newer concepts such as 'best-practice 
benchmarking' and 'business process re-engineering', probably remains the most 
influential of the quality models in use at present. In some quarters it has been seen as 
'faddish', yet it is the subject, now, of a number of dedicated journals and 
consultancies. By the 1990s, as 'quality' became the management issue to be 
proactively sponsored by government (DTI 1991a; b; c; d; e; f), TQM became the model 
of quality management 'best practice' for management: 
... [the] DTI promotes Total Quality Management, emphasising Management Best Practice as 
appropriate within each British company rather than allegiance to a single guru. (DTI 1991a 
pl) 
TQM is a holistic management methodology and has been defined as being the 
integration of the 'hard' performance based management approach with the 'soft' 
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HRM-type approach (Legge 1995), or as a mechanism that can be understood in 
'technical' and in 'symbolic' terms (Reed 1995 p46). TQM, then, incorporates 
systemic, organisational, operational and 'cultural' elements. BS 7850 reads: 
Total quality management assures maximum effectiveness and efficiency within an 
organisation by putting 4a place processes and systems which will ensure that every aspect of 
its activity is aligned to customer needs and all other objectives without waste of effort and 
using the full potential of every person in the organisation. (BSI 1992) 
In contrast to Taylorist conceptions, in TQM quality is seen as a company-wide concern 
rather than being the responsibility of a mutually exclusive inspection department. In 
TQM customer-need is deemed to be the chief focus of attention for the organisation. 
The process of harnessing quality, then, is through a series of stages relating back from 
the end customer of the product (see figure 3: 1). 
The first stage is in identifying the customer: customers are defined as being those 
persons who receive 'inputs' from 'suppliers' and are assessed by some form of input- 
process-output analysis (Juran op cit. ). The next stage is determining what customer 
needs are and to 'translate' these needs into a quantitative language that can be acted 
upon within the organisation; to translate customer needs 'into our language' as Juran 
op cit. ) put it. The focus from here is to input these quantified needs into product or 
service design and into the processes used for producing that product or service. The 
key element from this stage on is in monitoring - principally through the use of 
statistical process control (SPQ methods (Deming op cit. ). Monitoring is important 
within TQM and SPC can be seen as the tools by which TQM is applied as it provides 
the key to understanding processes and products, for re-designing processes and for 
reducing and controlling uncertainty. 
Figure 3: 1 Defining Quality Via TQM 
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Hill (1995) has defined the key organisational elements in TQM as being, first, a 
method driven by senior management because quality is a strategic rather than an 
operational issue. Second, quality is an issue dealt with horizontally, as well as 
vertically: cross departmental co-ordination is required to break down traditional 
departmental rigidities and employees are to operate in 'teams' - either as a work unit, 
as a 'generic team' in the case of problem-solving or project work (Oakland 1993; 
Aune 1992). Third, innovation is a managerial task. In TQM, managers delegate 
responsibilities to workers through the management system, but critically, the 
management system itself remains the exclusive prerogative of management. Finally 
Hill notes a fifth key element of 'cultural change', meaning a shift to 'high trust' 
management staff relationships. This is essentially a unitarist conception of the 
organisation where management's task is to create a 'constancy ofpurpose' (Deming 
op cit. ). In addition to the, elements noted by Hill, other definitions of TQM emphasises 
a number of other elements including the measurement of performance - so that 
continuous improvement can be realised, and the importance of training - so that 
workers may be given appropriate methodologies where operational decision-making 
may be delegated. This, then, suggests that TQM places great importance on employee 
commitment, with the possibility that this may lead to an intensification of work or a 
6managernent by stress'. These issues will be discussed more fully in chapter 5. 
Local Government: Why Quality Management? 
A number of factors have influenced the pressure to import quality management into 
the local government. In nearly all cases these could be reduced to a managerialist 
rationale discussed in chapter 2, though the circumstances have varied. 
a) Pressure from Government 
Pressure to adopt quality management methods in local government has come 
principally from central government. Based upon the new-right assumptions of the 
government during the 1980s and early 1990s, quality management could be seen as 
appropriate on the basis that it is founded upon the principles of 'sound management' 
developed in the private sector. It is also founded upon an assumption of 'consumer 
choice' which also provided the ideological basis to the then Government's 'enabling' 
model for local government (Walsh 1995b). The Labour Government too has, as a 
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matter of party policy from the early 1990s onwards, accepted the principle of 
borrowing from the private sector. At present, the actual pressures to adopt quality 
management from central government have come from the legacy of the preceding 
Conservative administrations. 
In terms of direct government advocacy for quality management, there is the official 
sanctionifig of TQM as DTI 'management best practice', mentioned previously. 
Government has also sponsored the use of the ISO 9000 quality system standard, the 
Investors in People (IiP) standard and its own Charter Mark customer service standard. 
These will be further discussed in the next section. 
Indirectly, and probably more effectively, has been the underlying pressures built into 
other measures imposed on local government. Most significantly among these have 
been the imposition of CCT, which will be discussed separately below. Other indirect 
influences from central government, however, have been Audit Commission and more 
recently the Citizen's Charter performance indicators set for local government. These 
have required local authorities to monitor performance in a number of service areas. 
Quality management provides the most comprehensive set of tools in which to achieve 
these as quality management is wholly compatible with the 3Es mentality of public 
service delivery. 
b) Structural changes - internal re-organisation of local government 
The advent of CCT has probably provided the most significant single incentive to adopt 
quality management methods, and warrant more detailed discussion in chapter 4. - 
Briefly, however, there are two reasons why this issue relates to an increased incentive 
for local authorities to adopt quality management methods. The first reason is that CCT 
has heralded major structural re-organisations within local authorities, making them 
more comparable to private sector organisations than had ever been the case previously 
(Morgan & Murgatroyd 1994). The significant aspect of the CCT legislation, here, has 
been the requirement of local authorities to introduce 'client-contractor splits' within 
services. This essentially split the administrative, policy oriented aspect of a service 
from the operational, contractor element. With this split made - and with the additional 
requirement of the authority having to publish a Statement of Support Service Costs 
(SSSC) - private sector competitors are considered to be more able to compare costs 
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without the concern that the local authority may be able to use transfer-pricing to 'hide' 
costs and thus compete unfairly. Although there have been variations in the 
implementation of the purchaser-provider split (Shaw et al 1994; Rao & Young 1995), 
the change involved has made a permanent difference to the accounting structure of 
local authorities as a whole and has ftirther enabled the pursuit of a 3Es philosophy 
within local government through the increased transparency of its cost-structures. 
Because of the above changes, the structure of local authorities more closely resembles 
the structures of organisations for which quality methods such as TQM were designed. 
C) Commercial pressure -'Competing for Quality' 
The second factor relating to CCT is through the effects of competition. Local 
authorities hostile to the principle of tendering out services have tried a number of 
means by which to retain contracts. Because of this, government tightened legislation in 
order to prohibit what it considered to be 'anti-competitive behaviour': 
... too many authorities have sought to bend the rules laid down by the legislation, to cushion 
their workforces against the full force of competition - and thus to deny their own charge- 
payers the financial and performance benefits that competition can deliver ... The 
Government wishes therefore to ensure that in future there is greater clarity about what 
constitutes anti-competitive behaviour. (DoE 1991 p4) 
Due to stricter regulations introduced on anti-competitive behaviour, one of the few 
areas in which to enhance in-house bids was seen to be through setting tight 
specifications for a contract. 
Although legislation prohibits local authorities' demanding specific quality standards 
such as ISO 9000, there is scope in the legislation to write high quality standards within 
a contract specification. For authorities hostile to outsourcing, then, having a tight 
contract specification combined with the introduction of quality management within the 
DSO or service contractor could itself be seen as a means by which to retain a contract. 
This has further implications. Introducing quality management in this context is also 
likely to be eased if it can be seen as legitimately contributing to maintaining the in- 
house contract. The 'external threat' factor could be used to temper residual employee 
or trade union hostility towards the introduction of such methods. 
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d) Electoral pressure from political leaders 
Another rationale by which quality management may be introduced into local 
authorities is through the compliance of political leadership. This pressure may come 
from political leadership following a new-suburban-right (NSR) agenda (Holiday 
1991), compatible with managerialism (see chapter 2). Even at a superficial level, 
quality management would be likely to appeal here, purely on the basis that it is 
private-sector oriented. 
Where an agenda for quality management is not inspired by ideological, political 
interests, though, quality management is still likely to have, at least in part, 
instrumentalist appeal. Where political interests could be persuaded that improving 
quality of service would be good for the authority as a whole, the electoral fortunes of a 
ruling political group could benefit. Where management has decided to embark upon a 
programme of introducing quality management, then, it would seem unlikely that 
political leaders would wish to veto it. 
Instrumentalist and ideological motives aside, however, the issue of quality itself 
remains political when linked to the public domain: 
Quality continues to be used as though it were something we all unquestioningly favour, 
rather as we condemn sin. In truth, no such consensus exists; nor is quality something that 
floats above politics. Once it is applied to the provision of welfare services, becomes 
inexorably bound up with the political battles that are being fought on that terrain. (Pfeffer & 
Coote 1991) 
e) Pressure from the new managerial class 
The managerialist agenda, described in chapter 2, has been based upon the premise of 
empowering management within local government. By diminishing the discretion of 
political influences (councillors) over decision-making, a new cadre of managerial local 
government officers have been emerging, as is perhaps exemplified by the following: 
The fundamental need for the Local Government Management Network, according to its head 
Kevin Lavery, is that "we're all managers now". (Local Government Chronicle 5 November 
1993 plO) 
While power within a local authority may traditionally have been located among certain 
professionals, in conjunction with political leaders, the managerialist agenda has shifted 
this. This 'empowered' managerial strata could be expected to be more susceptible to 
methods, techniques and agendas that suit their own sectional view of the organisation 
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and quality management provides this because it gives 'generalist' managers, whose 
legitimacy is not rooted in a profession which is being managed, can claim that quality 
management is a means of ensuring public accountability over professionals (Pollitt 
1990b). 
f) Academic support - the 'new public management' 
Running in parallel with the changes that have occurred over the 1980s or 1990s has 
been academic interest, either in terms of scrutiny, support or prescriptive 
recommendations. While this is probably a factor in most areas of social life, and of 
management in general, academic input into the area of public administration is 
probably more hifluential upon the practitioners of local government, than is generally 
the case in management practitioners as a whole. Academic descriptions and 
prescriptions of public administration is therefore likely to be of some importance than 
would be the case in general management. Pollitt (1990a) notes that among the list of 
those receiving material benefits from public service managerialisin have been 
management consultants, business schools and 'other parts of the education and 
training world which have offered generic management training' (p 134). 
The quality 'phenomenon' within the public sector has, then, been broadly 
encompassed within what has been termed 'new public management' (NPM) within the 
academic sphere. The NPM discourse has emerged in the 1990s as a form of 'renewal' 
in the general area of what used to be termed 'public administration'. This discourse of 
NPM, also follows closely, though not exclusively, the Post-Fordist approach to 
welfare state reforms (Cochrane 1994; 1995; Newman & Clarke 1994) - as discussed in 
chapter 2. While NPM claims to be an agenda that moves away from managerialist 
assumptions that private sector methods can be imported into the public sector, NPM 
nevertheless retains managerialist assumptions. For example, where decision-making 
models were discussed in public administration in the 1960s, they tended to follow a 
'rationalist' versus 'incrementalist line of thought; rationalists claiming decision- 
making could be planned and incrementalists claiming decision-making was 
evolutionary. In many ways the management decision-making methods in quality 
management (particularly TQM) echo rational decision making models for public 
administration in the 1960s. 
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Intended as a methodology to aid decision-making and policy implementation in large 
organisations rational decision making sought to provide efficient and realistic 
alternatives to the reductionism of 'rational economic behaviour' assumptions in neo- 
classical economics. However rational decision making was found to be flaWed in the 
following ways (Smith & May 1980): (i) it was seen to be utopian and did not allow for 
unanticipated consequences where ends are not clear; (ii) it unrealistically assumed that 
it is possible to dichotomise ends and means, values and decisions or facts and values; 
(iii) rational decision -making was value 
biased in favour of upper hierarchy, 
professions and senior management and generally assumed a top-down view of 
decision-making: (iv) rational decision making ignored power and vested interests and 
thus the determinants of the availability of choices. Within the context of public 
services, these criticisms may also apply to TQM. Table 3: 1 shows a comparison of 
rational decision making and TQM. 
Table 3: 1: Rational Decision-Makinci Compared to TQM 
Rational Decision-Making Process 
(Source: Smith & May 1980) 
TQM Decision Making Process 
Generic (Source: Roper 1994 p42) 
search process 0 identify customer 
formulation of objectives 0 identify customer needs 
selection of alternatives to achieve 0 quantify needs 
objectives 
evaluation of outcomes 9 design product/service and 
process/delivery system 
0 monitor performance 
0 re-evaluate customer needs 
At the operational level TQM is consistent, in its advocating of specific decision- 
making processes, with rational decision making. TQM provides the tools for making 
decisions, decision-making processes which are at the heart of TQM and are, again, 
advocated as universally applicable in any organisational setting. The point of 
departure, however, is that where rational decision making was essentially a 
management tQol, it was intended as a policy-making instrument and was likely to 
include representatives of political interests, community group and other interested 
parties as well as public officials and professionals. In TQM, as is continually stressed, 
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strategic decisions must be taken by senior managers, whose responsibility is 
leadership. 
In Pollitt's (I 990a) definition, the management methods of managerialism are identified 
as 'neo-Taylorist'. Throughout the 1990s, however, NPM has been emulating newer 
private sector management methods - what Pollitt terms 'cultural' forms of 
management. Quality has been a prominent issue here. Quality is almost seen as the 
new, anti-bureaucratic antidote to the 'inappropriate' neo-Taylorist forms of 
managerialism forced on the public sector by Thatcherism. Indicative of this trend, 
Flynn (1994) contrasts the styles and values of the 'new human resource management' 
being pursued by progressive organisations with the bureaucratic Taylorist styles and 
methods in the old welfare state. Using the language and broad line of reasoning of Post 
Fordism, Flynn argues that 'new HRM organisations' value employees and work in 
harmony with contractors in a decentralised environment that enables the effective 
interaction between service providers and service users. In the same volume, Newman 
and Clarke argue that 
The new wave management of Tom Peters and others provides a value base and set of 
techniques which has an interesting correspondence with the customer focus and quality 
orientation around which this [party political] consensus is constructed (Newman & Clarke 
1994 p26) 
Another important reason for the interest in quality management methods in the public 
sector has been, then, through the increased susceptibility of public sector decision- 
makers to prescriptive management agendas - which many of the quality management 
methods fit. As an example Morgan and Murgatroyd op cit) suggest that TQM, though 
based upon market led success criteria, is perfectly suitable for adoption in the, public 
sector and should be pursued as such: 
... given the political sponsorship or consents, the public sector can thrive equally as well on 
cultural change as the commercial sector (Morgan & Murgatroyd 1994 p47) 
Moreover quality managerpent methods such as TQM are now offered as universally 
applicable management methods, equally relevant in the public sector as they are in the 
private. This is emphasised by Morgan and Murgatroyd (1994) who contend that the 
five principal objections to the applicability of TQM in the public sector are 
surmountable. The five 'objections' identified are as follows: (1) that the nature of 
TQM inhibits its use in the public sector, (2) that the nature of the public sector inhibits 
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the use of TQM, (3) that professional 'work cultures' are inimical to TQM, (4) that the 
notion of the customer is problematic in the public sector and (5) that service provision 
is more complex in the public sector. 
In dismissing these objections one by one, Morgan and Murgatroyd reveal some critical 
issues. They highlight the likely difficulty of attempting to create uniformity of outputs 
prevalent in manufacturing versions of TQM, but stress the need to focus on work 
standardisation: 
The central TQM concept which both have in common is elimination of variation in process, 
i. e. process control, whether that process be one to achieve standardisation or one to achieve 
the delivery of the most desired differentiated response (Morgan & Murgatroyd 1994 p44) 
Morgan and Murgatroyd further note that in order to Create internal customer-supplier 
chains, TQM will need to tackle existing working relationships. This may require "... a 
conscious commitment to undo professional demarcations ifneeded' (ibid. p52) 
Also seen as imperative are the need for performance evaluation and performance 
related pay. No mention is made of any potential resistance from trade unions. 
Significantly Morgan and Murgatroyd point out that many of the objections to applying 
TQM in the public sector are being nullified by structural changes being made 
(particularly in relation to contracting). 
While others are not so assured about the total compatibility of quality management in 
a context of public service, there is still a general willingness to acknowledge the 
benefits of adapting the principles of such methods into the public goods domain. 
Gaster (1991) for example, compares the differences in the meanings of quality in 
public and private sectors (see table 3: 2) - but contends that the methods of quality 
management are appropriate for the public sector. 
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Table 3: 2: Defining Quality: Private/Public Spli 
Private Sector Public Sector 
Better than what's provided elsewhere Comprehensive 
As cheap as possible 
Value for money 
Economic 
Efficient 
Fitness for purpose 
Conformance to requirements 
Accurate 
Up to date Reliable 
Reliable (free from errors, consistent) Acceptable to consumers and providers 
Satisfies the customer Speedy 
Delivered on time Equitable (access and distribution) 
Efficacy minus effectiveness 
(source: (3aster 1991, p22) 
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Much of the justification from the (broadly defined) NPM advocates, above, do so 
through a rejection of the perceived 'bureau-professionalism' that a management cadre 
is supposed to replace. While there is a coherent argument here, the cause and effect, 
here, do not necessarily relate. The implications for manager/professional relationships 
is further discussed in chapter 5. 
The Prevalence of Quality Management in Local Government 
a) Local government quality methods: a crude typology 
Pfeffer and Coote (op cit) assess the various approaches to quality in the public sector 
and discuss some of the difficulties. They identify four broad types which they define 
as the traditional approach, the scientific or expert approach, the managerial or 
excellence approach and the consumerist approach. The traditional approach, they 
contend, is the definition most people identify with quality - one of prestige - and, as 
such, carries influence in practical application. The 'scientific' approach is identified as 
being that associated with perfonnance evaluation and with Taylorist divisions of 
labour. Pfeffer and Coote identify this approach to quality with 'Fordism'. The 
'managerial' approach to quality, according to Pfeffer and Coote, is broadly the one 
associated with 'culture management' and is associated with 'employee commitment', 
'leadership' and 'teamwork'. Finally the 'consumerist' approach to quality is associated 
with the use of market research surveys to guide policy choice. 
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Figure 3: 2 shows a variety of quality methods that are currently being used in local 
government. Methods are shown within a crude matrix according to the complexity of 
the method and the style of the method. The complexity of the method is fairly 
straightforward and is discussed more below. The 'style' continuum is, though, perhaps 
more contentious. Although, contrary to Post-Fordist assertions, the nature of 
management has not been fundamentally altered by some of the more 'cultural' forms - 
of management in the past two decades, many of these methodologies have represented 
a qualitative shift in style away from the assertions of Taylorism. This issue is discussed 
further in chapter 5. For the sake of simplicity, then, quality methods could be 
identified as being located on a continuum between 'Taylorist' and 'Cultural' 
management forms in the sphere of local government. 
Figure 3: 2: Quality Management Matrix 
Taylorist 
(style) 
'Cultural' 
Holistic ý (Complexity) , Simple 
IS09000 
Complaints System 
Quality Circles 
lip Service Charter 
Charter Mark 
TQIVI Customer 
Involvement 
Simple quality systems being used in local government range from the issuing of 
'service charters' to local citizens; to the monitoring of government instigated 
performance indicators, with their associated complaints systems; to customer 
involvement initiatives; to the use of Quality Circles or other 'team-based' work 
methods; to the participation in the government's Charter Mark award scheme - 
requiring a systematic approach to achieving 'customer focus': 
Public services do not, usually, have the stimulus of competition. But that is where the Charter 
programme comes in. The Citizen's Charter is about treating people as if they have a choice. 
Over the last four and a half years the best of public service - the Charter Mark winners - are 
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now setting a standard that matches the best anywhere. (Lord Blyth from Charter Mark Award 
Scheme Handbook: 1996. Emphasis in original) 
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Similar in nature is Investors in People (HP), which requires a demonstration of 
employee development determined through organisational goals determined by 
customer needs. 
Of the more holistic quality approaches, two stand out. ISO 9000 is an international 
quality system standard that became popular in British industry in the 1980s (in its 
previous guise as BS 5750) and the 1990s. The central theme of this method is based 
upon the principles of controlling production process through the regulation of working 
procedures (it is hence very 'Taylorist'). ISO 9000 provides a standardised management 
control framework which an organisation applies to its own particular circumstances. 
The organisation applies for accreditation and is audited by external assessors and, once 
accredited, is registered subject to further audit at regular intervals. Incentives for 
organisations wishing to apply for ISO 9000 vary from the perceived benefits that the 
system will bring, to marketing kudos, to commercial pressures from competitors and, 
significantly, customer organisations. 
b) Quality Methods: the extent of use in local government 
Initial understanding of the nature and extent of the use of quality management methods 
in local government in England and Wales was based upon data derived from the Local 
Government Management Board (LGMB) Quality Survey in 1994. This survey was 
based on a self-completion questionnaire sent to senior officers in every authority in 
England and Wales. It asked for the respondent to confirm whether the authority was 
involved in specific quality initiatives including, among others, TQM, ISO 9000, IiP, 
Charter Mark, team-working, customer charters, complaints procedures. The 
respondent indicated where a specific service was involved in such a method. The 
survey was repeated in 1995 and again in 1996. Overall the response was high (see 
Table3: 3). 
Table 3: 3: LGMB Quality Survey Details 
1994 1995 1996 
Councils Responding 1 299 379 384 
Response Rate (%) 1 74 96 98 
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Figure 3: 3 shows the extent of use of quality methods in local government between 
1994 and 1996, based upon these LGMB figures. Overall, Coml)laintsSyslems can be 
seen to be the most prevalent quality method, due largely to Citizens Charter and Audit 
Commission monitoring in this area. ISO 9000, Service Charlers and Custolnel 4 
Involvement, all being recognised and well established quality methods in their own 
contexts all seem to be settled at around the 60-65% uptake level. TOM, being the most 
intensive of all the methods, remains at the lower end of the uptake levels at 40 per cent 
- though this in itself is a relatively high figure. In contrast, Charter Mark and IiP have 
both risen consistently over the three years. 
Figure 3: 3: Use of Quality Methods in Local Government (a) General 
Usage 
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60 
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C) 
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Source Data: LGMB Quality Survey 1994,1995 and 1996 (England and Wales only) 
Some care must be taken with the basis ofthe survey, however. Some ol'the methods 
being surveyed, such as rQm, are regarded as 'best practice' in management fields and 
as such, may suffer frorn over-reporting due to a lialo effect. This has been seen to he 
the case when comparing managers perceptions of best practice linplenicntation and 
actual practices implemented (Oliver & Wilkinson 1992, Ropcr et al 1997). In tile (1,11,1 
presented here, the reported cumulative quality rating indicates that interest dipped in 
1995, only to rise again in 1996. In practice, it is likely that perceptions about What 
constituted an actual practice changed between 1994 and 1995. Alternatively, because 
the figures include those authorities who were 'planning to implement' as well as those 
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who actually implemented the stated policy, it is likely that some of the interest in 1994 
declined by 1995. Given that 1994 was the first year of the survey, however, it is likely 
that the survey's accuracy improved over the three years as authorities became more 
familiar with the format of the survey and, possibly, with their general understanding of 
the methods in question. 
Figures 3: 4 - 33: 8 show how the uptake of some of these methods has varied across local 
authority types. TQM (non-corporate) has seen consistently increasing popularity in the 
Metropolitan Authorities (Fig. 3: 4), although showing no clear trends in corporate 
(council-wide) use (Fig. 3: 5). liP has seen an across-the-board increase ill popularity in 
general use (Fig. 3: 6), but been consistently more popular in District Authorities as a 
corporate strategy (Fig. 3 3: 7). Charter Mark, though the least popular method across-the- 
board (often due to its political association with the then Prime Minister, John Ma . jor), 
has seen the greatest rise in Popularity and seems to be particularly popular with 
London Boroughs (Fig. 3: 8). 
Figure 3: 4: Use of Quality Methods in Local Government (b) General Use 
of TQM (By Authority Type) 
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60 - 
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(any) Policy 
50 - 
40- 13 % Mets with (any) 
Policy 
30 - 
20 - 0% LBCs with (any) 
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TQM 1994 TQM 1995 TQM 1996 
Source Data: LGMB Quality Survey 1994,1995 and 1996 (England and Wales only) 
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Figure 3: 5: Use of Quality Methods in Local Government (c) Corporate 
Use of TQM (By Authority Type) 
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Figure 3: 6: Use of Quality Methods in Local Government (d) General Use 
of HID (By Authority TYPe) 
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Source Data: LGMB Quality Survey 1994,1995 and 1996 (England and Wales only) 
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Figure 3: 7: Use of Quality Methods in Local Government (e) Corporat 
Use of HP (By Authority Type) 
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Source Data: LGMB Quality Survey 1994,1995 and 1996 (England and Wales only) 
Figure 3: 8: Use of Quality Methods in Local Government (f) Authorities 
Awarded Charter Mark (By AuthorRy Type) 
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Source Data: LGMB Quality Survey 1994,1995 and 1996 (England and Wales only) 
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C) Q-Scores 
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Given that many of the methods described have only existed for a few years, the 
adoption of quality-management methods in local government is relatively high, then. 
Another comparative way of viewing these trends, however, could be to use a crude 
score made up from the cumulative tally of the number of methods used in an authority 
(Q-Score)'. Thus, using the LGMB database, if an authority used TQM, Quality Circles 
and a Complaints Procedure it would score 3 (the maximum score being 8). This could 
then be compared over a number of years to see if any clear trends emerge, as to what 
type of authorities are adopting more or less methods. Table 3: 4 shows how local 
authorities compare, over a three year period. The mean, median and upper quartile 
values ar6 shown for Q-Scores in all authorities as a whole, and for sub-groups 
dependant upon party control of authorities. 
During the period being examined Labour has fared very well electoraly: at the same 
time the Conservatives have fared disproportionately badly. For this reason 'safe' 
Labour councils were assessed separately - so as to minimise the distorting effect 
caused by attributing management policies to Labour councils that may have been 
inherited from outgoing Conservative or 'balanced' (hung) administrations. 
Table 3: 4: Q-Scores For Authorities (Overall Use 
Mean Median St. Deviation Upper Quartile 
1994 (All) 4.4 4.0 1.9 6.0 
Conservative 4.1 4.0 1.9 5.0 
Labour, 4.8 5.0 1.8 6.0 
Safe Labour 4.9 5.0 1.8 6.0 
1995 (All) 4.5 5.0 2.2 6.0 
Conservative 4.2 3.5 2.1 6.0 
Labour 4.9 5.0 2.0 7.0 
Safe Labour 5.0 5.0 2.0 7.0 
1996 (All) 4.9 5.0 2.1 7.0 
Conservative 5.0 6.0 2.4 7.0 
Labour 5.2 5.0 2.0 7.0 
Safe Labour 5.2 6.0 2.1 7.0 
Source Data: LGMB Quality Survey 1994,1995,1996; Local Government Yearbook (various years). Figures rounded. 
In terms of crude Q-Score, then, Labour authorities would seem have had a greater 
penchant for taking up quality methods. Mean and median scores are consistently 
I Note: Value of I attributed for authority with either a stated policy to use method in place or with stated Intent to use 
method. 
I 
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higher than those of the population's as a whole (all authorities). This is further 
illustrated in figure 3: 9 which shows that safe Labour councils have the highest mean 
use of quality methods, over the three years, but that Conservative authorities, being 
below the average population Q-Score mean in the first two years, rose above the 
population mean in the last year. That is, for the most recent year, the two main parties 
were both keener on quality management methods than were other parties (Liberal 
Democrats, Independents or authorities without overall majorities). 
Figure 3: 9: Mean O-Scores (Overall Use) 
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In some ways the crude 'attribute' measure used in the above Q-Score may over- 
represent authorities who make only limited use of a quality method and not fully 
recognise those authorities making extensive use of a quality method. For this reason a 
further measure of Q-Score is used in table 3: 5 and figure 3: 10. Here the Q-Scores for 
authorities where a quality policy has been adopted corporately - on authority-wide 
basis is shown. 
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Table 3: 5: O-Scores For Authorities (Corporate Use 
Mean Median St. Deviation Upper Quartile 
1994 (All) 2.7 2 1.8 4 
Conservative 3.1 3 1.9 4 
Labour 2.6 2 1.8 4 
Safe Labour 2.6 2 1.8 4 
1995 (All) 2.4 2 1.6 3 
Conservative 2.9 3 1.4 4 
Labour 2.5 2 1.6 3 
Safe Labour 2.4 2 1.5 3 
1996 (All) 2.5 2 1.6 4 
Conservative 3.6 4- 1.6 4 
Labour 2.5 2 1.5 3 
Safe Labour 2.2 2 1.4 3 
Source Data: LGMB Quality Sur vey 1994,1995,1996; Local Government Yearbook (various years). Figures 
rounded. 
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In terms of corporate use much of the previous findings are reversed. Conservative 
authorities are the most fervent users of corporate quality methods. Over the three year 
period mean Q-Scores fell and then rose slightly: in Conservative authorities they fell 
and rose sharply. Also, in contrast with the convergence tendencies in overall Q-Score 
use, safe Labour authorities' adoption of corporate quality management methods dipped 
consistently over the three year period. 
Figure 3: 10: Mean Q-Scores (Corporate Use) . 
3.6-- 
.0 
3.4-- 
3.2-- 
3. o,. - -*- - All 
0- -Conservative 
2.8-- -)K-Labour 
2.6 - -A - 
Safe Labour 
_U 2.4-- 
2.2-. 
21 
1994 1995 1996 
Managerialism and Local Government 55 
Summary 
Quality management has been introduced into local government over the past few 
years. This has largely been the outcome of an inter-related set of circumstances, but in 
the main has been enabled by the general- managerialist trend in local government 
administration. Pressures from the introduction of CCT - through structural re- 
organisation and through the desire to outmanoeuvre private sector competitors - has 
been a crucial catalyst in this. Because of the various sources of influence, a variety of 
different quality management initiatives have been introduced into authorities of all 
types and all political hues. 
f 
Section III 
Work and Trade Uni 
Governme 
CHAPTER 4 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN LoCAL GOVERNMENT 
In section two, the political and managerial background to the local government 
management agenda was discussed. All of the developments discussed, of course, 
occurred simultaneously to parallel developments in the area of industrial relations, 
both in the broad national context and more specifically in the area of local 
government. In this context managerialism has operated both as a pro-active agenda, in 
that it was based upon a re-statement of management's position within local 
government; and in a reactive manner, in that the managerialist agenda developed 
specifically within the context of organised union resistance to much of the political 
aims of managerialism. 
This section will discuss the impact and relevance of worker activity within local 
government, focusing on collective bargaining arrangements and on the changing 
na ture of work organisation with the advent of new managerialist methods, particularly 
those associated with quality management. To the range of relationships affected by 
managerialism that are described by Clarke and Newman (1997) - between state and 
citizen, public and private, providers and recipients of social welfare and management 
and politics - the additional relationship of providers and managers is addressed here. 
While chapter 5 will discuss the implications for conditions of employment, this 
chapter will examine the actions and reactions of local government trade unions to the 
industrial relations climate created by managerialism. It will examine the unions' 
approach to dealing with the managerialist re-definition of the public sector in the UK 
over the 1980s and 1990s and it will examine the strategy adopted by the public sector 
unions to the issue of quality. 
The Industrial Relations Climate in the 1980s and 1990s 
The imposition of managerialism in local government, described in chapter 2, occurred 
as part of a wider ideological project to re-assert the principle of the absolute 
management prerogative. However, some misconceptions exist about the nature of 
industrial relations before the advent of Thatcherism (MacInnes 1987). Industrial 
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disputes in the 1970s are often retrospectively portrayed as a period where unions 
enjoyed unprecedented power in the workplace and where union leaders were seen as 
key power brokers within government itself Here the popular media image of trade 
unions was of the 1973/4 miners strike with its associated flying pickets, the Heath 
Government's capitulation to 'union power' following the imposition of the three-day 
week and of inefficient nationalised industries being closed by wildcat strikes (Glasgow 
University Media Group 1976). In reality, however, the 1970s were also characterised 
by rising unemployment, rising inflation and protracted industrial disputes that were 
often based upon issues of plant closure and management lockouts. To further blur the 
distinction between the 1970s and Thatcherism, it should be remembered that the first 
monetarist budget was delivered by a Labour Chancellor; that the first attempts at 
comprehensive industrial relations legislation aiming to restrict strike activity was 
undertaken by a Labour Government (In Place of Strife) in the 1960s and was being 
pursued by an earlier Conservative Government (The Industrial Relations Act 1972). 
Trade union activity in the 1970s, then, was often confined to defensive actions within 
a context of difficult economic times. 
This being said, however, the Thatcher Government of 1979 was a watershed in many 
ways. The incoming government made a priority of 'reforming' industrial relations in 
the UK and in terms of legislation and general approach, the Conservative governments 
of 1979,1983,1987 and 1992 maintained a greater consistency on this aspect of policy 
than on any other issue. While' the phraseology may have altered over time (e. g. 
references to 'supply-side' labour markets became references to 'flexibility'), the 
agenda remained consistent: restrict the capacity of workers to take collective action 
against employers. As one Director put it in 198 1, 
Managers for twenty years have had a buffeting from government and unions and we have 
been put in a can't win situation ... we have an opportunity now that will last for two or three years. Then the unions will get themselves together again; and the government, like all 
governments, will run out of steam. So grab it now. We have had a pounding and we are fed 
up with it. I think it would'be fair to say that it's almost vengeance. (Les Collinson, 
Managing Director and Management Consultant, Financial 77mes 5 January 1981. Quoted in 
Maclnnes 1987 p92) 
This agenda was pursued through direct legislative measures; by direct confrontation 
with trade unions in industrial disputes in situations where the state was the employer 
(the 1984-5 miners strike); by directly siding with employers in industrial disputes in 
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the private sector (the 1986 News International dispute); and by redefining the legal and 
economic boundaries of the state (privatisation and deregulation). In addition, all of the 
above occurred under a period of permanently high structural unemployment, which 
severely reduced the potential for the type of organised union resistance that occurred in 
response to government attempts to constrain union activity in the 1970s. The result has 
been an overall decline in trade union influence. One indicator of this is the well 
documented decline in trade union membership over the period Figure 4: 1 shows this 
decline from the 1980s, which contrasts with the previous period of sustained trade 
union membership growth. 
Figure 4: 1: Trade Union Membership (millions) 1970 - 1995 
a) Trade union legisIation 1979 - 1996 
The most obvious source of government activity on trade unions has been legislative. 
Prior to 1979, the legal status of industrial relations in the UK has traditionally been 
characterised as being voluntarist, or based upon the notion of collective laissezfaire 
(Martin 1998). From 1979, however, the legislative programme ensured that the state 
became pro-actively involved in the conduct of industrial relations and of the labour 
market. Anti trade union legislation began in 1980 and continued throughout the 1980s 
and into the 1990s. Legislation was introduced to undermine the viability of trade 
(Ref. Labour Market Trends 1997 p39: Data based on Certification Officer data) 
-1, 
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unions in three important ways (Brown et al 1997). First, legislation was aimed at 
shifting the conduct of industrial relations back to private law - making trade unions 
liable for the consequences of industrial disputes; second, legislation aimed, to 
undermine 'props' to collective bargaining - wages councils, national bargaining and 
fair wages resolutions; and third, legislation was aimed directly at the re-regulation of 
collective action - the direct intervention in the conduct of trade union activities 
themselves. 
These measures, then, aimed to reduce strike activity through restricting picketing, 
outlawing secondary, 'political' and 'sympathy' strikes and by imposing secret ballot 
arrangements, with prior notice to affected employers, for strikes. In addition, 
legislation aimed to undermine the legitimacy of trade unions within the workplace as a 
whole through negating the scope of collective bargaining. This took the form of 
restricting, then removing closed-shop arrangements, providing 'opt-outs' for union 
members not wishing to comply with balloted industrial action and by the requirement 
of members' positive endorsement for 'check-off arrangements for union 
subscriptions. Taken as a whole, these legislative measures tended to undermine the 
instrumentalist appeal of trade union membership. Table 4: 1 provides a summary of the 
legislation. 
Work and Trade Unions in Local Governmei 
Table 4: 1: Employment Lec 
Act Summary 
Employment Act 1980 reduction in employee rights in unfair dismissal 
maternity rights to reinstatement reduced 
restrictions to closed shop 
repeal of trade union recognition procedure 
restrictions on picketing 
secondary picketing outlawed 
limitations to secondary strikes 
0 extension of grounds for refusal to join union 
Employment Act 1982 0 reinforcement of closed shop restrictions 
0 'union labour only' commercial contracts outlawed 
0 selective dismissal of strikers now legal 
0 new definition of trade dispute 
0 'political' strikes outlawed 
0 removal of trade union immunity from civil courts 
Trade Union Act 1984 05 yearly ballots for voting members of union NECs 
0 secret ballots for industrial action 
0 ballots to establish political funds 
* redefinition of 'political' in political funding 
Wages Act 1986 wages councils only allowed to set single minimum rate 
of pay and single overtime rate 
workers under age of 21 not covered by mini um wage 
Sex Discrimination Act 1986 0 removed exception for small firms from complying with 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
Employment Act 1988 e union must hold separate ballot for each affected 
workplace 
ballot must provide other alternatives to strike action 
members have right not to be disciplined by union 
all union NEC members subject to 5 year ballot 
new Commissioner for the Right s of Trade Union 
Members 
post-entrV closed-shop outlawed 
Employment Act 1990 0 pre-entry closed shop outlawed 
" union liable for officials who call for industrial action 
" restrictions on unofficial strike action 
increased employer freedom to dismiss employee taking 
unofficial strike action 
further restrictions to secondary action 
Trade Union Reform and union members given right to join union of choice 
Employment Rights Act 1993 full postal ballot before strike 
employers to receive seven days notice of strike 
union members to authorise subscription 'check-off 
abolition of 26 wages councils 
removal of ACAS's requirement to encourage collective 
bargaining 
(Kef. ' Blyton & Tumbull 1994: ppl 63-164) 
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b) Government role in disputes during the 1980s 
Another source of government intervention during this period was in its direct 
involvement in industrial disputes, both where the state was employer and otherwise. 
VA-iile the involvement of the state in industrial disputes was hardly new, here, the 
combined effect of this with anti-union legislation, and rising unemployment in the 
more unionised sections of the economy increased the impact of government 
involvement. In addition, the government had made some of these disputes 'show-case' 
demongtrations of how it was not going to capitulate to the subversive influence of 
trade union power. 
The incoming Conservative government of 1979 saw 'trade union power' as a threat to 
the trade union legislation, itself set up to thwart the perceived threat that trade unions 
had to its economic policy. This fear was exacerbated by the apparent humiliation of 
the previous Conservative government by organised trade union resistance to its 
industrial relations legislation and, more significantly, by the miners strikes of 1972 and 
1973-4. As a prelude, the first real direct state intervention in an industrial dispute 
during the Thatcher administration was the Stockport Messenger dispute of 1983. Here, 
the police and the courts were successfully used to enforce the new anti picketing laws 
in a recognition dispute with the NGA union. The watershed dispute of the Thatcher 
regime was most obviously, however, the 1984-5 miners strike. For this showcase 
dispute, all the mechanisms of the state were brought into play to defeat the miners 
including not only anti-trade union, legislation, but prior economic planning, the 
centralised co-ordination of policing arrangements, news management and even the 
withdrawal of welfare benefits (Couller et al 1984; Green 1990). Coal stocks were built 
up in advance to insulate against the knock-on economic effects; the dispute was 
provoked over the issue of jobs - in order that a compromise would be unlikely to be 
negotiable; social security benefits were selectively withdrawn from miners families; 
challenges were made to the legality of the strike; 'breakaway' elements in the union 
were actively encouraged; and the police were centrally reorganised and deployed to 
physically break the strike. The miners strike polarised public opinion and when the 
miners were defeated, a political message was demonstrated to trade unionists. In the 
aftermath of the strike The Guardian commented: 
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The defeat of the miners will be seen as a landmark in the decline of the industrial working 
class and the advocates of political strike action. (Guardian 5 March 1985 quoted in Hain 
1986 p224) 
While this assertion overestimates the capacity to suppress industrial conflict, it does 
demonstrate a shift in attitude in 'progressive' and centre-left political opinion towards 
trade unions as being a progressive force. It also gave employers a demonstration of the 
type of 'industrial relations' that was now possible. This manifested itself, a year later, 
in the News International dispute where, again, a trade union with a prior history of 
firm entrenchment and workplace organisation, the NGA and SOGAT 82, was 
defeated. In this case the law and police were used in defence of a private-sector 
employer's right to dismiss an entire unionised workforce and replace it with a new 
workforce, with the support of the employer-friendly EETPU who provided the only 
recognised representation for the replacement workforce. 
Other important disputes took place in the 1980s and early 1990s, and these were not 
all defeated. Indeed, a number of other 'industrial relations benchmark' organisations 
suffered setbacks when confronted by strike activity - notably Ford in 1988 (Starkey & 
McKinlay 1989). In addition, the 1990s saw a rise in the propensity to take industrial 
action in new areas - notably in the National Health Service. Some of this action even 
prompted some comments of a summer of discontent in 1989 and even a second 
summer of discontent in 1996 (Heery 1997) Overall, however, high profile industrial 
disputes became rarer in the latter 1980s and 1990s and even where they did take place, 
they were often more inclined toward series of one-day stoppages and of greater 
attention paid to harnessing public opinion. Figure 4: 2, below, shows the continuous 
reduction in strike activity over the period, broken by the 'winter of discontent' and the 
1984-5 miners strike. 
Figure 4: 2 Strike Activity 1968 - 1996 
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C) Redefining government intervention 
A third source of government intervention into industrial relations was in the fonn of 
direct and indirect economic intervention aimed at promoting 'good' industrial 
relations. With the abandonment of formal incomes policy from 1979, other forms of 
regulation were pursued to achieve the same ends. These took the forms of broad 
economic policy, the privatisation/deregulation agenda, the use of foreign direct 
investors to promote model practice and the changing nature of the state-as-employer. 
In terms of broad economic policy, the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) was 
the first attempt by the Thatcher administration to discipline employers and workers 
into pay restraint. The MTFS was intended to be the practical application of 
monetarism, whereby the 6ycle between price and wage inflation was to be broken, 
therefore breaking the 'stagflationary' inflation/unemployment trade-off of the Long 
Run Phillips Curve (Friedman 1968). The outcome, though not the outcome predicted 
by the monetarist gurus, had a direct impact on the labour market through the induction 
of high levels of unemployment into the economy. The ideological message here was 
one of 'living within our means', meaning that businesses had to be able to make 
changes (reductions) to the size of their work-forces where the market demanded cost 
reductions, without interference from the monopoly power of trade unions. In the 1990s 
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this principle has become orthodoxy and is now pursued in the guise of 'downsizing' 
by large corporations wishing to display to financiers their ability to shed labour at will 
in the face of 'globalisation'. In 1979, however, this was not the case. The major 
economic shakeout that the MTFS induced was a major factor in the well documented 
steep decline in trade union membership during the early 1980s. It affected many trade 
union members directly due to the disproportionate effect that this economic 
contraction had on large-scale, 'traditional' heavy industry, where trade union density 
had been highest. 
The second and probably most significant form taken by government economic 
intervention affecting trade unions, was the reorganisation of major industries through 
the 'privatisation' agenda - combining state asset sales and deregulation. In contrast to 
the official government rhetoric of the time, however, the reorganisation'of the state in 
the 1980s constituted a re-definition, rather than a withdrawal of government economic 
intervention. The entire privatisation programme, despite the variety in the status and 
manner by which these various state assets were transferred to the market, constituted 
an attempt to introduce greater labour-market 'flexibility' and to discipline workers into 
the idea that their own interests were best served by ensuring the long-term profitability 
of the organisation in which they were working. 
The privatisation programme, in contrast to previous denationalisation programmes, 
became a proactive agenda. Paradoxically, however, while privatisation was a policy 
pursued with great zeal in the 1980s it was nevertheless an agenda that was largely 
improvised and later given an ideological rationale. Privatisation did not * 
appear on the 
1979 Conservative manifesto. Swann (1988) places the origin of the privatisation 
agenda from the end of the Heath government in 1974 and the role played by the 1973 
miners strike. The economic agenda for the Conservatives from 1975 onwards, centred 
around Friedman's monetarism and the Bacon and Eltis thesis - described in chapter 2. 
The response was Keith Joseph's production of 'The Right Approach to the Economy' 
in 1977 and the Ridley Report in 1978. Tliese linked the efficiency of industry with the 
trade union 'question'. This theme continued into the 1979 Conservative manifesto 
where the only mention of denationalisation was for the recently nationalised Britoil, 
British Aerospace, National Freight and the shipbuilding industry. The agenda only 
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shifted when the Government considered that it might not be able to make these 
industries efficient. As then minister John Moore commented: 
Why has these industries' performance been so disappointing ... They do their best but are faced with an impossible task. Ile odds are stacked against them. Not only are the 
industries constantly at risk from political and bureaucratic interference, the managers must 
at times wonder what it is they are supposed to be managing. Are they industries or social 
services? (Moore 1986) 
By the 1983 manifesto this emphasis had changed, yet still failed to use the term 
Gprivatisation': 
A company which has to satisfy its customers and compete to survive is more likely to be 
efficient, alert to innovation, and genuinely accountable to the public ... We shall continue our 
programme to expose state-owned firms to real competition... We shall transfer more state- 
owned businesses to independent ownership. (Conservative Party 1983) 
The 1983-87 Government made much more of the privatisation agenda, this time based 
upon the rhetoric of public floatation and 'wider share ownership'. By the time of the 
1987 election, the language had changed: 
We were determined to make share ownership available to the whole nation. Just as with 
cars, television sets, washing machines and foreign holidays, it would no longer be a 
privilege of the few; it would be the expectation of the many... 
... In the next parliament ... we will privatise more state industries 
in ways that increase share 
ownership, both for the employees and for the public at large. (Conservative Party 1987) 
Even here, however, privatisation remained as much motivated by increasing 
government short term revenue as it was about 'rolling back the ftontiers of the state' 
as former prime minister MacMillan famously commented when accusing the 
government of 'selling offthefamily silver'. 
If many of the political and economic justifications for privatisation were unfulfilled, 
the desired impact on employment relations within the affected industries certainly was. 
From the protagonists of deregulation/privatisation, public monopoly was replaced with 
private monopoly. In this situation, the state was not removed from the strategic 
direction of such industries. As a number of commentators - protagonists and critics - 
have noted, the privatisation agenda developed with a parallel development of whole 
new structures of regulation (Swann op cit; Price 1994). Here, then, deregulation could 
more appropriately be interpreted as a re-definition of regulation. The regulation that 
was introduced, however effectively it worked in practice, was restricted to Protecting 
the interests of consumers and competitors. It was not concerned with the protection of 
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employees interests - quite the reverse. It was not until the 1990s until European TUPE 
legislation (Transfer of Undertakings: Protection of Employment) put this on the 
agenda - to the dismay of the government at the time. 
A common theme that seems to permeate all the privatisation/deregulations: is the 
importance of contract relationships. Based, partly, upon theories such as transaction- 
cost economics (Williamson 1997), it became economically fashionable in the 1980s, to 
break-up the multi-function organisation into its constituent parts. The resulting 'lean' 
organisation is expected to gain savings through the enhanced ability of the 'core 
business' to control dependent contractors, without the requirement of having to 
maintain the 'social wage' of employees working within the outsourced contractor 
(wage parity, terms and conditions of employment, job security etc). The tendency is 
for employment decisions to be passed down to the contractor level. This, combined 
with an increased necessity for continuous cost reductions (to maintain share value 
performance and/or maintain prices set by regulatory bodies) has led to large job cuts. 
This, of course, is the primary justification for compulsory competitive tendering 
(CCT). 
Government activity was also focused on the way in which it encouraged foreign direct 
investment (FDI). This was another important form of the re-constitution of workplace 
industrial relations. The government used its promotion of 'good industrial relations' -a 
reduction in strike rates and a declining trade union membership - to attract foreign 
investors. In turn, it also promoted high profile foreign investors as models of industrial 
harmony. The arrival of Nissan in 1986 was hailed as a great victory for the 
Government's industrial relations policy, as much as for its economic policy. Nissan 
was then paraded as a model for industrial relations. Its apparent success was further 
used to discipline the aspirations of workers in the British motor industry and beyond 
(Oliver & Wilkinson 1989; 1992; Garrahan and Stewart 1992). Here, the greenfield site 
manufacturer dominates the local economy and can influence employment practices 
both directly, through its own employment practices, indirectly, through its regulation 
of dependent supply chain companies, and indirectly again, through the promotion of 
the corporate vision of employment relations: 
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Nissan and other contemporary greenfield site operators strive towards a fully corporate 
manufacturing organisation that contains within it what at best can only be described as 
sublimated conflict. (Garrahan & Stewart ibid. pp66-67) 
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A fourth way in which industrial relations was affected by government sponsorship was 
through the way in which the government re-defined its own role as an employer. Key 
to this was the shift away from a 'model employer' ethos. Thornley (1995) notes, 
however, that this ideal concept of the state being 'model employer' is itself a myth. 
She points out that such a definition views the state as neutral, and therefore ignores the 
differences in party political influence, or how the dynamics of industrial conflict vary 
between sectors. She argues that the 'model employer' assumption inherently views 
industrial relations within the state as a series of 'processes, thereby ignoring the 
outcomes of conflict. There is strength in this argument. Indeed, the very fact that it is 
this self-same 'model employer' that is subjecting public sector workers to the 
discipline of the market, belies the notion that employment relations within the state are 
inherently stable. However, in principle it could be accepted that the Government, 
during the 1980s, consciously moved away from practices associated with what was 
regarded as 'model employer' practice. 
Some significant changes to the industrial relations climate, as a whole, took place 
during the 1980s then. All of the above mentioned changes had a significant bearing in 
the way in which industrial relations was conducted in local government. The overall 
function of legislation, employment deregulation, privatisation and the lionising of 
employment 'best practice' in high profile FDI deals, has been to induce 'market 
awareness' into the workforce as a whole. The following section will highlight how 
these changes affected industrial relations in local government. 
Local Government Industrial Relations 
The formal industrial relations structures in local government have developed as part of 
the general reorganisation of collective bargaining arrangements in the state throughout 
the twentieth century. Tbis, in turn, has been tied-up with the growth - and later 
contracting - of the state sector and the shifting profile of occupations and trades within 
it, and with the prevailing industrial relations climate nationally. 
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a) Bargaining structures . 
The first formal bargaining structures to emerge in local government were those that 
emerged as a result of the Whitley Committee's recommendations for Civil Service 
practice in 1919. The recommendations were initially resisted by the government 
because it was argued that public sector employees could not be assessed for relative 
performance with relation to the market, as was the case in the private sector (Thomson 
& Beaumont 1978). Whitley Councils, however, were eventually recognised as being 
the official joint negotiating bodies for Civil Servants. Local government inclusion in 
this mechanism took longer. Despite union demands for national bargaining structures 
and the setting up of sectional bodies such as the National Joint Industrial Councilfor 
Local A uthorities'Non Trading Services for some manual workers in local government, 
national bargaining did not become the prime focus of industrial relations in local 
government until wartime legislation shifted the agenda in, 1940 (Thomson & 
Beaumont ibid. ). The bargaining focus of Whitleyism. was based upon the principle of 
consultation (rather than bargaining), upon a principle of consensus agreements and of 
national, rather than local, bargaining (Fairbrother 1996). The trade unions involved in 
local government (NALGO and NUPE) were founded, in the main, as 'staff 
associations' and developed in line with local government management. Here union 
structures developed in line with Whitley structures. 
By the 1970s, the collective bargaining structures set up for local government were 
becoming increasingly anachronistic (Fairbrother ibid. ). Bargaining between unions and 
employers became more hostile as local government became a target for budgetary 
constraints. With this, the Whitleyist assumption of consensus disappeared, though 
national bargaining remained. 
b) Developments in the 1980s and 1990s 
Along with the generally hostile climate facing trade unions in the 1980s, local 
government trade unions faced the further ignominy of representing workers in a sector 
controlled by the government's political opponents. As was noted in chapter 2, local 
government formed a large proportion of public expenditure and was seen as a potential 
threat to the monetarist economic plan of the 1980s, particularly where it was controlled 
by of the Government's political opponents. NALGO and NUPE were portrayed as 
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being part of an 'unholy alliance' along with profligate high spending authorities: 
finther, they were also demonised for their part in collapse of the previous Labour 
Government's Social Contract incomes policy in the Winter of Discontent in 1978/9. 
While there was a brief time when alliances that held together the new urban left (NUL) 
in local government held some degree of coherence, this was not to say that there were 
not tensions even here leading, paradoxically, to higher than average levels of industrial 
conflict in these authorities. Heery (1987) notes the paradox that Labour left 
administrations, which tended to be more generous employers and which were 
nominally working in allegiance with the trade unions, tended to face greater resistance 
from trade unions because of (a) the strength of trade unions in Labour controlled areas 
and (b) because of an underlying mutual mistrust about the means by which 
decentralisation and equal opportunities policies were being implemented. While Heery 
notes that conflict was often due to the confrontational stance by which NUL 
administrations attempted to implement decentralisation and equal opportunities 
policies, Lansley et al (1989) locate the problem in the weakness and political naivetd 
of NUL administrations, being guilty of failing to adequately confront unions. In 
contrast, Miller (1996) notes that, for NALGO activists in Islington Council in the 
1980s, difficulties arose where they were trying to match a variety of interests: 
politically, being supportive of the NTJL agenda; professionally being concerned about 
the service; but as trade unionists, being concerned about the likely impact on 
members' working conditions and of the impact on the union as a whole. 
Trade Unions and Quality 
There is a close correlation between the introduction of performance management and 
quality management initiatives and an increasing trend toward the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining arrangements in local authorities. According to Bryson et al 
(1993) the introduction of quality and performance management initiatives 
... have had a major impact on the personnel practices of these authorities 
including the 
introduction of performance related pay for white collar staff and in some cases profit 
related pay for manual staff in direct service organisations. This represents a major 
departure from the tradition of the national agreement which sought to set national standards 
in terms and conditions of work. (Bryson et al 1993 p563) 
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This is due to assumptions within quality management about the prescribed structure of 
the work organisation and the recommended communications structures within this. 
Both of these have no fonnal place for collective bargaining. 
a) Delayering and collective bargaining 
... implementation [of TQMj begins with the drawing-up of a quality policy statement, and 
the establishment of the appropriate organisational structure, both for managing and 
encouraging involvement in quality through teamwork. (Oakland 1989 p29 - italics added) 
Implementing 'pure' TQM successfully into a local authority implies structural re- 
organisation of some sort. TQM is not dis-similar to HRM in this. There are two 
dangers for union organisation here. First, it re-focuses strategic decision-making, 
affecting the authority-wide collective bargaining relationships; and second, it re- 
focuses operational decision-making, potentially challenging the role of the union 
representative or shop steward. 
The decentralising focus of TQM tends to shift the focus of bargaining to localised 
bargaining. The focus is on the de-centralisation of decision-making, thus enabling the 
'empowerment' of frontline staff to be more responsive to customer, or service user 
needs. Because the adoption of TQM-type policies have been made realisable through 
the internal restructuring required for CCT (see chapter 3) it is possible that a quality 
policy may not be directly responsible for shifts in bargaining structures per se. 
Nevertheless, successful implementation of TQM, according to its protagonists, 
depends upon this reorganisation. This may have serious implications for the 
bargaining structures that trade unions operate under in local government, which is 
based overwhelmingly on Whitley-based national agreement based structures. Colling 
(1995a) and Fairbrother (1996) note the detrimental effects that local government 
decentralisation strategies have had on trade unions. Conversely, Beaumont (1990) 
notes that national bargaining has been based upon, among other factors, local 
government unions traditionally having inadequate local steward organisation to 
successfully negotiate locally. In such circumstances localised bargaining in such 
circumstances may even have the effect of a derecognition scenario. A comparison of 
typical bargaining arrangements in local government are reproduced from Beaumont 
(ibid. ) and shown in Tables 4: 2 and 4: 3 below. Though not fully comparable, they do 
indicate the general shift towards localisation throughout the 1980s. 
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Table 4: 2: Public Sector Bargaining Structures - 1978 
National National plus 
only supplementary Local No agreement 
Managers 76.7 11.3 2.7 9.3 
Professionals 80.0 12.9 0.9 6.2 
Intermediate non-manual 82.7 12.8 1.1 3.3 
Junior non-manual 86.8 9.7 1.1 2.3 
Foremen 
. 
70.0 19.3 5.5 5.2 
Skilled manual 65.1 27.4 3.5 3.9 
Semi-skilled manual 78.4 17.1 1.1 3.4 
Unskilled manual 66.6 28.2 2.0 3.1 
(ref. Gregory & Thomson BJIR XIX/1 1981 - IN: Beaumont 1992 PI 06) 
Table 4: 3: Local Government Bargaining Structures 1990 
National National Local with ref. 
conditions modified by to national Local 
(Districts 1990) (unmodified) local conditions conditions 
variations 
Chief Executives 24.4 55.4 13.6 6.1 
Chief Officers 25.8 54.9 13.6 5.6 
APT&C 26.8 57.3 11.7 4.2 
Manual 33.8 46.0 12.7 4.7 
Craft & Chief Officers 38.0 43.7 11.3 3.3 
(ref. NALGO IN Beaumont 1992: pi 13. ) 
Another aspect of structural reorganisation is the desired effect on official lines of 
communication which, in TQM, is intended to allow more effective managerial 
decision-making at the operational level. The intention, here, is to simplify internal 
decision-making through the replacement of vertical hierarchies with horizontal 
structures and teams. 
Two critical communications issues in TQM are communications relating to decision- 
making channels, and communications/information about processes. At the lowest 
hierarchical level, communications would ideally be expected to be informal and 
incremental with increased routine decisions being taken at the lowest level through 
'teams' and through the basic operations of internal customer-supplier chains. 
At the senior organisational level, decision-making may be expected to be strategic, 
highly structured and play a high emphasis on 'leadership' and planning. Most TQM 
models stress a critical role in top-down decision-making at this level, emphasising a 
need for the TQM message to flow downwards through an organisation's structure. The 
dmanagement team' would be expected to have the authority and responsibility to take 
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agreed action and would meet regularly to report back on progress. One possible 
version of this is in the use of 'team-briefings' whereby information is transmitted 
progressively downwards throughout the organisation, through small briefing sessions 
based around the team format (see figure 4: 3). While it is rarely mentioned in 
prescriptive TQM literature, it is assumed that trade-unions would accept these official 
lines of communications. This is due, largely, to the fact that TQM was developed 
around unitarist assumptions of organisational culture. 
Figure 4: 3: Team-Briefing (generic) 
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The structural and communications requirements within quality management, then, 
potentially challenge the established lines of communications between stewards and 
members in a highly unionised set-up; and challenge the standard format of collective 
bargaining. Where unions are by-passed on some of the operational decision-making 
issues, unions could be isolated from important areas and could face legitimacy 
problems from members. It was this perceived threat by unions that led to Ford 
abandoning early attempts to set-up quality circles in the early 1980s (Starkey & 
McKinlay 1989). 
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b) Employment changes in local government 
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Another, more blunt, challenge to trade union organisation comes from the effects of 
declining employment and the shift in the composition of employment in local 
government. The take-up of quality management initiatives in local government have 
been on the back of the managerialist agenda shift described in chapter 2 and 3. To. 
summarise, managerialism justifies the use of commercial management practices to 
replace 'outmoded' models of public service management it asserts the unchallenged 
management prerogative in organisational decision-making. While quality management 
methods are wholly compatible with these unitarist assertions, its protagonists are likely 
to be keen to distance its paternalistic aspirations to 'empower' workers from workers' 
prior association of management change programmes and the adoption of commercial 
management practices. Conversely these same quality management methods may be 
implicitly being used to 'focus minds' - where increased managerial scrutiny of output 
performance go hand in hand with selective job cutting. In short, CCT has proved to be 
one of the major catalysts for the adoption of quality management and with large scale 
downgrading of employment conditions. Table 4: 4 shows the marked fall in full-time 
employment in local government from 1985. While some areas have seen a rise 
(Economic Development and Housing) those most exposed to CCT have seen marked 
decline (Construction, Leisure, Refuse). While some other services have been positively 
affected by the transference of responsibility to local government (Social Services 
through Care in the Community), others have been adversely affected by opt-out 
legislation (non teaching Education through Polytechnic 'incorporation' and Local 
Management of Schools). Overall, though, full-time employment in local government 
declined by nearly 20% over this period. 
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Table 4: 4: Change in Local Government Full-Time Employment 1985 - 
1997 (England, Selected Services) 
Service 
1985 
No (k) 
1990 
No (k) % Diff (85)1 
1997 
No (k) % Diff (85) 
Education (non teaching) 169 160 -5.5 118 - 
Construction 103 93 -9.2 55 -46.6 
Social Services 138 155 +12.6 151 +9.8 
Libraries, Museums & Art Galleries 23 24 +1.6 20 -14.3 
Leisure & Recreation 65 64 -2.3 44 -32.2 
Environmental Health 19 18 -2.7 16 -15.8 
Refuse, Recycling & Cleansing 38 30 -21.4 23 -37.8 
Housing 50 58 +15.6 59 +17.9 
Planning & Economic Development 19 22 +13.6 25 +29.5 
Other2 235 224 -4.6 163 -30.7 
ITotal 860 849 -1.3 676 -21.4 
(,, source Joint titaffing VVatcn: vitso; ivvu; ivvt- rigures r-u-) 
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In addition to this trend, the tenure of employment in local government has shifted. 
Figure 4: 4 shows how the distribution of total employment has been consistently 
moving from full-time to part-time employment - part-time employees now over half of 
all employees in local government services covered by the main public service unions 
outside teaching. 
1% Diff = per cent change in staff from 1985 level 
2 'Other includes 'Miscellaneous Services' and 'Transport' from pre 1990 JSW figures and 'Engineering & Technical' 
'Corporate Services: Finance & Computing' and 'Corporate Services: Other from 1990 onwards JSW figures. 
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Figure 4: 4: Full-Time/Part-Time Employment (England, Selected 
Services) 
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(Source Joint Staffing Watchý 1985,1990,1995,1996,1997: see footnote 2 from table 4: 4) 
Quality and Trade Union Strategies for Renewal 
Trade union responses to the (often unilateral) introduction ot' management initiatives 
such as HRM and TQM have been mixed. This has in large part been due to the general 
problems being faced by unions over the 1980s and 1990s and 01' the Subsequent 
reactive nature of trade union responses. By the start of' the 1990S, Union responses 
were beginning to show signs of more coherent responses to IIRM and TQM 
initiatives. These responses tied-up with more general responses to the issue of' trade 
union 'renewal'. Arguments providing solutions for trade union renewal necessarily 
depend upon the definition of the main cause ofunion decline. While Consensus exists 
as to the general factors involved - being hostile legislation, labOUr market changes, 
higher levels of permanent unemployment. cyclical economic conditions - no sLIch 
agreement exists as to which factors have been the determining I'lictors. These 
arguments, however, have affected unions' outlook and, from 1997, government policy 
on trade unions. Broadly. union responses tend to follow a number of gellerýll 
approaches. The Irish Congress ofTrade I Inions (nd) offer what is probably the most 
useful typology of potential responses to I IIZM/'I'QM, these being opposition. local 
Work and Trade Unions in Local Government 77 
responses, minimalist responses, positive approaches or active promotion with a union 
agenda (see table 4: 5). 
Table 4: 5: Trade Union Approaches to HRM/TQM 
Option Benefits Risks 
Opposition Maintains traditional adversarial Unions by-passed by management 
approach 
No need to adapt or change Members questioning relevance of union 
membership 
Miss opportunity to be involved in quality 
initiatives 
LocalResponse Allows issues to be addressed Wide variety of local practices 
without having a formal policy 
Maintains adversarial position No support or guidance from trade union 
nationally, while presenting a 
4positive' response locally 
No blurring of traditional IR agenda Reacting rather than influencing 
management proposals 
No need for unions to change or Quality initiative remains with management 
adapt 
Minimalist Provides clear policy and guidelines Takes no account of; 
Approach * local practices 
" existing relationships 
" reasons for and scope of initiatives 
Provides framework for local Limits scope of local officials to develop 
officials and members optimum solution 
Maintains uniformity of approach Could be perceived as negative, if 
conditional upon achieving 'up-front' 
agreement 
Positive Allows for tailor made approach Could blur traditional 'us and them' 
Approach relationships 
Allows unions to optimize their Blurring of traditional bargaining agenda 
level of input 
Opportunity for greater involvement Undermining of union solidarity 
of members 
Builds members identification with Variety of local outcomes 
union 
More involved in shaping final 
outcomes 
Actively More involved in setting Could be perceived as 'doing 
Promote with management's job' 
Own Agenda 
Seen to address wider needs Undermining of union solidarity 
(Source: ICTU nd) 
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In practice, Fitzgerald et al (1996) note three broad 'clusters' of responses in the UK. 
The 
, 
first cluster, typified by the (ex) EETPU, is one of positive acceptance. For this 
union, this response is in line with their general 'social partnership' stance on industrial 
relations adopted throughout the 1980s. This model, however, is also the one that is 
implicitly (if not explicitly) adopted by the Labour Government from 1997, and is 
justified by the generic Post-Fordism line of reasoning. A second cluster identified by 
Fitzgerald et al is one associated with the GMB and is described as a pluralist stance - 
accepting the management agenda, but within the context of the centrality of collective 
bargaining. The third cluster identified is the one associated with the TGWU and is 
described as 'holding on to independence' - an assertion of union autonomy where it 
reluctantly had to accept HRM practices. In the context of 'public service' however, no 
official union response has yet been forthcoming. In this type of work the issue of 
6 quality' takes on additional political significance - as a weapon in protecting services; 
or as a means by which to make staff more efficient. With these points in mind, the 
remainder of this chapter will define a condensed typology of union strategies, based 
upon the main arguments proposed by academics and commentators. The broad 
categories are (i) responses based upon the realisation that collectivism is in permanent 
decline, (ii) responses based upon the premise that the industrial relations climate is 
cyclical (iii) responses based upon the need to build wider coalitions (iv) responses 
based upon 'bottom-up' approaches of union renewal. 
a) Changes in the nature of collectivism 
The first model for renewal is associated with the generic Post-Fordism/flexible- 
specialisation argument, described in chapter 2. This forms the basis of the arguments 
used by 'new realist' approaches, such as that adopted by the now defunct EETPU. The 
Post Fordist interpretation has arguably been the most influential of all the solutions 
offered for trade union revival because, despite it apparently undermining the very 
legitimacy of collective action or association. The ideas explicit in Post Fordism 
became increasingly implicit in the policy proposals of the Labour Party during the 
1980s, influencing policy areas relating to public service provision by challenging 
universalist principles and providing enhanced legitimacy to the types of managerialism 
described in chapter 2. In the area of industrial relations the Post Fordist models of 
4 partnership' and co-determination began to influence policy after the 1987 general 
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election defeat (Labour Party 1988). It now provides the assumptions which underpin 
the 'New Labour' government policy agenda on the issue of trade unions and 
employment. 
Post Fordism essentially asserts that collectivist associations have become redundant in 
(post) industrial society due to the shift away from mass production and mass 
consumption patterns, in favour of niche markets and individualist social and political 
identity. The industrial relations manifestation of this thinking is that, to survive, trade 
unions should embrace 'social partnership' models of industrial relations and offer 
members fringe benefits: 
The EETPU's lead in embracing private pension schemes, BUPA, internal flexibility, union- 
organised training and single-company unions are all consistent with this path of post-Fordist 
industrial relations (Murray 1988 p12) 
The argument goes that unions became out of touch with members during the 1980s, 
and were feeling increasingly alienated by confrontational approaches to industrial 
relations. This change of attitude was caused by the change in composition of the 
working population, through a Post Fordist logic, to a flexible, part-time, feminised 
workplace. The benefits of abandoning Tordist' modes of collectivism are said to be 
increased, consultation of management and increased legitimacy for the union. The issue 
of quality, of course, is seen as the very manifestation of Post-Fordist production. 
There are, apart from the issues already identified in chapter 2, problems with the 
assumptions that determine this agenda. First, it is assumed that women, white collar, 
4 pink collar' and professional workers necessarily have, a different agenda to the 
4 militant' male blue collar workers associated with the 1970s. However, should these 
arguments hold true it would be expected that local government industrial relations 
would be particularly affected by these treýds. Although local government has a 
sizeable blue collar section to its work-force, it is also made up of large numbers of 
white collar, professional and clerical staff and it has a large number of women workers 
- and these were the areas that saw a large growth in membership during the 1970s 
(Kelly 1990). Despite the increasing use of part-time and temporary employment and 
the effects that CCT has had, union membership in the 1990s, despite some decline, 
remains relatively high. As has been noted, the direction of the relationship between 
management and unions during the, 1980s and early 1990s became more, not less, 
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confrontational and therefore the notion that any gender or occupational changes to the 
work-force necessarily correlates with changes to a collectivist stance would seem 
false. Indeed, loyalty towards professional or service-user based ethical principles has 
often led to a reinforcement of the legitimacy of union activity within the workplace. ' 
Despite these problems, the generic Post-Fordist model seems to have been influential 
within trade unions. Heery and Kelly (1994) term this as a shift to 'managerial 
unionism' whereby the servicing of members' individual needs is based upon an 
assumption that trade union membership is based upon instrumentalism. Trade unions 
have accordingly embarked upon internal reorganisation, managerial rationalisation and 
the use of advertising: effectively appealing to the assumed managerialist values that 
employers adopt to harness employee commitment. 
b) Cyclical changes in trade union activity 
An alternative suggestion for the decline in trade union membership and participation, 
based upon a shift in the nature of collectivism, is that which sees workers' insecurity 
caused by labour market insecurity brought on by downturns in the business cycle. 
In some ways this argument contains some similarities with the Post Fordist analysis. In 
its crudest form it contains an element of determinism - particularly where over- 
associated with Kondratieff cycles. However, less deterministic variants have been 
applied to the fortunes of trade unions and do provide some useful insights and, in 
addition, the business cycle argument does not assume any permanent shift in collective 
consciousness. In assessing the crisis in trade union membership recruitment and 
retention over the 1980s Kelly (1990) criticises the view that trade unions are 
necessarily on a path of continuous decline. The argument that membership decline is a 
product of a changing workforce structure - implied in Post Fordist analysis among 
others - is inconsistent with the overall shift in trade union membership over a longer 
period. The steep decline in union membership in the 1980s was preceded by a decade 
of s ustained growth in union membership. In addition, the membership growth in the 
1970s was particularly marked in white collar, technician and women workers. In 
addition, the decline in overall membership in the UK over the 1980s was not matched 
uniforrnly in other advanced capitalist (or so-called 'post industrial') economies. In 
many cases membership declined more steeply than in the UK - particularly in the US. 
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In other countries, however, membership increased - particularly noted here is Canada. 
This evidence, according to Kelly, suggests that a uniform trend cannot be based 
around any demographic shifts in the composition of the working population. 
Historically, Kelly notes the rise and fall in trade union membership and related this to 
the business cycle. During recessions in the late 19th century and 1930s, union 
membership and strike activity declined markedly. At periods of increased economic 
activity, however, workers increased security fuelled demands for increased wages and 
conditions. These processes can be seen in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Through the business cycle argument, then, the permeation into the workplace over the 
1980s of unitarist management methodologies such as quality management would be 
seen, not as an indicator of management legitimacy and consensus, but as an indicator 
of the current condition of management-union power relationships. Changes to these 
conditions could, then, see a change in the way quality management schemes are 
received and implemented. While cyclical explanations of trade union activity offers 
some explanations as to current and possible future industrial relations scenarios, they 
do not - nor they claim to - offer strategies or tactics to enact a change in the fortunes in 
trade union fortunes. Indeed, the growth of 'managerialist unionism' could be seen as 
the 'cyclical' response to trade union fortunes within the present business cycle. 
The inter-related factors of relative employer/union power resources and the existence 
of periods of cyclical re-adjustment provide some base criteria to formulate potential 
strategies for trade unions. Kelly's model, above, refers to Batstone's (1988) model. 
Batstone discusses the issue of strategy in relation to how changes to production 
systems, product markets and institutional patterns of regulation interact with the 
permanent features determining trade union and employer power resources. The power 
resources discussed are worthy of further consideration here. Trade unions' power 
resources are derived from members' individual power resources within the workplace 
and the collective power resources derived from trade union organisation. Individual 
worker's power resources are (a) the capacity to disrupt production, (b) the 'scarcity 
value ofthe characteristics which the worker brings to the employer' (ibid) - this being 
skill, knowledge etc., and (c) the political influence that workers can hold. The union's 
collective resources are derived from the ability to maximise the individual power 
resources, but is compounded by the level of ability to gain association - membership - 
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by workers and by the level of its capacity to mobilise its members. Figure 4: 5 provides 
a summary. 
Figure 4: 5: Trade Union Power Resources 
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All of the above factors are affected by the goal of the union - ranging from militancy 
through to instrumentalism - and of the changing power resources of the employer; all 
of which are affected by said changes to production systems, product markets and 
institutional arrangements. Further to this, union strategy is affected by its approach to 
achieving its major goals - often leading to compromising on short term agenda to 
achieve what is perceived to be achievable. The union's position here, then, is 
determined by its mobilising capacity which, in turn, is affected by such factors as 
membership density, level of commitment and involvement by members and the 
complexity of the organisation members are employed at. 
In the local government scenario, then, a number of factors combine. CCT has proven a 
catalyst in weakening political influence of members through relocating the threat to 
employment relations away from the direct employer to an unknown external 
contractor. CCT has also affected the level of complexity within the local government 
organisation. Nominally, complex organisations could be considered to increase inertia 
in negotiating mechanisms - unions requiring more complex forms of representation 
and employers finding consensus agreements more difficult to achieve. The devolution 
of management structures involved in CCT - and more so with TQM - breaks down this 
intertwining of conflicting interests. This last factor has assisted managements' in their 
capacity to reorganise workplace relations away from authority-wide negotiations. 
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Dealing with unions closer to the workplace, however, may not undermine trade union 
organisation in the longer tenn, however, as will be discussed later. 
C) Public service coalitions and the co-opting of quality 
Another likely set of options for trade unions, with specific reference to public service 
unions, is that of co-opting the issue of quality to protect the interests of service users 
and employees alike. At a practical level, Unison has attempted to pursue the issue of 
quality as a justification for retaining in-house service provision against the threat of 
CCT 
Unison believes that public services should be provided by direct labour. 
It is important that the case for direct labour is re-stated to councils preparing for white 
collar CCT. We need to ensure that they are fully committed to the in-house service, and 
know why they are going through these processes. A commitment to direct labour can help 
shape many of the decisions councils face ... (Unison nd) 
While such a strategy, in the face of CCT, is probably in the best interests of Unison 
members, it does pose some dangers. Most significantly the promotion of quality, 
within the context of CCT, inevitably raises the danger of Unison being co-opted into 
the process of implementing quality management. As has been pointed out, the rules 
governing CCT ensure that quality can only be addressed in an exclusively 
managerialist context. In supporting, uncritically, the use of quality management for 
retaining services in-house could pose future dangers for Unison in its bargaining and 
steward organisation (as described above). 
Another option of adopting quality is offered by Miller (1996). From a study of 
industrial conflict at Islington Council during the 1980s, Miller suggests that the failure 
of the NUL strategy to harness the interests of user groups simultaneously with those of 
NALGO activists and members was due to the failure of the various parties (NUL 
councillors, community groups, professionals, managers and NALGO) to fully consult 
each other at the outset. This lack of consultation was exacerbated by a mutual lack of 
trust of each party's sectional interests and by the additional pressure being imposed by 
central government. Nevertheless, Miller argues that traditional industrial relations 
approaches are insufficient to understand the nature of industrial relations in this 
scenario because of the overlapping sectional interests of trade unionists in this 
scenario. Future strategies based on coalitions, it is argued, would be most likely to 
succeed under a broader social movement, which could more effectively marry the 
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interests of the groups concerned. In practical terms, Miller sees the likelihood of 
Unison being able to promote progressive public services, while simultaneously 
pursuing the interests of workers: 
The new union will also have to balance such competing internal sectional demands against 
those of organised service users, community organisations and social movements, as well as 
political parties, for better quality services, yet without necessarily gaining and automatic 
increase in resources, and greater involvement in the determination of social welfare policies 
and organisational structures and practices. It is likely, especially given the ebb and flow of 
such social forces at least in their local manifestation, that Unison will attempt to play a 
calculating game that protects as much of what it has, and is careful about what it trades in, 
in return for any changes to working practices. (Miller op cit p234) 
While Miller's focus of attention is based upon conflict emerging in NUL strategy on 
decentralisation, the argument could equally apply to the issue of 'service quality'. The 
problem again, however, is that the terms by which quality is likely to be pursued will 
be - at best - through user-defined quality byproxy ofmanagerial control. 
d) Workplace based unionism and union renewal 
With all the above changes and dislocations, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
position of trade unions within local government are becoming somehow anachronistic 
to current or future realities. The assertion that this may be the case is based, at least in 
part, upon an assertion that the nature of work itself is being individualised with the 
processes of managerialism. This assumption is strongly refuted, and discussed more 
fully in chapter 5. In terms of collective bargaining, however, the 'inevitable decline' 
argument is also refuted, upon the arguments stated earlier, that trade union bargaining 
power as a whole, tends to be tied into the broader business cycle. It is therefore quite 
possible that trade union activity as a whole could witness some resurgence. 
Using case-study evidence which includes a local authority housing department, Fosh 
(1993) argues that trade union viability can be greatly enhanced in situations where 
local leadership offers a collectivist outlook with a participative leadership style. 
Recognising that formal and informal union activity can be many faceted and may be 
motivated by an attachment to the union based on an individualistic or collectivist 
outlook; and motivated by an ideological or instrumentalist assumptions about 
collectivism, Fosh argues that 
... local leaders, by their ability to 
lead in a way that encourages members to become involved 
and to see the collective implications of the issues that arise, can build upon surges of 
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participation and interest, thus increasing the strength of workplace unionism. (Fosh 1993 
p581) 
Workplace-based renewal is most recently put forward by Peter Fairbrother (1994; 
1996). Fairbrother asserts that the changes that have been undermining trade union 
barganung power within the state sector over the 1980s onwards are now creating 
conditions within public sector unions, which have the potential for invigorating a new 
active and participatory form of trade unionism: 
With moves towards more decentralised forms of management, union members have taken 
tentative steps to generate more participative and active forms of unionism. This, however, is 
not a straightforward or inevitable process, being the subject of debate and contest about the 
best way to proceed in circumstances of uncertainty and unpredictability. Nonetheless, where 
union members exploit these structural circumstances, there is the prospect that a process of 
renewal will occur. (Fairbrother 1996: pI 11) 
Fairbrother's argument is based upon research conducted on activities observed in civil 
service unions and, crucially here, social services departments' NALGO and NTJPE 
branches in two local authorities. Structural changes to management within the two 
authorities had the effect of relocating the focus of bargaining power away from 
national and regional union officials, more toward local stewards who were negotiating 
with issues of terms and conditions on a more regular basis. 
The important factors in this process, for Fairbrother, could be summarised as 
following. The restructuring of the state over the 1980s has had the effect of devolving 
operational management whilst centralising strategic management issues, the latter 
holding the former to account through devolving budget responsibility under tight 
contractual control mechanisms. The effect of this has been the deregulation of 
important aspects of employment to management at the workplace level. The problem 
for local government unions here has been that the structure of bargaining mechanisms 
was based at national and regional level, based upon Whitley structures built around 
assumptions of unions being staff associations negotiating on a consensual basis. 
Despite the fact that these assumptions were being challenged within NUPE and 
NALGO in the 1970s, these structures remained the focus of the unions and were 
becoming increasingly anachronistic by the late 1980s. National-based bargaining 
structures discouraged membership participation at the local level and stewards were 
often used as mere ciphers to convey policy between membership and regional level 
officials. The shift towards localising employment conditions, then, created tensions 
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between local stewards, where the bargaining was now having to take place, and 
regional level, where the bargaining experience and expertise was located. From this 
Fairbrother has noted a 'partly submerged vibrancy' of union activity at department, 
rather than authority level, regional and authority-based activists and officials were now 
becoming dependent upon local activists for information as to developments occurring 
at the workplace level. 
No longer is it possible for unions to organise on the assumption of relatively remote and 
inactive memberships, involved in union activity at the behest of national leaders or regional 
officers. T'his is a form of unionism which does not allow local activists readily to address the 
pressing problems that have begun to emerge through the restructuring of the 1980s 
(Fairbrother 1996 p 136) 
While all this offers the possibility of union renewal in the state sector as a whole, and 
local government in particular, Fairbrother also warns against some dangers. First, 
because of the often dispersed nature of workplaces and variety of occupational groups 
involved in local government, there is a danger that developments to relocate the focal 
point of union activism could happen in a too ad-hoc manner, which would be counter- 
productive. Secondly, without some form of co-ordination, there lies a danger that splits 
could emerge within union branches. Third, there is a danger that if localised 
developments *occur without any form of co-ordination, local agendas may veer toward 
enterprise unionism and/or the co-option of a local branch by sectional interests, 
possibly in pursuit of managerial goals 
Fitzgerald et al (1996) are wary of the 'union renewal' strategy because its analysis of 
the 'problem' - the under-developed nature of workplace-level trade unionism - 
assumes that pay bargaining structures reflect union activity and strength. However, 
Fitzgerald et al note that the 'renewal' approach does have some value with relation to 
quality management: 
The actual experience of managerial quality strategies may be very different as they are used 
to challenge traditional systems of job regulation. This is not an unmediated process 
particularly as professional codes and a public service ethos still permeate much of local 
government. Of equal importance is the role of the union branch and our case shows that there 
are opportunities to build on the organisational strength developed around CCT campaigns in 
order to seek to exploit the contradictions in management quality strategies. (Fitzgerald et al 
op cit p13 1) 
With these issues in mind there may be an agenda, within the 'union renewal' theme, 
by which the issue of quality may be fruitfully addressed by trade unions. 
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Summary 
The introduction of quality management into local government has occurred against a 
background of other important issues for trade unions. The nature of the labour market, 
the restructuring of local government and the general weakening of trade union power 
over the 1980s and 1990s has meant that trade unions have not been able to 
- successfully resist the imposition of such strategies. The introduction of quality 
management also offers some dangers for trade unions. First, quality management, in 
its prescribed form, potentially challenges national and authority-wide bargaining 
through the inherent decentralising tendencies involved in such strategies. Second, 
quality management also poses a challenge to steward organisation in the attempt to 
rationalise internal channels of communication. However, the prescribed forms of 
quality management are often not the versions that are actually implemented - even in 
the private sector where they originate - particularly where trade unions have been 
involved. While local government unions have, implicitly at least, endorsed the use of 
4quality' as a means of resisting CCT, the actual outcomes of the management-led 
schemes that may be implemented are likely to enter into the general arena of industrial 
relations, particularly at the workplace level. In this scenario a number of strategies 
may be adopted locally, though remaining fully integrated with national developments. 
Nationally, Unison should remain at the very least sceptical, rather than 'positive', 
about quality management. 
CHAPTER 5 
QUALITY AND THE STATE SECTOR LABOUR PROCESS IN 
THE1990S 
In chapter 4 the implications of introducing quality management into local government 
were examined in respect to the position of trade unions and collective bargaining. This 
chapter will examine the introduction quality management into local government and 
its implications for the regulation and organisation of work. This area relates strongly to 
the industrial relations aspect discussed in the previous chapter. However, due to a 
largely unwelcome dichotomy that seems to have developed between 'industrial 
relations theory' and 'labour process theory', it seems appropriate to address the issues 
separately in order to integrate the two issues. 
This chapter will highlight the major areas of theoretical concern which are important 
to the organisation of work in local government in the 1990s and in the emergence of 
newer forms of management control which have emerged - particularly the co-option of 
4quality'. In order to assess this, it is important to consider a number of wider 
influences. The main influences concerned here are the influence of current orthodoxies 
surrounding work in the 1990s - 'flexibility', 'insecurity' etc; developments in the 
reorganisation of employment in the public sector in the 1990s; and the content of 
'new' forms of management - particularly quality management. 
Employment Patterns in the 1990s 
There is no doubt that the qualitative nature of the UK labour market altered in the 
1980s. Inspired by new right economic doctrine, successive governments in the 1980s 
and early 1990s made various attempts to remove 'rigidities' from the labour market. 
Labour market 'rigidities', here, are seen as any obstacle to the ability of an employer 
to reduce labour costs through (a) its unilateral ability to hire and fire labour; (b) the 
ability to bid down wages with recourse only to going market rates; * and (c) the ability 
to maximise output from its workers through its manipulation of the reward-effort 
bargain'. The obstacles variously identified were, then, trade unions, all forms of wage- 
' Another 'supply-side' rigidity Is the issue of skills and the degree to which the skills workers possess match the skills 
employers require. 
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fixing, state benefits that diminished dependency upon employment as the main source 
of income, and legal restrictions placed upon employers. Partly because the new right 
was not fully coherent ideologically (see chapters 2 and 4) and partly because of 
6 politics', the 'supply-side' policies pursued during the 1980s were uneven in their 
application and outcomes. As is discussed in chapter 4, however, trade unions were 
always seen as the most important target and policy aimed at neutralising the effect of 
trade unions was pursued relentlessly. Dealing with the 'trade union issue' was the 
prerequisite in allowing the other changes in labour supply: these being abolishing 
wage councils, loosening employer liabilities and restrictions on employment, and 
creating more favourable conditions for employers when managing the effort-reward 
bargain in the labour process. It could be argued that 'globalisation' has been an 
important determinant of change here as well. However, the debate as to the specific 
nature of 'globalisation' is, at present, unclear and in most guises is prone to some of 
the over-generalised and determinist assumptions present in the Post-Fordist analysis 
(criticised in chapter 2) and in much of the 'flexibility' analysis - discussed below. 
Where 'globalisation' can be said to be of concern here, is in the almost unlimited 
capacity that now exists for the movement of capital. Even here, however, capital 
movement was, in the UK at least, enabled largely through deregulation of capital 
controls in the early 1980s (allowing capital to leave) and of the high levels of foreign 
direct investment directly encouraged by the Government (see chapter 4). 
Overshadowing these issues, however, was (and is) the prevailing issue of 
unemployment. The shift in the economy to permanently higher levels of structural 
unemployment were, consequences of government policy, through intent and through 
indirect outcomes (Layard & Nickell 1989). This, combined with the inter-related 
decline in trade union membership, described in chapter 4, provide some of the major 
determinants of the change in the labour market as a whole. This being said, other 
important factors also contributed. The major one of importance here, has been the 
pervasive influence of 'flexibility'. 
a) The orthodoxy of flexibility 
Flexibility is currently seen as not only a positive heuristic by a consensus of all the 
major political parties and management, but also as a labour market fact. The 1990s has 
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effectively seen the reffication of flexibility. An examination of the more specific 
claims about flexibility, however, make the claims into its empirical reality 
unconvincing. Flexibility has been criticised as being an amorphous term referring to a 
number of different situations (Pollert 1991). In one version flexibility refers to 
employer strategy, in another it refers to the adaptability of workers, and in yet another 
it refers to the legal framework governing employment. 
In the 'flexible firm' model it is argued that organisations are increasingly dividing 
their work-forces into 'core' and 'periphery' workers (Atkinson & Meager 1986). Core 
workers are deemed to be functionally flexible, being multi-skilled and occupying 
positions of relative labour market security. Peripheral workers, in contrast, are deemed 
to be numerically flexible - typically being temporary, part-time or sub-contracted and 
thus occupy insecure sectors of the labour market. In another version Beatson (1995) 
proposes 'flexibility on the extensive margin' - meaning the ability of a firm to modify 
the number of employees; flexibility of the intensive margin' - meaning the ability of a 
firm to re-deploy labour internally; and 'wage' or 'reward' flexibility - meaning the 
ability of a firm to modify payment and incentive schemes to suit market conditions. 
Empirically, however, evidence of these employer-strategy models is, at the very least, 
inconclusive (Hunter et al 1993) and even where there may be evidence of such a 
strategy, it is unclear as to how this compares historically to any period of time where 
all employment was secure (Pollert op. cit. ). 
Other definitions of flexibility are tied to 'radical break' theories such as that of Post 
Fordism, flexible specialisation and regulationism (Pollert op. cit. ) - which are subject 
to the criticisms described in chapter 2. 
The fact that flexibility may be suspect as an absolute reality, however, is less 
significant than its increasing orthodoxy among policy makers and employers. Pollert 
has identified flexibility as an orthodoxy which serves to obscure the wider context in 
which it is used: 
... the overarching importance of flexibility during the 1980s are complex, involving the 
relationship of ideology and concrete developments in policy and practice ... : the resurgence of 
neo-classical economic policies, preoccupation with strategic management, 'Japanisation' and 
dualism. But there is a further political and ideological level of explanation which locates the 
flexibility debate within the conservative tradition of industrial society theory and models of 
social integration and equilibrium. (Pollert 1991 p9) 
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b) The insecure workforce 
While the agenda surrounding flexibility is inexorably tied up with certain ideological 
connotations, an emerging debate is developing around the concept of the 'insecure 
workforce' (Heery and Salmon 1998). It is accepted that problems may exist with 'the 
insecure workforce' definition if contemporary employment is seen as being insecure 
relative to prior periods, which offered stability - which is clearly not the case if female 
employment and employment among ethnic minorities, as well as labour market 
segregation based on 'skill' is taken into account. However, a concept of the insecure 
workforce can offer a recognition that, as a consequence of higher structural 
unemployment, deregulated employment protection, weaker trade unions and a 
managerialist hegemony of the employment agenda, that there is a general perception 
that jobs are perceived as being less secure in the 1990s than they have been in previous 
periods - Beynon (1997) summarises the evidence of this general perception. 
Furthermore, the 'insecure workforce' does not resort to neo-classical ideological 
assumptions or to the problems of labour market dualism which are problematic in the 
radical break assertions of flexibility. Indeed, while not assuming homogeneity among 
the workforce, insecurity is likely to affect more than the so-called peripheral workers. 
The effects of 'downsizing' and out-sourcing - seemingly viewed as a fashionable 
indicator of corporate virility in the 1990s - tends to threaten core as well as peripheral 
workers. The dualism inherent in flexibility fails to recognise that today's functionally 
flexible core worker -cannot be guaranteed not to be tomorrow's numerically flexible 
peripheral worker. 
A perception of insecurity is hard to define, but is more related to the fear of 
redundancy and unemployment than the actual rate of redundancy and unemployment. 
As Brown (1997) notes, if the perceptions are real then so are the consequences of those 
perceptions. Despite a number of studies implying that such insecurity is unjustified 
through the evidence displayed in redundancy rates, government rhetorical assertions 
that there will be no more 'jobs-for-life' effectively states labour market insecurity as 
officialpolicy: if there is no insecurity then government labour market policies over the 
1980s and 1990s would be deemed to have failed. 
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The existence of an underlying insecurity will obviously have an affect on the labour 
process but the effects are likely to be difficult to assess when tied up with managerial 
strategies that call for employee commitment. A scenario can be envisaged whereby 
management strategy demanding employee commitment may get such commitment out 
of fear rather than enthusiasm., This issue will be discussed in relation to quality later. 
Another factor of importance, here, is the fact that changes to the public sector have 
meant that, in contrast to perceptions in the past, insecurity is now a factor in public 
sector employment. 
Work in the Public Sector 
"The general trend is thatjobs are heing lost, andjewer people are trying to do as much or 
more work.. All this talk of efficiency savings is just getting rid of people, and persuading 
staff to work harder. " Spokeswoman for Unison on local government employment. 
(Independent on Sunday 21 Sept 1997) 
While there is no definitive analysis of a distinctive labour process existing in the state 
sector, it is clear that there are certain characteristics involved in the organisation of 
work in the public sector which distinguish it from the organisation of work in the 
private sector. Most importantly, the labour process in a private sector organisation is 
linked to the accumulation prý)cess and, ultimately, the driving mechanism for defining 
managerial success in the organisation of work, here, is profit. This mechanism does 
not exist in most of the areas that remain in the public sector in the UK in the 1990s. 
The aim of government policy from the 1980s onwards, however, was aimed at 
changing this relationship through the series of measures described in chapter 2. Flynn 
(1994) notes that public service organisations in the 1990s have a number of 
distinguishing organisational characteristics as a result of these changes. First, public 
service organisations are now divided into either 'buyers' or 'sellers'; second 
competition has increased both between and within organisations; third, moves have 
been made to 'devolve' management; fourth, there have been moves away from 
national pay bargaining (see chapter 4); and fifth, differentials have increased within the 
effected organisations. 
A number of important developments arise from these issues. First, because the 
marketisation of public sector organisations was explicitly intended to increase 
productivity within these services, there was an associated knock-on effect on the 
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working conditions of employees in these services. Second, the marketisation of public 
services produces a different set of outcomes to normal market conditions and therefore 
a different effect on the labour process than in either the private sector, or the 
'traditional' public sector. Third, the managerialist agenda that has driven the whole 
process of public service transformation challenges the autonomy of a relatively 
powerful group of workers within public services - professionals. These issues will be 
further discussed below. 
a) Marketisation and the stimulation of productivity 
Government policy from the 1980s onwards has been aimed at attempting to stimulate 
market mechanisms into the public sector and in all cases one of the explicit aims has 
been to subject workers in the public sector to the same pressures and 'stimuli' that 
workers in the private sector were subjected to. Where privatisation was not possible to 
achieve this, 'quasi markets' (LeGrand 1990) and contractual relationships were grafted 
onto the structure of public sector organisations to substitute market conditions: the 
internal market in the NHS, market testing in the Civil Service and CCT in local 
government. Explicit in the promotion of these policies was its intended impact upon 
productivity and working practices. 
"Competitive tendering means more than savings. Benefits accrue from setting clear 
specifications, the acquisition of new and improved management skills, the cultivation of a 
more business like and innovative approach, the removal ofrestrictive practices, the setting of 
targets for standards and productivity and the development of performance indicators. The 
whole process, whether authorities have won the work themselves or awarded contracts to 
private firms, has been the catalystfor increased efficiency, better value for money, and the 
best possible service for the customer. " (Ian Lang, MP, Secretary of State for Scotland, 
speaking in Scottish Grand Committee on local government structure and finance in Scotland 
on 18 June 199 1: cited in Competingfor Quality: DoE 199 1) 
The most obvious form in which an improving 'efficiency' could be demonstrated was 
through the reduction in employment. During the 1980s and 1990s the Conservative 
Government continuously made the 'over-staffing' of local authorities a political issue 
and with the ideological convergence of New Labour on this issue - in opposition and 
later into government - reducing employment in local authorities is now seen to be an 
end in itself. In chapter 4, the reduction in direct and full-time employment over the 
1980s and 1990s has been indicated. Reducing direct staff does not in itsetf constitute 
an increase in efficiency; the link between output efficiency and direct employment 
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cannot be directly made. However, assuming that the levels of service needs and 
relative levels of service provision have remained constant, the large-scale reductions in 
full-time employment, combined with the shift from full-time to part-time employment 
(both indicated in figure 4: 8 in chapter 4) and the downward pressure that CCT places 
upon average wages and working conditions, the aggregate affect has been fewer staff 
doing more work on lower wages. Of course, 'other things not remaining equal' it is 
likely that some decline in levels of service provision has occurred. In any event, 
because it remains true that absolute employment has declined over this period, any 
increased productivity cannot be considered to be a zero-sum 'win-win' equation when 
considering the fortunes of those ex-employees. Indeed, for those remaining a question 
remains as to whether the productivity gains made (in terms of the output of work per 
employee) was (and is being) made through encouraging workers to work 'smarter-not- 
harder' or whether it was (and is being) made through the intensification of work. 
b) Quasi-markets and performance stimuli 
A second consequence of these developments is that the quasi-marketisation of public 
sector organisations produces two counter tendencies. On the one hand, the sudden 
transformation to quasi-commercial status inevitably produces a greater shock to the 
working conditions of those working within those organisations than would be expected 
in a 'normal' private sector organisation - where change could be expected to be 
permanent and gradual. Conversely, what remains of the public sector in the 1990s is 
that which is involved in non-marketable services - either because the services being 
produced are either public or merit goods, or because the services being provided 
remain too politically sensitive to be overtly privatised. Because of this much of the 
actual work involved in public services is not subject to 'market clearing' stimulated by 
market-based success criteria: the 'demand' for the work provided variously by social 
workers, librarians, nurses, tax officers, street cleaners or pest control officers is 
(largely) unaffected by general economic upswings or downswings. Introducing quasi- 
markets, then, will always be crude simulations, rather than actual manifestations of a 
&real' market. 'Demand' for services is isolated from its 'output'; and 'output' is 
completely separated from revenue generation (and the capacity to link productivity to 
reward). 
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C) Managerialism and professional workers 
A third characteristic of public sector work, partly relating to the previous point, is that 
public service organisations contain a significantly higher proportion of workers who 
adhere to a professional or 'public service' ethos, than is the norm in the private sector. 
These issues are perhaps most prominent in the area of quality, where the managerialist 
redefinition of quality seeks to remove discretionary decision-making from 
professionals (Lawson 1993; Davies & Kirkpatrick 1995). Professionals have 
traditionally been able to create labour market havens to ensure higher degrees of 
autonomy from orthodox managerial agendas. The introduction of a managerialist 
agenda that has accompanied the changes of the 1980s and 1990s, is therefore likely to 
introduce a new arena of confli6t between these traditional bUro-professionals and their 
managers, where professionals themselves are not co-opted into the process. Areas of 
conflict are likely to include scenarios where attempts to de-skill, regulate or 
standardise professionals' work in the name of efficiency, equity or customer 
responsiveness are met with resistance to the undermining of professional autonomy. 
Quality and the Labour Process 
The introduction of quality management into the operation of public services, then, 
must be seen within the wider context. Quality management is being introduced into a 
public service workplace, where employment security has been reduced through various 
quasi-market mechanisms, where the pressure to improve 'efficiency' is seen as the 
prime imperative, where trade unions retain a strong presence and where these issues 
coexist in a 'political' environment. For quality management to have any relevance 
within local government at all, then, the very rationale for its introduction must 
contribute to the changing relationships between these factors. While understanding the 
terrain into which quality management is entering in itself provides clues as to what 
quality management must be, to understand how quality management is likely to affect 
work in local government, it is necessary to take a closer examination of what quality 
does. This involves inter-related issues of managerial objectives, the labour process, 
power relations at work and control mechanisms. The number of contributing 
background features, however, adds to the variety of the pre-existing conditions likely 
to be found within any one organisation. While quality management may be 
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predisposed to affect certain changes in workplace relations, there are a number of 
possible outcomes in practice. Just as Taylorism came to be defined in terms of its 
outcome, rather than its intent (i. e. a workplace dominated by demarcation and complex 
collective bargaining, arrangements, rather than a workplace regulated by unitarist 
managerial decision-making operating reward management) so quality management 
should be judged. There is a tendency for writers to define various 'new, management' 
methods as representing continuity or change in managerial control mechanisms. 
Insufficient attention is paid to the fact that control mechanisms introduced by 
management may use a combination of control strategies. Here, then, just-in-time (JIT) 
production methods may be based upon forms of surveillance to which a 'panopticon' 
metaphor may be appropriate in one workplace scenario (Sewell & Wilkinson 1992); 
but this does not necessarily make the panopticon the basis of JIT. It may be that what 
appears to be total management hegemony of the labour process, upon closer 
examination requires the support of less 'pure' forms of control as circumstances 
change; perhaps because management cannot make the prescribed methods work at all 
to plan (Roper et al 1997). Quality management, as a 'new management' method, then, 
may well rely on a number of control methods to achieve its ends. 
Of key importance in defining what quality management - to use, for the moment, the 
generic term - attempts to do, is to understand, specifically how quality itself is defined 
and identified. Quality, as a precise concept, is elusive, as all the quality gurus assert. 
The following is a list of OED (1961) definitions of quality: 
1. Character, disposition, nature. 
2. A mental or moral attribute, trait, or characteristic; a feature of ones character; a 
habit. 
3. Rank or disposition in (a) society. Now rare. 
4. Nobility, high birth or rank, good social position. Now arch. 
5. Profession, occupation, business, esp. that of actor. 
6. Title, description, character, capacity. Now rare. 
7. An attribute, property, special feature or characteristic. 
8. The nature, kind or character (of something). Now restricted to cases in which there 
is a comparison (expressed or implied) with other things of the same kind; hence the 
degree or grade of excellence etc. possessed by a thing. 
9. Without article. 
10. Logic of propositions. 
1 II. A particular class, kind or grade of anything as determined by its quality. 
By these various definitions it is clear that quality has meant a number of things over 
time, but in all definitions the term has retained a degree of honorific status: quality is, 
and has been, universally perceived as good, as Pfeffer and Coote (1991) note. 
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However, rather than this being an unimportant aspect of quality, as Pfeffer and Coote 
imply, the fact that the term itself is so value-laden has implications for how working 
practices embued with such status is likely to be implemented and received. The 
definition of quality in the form that management requires it to be used is necessarily 
more specific because it has to be totally compatible with managerial decision-making 
processes. Ultimately for management, quality relates to the status of the product or 
service that an organisation produces, as defined by the end user. The importance of 
managing quality, then, is as important as managing the end price of the service or 
product. In a market situation the enhancement of product quality while maintaining a 
fixed price, enhances the relative value of the product and therefore increasing market 
share and ultimately, profits (quality management was developed entirely as a private 
sector methodology - as was described in chapter 3). Further to this quality, within 
quality management, can be ftirther broken down and a number of distinctions have 
been made by a number of writers - both prescriptive and critical. Distinctions between 
quality management 'styles' could be considered useful in highlighting a historical shift 
in emphasis from detective to preventative forms of quality management (see Legge 
1995). Similarly, distinctions between emphases on 'control' and 'assurance' 
approaches to quality is also often made (Walsh 1991). However, these distinctions do 
not allow for management practices that rely on combinations of styles and approaches: 
even in the 'pioneering' Japanese factories, while quality may be approached through 
internal customer chains, preventative methods and 'teamwork', in most cases, 
traditional 'inspectors' are still used to check the final product. Indeed, Elger & Smith 
(1998) note how a variety of differing labour strategies are used by Japanese transplants 
in the UK. Quality, then, does not depend upon a fixed mode of control. Rather than 
using a typology that requires a mutually exclusive definition of quality management 
style, then, the definition being proposed here is one that focuses on the particular 
aspect of quality that is being managed in any particular situation. 
Quality management operates upon three general aspects of quality. At the basic level, 
quality management is concerned with reducing waste, therefore reducing costs, and 
ultimately enhancing real productivity. Here, the focus is on reducing the level of 
defective products produced. At the second level, quality management is concerned 
with increasing the reliability of the product, thereby enhancing the reputation of the 
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product. Thirdly, quality management aims to directly enhance the value of the product, 
through improving the characteristics of the product. The form in which quality is being 
managed affects the way in which quality is managed. While much focus has been 
placed, by implication, upon the fact that organisations now see the third form of 
quality as the focus of attention, it should be noted that the management of the third 
form tends to assume that the second, form is already under control, which in turn 
assumes the prior control of the first form. Yet all three remain separate objectives. By 
implication, then, different quality objectives have different effects on the organisation 
of work. In TQM, all three of these objectives could be said to be important. Therefore 
the impact on the labour process could be expected to be complex. 
a) Managing for quality (i) increasing reliability (work standardisation) 
Increasing the reliability of a product or service requires increasing process consistency 
and implies a standardisation of work routines. Standardising work as a means to 
enhancing quality is, of course, very much a Taylorian approach to a problem, yet is 
forms the basis of systemic approaches to quality such as ISO 9000, which has proven 
so popular with managements over the 1980s and 1990s. The tendency for quality 
management to standardise work, however, cannot be dismissed as an anachronistic 
Fordist approach to the labour process, however. Work standardisation is built into any 
commercial management process that attempts to deal with the enhancement of product 
reliability. The 'unreliability' of a product or service is caused by a combination of an 
unreliable process and inadequate detection methods. Ultimately, prevention is 
preferable to detection, on a cost basis alone. Prevention, then, entails a standardisation 
of processes. This could entail the designing-in of fail-safe mechanisms into a process 
('poka-yoke') - whose purpose it is to remove discretion from the worker - or it could 
mean the use of measurement and monitoring processes to predict the future output of a 
process. In an large-volume production environment, detection, apart from being an 
unreliable method in itself, 'suffers from diminishing returns as the efficiency of the 
process increases. This is well illustrated in some of the 'mini-parables' found in some 
of the quality gurus' writing: an inspector whose job it is to verify the output of a 
process with a 30 per-cent defect rate, is more likely to be successful than an inspector 
attempting to detect the occasional defect from a process with a 0.5 per-cent defect rate. 
Therefore it is possible for an increase in the quality-efficiency of a process to lead to 
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an increase in the output defect-rate. The answer is the use of statistical process control 
(SPC). Through SPC, product and process variation is measured in order to control it. it 
is an important element in the preventative nature of problem-solving in TQM, 
providing the information for continuous improvement. For Deming SPC is critical but 
also plays a significant role in most of the gurus' models. 
Measurement must be seen as an integral part of a planned, implemented quality management 
programme. Selection of key measures must be part of senior management's responsibility 
and they must be collectively identified, agreed, monitored and used as the basis of decision 
making. (Bendell et al 1993 p3 1) 
The use of SPC to monitor process, performance is the norm in many manufacturing 
environments. It allows manufacturing operations to work to nominal defect rates of six 
defects per million parts - which is effectively zero considering that production runs 
will be operating at considerably less than one million. SPC itself, however, does not 
improve process reliability; SPC is operated as the tool by which processes can be fine 
tuned to ensure optimum settings for a zero-defect output. Importantly, though, 
information produced from SPC monitoring is information that enters into the domain 
occupied by managerial control. Not only is the process being made more transparent 
by use of monitoring, but so is the worker. Crucially, however, the aim of SPC 
monitoring i's to ultimately remove all variation from the process; that is to remove all 
worker discretion from the process. By incremental stages, the process is intended to 
become incrementally more knowable by management as the operation of that process 
becomes increasingly predictable. A fonnat for the use of SPC, as used in the motor 
industry, is reproduced in figure 5: 1, below. 
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Figure 5: 1: Process Control using SPC 
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(Adapted: Ford Motor Co 1984) 
The use of SPC has been mainly applicable to a manufacturing environment, where a 
process is mechanical. However, the principle is claimed to be universal. Quoting from 
the Ford SPC handbook: 
... the basic concept of using statistical signals to improve performance can be applied to any 
area where work is done, the output exhibits variation and there is a desire for improvement. 
Examples range from component characteristics to book-keeping error rates, performance 
characteristics to computer information system, or transit times for incoming materials. (Ford 
Motor Co 1984 p 1) 
The monitoring of performance has become an increasing focus in service areas: 
monitoring telephone response times, Monitoring written reply response times are 
examples. In the public sector this has been further encouraged by the increasing use of 
performance indicators: school league tables, Citizen's Charter indicators and even the 
much maligned 'cones hotline'. 
The proceduralisation of work processes is also the main function of ISO 9000 - which 
has also seen rapid growth in uptake from the late 1980s onward. ISO 9000 and its 
derivatives provides a standard format for the management of quality. While the system 
it creates is intended to be adaptable to any organisational setting, ISO 9000 has a 
number of specific pre-requisites: it requires strict documentation, accurate record 
retention and the ability to trace back any quality problems to their source. Here again, 
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then, in the name of improving service or product output reliability, there is a tendency 
towards the standardisation of work regimes occurring. 
b) Managing for quality (ii) reducing waste (increasing productivity) 
Managing to reduce the level of defective products (or services) produced is largely 
about identifying and reducing mistakes. In 'pure' Taylorist management, this is 
achieved by breaking down work tasks and de-skilling the worker through the use of 
designated quality inspectors. In just-in-time (JIT) production - with which TQM is 
partly derived - the onus is re-directed back to the worker. 
JIT reduces all elements of slack among the various factors of production (Oliver 
1991). The logic of JIT is to enhance exposure to the same uncertainties which are 
insulated against in 'just-in-case' methods. JIT's strength is in its ability to constantly 
seek out bottlenecks and problems in order to remove them. While JIT is concerned 
chiefly with the general productivity of a series of work processes, it is interconnected 
with the issue of quality, because quality concerns are one of the key causes of 
bottlenecks. JIT achieves this by reversing the direction of information flow i. e. 
information is generated from the final process and flows upstream. Buffers between 
processes are intentionally reduced to a bare minimum in order that, ideally, zero 
buffers exist between processes. The outcome, then, is that JIT has integrating effect 
between process operations. 
Despite some exaggerated claims to total worker autonomy in JIT work methods - 
largely unfounded in any close examination of the prescribed Toyota system 
(Cusumano 1991) - the important differences between Taylorist and JIT working 
methods,, according to Wood: 
... has been to change the nature of assembly line design by industrial engineering. The target is to eliminate the 'non-average' so that nothing goes wrong at a given speed and scale of 
operation. (Wood 1989 - p45O italics added) 
With this important element of control in the hands of management, what is left of the 
design of work organisation, is delegated to the work 'team'. Here then, because of the 
inter-dependency created between previously autonomous work processes, the 
individual worker is subjected to a work routine which is necessarily made 'transparent' 
to other workers and, crucially, to management. This does not constitute autonomy. The 
all important decision-making is dictated to by the speed of the final process. In short, 
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the key to work design in JIT is in the harnessing of the 'tacit skills' of workers that, in 
4pure' Taylorism, can be used to insulate workers from some of the pressures of the 
line. This, then, amounts to an intensification of work and has perhaps best been 
exemplified by Karnata's (1982) description of working on the Toyota gearbox line. 
The operational principle of JIT is effectively applied in TQM and the principle that 
operations and functions should become inter-dependent can be translated from 
manufacturing to administrative and even service work (Deming op cit. ). Where any 
two processes run concurrently, it is argued, 'customer-supply chains' can be used to 
integrate operations. 
C) Managing for quality (iii) enhancing value-added (changing attitudes) 
in the 'culture' movement one can see how Taylor's original attempt at direct, stick and 
carrot control of the workforce has long since given way to a much more subtle and indirect 
approach. Managers now work to create the right climate, to encourage identification with 
corporate goals, high motivation, internalisation of 'constructive attitudes' (Pollitt 1990a: 
p24) 
In attempting to maximise output value, the management of quality aims to make 
continuous, positive improvements upon the product or service being produced. Here, 
the aim is to promote worker involvement in clearly defined areas of decision-making 
so as to maximise the fortunes of the organisation 'for the mutual benefit of all'. It is in 
this guise of quality management that only real form of worker 'empowerment' could 
be argued to be taking place. Even here, however, the effects are not clear. In 
encouraging worker involvement in enhancing value-added, management enters into 
the arena of 'identity work', 'culture management' and the vexed issue of 'emotional 
labour'. 
For the advocates of TQM, 'culture' is of critical importance. It is the cultivation of 
4appropriate' employee attitudes that is the key to a successful 'quality breakthrough' 
and 'changing attitudes' is often emphasised as being a core prerequisite in 
managerialist texts on the subject. However, even ignoring the external 'structural' 
conditions that are likely to play a part in shaping attitudes, it is difficult to see the 
manipulation of worker attitudes as not being, at least partly, effected by the use of 
structural or bureaucratic means. Legge (1995) notes that organisations implementing 
cultural change programmes invariably resort to empiricist-rational strategies - 
appealing to employees' recognising a 'need' for change; normative re-educative 
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strategies - attempting to change attitudes by re-training exercises; and power-coercive 
strategies - using some form of threat to those not seen to have changed attitudes. In 
practice these strategies are realised through re-organisation, re-education and 
replacement. There is a paradox here, as Legge notes: 
... it is interesting that the mechanisms by which messages of initiative, autonomy, innovation, 
risk-taking and personal responsibility are conveyed - organisation-wide cascaded briefings, 
training days, appraisal systems - are themselves highly bureaucratic. (Legge 1995 p 199) 
Even where the manipulation of worker attitudes is not claimed to be a product of a 
bureaucratic process, it is hard to see how the work environment created by 
management will not be a key catalyst in the outcome of any change in 'culture'. As an 
example, for its protagonists, JIT is stated to work because it is employed within a 
wider system that 'respects the human system' (Sugimori et al 1977; Monden 1983). 
However, the continuous removal of 'slack resources' (inventory and labour) from 
processes itself creates the imperative for improvement: the culture of continuous 
improvement ('kaizen') here, then, may be more a result of necessity than through a 
successful creation of a unitarist culture within the organisation (Berggren 1993). In 
one interpretation, for example, JIT and TQM are associated with a change from 
bureaucratic control mechanisms to Foucauldian definitions of control through the 
4panopticon' effect of self regulation (Sewell and Wilkinson 1992). Here, the use of 
internal customer chains, combined with the increased visibility of work processes, 
subjects individual workers to the managerial gaze. Others see work regimes such as 
JIT and TQM as the intensification of Fordist practices, rather than a departure 
(Slaughter 1987; Berggren op cit. ). There are a number of methodological implications 
in these arguments, and these will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 
While the fact that the main protagonists of TQM hold unitarist assumptions about 
organisations and that this distorts their view of the wider dynamics of the situation, it 
is informative to see how these advocates place 'culture' in the quest for quality - after 
all, these 'gurus' remain influential among the managerial class who are implementing 
the prescribed schemes. It is in these assumptions that TQM merges with HRM in its 
view of the individuated worker. The language of 'empowerment' used here, is based 
upon the ideal of the individual who requires only the guidance and leadership of 
managers in order to fulfil the goals of the organisation, while management's role is 
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ensure that the individual worker is provided with the correct training and incentives. 
The appropriate phrase here is making the worker 'own the problem'. It is important to 
note that, despite some selective reading of TQM texts by those who see it as part Of a 
Post Fordist paradigm of intra-organisational harmony and co-operation, TQM in no 
way negates the importance of hierarchy. Quality can only be achieved by the 
Organisation following a single vision, pursued relentlessly by all, through the 
leadership of the most senior executives and while the good intentions of willing 
employees are seen as important, employee empowerment does not mean that good 
intentions will be considered enough: 
Equally dangerous, however, are the uninformed who try to follow their natural instincts 
because they 'know what quality is when they see it'. This type of intuitive approach will lead 
to serious attitude problems, which do no more than reflect the understanding and knowledge 
of quality that are present in an organisation. (Oakland 1989 p 14) 
It is important to note that devolving decision-making in activities such as 'quality 
circles' 'kaizen' activities, 'force field analysis' (IDS 1990) could be seen as the 
delegating-down of a de-skilled decision-making process: the methodolov for making 
decisions is conducted by management and this process is then handed to the worker (or 
team of workers) to operate within a context defined by management. 
Continuing on the 'culture' theme, one recent development on the issue has been an 
interest in the issue of 'identity work' (Thompson & McHugh 1995) and 'emotional 
labour' (Taylor 1997). In contrast to the general emphasis in viewing the mobilisation 
of commitment through increasing employee autonomy within specific parameters, the 
issue of 'emotional labour' introduces the notion of the regulation of employee attitude. 
In 'pink collar work' - i. e. work that is specifically concerned with 'service' or with 
direct customer interface - the actual service encounter becomes the actual 'product'. 
Therefore assessing, monitoring and controlling, output quality here requires the 
regulation of the totality of features that make up this encounter. Typically this may 
include aesthetic aspects such as the condition of the environment that the service takes 
place in - the layout of reception areas, for example - the availability and accessibility 
of information for service users, or the dress codes of employees. The growth in the use 
of 'one-stop-shops' is an example here. In addition, however, the quality of the service 
encounter may also include less tangible aspects such as the politeness, responsiveness 
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and helpfulness of staff. Key to this is the mobilisation of commitment through the 
'identity' of the worker as determined by the public service ethos. 
In Taylor's (1997) study, he notes that the use of managerial control to effect the 
service encounter involved a degree of 'positive discretion' being delegated to 
employees. In his case, employees were being encouraged to use the customer contact 
situation to sell other company services; an activity in which management actively 
supported employees' using a personal approach with customers. In addition, however, 
the delegation of such 'tactical responsibility' occurred 'at the same time as 'strategic' 
managerial control is centralised through sophisticated workplace surveillance' (ibid. 
pl9l). Monitoring here was based upon the collection and evaluation of 'hard' 
performance indicators and of 'soft' subjective criteria, such as 'attitude' and teamwork 
performance, often through the use of 'mystery shoppers', customer feedback and the 
monitoring of telephone-sales interactions. 
TQM as paradigm shift 
There has been a general tendency to place the quality agenda within a wider shift in 
management, away from 'old' conflictual, collectivist management forms associated 
with Taylorism. This assumption is almost completely false upon any close 
examination of the prescribed values of TQM and of its observed reality. The issues 
upon which the Taylorist/TQM dichotomy seem to be based are shown in table 5: 1 
below. 
Table 5: 1: Definitions of'Old'and 'New'Management Styles 
'Old Management' 'New Management' 
Taylorist post Taylorist 
Fordist Post-Fordist 
'Hard' 'Soft' 
Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial 
Compliance Commitment 
Hierarchy Delayered 
Regimentation Flexibility 
Managers as planners Managers as leaders 
Workers are passive Workers are empowered 
Workers identity is'collective' Workers identity is 'individuated' 
(various sources) 
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A first assumption made about TQM is that it is a Post-Fordist form of management. 
This often occurs by default through assuming the Post-Fordist definition of 
contemporary socio-economic organisation as an uncontentious descriptive term, rather 
than a theoretical proposition. In these cases, then, the assumption leads merely to a 
teleological argument: TQM is a Post-Fordist management methodology because it 
exists in a Post-Fordist era. In other cases, however, the. Post-Fordist position is 
implied rather than explicitly asserted. The general assumptions in this line of reasoning 
is closely associated with - the Post-Fordist arguments in industrial relations discussed 
in chapter 4. Correspondingly, the assumption that TQM is 'post-Taylorist' contains the 
same errors as the Post-Fordist analysis (discussed in chapters 2 and 4). 
In most cases the 'radical break' assumptions about the nature of TQM are less overt, 
though often containing some of the same errors. Another example of this tendency is 
in the assertion that TQM fits with an 'entrepreneurial' form of management, as 
compared to 'old' management - which was bureaucratic. Here, TQM is seen as being a 
manifestation of the organisation transforming workers' identities to one of customer 
consciousness: 
In reconstructing the commercial organisation around the character of the sovereign 
consumer, the work-based subject is also reconceptualised: the employee is re-imagined as an 
individual actor in search of meaning, responsibility, a sense of personal achievement and a 
maximised quality of life. Work is now construed as an activity through which people 
produce and discover a sense of personal identity. In effect, workers are encouraged to view 
work as consumers ... (DuGay 1996 p78) 
However, such assertions are often based upon managerialist assertions of what TQM is 
intended to do and how this compares to 'traditional' methods, rather than what 
actually happens and how this compares to 'traditional' management methods. Legge's 
observation, noted earlier, that entrepreneurial-style re-education programmes are, 
paradoxically, dependent on highly bureaucratic procedures is apt, here. One of the key 
problems in assessing the content of TQM is in distinguishing how much of it is 
rhetoric. It is invariably presented in a manner which claims its revolutionary character: 
it is unlikely that a managerial discourse presenting itself as merely making incremental 
changes to some aspects of tried and tested management methods would make much 
headway in what seems an increasingly competitive management consultancy market. 
In reality, however, examples of implemented versions of such practices are likely to be 
very familiar to 'traditional' methods (Roper et al op cit. ). The problem arises as to 
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whether the prescribed versions of TQM, or the implemented versions of TQM are 
considered to be the authentic ones. 
Another distinction often made between TQM and 'traditional' quality methods is in 
the importance played on the 'soft' - as opposed to 'hard' - elements of quality. While 
there is a strong emphasis on these 'soft' elements - attitudes, company 'culture', 
6empowerment' etc - this is not at the expense of dropping the 'hard' aspects to quality 
management. On the contrary, TQM methodo. logy explicitly requires the use of 
quantitative methods of performance evaluation as a prerequisite - the importance that 
SPC plays in TQM, described in section (b) above is a demonstration of this. In 
addition to this, the contested issue of 'emotional labour' and its attempted regulation - 
described in (c) above - show that what may appear to be a move towards 
subjectification of the labour process may, in fact, be an attempt to regulate subjective 
behaviour. Here then, it may be more appropriate to see methods such as TQM as 
reigning-in aspects of the labour process previously under-exploited in 'traditional' 
methods. 
Another dichotomy that is often assumed between TQM/HRM and Taylorism, is 
between a focus on the former's focus on employee 'commitment' as opposed to the 
latter's focus on 'compliance'. The fact that TQM and HRM place a great deal of 
attention on the issue of employee commitment is not disputed. The generic model 
tends to place employee commitment being reciprocated by the employer's paternalistic 
recognition of its workers' value: the adage that 'people are our most valuable asset' is 
a good example. However, because there is an emphasis on employee attitudes in TQM, 
this does not equate to an abandonment of worker compliance as a prerequisite of 
managerial authority. The distinction may more accurately be a shift from compliance 
to compliance with commitment. 
This misunderstanding is also present in the other dichotomous assertions that 
Taylorism favours hierarchy whereas TQM favours delayered structures. TQM does 
tend to be associated with flatter management structures, but the quality gurus strongly 
emphasise the importance of top-down leadership as the most important first stage in a 
TQM programme (Deming 1986). The differences that exist, here, are perhaps 
differences in language: rather than managers being seen as organisers, as Taylor 
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asserts, there is a focus on managers as 'leaders', which is more in fitting with the 
language of 'entrepreneurial' management preferred in TQM. 
One 'area where a distinction could be made between Taylorist and TQM-type 
assertions of management is in the view taken of workers themselves. Taylor's 
principal objective is in subverting workers' natural tendency to 'soldier'; a reference to 
the effort-reward bargain. His use of control and incentives reflected this. For the 
quality gurus, however, there is a stated assumption that workers only require 
leadership: 
Give the work force a chance to work with pride, and the 3 per cent that apparently don't care 
will erode itself by peer pressure. (Deming op cit. p85) 
While this is an important difference, it also seems to reveal an important - if not 
obvious - similarity: this being that there remains strong unitarist and managerialist 
assumptions in both Taylor's and Deming's definition of the organisation. Indeed, 
Taylor's language concerning workers' motivation is not so dissimilar to Deming's 
once the workers have been 'correctly' organised: 
This close, intimate, personal co-operation between the management and the men is of the 
essence of modem scientific or task management (Taylor 1911 p26) 
During all these years there has never been a single strike among the men working under 
this system. In place of the suspicious watchfulness and the more or less open warfare which 
characterizes 
' 
the ordinary types of management, there is universally friendly co-operation 
between the management and the men. (ibid p28) 
Quality management is often, though not exclusively, placed within the 'new' 'soft' 
forms of management. Much of the critical assessments of TQM seem to have taken the 
anti-Taylorist rhetoric present in the prescriptive managerialist texts at face value. The 
attempted distancing from Taylorian management is not new. It is interesting to note 
that, while Braverman over-states the prevalence of pure Taylorism, he recognises that 
other management 'schools' have co-existed with Taylorism. While may of these 
'schools' have often placed themselves in direct opposition to Taylorism, Braverman 
notes their duplicity within a broader context: 
Work itself is organised according to Taylorian principles, while personnel departments and 
academics have busied themselves with the selection, training, manipulation, pacification and 
adjustment of "manpowee' to suit the work process so organised. Taylorism, dominates the 
world of production; the practitioners of "human relations" and "industrial psychology" are 
the maintenance crew for the human machinery. If Taylorism does not exist as a separate 
school today, that is because, apart from the bad odor of the name, it is no longer the property 
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of a faction, since its fundamental teachings have become the bedrock of all work design. 
(Braverman 1974 p87) 
While there are important distinctions between Taylorist and 'new' forms of 
management, these seem to have been over-emphasised in relation to the similarities. 
This problem is often due to making comparisons that are not based upon historical 
context. Retrospectively comparing the operations of the idealised workplace of 1930 
(assumed to be Henry Ford's production-line) to the idealised workplace of the 1990s 
(assumed to be the JIT production system in a Japanese transplant) is not helpful. 
Numerous 'external' factors, aside from labour-markets and industrial relations 
practices - which could include relative levels of development, demographic differences 
and legislative differences, mitigate to make comparisons difficult. Where caricatures 
are avoided, however, a remarkable degree of similarity could be seen to exist between 
suppogedly polar opposite types, Williams, Haslarn and Williams' (1992) comparison 
of Ford's Highland Park facility with the Japanese production system is a good example 
here. As a ftu-ther demonstration of the dangers of overly relying on rhetorical 
caricatures of management typologies, the following is a transcription of an article 
written about the 'future of production', published in a special edition of a journal in 
which the transformation of the economic, social and political order is discussed. The 
article contains general terms of references expected within a Post Fordist position: 
references to the new sophisticated consumer, the need for flexibility in production etc. 
The article, however, was published in 1930 and refers to, what would now be termed 
'Fordism': 
... there is no doubt that the consumer is in the saddle and that he (sic) is having more say 
about the nature and the quality of the articles that he accepts, than before. He is becoming 
much harder to please. For example, it was not very long ago that the qualities of a "good 
shoe" could all be summed up in the virtue of wearing ability. Today, a shoe is not "good" 
unless it offers, in addition, comfort, flexibility, style, and other advantages. 
Finally, the buyer is getting to be a change-loving individual. He wants this today and that 
tomorrow. He looks forward to the new and he expects improvement. 
There is the writing on the wall. If production is to satisfy, it must become increasingly 
sensitive to consumer desires, either present or potential, and increasingly flexible in adjusting 
itself to changes in consumer predilections. (Schell 1930 p28) 
There is no evidence within the managerialist sources, then, to suggest any mutually 
exclusive paradigm shift existing between 'old', 'Fordist', 'hard' quality management 
and 'new', 'post-Fordist', 'soft' quality management. Providing that such dichotomous 
definitions are avoided, however, comparisons of quality management types is 
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legitimate - perhaps based upon a number of factors on a continuum, as described in 
chapter 3. In a *real world scenario". then, a particular quality management policy could 
be operating at a number of different levels - which may be manifested in a number of 
apparently contradictory ways. 
At a descriptive level highlighting differences between management typologies is 
sometimes useful - the typology offered here, in chapter 3 (figure 3: 2) is an example. 
Rather than seeing developments in management methods as being based upon SLICII 
paradigm shifts it is important to see developments as being largely incremental, being 
based upon core managerialist values. 
Within this context it is perhaps useful to highlight the continuity between Taylorian 
principles and the TQM model. Table 5: 2 provides a reference. 
Table 5: 2: Taylorian and TQM Models Compared 
Taylorism TQM 
Role of Management Control 'Leadership' 
View of Workers Tendency towards 'systematic 
soldiering' 
Natural willingness to do a good 
job - given the opportunity 
Implementation Top-Down Top-Down 
Application Universal Universal 
Key Tools 'Science' Statistics 
View of Management Planning of work (50% of total 
responsibility) 
Maintenance of system (>90% of 
total responsibility) 
Role of Workers Passive role - tasks 
determined by management 
Discretionary role - innovation 
under strict parameters and 
methodology set by management 
It is notabIc that the three principal managcrial ob. 1cctives of quality nianagcnient 
described in section (a) above are all incorporated within TQM - which is allegedly 
anti-Taylorian in its approach. 
Quality and the Labour Process in Local Government 
This section will discuss sorne ofthe labour process iniplications of' introducing quallIN, 
management methods into local government. In doing this it will incorporate tile 
background influences of' 'insecurity' and file Structural changes made to Ilic local 
authority as employer- which were discussed earlier - with the general labour process 
issues raised in the nature of quality management as a whole. Figure 5: 2 below, based 
upon the arguments based in this chapter, shows a proposed l'onnat. 
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Figure 5: 2: Influences on the Organisation of Work in Local Government 
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The introduction of quality management methods into local authority work has been 
prompted by the general managerialist shil't in local government throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. In practice this has meant that quality has been pursued predominantly 
through the market and through performance indicators laid dovm by central 
government (Walsh op cit). However it is not as straight forward as this. The adoption 
of quality methods designed to react to market stimuli cannot be expected to adapt to 
operating in areas where these indicators either do not exist, or have been artificially 
created: the success criteria of a TQM policy being operated in a car Cactory will 
Ultimately be increased market share and/or increased prolitability (this is what tile 
euphemism achieving custorner satistactIon or 'delight' actLially means), Wllýlt SLICCCSS 
criteria, then, is used for nicasuring the Output 01' Social services, or building 
regulations, or environmental health'? Tlie nature of' the 'service cricoLinter' present in 
most local government activities has meant that orthodox methods of' quality 
management through the 'quality control' approach is not viable (Walsh 1991,1995, 
Gaster 1991 ; 111cfTer & Come 1991 ). Not only this but the ditTerence in the nature of' 
different services does not allow Im unil'Orm approaches to quality in all areas. One 
demonstration of this is provided by Walsh (1991). Here, imbalances bctwcc" tile 
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producer's ability to evaluate quality is compared with the user or recipient (see table 
5: 3). 
Table 5: 3: Producer/Consumer Abilities of Evaluating Quality 
Degree of difficulty for user In evaluating quality 
High Low 
Degree of difficulty High Mutual knowledge Producer knowledge 
for producer in 
evaluating quality Low Consumer knowledge Mutual ignorance 
(Source: Walsh 1991 p509) 
In the definitive quality management models mutual knowledge is assumed. In the area 
of public services, however, this is probably the least likely scenario. More likely is a 
scenario of imbalance. The scenario may be that producer knowledge is prevalent, 
manifested, perhaps, in the case of professional type work where expertise is 
specifically required. Alternatively the scenario may be that consumer knowledge is 
prevalent - where work is dispersed among a number of agencies, or inter-dependent 
services within one agency, where the output is invisible and the user's needs are 
changing, where the identity of the provider is considered important by the user and 
where the perception of quality varies greatly between one user and another. Finally, 
there may be mutual ignorance as to the quality of outcome - this could be in the case of 
services where the outcome is long term, or in services where the output is intended to 
be preventative (i. e. the success criteria is if nothing happens). This implies that not 
only are ýthe effects of quality management likely to differ as a result of the particular 
nature of 'quality' that is attempted to be managed, but there are likely to be further 
differences based upon the actual service relationship with the service user. Here, the 
situation becomes somewhat complex, particularly as work in a particular service may 
fall under different knowledge-based categories depending upon the relationship of 
particular job functions within that service. So, for example, social work may be 
considered to be preventative in terms of the assessment of its quality output - and 
therefore be based upon 'mutual ignorance'; yet it could simultaneously be considered 
to be only one input into a wider array of services , 
in the area of 'Care in the 
Community' - which would place this aspect of the work under the category of 
4producer knowledge'. Table 5: 4 provides examples of how services may be viewed 
within this matrix. 
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Table 5: 4: Knowledge Asymmetries and Quality Assessment in Local 
r. nvornmant 
Knowledge Example Service Examples 
Base 
Mutual Simple goods and services 
Knowledge 
Producer Professional services Architects, accountants, 
Knowledge legal advisors 
Consumer Team-based services Social services 
Knowledge 
Multi-agency services 'Care in the Community': 
social services, housing, 
welfare rights 
'Identity' based work Youth work 
Services with wide variety Libraries, reception areas, 
of consumer expectations sport and leisure, finance 
Mutual Longer term services Planning, building 
Ignorance regulations 
Preventative services Environmental health, 
trading standards 
Managing output quality in public services, then, produces a number of complexities 
for the commercial management practices that form the basis of quality management 
which in turn provide unique circumstances in the management of the labour process. 
First, the fact that the output of such work is public goods means that market share 
criteria cannot be used as the ultimate indicator of success. Despite the attempts to 
commodify public services, they remain inherently political. These two related factors 
introduce complexity into the criteria by which quality management attempts to 
objectify the criteria by which the output of work is assessed. A third factor is that local 
authorities, through statutory regulations, provide a number of minimum services 
which, in a commercial environment, would be outsourced or dropped completely 
where it was seen to be diversifying from the business's 'core activities'. This 
introduces organisational complexity into the situation. In turn this dictates that 
managing quality involves managing a disparate array of trades, professions and skills, 
which in turn complicates the scrutinisation of work processes. 
Because of these issues, and the general background of the '3Es' mentality forced upon 
the public sector in the 1980s and 1990s managing quality in local government is better 
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understood in the previously discussed forms of increasing standardisation, reducing 
waste and enhancing the value-added of services. 
a) Managing output consistency: the management of equity 
This aspect of quality is, perhaps, the one that could be argued to fit the most 
comfortably with a 'public service ethos'. The objectives of maintaining output 
consistency and reliability are the values which are contained within professional codes 
of conduct regarding equity. The transfer of responsibility for assuring this in TQM, 
however, challenges the discretion of professionals. This is an important example of 
left-right convergence to managerialist consensus. TQM simultaneously offers a 
solution to those who see professional power as being based upon an ability to protect 
restrictive work practices, and to those who see professional power as being the un- 
constrained ability to use status and legal-rational power to avoid accountability to 
service users. Morgan and Murgatroyd state: 
TQM is, in its essential nature, subversive of professional exclusivity and requires strong 
collaborative working. There is no essential reason why the'equal and full collaboration of 
professionals within a TQM-committed organisation cannot be achieved, but tradition and 
history dictate that a full awareness of this aspect is needed together with conscious 
commitment to undo professional demarcations if needed. (Morgan & Murgatroyd 1994 
p52) 
This aspect of quality is likely to apply more to regulatory functions within local 
authorities: environmental health, trading standards, building control; and also Care in 
the Community work such as social services, housing and welfare rights; and also, 
possibly, what Gaster (op cit. ) terms 'front-line' work. 
The means by which this transfer of the control of equity and output consistency from 
'unaccountable' professionals to 'accountable' managers, is operationalised through the 
use of the increasing array of public consultations and surveys used by councils and by 
the array of Citizen's Charter performance criteria governing complaints procedures. 
For the more pro-active, the Charter Mark award scheme probably offers the most 
comprehensive managerial package to ensure that 'customer expectations' can be 
clearly built into work processes and organisation. In addition, the ISO 9000 quality 
system standard also offers a means by which to formalise work processes that may 
previously have been more discretionary. 
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b) Reducing waste: internal customers, CCT and cutting costs 
The general notion of using quality management as an implicit means of reducing waste 
in the private sector can be measured in the form of reducing relative costs. In effect 
this is improving efficiency or improving productivity. The benefits of increasing 
efficiency by these means in the private sector can be either used to maintain output at a 
consistent level or be used to increase output at the original cost, therefore hoping to 
increase revenue. The benefits of this could then enter into the collective bargaining 
arena. A good example of this was the productivity increases that were gained by Ford 
UK over the 1980s through various restructuring programmes, including quality 
initiatives. The apparent improved financial success that these programmes had was 
used by workers to force wages and conditions improvements in the dispute of 1987 
(Starkey & McKinlay 1989; Wilkinson & Oliver 1990) In contrast, benefits from 
increasing efficiency in the public sector are not likely to be as straightforward. In most 
cases, increasing the efficiency of a service provided by a local authority will not 
increase revenue. Nevertheless an increasing tendency of the 1980s and 1990s has been 
the attempted linkage of public sector pay to productivity: 
"The Government's approach to puhlic sector pay continues to he that pay and price 
increases should he offset, or more than offset, hy efficiencies and other economieP Kenneth 
Clarke: Chancellor of the Exchequer September 1995 (Independent 19/9/95) 
In practice, the association that has been created between quality, efficiency, 
productivity and staffing has led to an implicit linkage between the issue of quality and 
work rates. Given the labour intensive nature of most local government services, this 
inevitably means work intensification and/or staff cutbacks: 
The impact of the pursuit of quality in the public service, through the use of market-based 
mechanisms, has been a significant reduction in the number of staff employed. Competition 
is seen as ensuring the delivery of better-quality services at lower cost, which, given the 
labour-intensive nature of public service, inevitably means lower staffing. (Walsh 1995b 
p95) 
With the increasing pressure to cut staff costs there has been increasing pressure on all 
aspects of employee performance. This has not only affected the increasing use of 
'flexibility' (numerical and functional), but pressure to reduce absenteeism among 
employees as well (Walsh 1995a). 
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The linkage between quality and work intensification is fin-ther enhanced with the 
structural reorganisation of local authorities required in the CCT process (the client 
contractor split and the associated cost-centre ethos to the delivery of services). The 
need to comply with Central Government imposed performance indicators (Audit 
Commission/Scottish/Welsh Offices and Citizen's Charter), combined with the 
increased ability to create transparency in individual responsibilities, has transformed 
the organisation of work in local government to a regime that is increasingly similar to 
the underlying logic within JIT. This is further realised with the increasing applicability 
of 'performance management' type approaches to quality - integrating the issues of 
quality to cost-based issues. 
C) Service and emotion - customer care 
In this format, quality management is concerned with the management of the service 
encounter. The aim here, is to ensure that staff are sufficiently 'customer oriented'. 
While, if taken to particularly evangelistic levels, this could affect all workers - in the 
sense that most employees are likely to have some level of contact with the public - in 
practice the management of customer care is likely to affect those whose work is 
explicitly concerned with dealing with the public. This would include quasi-commercial 
operations - like leisure; 'reception' type work - such as that involved in one-stop- 
shops; and employees who work in libraries or other public access areas. 
While the management of 'culture' may take a number of forms - from highly 
subjectivist to highly regulatory, as noted earlier in this chapter - it is perhaps more 
popularly manifested, as a management system, in the Investors in People IiP award 
scheme with its explicit linking of corporate goals to work practices and training, and 
with Charter Mark. 
Summary 
The introduction of quality management into local government, then, is explicitly 
concerned with changing the labour process - as it is in the commercial organisations in 
which was pioneered. The difficulty in introducing a management methodology into the 
operation of public services, however, is that unlike the commercial organisation, no 
equivalent indicators of success are available. The proclaimed win-win scenario of 
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quality management being able to deliver increased market share or revenue - and this 
being able to secure benefits to workers - is not available. The logic of quality 
management in this scenario, then, is that it is to be used to enhance the efficiency, 
effectiveness and equity of service delivery with no tangible benefits to workers. The 
co-option or supplanting of the 'public service ethos' into a 'customer-centred' 
approach to work is implied here. However, the background of increasing employment 
insecurity in public services is likely to provide a more tangible form of motivation. 
Section IV 
Methodology 
CHAPTER 6 
RESEARCHING THE WORKPLACE IN PU13LIC SERVICES 
In Section IV the methodological issues involved in this thesis will be outlined. Key 
issues here include a consideration of the underlying philosophical assumptions about 
the research process; theoretical concerns involved with researching work, employment 
relations and the labour process - which necessarily contains some overlap with issues 
raised in section III of this thesis; a rationale for the choice of research methods used to 
realise these concerns; and how these methods were put into practice in the research 
actually conducted for this thesis. 
The following chapter, chapter 7, is concerned with these latter issues - the actual 
conduct of research. This chapter is concerned with 'theory': of how research should be 
conducted in researching public service workplaces, and how representative 
contcxtualised case studies can be selected to do this. 
Realism and Research 
At the heart of any research is the relationship between the (middle range) theory being 
generated or tested, the data which is being used - and the methods by which the data is 
applied to theory - and the methods by which these data are collected. These 
relationships are determined by the underlying ontological and epistimological 
assumptions that inform the research. These assumptions are, in turn, determined by the 
(first order) theory from which the assumptions that govern the definition of the 
research 'problem' are derived - whether or not the first order theory 
is explicitly 
acknowledged. The theory that underlies the research assumptions also ties in with the 
specific philosophical justification for the methodological approach. The starting point 
for this research is informed, predominantly, by a Marxist approach to the study of 
work Organisation: the underlying assumption here, being that the relationship between 
workers and management within the local state set-up is ultimately conflictual due to 
the nature of the employment relationship itself, which is determined by the market 
relationship by which the capacity to work is commodified. 
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A key issue in applying research is the relationship that theory-building and data- 
gathering have with each other. The underlying philosophical stance taken to this issue, 
here, is a realist position whereby the relationships and mechanisms that determine 
events are assessed in addition to the events themselves. 
For the realist, adequate causal explanations require the discovery both of regular relations 
between phenomena, and of some kind of mechanism that links them. So, in explaining any 
particular phenomenon, we must not only make reference to those events which initiate the 
process of change: we must also give a description of that process itself. (Keat & Urry 1982 
p3 1) 
Realism acknowledges the existence of abstract unobservable issues - 'labour markets', 
ideology and relative power relationships, for example - as being real factors in 
determining the tangible actions and behaviour of workers and managers. In contrast, 
the positivist approach explicitly rules out the existence of such mediating factors. 
a) The inadequacy of positivism 
The positivist approach asserts that knowledge is contingent and that, through the use 
of logical arguments, events may be predicted, but not explained, because causality can 
never be attributed. Since Popper (1963) the generally accepted positivist paradigm 
asserts that valid research adopts a hypothetico-deductivist stance- i. e. that theory 
provides the basis for which empirical data can be related. Here, scientific progress is 
achieved through the principle of falsification, whereby a given theory is deemed valid 
only where absolute criteria are laid down for its unequivocal acceptance in order that 
the theory is capable of being disproved by subsequent scientific investigation. Theory, 
then, is only ever partial and scientific progress is incremental. In practical terms, 
Positivism is challenged by Kuhn (1970) who argues that scientific knowledge does 
not, in practice, progress incrementally through falsification, but through the less 
rigorous process of 'paradigm shifts' whereby current scientific orthodoxy is bolstered 
through the personalities and institutions that are supported by existing theory. Where 
scientific opinion has changed dramatically, Kuhn argues that this is when a large 
enough body of scientific opinion has been built up to challenge the current orthodoxy. 
In the social sciences, positivism has been undermined more drastically by the inherent 
epistemological weaknesses that Kuhn's argument identifies: i. e. that positivism's 
1 In Positivist economics, for example, markets are seen as they are observed at a fixed point in time - this being the 
cause (or effect) of Positivist economics assuming that markets are in a state of equilibria 
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claims to scientific objectivity are, at best, misinformed and at worst, render positivism 
as nothing more than ideology. The critique of positivism within social science has 
been well documented and, as such, it now has few open adherents. Bell and Newby 
(1977) note that the attacks came from within, as well as from outside the disciplines 
of positivism. Where positivism could no longer claim universal applicability it 
became fatally flawed. 
b) Realism: causality and essentialism 
The strength of the realist position is its focus on the mechanisms that determine events. 
However, this in itself is problematic. Positivist critics argue that realism is limited by 
the 'problem of induction', the problem of causation and essentialism. The problem of 
induction introduces the concept that it is impossible to guarantee that the observation 
of any event - day following night - can lead to the conclusion that the event will 
continue to occur. Following from this, it is argued that causation can never be 
attributed. For this reason, the positivist scientific approach claims not to depend upon 
any notion of causation, but merely to note the sequence of events in observed 
phenomena. However, as Sayer (1992) argues, while the 'problem of induction' is real, 
the conclusions drawn from the problem are invalid. First, the problem assumes 
atomism - that all events are mutually exclusive, and that observation is punctiform, 
rather than continuous. This assumption leads to the conclusion that change is possible 
between things, but not within things - which is clearly ludicrous. 
Sayer argues that, in 
any case, realism does not rely upon induction as a means of understanding events: 
because observed events are related to prior knowledge of objects and relationships and 
because prior knowledge also allows the possibility of dismissing spurious 
relationships. In effect, realism uses retroduction whereby natural necessity is 
presupposed and prior knowledge of the behaviour of objects can be assumed. If prior 
knowledge cannot be relied on in this way, the implication would be that we cannot 
ever rely on prior experience of any phenomena. 
In addition to the problem of causality, realism is accused of essentialism. Essentialism 
is the doctrine that the aim of science is to discover the 'essence' of things; that science 
is achieved through making generalised claims based upon intuitive claims made 
through induction; that the 'essence of things are unchanging; that every object has a 
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single, unchanging 'essence'; and that absolute knowledge can be achieved about the 
6 essence' of an object (Sayer op cit). Realism, however, is guilty of none of these, 
particularly where the criticism relates to the problem of induction - which is rejected. 
In addition, realism does not claim to be able to attain 'absolute truth': 
... we can express our (fallible) knowledge of necessity in the world in terms of either definitions or logically contingent statements and that which we choose is of little importance 
(ibid p 163 - emphasis in original) 
Of course, in addition to the stated ontological and epistemological concerns, criticisms 
of the realist definition of scientific method are inexorably tied to the assumptions 
inherent in opposing views. In the case of the positivist critique, the ideological 
assumption that a 'scientific' method cannot seek to identify the internal mechanisms 
and relationships between objects or phenomena, is tied to the assertion that scientific 
enquiry should not seek to examine deeper meanings that underlie surface appearances. 
If the positivist assertion were to be accepted in the research here, no examination could 
be pursued to understand any differences in opinions expressed by workers and 
opinions expressed by managers; by disparities between expressed opinion and other 
('external' criteria; or by the varying circumstances that exist in the different workplaces 
examined. 
C) Mid range theory, data and method 
Because realism accepts that causal relationships are often partial in their conditions, 
some of the underpinnings of grounded theory, which has been influential in case-study 
based research, 'has been considered to offer some possibilities for the generation of 
mid-range theory within a realist framework. Grounded theory takes an incremental 
view of the research process whereby theory-building is conducted with direct reference 
to the primary empirical data: 
Our strategy of comparative analysis for generating theory puts a high emphasis on theory as 
process; that is, theory as an ever-developing entity, not as a perfected product. (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967 p32 - Italics in original) 
Grounded theory tends to be an approach which is based in the immediate and micro- 
oriented research subject. However, for Layder (1993) there are aspects to the grounded 
theory approach which make it compatible with a realist approach Layder takes what he 
views as the positive elements of grounded theory, whereby models can be built 
directly from research data, and incorporates the aspect of critique and the acceptance 
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of social structure, made possible by the realist approach. It does this through the use of 
$sensitising' or background concepts in the research area in order to provide an 
acknowledged starting point for the research, without being tied to these concepts. 
Realism aims to examine observable data without excluding the possibility of 
incorporating macro and structural influences which come into play within a case-study 
merely because they cannot be directly observed. This has been considered by grounded 
theorists who note that 
The grounded theory mode of research requires that the explanatory conditions be brought 
into analysis and not be restricted to those that seem to have immediate bearing on the 
phenomenon under study. (Strauss & Corbin 1990) 
A significant element in this research was in the acknowledgement of power as a 
phenomenon which had to be interpreted, and that this inevitably needed to incorporate 
the use of a theoretical perspective in which to view employment relationships, 
collective bargaining and the labour process in local government. In this respect the 
realist perspective allows levels of theoretical underpinning not fully compatible with 
pure grounded theory: 
The realist position encourages the researcher to seek out aspects of society which are not 
immediately apparent or 'obvious' in the normal course of observation, interviewing or the 
examination of documentary evidence. (Layder op cit. pp54-55) 
Research involved in this thesis causes some theoretical problems in that its focus lies 
somewhere between the scope of an 'industrial relations' approach and labour process 
theory. This chapter relates current issues surrounding the 'labour process debate' 
(LPD) to the broad issues of industrial relations in the state sector in the 1990s, 
adopting an 'employee relations' approach. 
Industrial Relations, Employment Relations and Labour Process Theory 
Because of the interconnected nature of theory and method, the arguments and 
discussion in this chapter necessarily relate to the problems, issues and debates 
discussed in previous chapters: the appropriate means by which a workplace should be 
researched depends, ultimately, upon how the workplace itself is conceived. 
Because of the structure, history and institutions involved in local government 
employment, an approach which recognises collective bargaining as a central 
determinant is vital in understanding the context of any changing relationships. Broadly 
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speaking, an industrial relations approach achieves this. On the issue of changing work 
patterns under quality regimes, however, theoretical considerations from an industrial 
relations approach necessarily need to fully incorporate the nature of changes at the 
workplace level. Labour process theory enables this through its focus on the control 
and organisation of work. The labour process debate as a whole, however, has had a 
tendency to undervalue the role of labour within the employment arena. The aim here is 
to highlight the areas of convergence between these two broad camps. 
Unlike managerialist approaches to employment relations such as 'human resources 
management' (HRM), the industrial relations approach retains a vital element of 
critique, recognising conflict as inherent within the management/employee relationship 
(whether this be Marxist, pluralist institutionalist, or elitist). The industrial relations 
approach, however, has tended to focus upon the (formal or informal) relationships that 
develop around collective bargaining: the focus of attention is essentially that of 
management-union relationships. A problem here is that the essential dynamics that 
underpin changing relationships are secondary considerations to the outcomes. The 
industrial relations approach also has an 'image' problem, associated with being overly 
concerned with exclusively male, manual labour in heavy or primary industries (Blyton 
& Turnbull 1994). For these reasons a number of writers have switched emphasis from 
industrial relations that of employment relations or employee relations (Blyton & 
Turnbull op cit; Beaumont 1995). Blyton and Turnbull's (ibid. ) approach provides a 
useful framework. Here, the employment relationship remains central to analysis and 
employees can be seen, collectively, as distinct from management. It does not assume 
(or preclude) formal institutions and structures, trade union involvement, or any 
sectoral bias. It also retains, crucially, a focus on the central dynamics of change. 
A useful demonstration of this, though not in these terms, is provided in the business 
cycle explanations of trade union activity (see chapter 4). Here, Kelly (1990) assesses 
the decline in British trade union membership from 1979 in context of wider influences. 
The usual factors such as the decline in sectors traditionally associated with high 
density unionisation, hostile legislation and higher levels of structural unemployment 
do not, individually, explain the decline. These factors, together with the business 
cycle, were able to affect unions' ability to organise and it was this, according to Kelly, 
that affected workers attitudes towards trade union involvement, though not about the 
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legitimacy of trade unions per se. Kelly notes that positive perceptions of unions are 
inversely proportionate to their bargaining power. Union membership, then, could be 
seen as being more attributable to the bargaining power of particular workers in 
particular circumstances, than to the image of trade unions as either 'new-realist' or 
'dinosaur'. 
Broadly, then, this case demonstrates the need to contextualise changes within the 
broader environment and of shifting power relationships at the workplace level. If a 
union's appeal is based upon its perceived bargaining power in the workplace, and if 
that bargaining power is dependent, in part, upon the capacity and willingness of its 
members to act, then some attention to the workplace itself warrants closer attention. 
Recent Trends in the Labour Process Debate (LPD) 
Until relatively recently, Marxian approaches had dominated the agenda within the 
labour-process debate (LPD). This, however, has now changed and labour process 
theory (LPT) is now engaged in a 'crisis' in which the founding principles upon which 
LPT are based'- ultimately, the labour theory of value - are attempted to be replaced 
with a subjectivist definition of the labour process, where the central focus of the labour 
process -is the individuated worker. This is of central importance in the way that the 
organisation of work is researched. 
a) The initial debate: Braverman 
The LPD was initiated by the publication of Labor and Monopoly Capital in which 
Braverman (1974) re-introduces Marx's work on the labour process into the analysis of 
work over the twentieth century and, in particular, the analysis of the control of work. 
While Braverman's analysis is essentially an analysis of the degrading effect that 
Taylorist management has had on work over the twentieth century, the assertion is that 
Taylorism is itself a natural outcome of capitalist development in the social 
organisation of work. Here, then, scientific management enables the transformation of 
the worker's capacity to work into actual work -a function that cannot be assumed by 
the mere purchasing of labour power. Scientific management, by Taylor's own intent, 
provides the optimum means by which this can be achieved. Through the increased sub- 
division of labour tasks, the control aspect of work - the design and planning aspect of a 
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product and process - is separated from the execution aspect of work - the physical 
effort. In order to gain maximum productivity from workers, management's task is, 
then, to monopolise the control aspect, predominantly through the use of technology - 
which is also controlled by management. According to Braverman, this amounts to a 
permanent drive to deskill workers and the consequent permanent degradation of work 
itself. 
Braverman's work challenged orthodox, views that technology was enhancing the 
quality of working life and it provoked debate from the outset. Initially problems were 
seen to be in Braverman's definition of skill and his overly romanticised view of 'craft' 
work. It was also criticised for the over-dependence his thesis had upon Taylorism as a 
universally applied management methodology. Finally, and crucially, Braverman 
viewed the process of deskilling and work degradation as one pursued by management 
with no tacit or organised resistance by workers (Elger 1982). Nevertheless, the debate 
that ensued created a new sub-discipline within the broad area of employment and 
throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s there was some degree of academic interest 
into some of the broad themes that the Braverman debate had created. At this time these 
themes were largely related to the application of technology in -the workplace, 
deskilling and work degradation. By the mid 1980s, however, attention began to be 
placed upon new forms of management that were seemingly becoming popular at the 
time. 
b) The 1980s: 'Japanisation' 
By the 1980s the focus of attention had begun to shift away from the initial pre- 
occupation with post Braverman debates about Taylorism and technology and into new 
areas of concern. The apparent crisis in the North American and European motor 
industry provoked a shift in emphasis within the LPD. Firstly, the relative decline in the 
importance of the motor industry as a vanguard industry prompted a greater focus of 
attention to be made on an agenda of the transposition of straightforward Taylorism 
into 'Japanisation'. The focus, here, was now on the analysis of new work regimes - 
particularly just-in-time (JIT) manufacturing, 'team' based work and quality circles 
(Turnbull 1988; Wood 1989; Oliver 1991; Oliver & Wilkinson 1992; Sewell and 
Wilkinson 1992). Similarly, the focus of research switched from 'brownfield' 
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manufacturing to Japanese 'greenfield' transplants, sub-contracting arrangements and 
the knock-on effects on competitors and suppliers (Rainnie 1991; 1993; Garrahan & 
Stewart 1992). Related to this was increased interest in the plethora of 'new' 
management types that seemed to be emerging in the 1980s - heralding an increased 
level of interest on the critical assessment of the content of these management styles 
(particularly FIRM and TQM). Whilst not always dichotomous, definitions of HRM and 
TQM during the 1980s tended to divide along two main paths within the LPD. 
Definitions tended to focus on either the respective roles of HRM and TQM in a 
restructuring of capital - changing working arrangements and practices; or they saw 
HRNVTQM as part of an ideological project to re-educate workers expectations (see 
chapters 4 and 5). VAiile this marked a shift away from the previous over-emphasis on 
Taylorism as the basis of all management, it raised the possibility of shifting LPT into 
areas that focused upon the differences that can exist between management strategies, 
rather than seeing management as being reducible to the process of work degradation. 
These trends grew in the 1990s. 
C) The 1990s: quality, subjectivity and power 
While the LPD shifted away from the focus on the issues raised by Braverman in the 
1990s, the focal point of debate shifted again, based on fundamentally different 
approaches to work organisation. While a shift in agenda is welcome, the shift ihat 
appears to have occurred is one which challenges the very notion of a 'labour process' 
in the first place. The shift is attributable to the need to incorporate the issue of 
subjectivity into the analysis of the labour process. At the outset of the LPD, one of the 
most significant criticisms of Braverman's analysis was the omission of how and where 
workers resist and thwart Taylorian attempts to degrade the labour process: 
[Braverman's analysis] warrants a treatment of the working class as an object of capital, 
which, while underlining the capacity of capital to reorganize the labour process, degrade the 
labourer and propel her/him from sector to sector, forgets that the working class remains an 
active agency in the capital relation. (Elger 1982 p24) 
Subjectivity here, then, refers to the inadequacy of explanations that attempt to 
objectify the issue of control, without understanding the interplay of subjective agendas 
as part of the internal dynamics of change. The subjectivism that has emerged as a 
major tenet in the LPD in the 1990s, however, is one which seeks to supplant the issue 
of work degradation - present in all post Braverman LPT - with subjugation - almost 
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exclusively derived from interpretations of the works of Michel Foucault. A major 
focus of this trend has been in the interpretation of the issue of quality in management. 
In previous chapters some of the key characteristics of generic quality management 
types have been outlined and these areas remain largely uncontroversial within the 
critical texts on the subject, although the emphasis may be contested by some. 
The divisions as to the nature of quality management occurs along the issue of whether 
quality management in the 1980s - in particular, TQM, represents a departure from 
Taylorian logic. This is an area of some debate - largely dependent upon various 
authors definition of the essential nature of quality management: i. e. that it is the 
manifestation of Post Fordist management, or that it is the mobilisation of subjectivist 
power discourses, or that it represents an intensification of Taylorian' management 
principles. 
This is often implied, rather than stated. The introduction of a notion of radical 
discontinuity in the labour process also, however, has been introduced simultaneously 
with a break in labour process analysis per se. The issue of departure is on the issue of 
sub . ectivity. The apparent importance of subjectivity in TQM and HRM has provided J 
an opportunity for some to make a break with the Bravermanian notion of objective 
conditions affecting the power relationship between managers and workers and 
replacing it with a concept of subjective power/knowledge relationships adapted from 
Foucault. Knights and Wilmott (1989) begin this with a critique of Marxian labour 
process theory, re-stating the problems in Braverman's analysis of the labour process as 
being essentialist while at the same time romanticising the issue of skill within the 
labour process. Initially this is stated as being intended to compliment current 
understandings of the labour process: 
... is it possible to take subjectivity seriously without degenerating 
into a 'subjectivist' analysis 
of the social world? (Knights & Wilmott 1989 p535) 
However, subsequent contributions seem to draw the Foucaldian analysis of the labour 
process into this very area. in essence, the Foucaldian interpretation of the labour 
process relies upon the concept of power discourses being operated within the 
workplace in such a way as to harness the consent of individuated worker, therefore 
removing the 'problem' of resorting to a dualist definition of power: 
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... the freedom of the subject is directed narrowly, and in a self-disciplined fashion, towards 
participation in practices which are known or understood to provide the individual with a 
sense of security and belonging. In shorý it is the comparative social isolation which subjects 
suffer as a result of the individualising impact of modem power that renders individuals 
vulnerable to precisely the demands or expectations that such power makes of them. (ibid 
p550) 
The key aspect of power for Foucauldians, then, is that power and resistance are 
synonymous with each other. Power is manifested in the form of knowledge imbalances 
which serve to provide the basis for control through self regulation. Here, then, TQM 
could be seen as representing a managerial response to coping with the new 
individuated worker, created by the demise of collectivism, and as an attempt to 
delegate increased responsibility to the individual worker: 
... TQM may be seen as one of the most recent 
in a long line of managerial discourses that 
have professed to fill the gap left open by the decline of earlier f6rms of collectivism. Quality 
management, or more accurately its managerial plausibility, is at least in part a reflection of 
the necessity for large corporations to find new and innovative ways of competing 
constructively, and of managing fragmented workforces. (Kerfoot & Knights 1995 p222) 
A key issue in the Foucauldian interpretation of the 'new labour process' is in the status 
given to managerialist text. The trend towards a subjectivism in LPT could be made, at 
least in part, on academic fashion: a point of departure is made between the 'old' 
objectivist approach of Taylorism. and its equivalent critique in Bravermanian analysis; 
and the 'new' subjectivist approach of TQM and HRM with its equivalent critique in 
Foucault. However, much has been made of differences between Taylor and TQM 
where differences have often been slight. Taylorism and TQM do not occupy polar 
opposite positions as methodologies, and are markedly similar in other ways, as is 
noted in chapter 5. 
d) Bringing the employee back in: misbehaviour 
The false assumption that TQM occupies a polar opposite to Taylorism, provides a 
useful indicator of one of the key problems in Foucauldian LPT. In a comprehensive 
critique of Foucauldian LPT, Thompson and Ackroyd (1995) point out that in using a 
definition of power that places power and resistance in the same location at the same 
time, it depends upon the perception of power to exist. In practice, Thompson and 
Ackroyd note that studies that have adopted such an approach have not located 
resistance and that, paradoxically, resistance is therefore deemed to have been 
6squeezed out' by the success of new management practices. While the Foucauldian 
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castigates approaches to LPT that attempt to presuppose external relationships to the 
workplace that are not directly perceived within the workplace (e. g. labour theory of 
value) the Foucauldian position itself depends upon a framework that requires power to 
be sought from outside the perception of workers: 
Given that post-structuralists believe that language constitutes reality, perhaps it is the case 
that the language of the prison, of docile and obedient workers.... of colonisation and 
conquest, becomes the Foucauldian's own conceptual cage. (Thompson & Ackroyd op cit. 
p624) 
Because the Foucauldian is so concerned to avoid any association with 'the specific 
character of employment relations in a capitalist society' (ibid p625) the analytical 
approach 'is not actually a specific account of the workplace at all' (ibid. p625). There 
is'no (acknowledged) underlying reason or logic for managers to be subjugating 
workers to the disciplinary regimes except for an apparent desire to harness 'power- 
knowledge' for its own sake - despite this rationale apparently being universal for all 
managers. 
Most damaging of all, however, is that the Foucauldian definition of power does not, in 
practice, allow any place where resistance can exist. While power is identified as being 
with managers through the knowledge imbalances created by new managerial regimes, 
no account is taken of the potential resources available to workers outside the 
managerial agenda: because resistance always occurs where power is exercised, and 
vice-versa, the Foucauldian only needs examine management agendas to determine 
where resistance is being neutralised. Such an approach is, at best, inadequate and, a 
worst, serves only to reinforce assumptions present in managerialist discourses: 
Whether it be the establishment of Taylorism, bureaucracy, human relations, or new 
technology, extravagant claims as to the rationality and effectiveness were made by 
managerial advocates and too often believed by academics. We now know that workers 
learned to bend the bars in these particular iron cages. Why should the current crop of new 
management practices be any different? (ibid p629) 
Thompson and Ackroyd call for an approach which recognises conflict existing within 
the workplace which does not merely reinterpret the terms of managerialist strategy. 
They argue that labour be put back into the centre of industrial sociology - and by 
implication LPT - to where resistance occurs at the workplace. In particular, they cite a 
return to the study of informal resistance at the workplace - or 'misbehaviour' as a way 
forward in the use of subjectivism within employment relations. 
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e) Bringing the employment relationship back in: the 'collective worker' 
In a critique of Thompson & Ackroyd, however, Martinez-Lucio and Stewart (1997) 
criticise their use of 'misbehaviour' as a conceptual device. While agreeing with 
Thompson and Ackroyd's refutation of the demise of workplace conflict, they point out 
that Thompson and Ackroyd's own critique falls victim to an assumption that the 
growth of HRM unequivocally individuate workplace relations. Here, Martniez-Lucio 
and Stewart note the importance of the essentially collectivist nature of productive 
relationships within the labour process: 
Under these determinate conditions of the capitalist mode of production work is never an 
individual process despite'worker experiences to the contrary. (Martinez-Lucio & Stewart op 
cit p53) 
Of course, such an assertion depends upon being able to assert that relational conditions 
can exist despite the perception of those involved. This is not to say that subjective 
perceptions are not very important, but rather that external relations can exist outside 
the perceptions of the individual worker. The stated attempt to individuate workers in 
HRM, then, should not be confused with the actual practice of individuation. Indeed, it 
should not even assume that this is even being attempted. Such an assumption is based 
upon erroneous understanding of the 'individual' and the 'collective'. The individuated 
worker is assumed, rather than observed, because of the growing orthodoxy contained 
within the terms of reference used to define labour (e. g. management literature, 'Post- 
Fordism', 'flexibility'). 
... there is an inherent negation of an ideal typical understanding of the 'collective' and its decline in political, social and economic terms, ... 'individualisation' 
is constructed through a 
discourse of equivalence whereby its character is constituted ideologically and intellectually 
on the basis of a negation of its 'opposite', in this case collectivism. (ibid. p59) 
Here, Martinez-Lucio and Stewart argue that in the rediscovery of 'misbehaviour, 
Thompson and Ackroyd bring the &employee' back into industrial sociology, but not 
'labour'. It falls victim to the criticism that 'misbehaviour' is merely a reaction to 
managerial agendas which, in turn, assumes that alternative agendas do not exist within 
the workplace. 
Martinez-Lucio and Stewart offer a research agenda that attempts to integrate the inter- 
relationships between individualism and collectivism at work. These include a focus on 
the '... contradictions that emergefirom the construction of management-centred notions 
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of collective interests and points of identification through social institutions such as 
leamworking' (ibid. p7l); an examination of the differences in collective identities that 
emerge on the basis of workplace sub-units; the effect that new management initiatives 
are having upon collective bargaining dialogue; new collectivist agendas based upon 
themes of ethnicity and gen4er and; emerging relationships between different elements 
within the labour movement on these issues. %ile all these issues have not been 
addressed here, there is a recognition that collective identities - in the form of trade 
union activity - remain a crucial issue inseparable from the labour process. 
Conceptually, then, the research agenda in this thesis was concerned about ensuring an 
approach which could interpret the motives and rationale adopted by managers and 
workers within a specific employment relationship. The pursuit of management goals, 
here, occurred within a specific political environment, but that did not assume 
management omnipotence. Managers use of prescribed quality management methods 
was not assumed to be uniform due to, first, differences in emphasis caused by pre- 
existing local situations; second, uneven interpretations of what constituted 'quality 
management'; and third, the difference in outcome of such strategies as affected by 
overt and tacit distortion by workers. As for the outcome of implementing quality 
management in terms of the workers experience, the research agenda did not assume 
that managers' stated agendas to constitute the whole agenda. For example an agenda 
may be stated as being 'improved customer service through increased employee 
responsiveness' whereas the implicit agenda may equally be 'increased employee 
responsiveness through enhanced customer feedback'. Workers were also assumed to 
be capable of resisting, or deviating managers' agendas either individually or 
collectively, and either tacitly or overtly. These issues were important in the actual 
methods chosen to research the workplaces involved and are described in the following 
chapter. 
Defining the Contingent Factors in the Local Authority Workplace 
Chronologically, the first aspect to conducting research, before 'the problem' can be 
identified, is defining the background issues. Layder, taking a realist methodological 
stance, considers it legitimate to use elements of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 
1967) whereby models can be built incrementally from research data - implying 
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induction - can be combined with a hypothetico-deductivist approach to macro-theory 
and data and the relationship between the two. 
Realism attempts to rescue some of the useful aspects of an objective scientific approach to 
social phenomena while rejecting those aspects that have proved to be inadequate or 
troublesome (Layder 1993 p54) 
It does this through the use of 'sensitising' or background concepts in the research area 
in order to provide an acknowledged starting point for the research, without being tied 
to these concepts. Realism aims to examine observable data without excluding the 
possibility of incorporating macro and structural influences which come into play 
within a case-study merely because they cannot be directly observed. Considering these 
background issues, then, defines the parameters of the research and determines who or 
what would be appropriate subjects for research. In this case, background issues 
discussed in sections II and III of this thesis formed the basis of how local authorities 
could be contextualised and compared to each other. Local authorities, while having 
similar status and being of a similar nature regardless of local situations, are also a 
widely disparate collection of organisations. 
... local authorities do not constitute a homogenous group of employing units. 
There are major 
structural differences between the different types of authority - shire districts and counties, 
metropolitan districts and London Boroughs - in terms of the areas and populations covered, 
and the range of services provided and the occupational diversity of the workforces employed. 
(Kessler 1991 p3) 
Walsh et al (1997) contextualised their local authority case studies by size and type of 
authority, the approach to CCT and the approach to the client contractor split. Other 
factors could be political orientation, geographical location, and the demographic 
composition of the population. In turn these affect, or are affected by, such factors as 
the structure of the local economy, unemployment rates, levels of deprivation, the 
influence of local lobbies. In this sense context is vital. A national picture is not 
possible by the use of broad aggregate data because there are just too many 'variables' 
to contend with. What is required is a number of representative cases - in sampling 
terminology this could be termed the use of 'purposive sampling' (Robson 1993). 
The contingent factors involved in researching the effect of quality management on 
employment relations in local government are summarised below. 
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The only important selection criteria, as far as the use of quality management methods, 
was to select authorities that operated a quality policy. Pairing an authority with a 
quality policy against an authority without a quality policy was not an option. Pairing 
quality oriented authorities against non-quality oriented authorities would have 
necessarily reduced the level of contextualisation in other areas. More importantly, 
however, it would not have been legitimate to make any inference out of the likely 
impact of the 'non-implementation' of a certain policy. 
This is not to suggest. that selection, on this criterion, was straightforward. At early 
stages of the research a number of authorities implicitly singled themselves out for 
inclusion as case studies through their high profile quality programmes. The authorities 
that could have been selected merely through this, however, would have proven 
inadequate in terms of other important case study criteria noted below. For this reason 
the primary method of selection, for this category, was based upon data derived from 
the LGMB Quality Survey in 1994. The authorities that were selected were those that 
scored highly (upper quartile) in terms of their stated use of TQM and scored highly 
(upper quartile) on a cumulative score derived from a number of quality management 
initiatives in the form of a Q-score (this is described more fully in chapter 3). 
From the total number of authorities selected as 'critical case scenarios', in terms of 
their stated quality management usage, further filtering was conducted in order to 
ensure that other important contextualisation of case studies could be made. This 
further selection was based upon the categories described below. 
b) Political influence 
At the most obvious level, local authorities vary according to which political party has 
control. This factor is likely to be the strongest determinant of policies such as 
contracting-out council work (through either CCT or VCT) and of the relationship 
between management and the union. In turn the motive behind the adoption of quality 
management practices are likely to be affected by these. Conservative authorities could, 
on'this broad basis, be said to favour contracting work out and be more hostile to union 
involvement in management decision-making. 
Methodology 135 
In practice, a binary division between Conservative and non-Conservative is not as 
simple; even where confining this to a straightforward Conservative/Labour split. First, 
there is the obvious issue of policy inheritance. Local government has been consistently 
shifting out of Conservative control throughout the 1990s. This has meant that choosing 
a non-Conservative case-study also requires a sub-division between an authority that is 
a long-standing Labour authority pursuing a quality agenda, a Labour/Liberal Democrat 
council that is the reluctant inheritor of Conservative quality policy, or an ex 
Conservative authority that is pursuing its own quality policy agenda. 
A further distinction to be made is that of ideological differences among different 
Labour councils and among different Conservative councils. A Labour council, for 
example, may be of a 'new-Labour', 'modernising', 'post-Fordist' hue; in contrast it 
may instead be of a more 'traditional' paternalist-collectivist hue; yet again it may be of 
a new-urban-left hue. Similarly, a Conservative council may be of a 'radicalý new- 
suburban-right bent; or it may be more 'traditional', paternalist-patrician in its outlook. 2 
All these factors must be taken into account when considering the selection of a 
&representative' council. 
C) Authority type 
A significant distinction between local authorities is that of their structural type. 
Through numerous changes, over four decades, local authorities span a wide variety of 
sizes, responsibilities, workforce sizes and borough/countY populations. In 1996 local 
government was re-organised in Scotland and Wales, abolishing the existing two tier 
district, county and regional authorities in favour of new unitary authorities. Because 
this structural re-organisation affected issues relating to management continuity, case- 
studies were not selected from these authorities, except for pilot studies at initial stages. 
In England local authorities are divided into five basic types: county councils, district 
councils, metropolitan boroughs, London boroughs and unitary authorities. District and 
county councils operate over the same geographical area in a two tier arrangement. The 
counties operate the major labour intensive services (education, social services, 
libraries, housing) while district councils, at the more localised level fulfil the 
remaining services, including refuse collection, leisure services and most of the 
See chapter 2 for a fuller explanation of these ideological sub-groups. 
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regulatory functions (building regulations, environmental health etc. ). For this reason 
counties are much larger employers than districts (see table 6: 1 for summary). In the 
case of the metropolitan and London boroughs, these assumed unitary status following 
the abolition of the metropolitan counties and the Greater London Council (GLC) in 
1986. These authorities are also, then, large employers. 
Table 6: 1: Local Authoritv Structures: Summa 
Authority 
Type 
Employment (WTE 1995)* 
(Mean) (Highest) (Lowest) 
Functions 
Counties 16,077 32,650 8,403 Strategic planning; national park & countryside 
functions; traffic & transportation; highways; 
caravan sites; education; housing (reserve 
powers) social services; police; fire services; Food 
& Drugs Act 1955; weights & measures; libraries, 
museums & art galleries; refuse disposal. 
Districts 673 3,683 144 Baths & pools; car parks - off street; museums & 
art galleries; planning; cemeteries & crematoria; 
environmental health; electoral registration, 
markets and fairs; parks and open spaces; 
housing; refuse collection. 
Metropolitan 11,004 35,755 5,079 All local government functions (see County and 
Boroughs District functions) 
London 6,406 9,983 3,712 Baths & public halls; cemeteries & crematoria; 
Boroughs education & youth employment; electoral 
registration; environmental health; food & drugs; 
housing & slum clearance; libraries, museums & 
art galleries; local roads (construction, 
maintenance, lighting & improvement); Offices, 
Shops & Railways Premises Act; parking places 
for vehicles; parks & open spaces; personal social 
services; refuse collection & street cleansing; town 
planning; weights & measures. 
(Source: Joint Staffing Watch DoE Sept 1996. *Based upon LGIVIB sample, 1996) 
In addition to the size of workforces, the differing types of work conducted by different 
authority types will also have an effect on the membership profile of the union. 
Broadly, district councils would be likely to have a higher proportion of APT&C staff 
(ex NALGO) and metropolitan boroughs would be likely to have a higher rate of 
manual staff and/or 'caring-service' staff (ex NUPE; GMB; TGWU). 
d) Union entrenchment 
The position of the trade union (in this case Unison) within an authority is likely to be 
Partly determined by a combination of the above factors (entrenchment of the Labour 
Party locally, size of the workforce and services conducted by the council. It is also 
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likely to be based upon unique characteristics developed within local circumstances. 
For example, membership density may, for a number of reasons, be higher in areas 
where general union density is higher. This in turn is likely to be affected by the 
structure of the local economy, local unemployment rates, the local propensity for 
industrial militancy, along with particular histories and disputes within the authority 
itself. 
e) Contextualising the contingent factors 
The criteria, above, cover the most important sources of local authority variation. Other 
binary pairings could have been considered (northern and southern; urban and rural; 
affluent and economically deprived) but the criteria selected inter-relate with these 
factors in a number of ways so as to ensure that most situations can be allowed for. 
It becomes apparent, when considering the number of likely 'key' influences on 
authority differentiation, that selecting 'representative' cases for each possible 
condition would be impossible - given realistic constraints of finance and time. 
However, it is not methodologically necessary to include all possible permutations to be 
able to make some conclusive observations and comments - providing that case study 
observations are contextualised. 
Instead of using any of these 'variables' as 'blunt instrurnents' to define paired case 
studies, these factors can be considered as indicative of a type, but not a stereotype. For 
example, it may be expected that a Labour authority would be more likely to be union- 
friendly and a Conservative authority would be more likely to be union-hostile, yet 
these relationships carry complications. For example Heery notes the ambiguous nature 
of the relationship between Labour councils and local authority trades unions: 
The propensity of local government workers to take strike and other industrial action is 
positively associated with the proportion of council seats held by the Labour Party. "Local 
socialism", it would appear, is more effective in prompting trade unions into defensive action 
than cuts or privatisation (Heery 1987 p 194) 
He notes that this relationship became strained particularly where the NUL prevailed. 
Similarly Colling (1995b) notes the hostile relations existing between a London Labour 
authority and the trade unions regarding the implementation of quality programmes. 
Contextualisation of each case study was based upon a variety of published secondary 
sources about the authority in question. A precedent, here, is with Crabbe's (1992) 
Methodology 138 
methodological approach to a study of the effects of CCT to DSO contracts in local 
government. Crabbe defined his case-study selection as being based upon considering 
much the same criteria, in a non-rigid, non-quantitative manner. 
Different pressures such as local political conditions, industrial traditions and other subjective 
influences have provided varying environments and experiences which would not have come 
out in a structured quantitative survey (Crabbe: 1992 p 182) 
Crabbe uses case-studies as the focus of research and within that context uses telephone 
questioning of union officers, councillors etc.; documentary evidence and interviewing: 
"I have avoided any focus on one specific situation and attempted to use a broad 
comparative approach" (ibid: p 183). He thus allows for the following factors: 
" Political complexion of the Authority 
" The defined activities being studied 
" The Contractors involved 
" The prevalence of DSOs 
Each case is then contextualised with a description of the authority's demography, 
recent political history and policy before the case is explored. 
f) Differentiation by work type 
Contextualisation is also vitally important within case studies themselves. Because of 
the wide variety of functions carried out by local authorities, varying from 
'professional' work to unskilled manual work, the nature of the work areas being 
studied is vital (see chapter 5). Through this, the effects of specific policies on specific 
work regimes in specific services can be examined. Where it is possible to examine 
identical services in different authorities, some comparison can be made. Similar 
considerations are made at different hierarchical levels of management within the 
authorities being studied. This can show differences of perceptions at these levels and 
the extent by which middle managers feel that they are being either de-skilled or 
'empowered' by the effects of quality management - and how these experiences differ 
depending on the quality method involved. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CASE STUDY SELECTION AND RESEARCH METHODS 
This chapter will define the methods and case study selection used in this thesis. The 
methodology adopted in this research is based upon a plurality of appropriate 
research techniques used within a number of contextualised case-studies. Within this 
setting the approach adopted for the investigation and interpretation of events was in 
line with a realist interpretation of social science, as discussed in chapter 6. 
The parameters of the research process could be broken-down into four areas: 
defining the research issue, the availability of research data, the material constraints 
limiting research, and the selection of research strategies (Layder 1993). The first 
area - defining the nature of the research issue - was informed by a reading of recent 
literature on developments within local government. These issues - briefly these 
being managerialism, restructuring of collective bargaining and the labour process in 
public services - are described in sections II and III of this thesis. The second issue - 
the availability and accessibility of data concerned issues of gaining access to 
information about the nature and reactions to quality policies within local authorities. 
In turn, this required agreement by senior managers to be interviewed, and to provide 
access to other representative members of staff to be interviewed: it also required 
simultaneous agreement by case study Unison branch representatives to be 
interviewed and agreement and co-operation by the Unison branch in the conducting 
of a questionnaire survey of membership opinions. The third issue concerning 
financial, time and material resources at the researcher's disposal were not 
particularly prohibitive, but did restrict research to one researcher, a three year 
timescale and limited the number of case studies and the scale of the survey. Finally, 
the fourth issue - the selection of the research strategies generally thought appropriate 
within the field of study - was informed by what was known of other research 
conducted in organisational settings. Research, then, was conducted in a series of 
contextualised case studies. The rationale for the research process is described, 
chronologically, in the following sections. 
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Stage 1: Using a Case Study Approach 
The core of the research for this thesis was conducted in four local authorities. Broadly 
defined, a case study approach is an in-depth analysis of a single case that is 
representative in some way of a research topic. Beyond this, a case study may take a 
number of forms. Methods used in case-studies have ranged from highly experimental, 
quantitative studies to highly qualitative descriptive studies. Hakim (1987) has placed 
case study types on a broad continuum between descriptive reports and rigorous 
hypothesis testing. Craig-Smith (1991) has noted that providing the context of a case- 
study is incorporated, the analysis can be considered valid: the case-study selected need 
not be justified through any statistical representativeness but through its ability to 
demonstrate 'logical inference'. Thus the case-study can provide the basis for a depth 
analysis providing that conclusions are restricted to the context in which the case study 
has been selected. 
A case study approach has been increasingly seen as the appropriate strategy to adopt in 
an organisational setting: 
Case studies are a usefiil design for research on organisations and institutions in both the 
private and public sectors, and encompass studies of firms (including very small firms), 
workplaces, schools, trade unions, bureaucracies, studies of 'best practice', policy 
implementation and evaluation, industrial relations, management and organisation issues, 
organisational cultures, processes of change and adaptation, extending to comparative studies 
of nations, governments and multinationals. (Hakim 1987 pp69-70) 
A key strength of using a case study approach is that it offers advantages of flexibility 
in being able to adopt research methods appropriate to the specific organisation in 
question. The practice of using a variety of research techniques within a case-study is 
both methodologically consistent with, and is a prerequisite for valid case study 
research (see Hakim op cit.; Craig-Smith op cit. ). 
There are, aside from the practicalities discussed above, serious methodological 
justifications for adopting a pluralistic approach. One justification is based on the 
principle that a single-method approach should not be relied upon. The argument here is 
that claims that any one methodological approach can offer universal applicability - 
what Bell and Newby (1977) term 'methodolatory' - have been undermined by the 
demise of positivism as the dominant methodological paradigm (see chapter 6). 
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The other significant justification for adopting a multistrategy approach is based upon 
the premise that the validity of any research will be enhanced the greater the number of 
approaches that the problem is tackled. This has taken a number of forms but probably 
the most widely known has been that of Denzin's 'multiple triangulation' (Denzin 
1978). Denzin's approach, however, has been noted to be somewhat constraining 
(Hakim op cit. ) in that it is largely an approach designed for large scale research 
involving macro and micro analysis, the use of more than one researcher and using a 
number of theoretical approaches in order to triangulate the research and does not 
therefore lend itself to case-study research. This does not, however, detract from the 
benefits that can be gained by applying the principle of multiple-triangulation: the use 
of a range of methods to support and corroborate each other. In this research it was not 
possible, or desirable, to triangulate case studies with similar characteristics. 
The research methods used to investigate the aims and outcomes of implementing 
quality management in local government need to be able to identify what, specifically, 
is being implemented. This requires the comparative assessment of management 
strategies to known managerial models. In addition to being able to distinguish the 
nature of the intended management policies being pursued, however, it is also 
important to distinguish the origins and motives for management strategy in each case. 
Methods used here need to be able to determine how pre-existing management-worker 
relationships affect the choices being made by managers - something that cannot be 
done by merely accepting a 'retrospective rationalisation on the part of the main 
actors'(Hunter & Beaumont 1993 p318). Most importantly, research methods need to 
be able to assess the outcomes of the implemented strategy - again balancing the 
opinions of policy implementers with other affected people and other context-specific 
criteria. 
To do all this, a range of 'triangulated' methods were used - in varying degrees, 
according to the stage of research - depending upon the nature of access granted in each 
case. The results were then able to be interpreted within context to the case-study 
criteria. The methods used, then, included the use of secondary survey data on quality 
policy, documentary evidence, semi-structured interviews, focus group interviews and 
questionnaire survey data on trade union member attitudes. 
It 
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Stage 2: Selecting Criteria for Case Study 
The fact that quality management policies in local authorities may be affected by a 
number of contingent factors was established in chapter 6. Factors here included the 
variety in quality management methods themselves, structural differences between 
authorities, political and ideological differences, and differences between union 
entrenchment and management-union relationships. Selecting case studies could not, 
practically, be based upon pairing cases on all these issues as this would involve too 
great a number of cases leading to an over dilution of research in each case. Case 
studies were therefore selected according to their use of quality management, and then 
by contextualising according to the other contingent factors. 
a) Identifying authorities' use of quality management 
Initial selection involved the analysis of survey data conducted by the LGMB in 1994, 
1995 and 1996 of local authority use of quality management initiatives. This 
established the general level of quality management usage, shown in chapter 3, and 
allowed average and 'exemplary' authorities to identified. From this, a number of 
authorities that had higher than average use of quality management initiatives, were 
selected (see case study profiles below). From the number of authorities selected, some 
were further highlighted through the relatively high profile nature of their quality 
policies through publicity in local government j oumals and networks. 
b) Contextualising authorities 
At this stage a number of authorities were 'shortlisted' for further contact, ensuring that 
a good mix of metropolitan/district, Labour/Conservative, strong union/weak union etc. 
(available through local government publications, yearbooks, trade unions local 
authorities' own world-wide web sites and general sources). Contact was made, through 
the 'Chief Executive' of each, by letter and by telephone follow-up, and documentary 
information about the authority and its quality policy was requested. Documents used at 
this stage was, primarily, for background information only. While care was taken to use 
any documentary information in a legitimate manner (Mason 1996), the information 
sought from documents, here, was about the structure, political control, demography, 
and brief history of the case study authority in question and could be taken at 'face 
value'. 
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Using this information, case-studies were narrowed down, ensuring that a broad mix 
remained. After allowing for this, other factors was based upon self-selection: the 
authorities which provided information and which were responsive, remained case 
studies. Finally, three authorities were dropped from the selection, purely on the basis 
that only five authorities could be studied in any depth. The five that remained had a 
high (reported) usage of quality management methods and were diverse in all the other 
contingent factors discussed. 
Stage 3: Identifying and Contextuallsing Management & Union Policies 
Once the case study authorities had been identified and contextualised, management's 
quality policies had to be contextualised within the parameters identified in chapter 6. 
a) Documentary evidence 
Documentary evidence used at this stage was in the form of policy documents, quality 
management strategy documents and minutes of meetings. Attention was paid, here, to 
identifying the underlying motivations for the quality policy being adopted, given the 
possible alternatives of being driven by new urban left (NUL), post NUL, new 
suburban right (NSR) or officer-led 'managerialist' motives (see chapter 2). More 
careful consideration was given with data used here, therefore, to how documents were 
interpreted. Using the background information used at the previous stage, the different 
nuances in ideology were based upon implied stances on a range of 'NUL' 'NSR' 
priorities, as well ý as stances on specific issues such as compulsory competitive 
tendering and trade union involvement/entrenchment within the authority. Figures 7: 7 - 
7: 9 at the end of this chapter provides a summary of how the selected authorities 
compared on these themes. 
Management policy was not interpreted solely through documentation. The information 
taken from documentary evidence was also used to provide background information 
that informed the questions used when interviewing senior managers at the next stage. 
Stage 4: Assessing Senior Management and Union Branch Policy 
At this stage, contacts were made within each local authority in order to assess the 
policy and outcomes (see stage 5, below) of quality management implementation. Here, 
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the primary method of investigation was the semi-structured interview, supported by 
secondary sources (for example, management reports, minutes of meetings, staff 
surveys etc. ). The main method of investigation used here, however, was the semi- 
structured interview. 
a) The semi-structured interview 
Interviewing provides the most practical means by which people's opinions can be 
gauged without constraining responses. Semi-structured interviewing allows opinions 
to be gauged within the specific context of the interviewee, whilst pursuing the agenda 
detennined by the wider issues raised. 
While the good research interview may have a therapeutic side effect, it is structured in 
terms of the research problem. The interview structure is not fixed by predetermined 
questions, as it is in the questionnaire, but is designed to provide the informant with freedom 
to introduce materials that were not anticipated by the interviewer. (Foote-Whyte 1978 pI 11) 
Interview schedules were prepared in advance from information known about the 
authorities, and their broad quality policies. Questions remained general, however, in 
order that the interview could follow a course dictated by the interaction of the 
interview participants, thus allowing the focus to change from interview to interview - 
according to the differences in emphasis placed by interviewees. 
Interviewing was one of the principal methods used in gaining insights into managers' 
motives, rationale and opinions about the use of quality management. It was also the 
main method used in gauging the opinions of trade union officials in authorities. In 
both these cases, researcher bias - on the grounds of 'culture' or 'status' - was probably 
small - the interview effectively being a 'peer interview' or possibly an 'elite 
interview'. 
Stage 5: Assessing Quality Management Practice 
Assessing the perceived practice of quality management policies was, chronologically, 
done concurrently with the assessment of the policies themselves. The methods and 
interpretation of this aspect, however, warrants separate discussion. Methods used to 
assess management and union practices included the interviewing of line managers, 
union officials and supervisory staff. Interviewees at this stage tended to be self- 
selecting - or, perhaps more accurately, selected by senior managers. Those selected 
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were those managers who were identified as being able to provide the greatest insight 
into the successful operation of quality management. 
Where possible, as in the Arun and Newcastle cases, interview data was supplemented 
with the use of focus group interviews and, as in the Brent and Newcastle cases, by 
further examination of secondary information (staff surveys) provided by senior 
managers at the authorities. Where this information was available, careful attention was 
paid to the questions asked and the purpose of the survey and interpretation of results 
was qualified within this context. 
a) Focus gioup interview with managers 
In some cases it became possible to conduct group interviews. The format for this form 
of interviewing was conducted with focus group techniques in mind. Most of the 
rationale for focus group interviewing is identical to that of semi-structured 
interviewing: it allows free expression to targeted issues raised pro-actively by the 
researcher. However, the focus group differs in that it contains its own dynamic and the 
agenda can be shifted by any of the contributors. The result can be more valuable as the 
nominal level of analysis becomes the consensus of the group itself, as well as the 
individual opinions within that consensus. The researcher, in this scenario, becomes a 
moderator rather than an interviewer and the task of analysis begins during the group 
session (Goldman and McDonald 1987). 
Three group interviews were conducted. Two were conducted with Unison shop 
stewards at Newcastle and one was conducted with a group of managers at Arun, who 
met regularly to discuss quality issues. In all of these cases, then, the groups satisfied an 
important criterion essential for successful focus group sessions; that the participants 
are comfortable with each other, in order that a rapport can be built (Morgan 1995).. 
Prepared questions were presented at a thematic level following the same agenda as the 
interview schedules used for the case study concerned. 
Stage 6: Assessing Worker and Steward Perceptions 
Informed by knowledge acquired about management's intended policy on quality 
4 
management, by senior, line managers and trade union officials' perceptions of the 
outcomes of these policies, worker and union representatives opinions' were finally 
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sought on the main themes of this thesis: how does quality management affect working 
conditions in public services and how does this affect the position of the trade union? 
Methods used here were, where possible, semi-structured interviews (leisure workers at 
Wycombe), focus group interviews (youth worker stewards and activists at Newcastle), 
and the use of a self completion questionnaire survey (all authorities). 
a) Interviewing workers 
Where it was possible, low-graded workers were interviewed individually (Wycombe). 
This introduced a different social context to the interview, not present when 
interviewing managers. Whereas the managers who had been interviewed were 
predominantly self-selccting and could have been expected to have been familiar with 
much of the agenda, the situation was somewhat different in the case of lower-grade 
staff that were interviewed. While staff who were interviewed did so voluntarily, they 
were not 'self-selecting' in the way that senior managers had been, knowing nothing of 
the research prior to interview. In one case, the setting of staff interviews was also not 
ideal, being in a seated public area rather than a private office - where managers had 
been interviewed. These factors, combined, are likely to have biased some interviews 
somewhat and possibly constrained interviewees' ability to freely respond. While 
responses from these interviews have been included in the overall research, care has 
been taken not to attribute too much to them independently of other sources. 
b) Focus group interviews with staff 
As indicated above, two group interviews were conducted at Newcastle. The same 
considerations were given, here, as when interviewing managers in a focus group (see 
above) In this case, however, there was an additional dynamic, in that two focus group 
interviews were conducted, concerning similar issues at different stages of the research. 
The first interview, conducted at the early stages of the research, was set-up by the 
Branch Secretary to discuss the implications of introducing ISO 9002 quality manuals 
into various workplaces. Participants included Unison representatives, the Branch 
Secretary, myself and a researcher from the University of Morthumbria. This interview 
was exploratory and formed the basis for formulating further research. The second 
interview was conducted towards the end of the research. It was set-up by myself and 
consisted of a workplace Unison representative and five Unison members. This 
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interview pursued themes that had arisen from all the previous interviews and 
documentary research. While direct comparisons could not be made (because the 
participants were different), it was possible to draw some concusions from the 
differences and similarities between the two interviews. 
C) Staff questionnaire survey 
Quantitative methods, in realism, can be considered legitimate for disclosing 
mechanisms involved within a process (Sayer op cit. ); or for the provision of 
'sensitising data' (Layder op cit. ). Problems arise, however, where quantitative methods 
are used in a manner where they attempt to collapse complex relationships into mere 
sequences of events. Because survey data is analysed through the use of statistical 
methods, it is an inherently acausal technique. 
Contrasting with the prestigious view of the modeller as the guardian of 'science' is the 
image of mediocrity increasingly associated with the research project which uses the 
'regression bash' as a substitute for thinking. This mediocrity derives partly from the limited 
scope of the techniques and partly from the way they are frequently used. (Sayer op cit. 
p201) - 
While Sayer is sceptical about the validity of using statistical methods within a realist 
approach, he does not rule out such methods entirely - providing that they are combined 
with conceptual and theoretical clarity and NQere combined with qualitative methods to 
understand the more complex nature of causal relationships. 
A questionnaire survey was conducted to gauge opinion about more targeted issues. 
The targeted issues were based upon findings in earlier interviews with managers at 
pilot case studies and some of the early interviews conducted with union officials at 
case study authorities. These were: 
" Is quality management of much concern; is it just a 'fad'? 
" Has quality management increased 'commitment'? 
" Has quality management been intertwined with increasing workloads? 
" Could quality management undermine the union? 
The questionnaire survey is an appropriate method for gauging representative opinions 
- albeit in a constrained format. Using a questionnaire was considered justified in this 
study for two main reasons. First, it provided access to the opinions of staff who may 
otherwise have been excluded by the 'gatekeepers' who were providing access to each 
case study. Managers, in particular, could have been expected -to have presented 
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examples of 'best practice' which may not have been representative of general 
experiences. Secondly, it allowed comparisons between authorities and between 
services. The limitations of survey methodology are largely negated by the fact that the 
survey was providing only part of the overall account of opinion in the case studies. 
The questionnaire layout is divided into five main sections. The first section provides 
basic information about the respondent for coding. The second section concerns the 
respondent's level of knowledge about the quality policy being operated in his/her 
authority - and the respondent's general impression of the policy. The third section 
seeks the respondent's opinion as to whether the policy was increasing workloads. The 
forth section seeks the opinions about the impact of the policy on the union. Finally, the 
fifth section uses a series of likert-scale statements on all of these issues. The 
questionnaire also includes four open-ended questions (see appendices ii, iii, iv and v). 
Questionnaires were initially designed to be able to operate at two levels; at the union 
official/steward level and at the ordinary union member level. Two basic questionnaires 
were therefore used (appendices ii and iii). Though most questions are standard to both 
questionnaire types - and could thus be coded the same - some questions are different. 
In addition, one case-study authority - Newcastle - only one section of the authority was 
being studied (Community and Leisure Services). A 'hybrid' version of the two 
questionnaires was therefore produced to reflect this situation (appendices iv and v). 
The four basic questionnaire designs involved, then were: 
No I Standard questionnaire for union officials/stewards 
No2 Standard questionnaire for ordinary union members 
No 3 Hybrid version of version No I (Newcastle Leisure Services only) 
No 3 Hybrid version of version No 2 (Newcastle Leisure Services only) 
Distribution of the questionnaires was arranged through direct contact with union 
(Unison) branch officials at each council. When agreement was made, a first stage of 
questionnaires was put to all union officials and stewards at the branch. After this stage 
was completed, further assistance from the official was requested in the dissemination 
of questionnaires to ordinary members. Responses from the first stage was, however, 
inadequate to make general comparisons and was, therefore, not used for further 
analysis. 
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Questionnaires were sent to individual members with a covering letter of support from 
the union branch and seal-able return-paid envelopes. Respondents were then able to 
return the completed questionnaires via the union branch. 
Response rates for the ordinary member surveys averaged at about 20 per cent (see 
table 7: 1), though accurate figures were not possible because distribution was based 
upon membership lists held by the branch and invariably the membership list was not 
up to date. There was, for example, an overlap, equating to a few per cent, of cx- 
members included and new members excluded. A second reason for the imprecision of 
response rates was that an accurate count was sometimes not taken in cases where the 
branch distributed the questionnaires. The latter problem was difficult to overcome 
because this information was received retrospectively and conducting a second survey 
would have been counter-productive for reasons of time, finance and the risk of 
jeopardising the good will of the branch and its members. 
Table 7: 1: Resoonse Rates to Questionnaire Surve 
Q'aire No Date sent: No. Ret'd % 
Newcastle Stewards 1001-1027 - 2/10/96 8 29 
Brent Stewards 2001-2045 N/A N/A N/A 
Wycombe Stewards 4001-4025 14/10/96 5 20 
Arun Stewards 5001-5012 23/10/96 5 N/A 
Newcastle Members 6001-6240 21/10/96 50 21 
Brent Members 7001-7800 6/01/97 144 18 
Wycombe Members 9001-9233 14/10/96 43 18.5 
Arun Members 0001-0280 5/5/97 74 26.5 
Details of the survey responses are provided in chapter 9. 
Summary of Methods Used 
A variety of methods were used in this research, then, within the context of carefully 
selected case studies. There were some differences in the quantity of methods used in 
each case due to the degree of access granted and/or the level of 'self-selection' - 
particularly in relation to the number of interviews conducted. However, in all cases at 
least one senior manager, union official and at least two line managers were 
interviewed in all cases, as well as documentation and primary survey data. Additional, 
if uneven, information, was available in the form of focus group interviews and further 
interviews with managers and staff, and secondary data supplied by managers. 
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Table 7: 2, beiow, shows the range of methods used in the case studies and table 7: 3 
shows the relationship between methods, data and theory-building adopted. 
Table 7: 2: Research Methods (National Agendas) 
Issue Method/Source 
Government policy on quality Official documents, pilot interviews (Scottish 
Office), academic literature 
Party policies on quality Policy IDocuments, academic literature, practitioner 
conference (South Lanarkshire DC) 
Trends in local government management Practitioner joumals/publicity, LGMB quality 
policy on quality survey, pilot study: Grampian Regional Council, 
practitioner conference (South Lanarkshire DC) 
Trade union policies on quality Trade union publications, academic literature 
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Stage/issue Methods Used 
Brent Wycombe I Newcastle Arun 
I& 2) Profiling, local (All) Published data (Local Government Yearbook, DoE StaffWatch etc. ), 
authorities local authority publicity. 
3) Identifying and Council LGMB survey LGMB survey Council 
contextualising publicity. LGMB data. data. publicity. 
management and survey data. Management Management LGMB survey 
union policies Management policy policy data. 
policy documents. documents. Management 
documents. Council policy 
committee documents.. 
meeting minutes. 
4) Assessing Semi-structured Semi-structured Union Semi-structured 
management and interviews with interviews with consultation interview with 
union branch policy senior quality senior HR documents, branch secretary. 
manager, HR manager and minutes from Semi-structured 
manager and union branch meetings. Semi- interviews with 
union branch secretary. structured chief executive, 
secretary. interviews with senior manager 
senior manager, and union 
and union branch branch secretary 
secretary. 
5) Assessing quality Semi-structured Semi-structured Semi-structured Semi-structured 
management practice interviews with interviews with interviews with interviews with 
senior quality senior senior quality chief executive, 
manager, HR quality/HR manager senior customer 
manager, 12 line manager, 5 line (corporate), care manager, 5 
managers and managers, a team senior quality line managers, a 
union branch leader, 12 manager focus group of 
secretary. workers and the (Leisure), union customer care 
Secondary data union branch branch secretary, 'enablers' and 
from secretary. assistant branch the union branch 
management secretary. 2 focus secretary 
reviews. group interviews 
with staff and 
stewards. 
6) Assessing worker Questionnaire Questionnaire Questionnaire Questionnaire 
perceptions of quality survey, plus survey, plus survey, plus survey, plus 
management interviews (see interviews (see interviews and interviews (see 
above) above) focus group above) 
interviews (see 
above) 
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Some Case Study Profiles 
A number of authorities were contacted for inclusion and background research was 
conducted on many of those that were considered to be good candidates. Telephone 
discussions and interviews were conducted with relevant officers, documentary analysis 
of policies and minutes were carried out and visits were made to a number of 
authorities. From this, five authorities were ultimately chosen for detailed research. 
a) Pilot Studies 
At early stages contact was made with a number of authorities that would not be 
pursued as in-depth case studies. These, initial pilot studies proved useful grounding, 
however, in formulating some basic concepts for further investigation. The first such 
authority contacted was Bradford Metropolitan Borough Council. Useful background 
information relating to the relationship between the political leadership of the council 
and the administrative leadership of the council (management), in relationship to CCT 
and the adoption of a formal quality management programme, was obtained in the form 
of documentary evidence and telephone contacts. A second study involved formal semi- 
structured interviews and documentary information from Grampian Regional Council. 
This proved more useful in formulating further research ideas in all of the areas 
eventually pursued. Unfortunately Grampian Regional Council, like all councils in 
Scotland, was in the process of being abolished in re-organisational changes during 
1996 - making in-depth follow-up work impossible. Finally, contact was made with a 
new Scottish unitary authority in 1996 - South Lanarkshire Council, following its 
preaecessor (Hamilton District Council) holding a conference on the use of quality 
management. in local government. 
b) London Borough of Brent Council 
Brent is a London Metropolitan Borough situated towards the north-west of the city. It 
has one of the highest populations of all the London boroughs, being an estimated 
257,200 in 1990'. It was created in the local government re-organisation of 1963 
through merging two pre-existing boroughs demographically different to each other: 
Willesden being an 'inner city' borough, with a large working-class population and 
I The 1990 estimate being, probably, more accurate than actual census data In the case of London boroughs 
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latent Labour Party support; and Wembley being suburban with a more. middle-class, 
Conservative electorate. The borough is the most ethnically diverse in the UK - having 
a 44.8 per-cent non-white population (Brent Council 1994) - and much of the local 
politics of the past two decades have been affected by this factor. The borough, as a 
whole, has also experienced high levels of unemployment and deprivation over two 
decades. 
Because of the demographic factors discussed above, the Council has been a 'natural 
marginal' council: between 1980 and 1996 it changed control from Labour to 
Conservative and back to Labour again, with - numerous coalitions in between (see 
figure 7: 2). Since 1993 control had been determined by the casting vote of the mayor 
and in 1996 (during the period of research) control switched, again, to Labour - again, 
through the casting vote of the Mayor. 
During the early to mid 1980s Brent was one of the 'New-Urban-Left' (NUL) 
authorities pursuing policies of 'defending services' - thereby attempting to maintain 
high levels of employment 
"within 
the Council; and anti-racism - mainly through 
'positive discrimination' in service provision and council employment practice. It was 
one of a number of high profile London authorities demonised as 'loony left' by the 
national media at the time. 
In 1990 control switched to a 'New-Suburban-Right' (NSR) Conservative majority 
whose priorities were those pioneered by authorities such as Wandsworth i. e. lowering 
local taxation by reducing spending through measures such as voluntary competitive 
tendering (CCT is for wimps' as one officer paraphrased it); shedding administrative 
and manual staff, cutting 'unnecessary' services and adopting 'a more commercial 
approach' to administration as a whole. These priorities remained until mid 1996, when 
control switched back to Labour (see figure 7: 1). 
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Figure 7: 1: Councillor Composition: Brent LBC 
1) Minority Conservative Administration with support of two Labour defectors. 
2) Conservative Control through casting vote of the Mayor. 
3) Death of local councillor temporarily removes majority. Labour/Lib-Dem take control through 
replacement of mayor. 
On the broad quantitative measure of management take-up of quality Initiatives (see 
chapter 3) Brent has had a high usage and implernentation-rate ofquality methods (see 
Table 7: 4). From LGMB data Brent was in the upper quartile of local authorities, In 
terms of overall use of quality methods in 1994,1995 and 1996. In terms ofcorporate 
use of quality methods Brent was in the top 3 per-cent for 1994, though I'alling 
dramatically the following year and rising, again, to an above average score in 1996 
(though this fluctuation was due more to a change in Brent's definition of 'corporate') 
than its actual use of quality management methods. 
Table 7: 4: Brent LBC Comparative QualiV 'Rating' 
I Brent All Councils: Mean All Councils: Median 
Overall use of quality (1994) 8 4.44 4 
Overall use of quality (1995) 8 4.49 5 
Overall use of quality (1996) 8 4.86 5 
Corporate use of quality (1994) 7 2.68 2 
Corporate use of quality (1995) 2 2.38 2 
Corporate use of quality (1996) 4 2.55 2 
(Source Data: LGMB 1994; 1995,1996) 
Brent's qUality campaign, 'Ihe Qualily Council' and its innovation ofusing 'Onc-Slop- 
Shops' have been aniong tile most high profille Of ally quality Initiatives pursued by a 
local authority. 
z: iource uata: Locai uovernment YearbOOK 
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C) Wycombe District Council 
Wycombe Council is a district authority, situated approximately twenty miles north- 
west of London. It is a, largely, affluent commuter town with direct rail and motorway 
links to London and the Midlands. The district comprises of an urban centre with 
rural/suburban fringes; the town centre having higher than average ethnic minority 
communities. It has witnessed a large growth in population since 1945, reaching 
1592600 by the 1990 census estimate, giving it the nineteenth highest borough 
populations in England district authorities in England (local Government Yearbook 
1995). Economically, the town used to depend on the fin-niture trade as its main 
industry but, following its demise, the town has diversified into service industries and 
small-scale 'sunrise' industries. Unemployment has been below the national average 
since the war and trade union membership in the Borough reflects the generally low 
rates seen throughout the region. 
The Council has been dominated by the Conservative party since the end of the first 
world war and could be considered to be a classically 'patrician Tory' borough. For 
example, leading councillors, while supporting the virtues of private sector 'experience' 
in public office, did not support CCT being imposed on their council's activities: policy 
on CCT was firmly in favour of winning all in-house contracts. 
In the 1995 local elections, however, the borough was affected by the same electoral 
swings that affected most Councils in the mid I 990s, and the Conservatives lost their 
majority to an uneasy coalition of Labour and the Liberal Democrats (see figure 7: 2). 
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Wycombe's use of quality methods has been very high, on the scale developed fi-orn the 
LGMB Quality Surveys (see table 7: 5). In terms of its overall use ofquality methods, 
Wycombe's 'score' was in the upper quartile of local authorities for 1994,1995 and 
1996. In its 'corporate' use of quality methods, it was in the top 2 per-cclit of' local 
authorities in 1994, though this fell progressively in 1995 and 1996 - possibly reflecting 
a change in perception in how it defined some of its activities. 
Table 7: 5: Wycombe DC Comparative Quality'Rating' 
I IA/nr All rrmnrill, ' mpan All Councils- Mt=cii;; n 
Overall use of quality (1994) 7 4.44 4 
Overall use of quality (1995) 7 4.49 5 
Overall use of quality (1996) 7 4.86 5 
Corporate use of quality (1994) 8 2.68 2 
Corporate use of quality (1995) 6 2.38 2 
Corporate use of quality (1996) 3 2.55 2 
(Source Data: LGMB 1994,1995,1996) 
d) Newcastle upon Tyne City Council (Metropolitan Borough) 
Newcastle is at the heart of the North Fast I"11gland C011111-batlOn. It IS MI Urban borough 
with a population of 247,190 (Local Govcrnn1ent Yearbook 1995). With its traditional 
industrial base - shipbuilding and coal - in long-term decline, it is considered to he 
I post- I ndustrial' and has high levels of structural unemployment in common with the 
regional norm - 11.5 per-cent of the workl'orce (Firiployment Gazette 1995). The 
Council, like all councils and Parliamentary constituencies In the COIILIrbation is 
-->ource uata: LOcai uovernment Yeart)OOK 
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dominated by the Labour Party (see figure 7: 3) and the ruling Labour group is firinly ot 
the 'traditional" paternalist Labour mould. 
Figure 7: 3: Councillor Composition Newcastle City MBC 
The council has a firm policy of retaining all services in-house and consults with trade 
unions at policy level. The unions (or Unison) has strong local base: as recently as 
Spring 1995 it was able to effect a one day strike in opposition to spending cuts. 
Indeed, Painter defines Newcastle as an archetypal 'Fordist' council: 
... (it) is dominated by paternalist labOUrism. The local state on Tyneside remains 
dominated 
by Fordist forms of organisation, and continues to relate to its social and economic 
environment in much the same way as under Fordisin. Large scale, direct, public set-vice 
provision is still tile norm. The government's compulsory competitive tendering legislation 
has failed significantly to redUce the extent of' direct provision, tile stre"I'll, of tile union 
movement, or the wages and working conditions Of COLHICH staff. (Painter 199 1 p40) 
Table 7: 6: Newcastle City MBC Comparative Quality RatinT 
I Newcastle All councils: Mean All Councils: Median 
Overall use of quality (1994) 6 4.44 4 
Overall use of quality (1995) 6 4.49 5 
Overall use of quality (1996) 6 4.86 5 
Corporate use of quality (1994) 4 2.68 2 
Corporate use of quality (1995) 3 2.38 2 
Corporate use of quality (1996) 3 2.55 2 
(Source Dataý LGMB 1994: 1995,1996) 
While the ALIthority is roughly average in terms ofthe take-up ol'cluality management. 
one department has seen a high level ofaCtiVit)' Oil this - though this is not visible on 
the crude Q-scores shown above. There wits no plan to implement TQM corporately at 
the time of rescarch because ofthe autonomous nature Of departments at tile authority. 
'Source Data: Local Government Yearbook 
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The one department pursuing quality management, Leisure Newcastle, adopted a firm 
commitment to TQM - though largely through the pursuit of ISO 9000 accreditation, 
for which the Authority boasted the first residential day centre in the country to be so 
accredited. 
e) Arun District Council 
Arun DC is situated on the South coast of England in rural Sussex. It has three major 
centres; the towns of Littlehampton, Bognor Regis and Arundel. It has a population of 
138,205 (OPCS 1995) and is growing. The average age of the population is rising, 
reflecting the. number of post-retirement age people living in the Borough (31 per cent) 
making it the fifth oldest population in the UK. Deprivation levels are low in the 
borough, despite an increase in unemployment suffered during the early 1990s. 
Tourism is the most visible form of economic activity in the Borough. 
Politically, Arun could be considered to be a classic Tory council. It remained 
Conservative after the 1995 elections, where many other 'safe' councils were lost (see 
figure 7: 4). Traditionally, the ideological hue of the local Party could be said to that of 
the patrician Tory: one officer noted that they were the type who would "come back to I 
run the Council after having run the Empire". Some challenges were made to this in the 
1980s, with a NUR faction in ascendancy within the ruling group, but that this had now 
subsided following leadership changes in the early 1990s. As such, policy on CCT was 
to bid for the services being tendered, with the intention of retaining them where 
practicable. 
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Arun scores highly on the quality rating measure. In overall use it scores slightly above 
average, but for corporate policy initiatives, it is in the upper quartile (see table 7: 7). 
Arun's quality policy is focused around a 'customer care' approach (it is known, 
officially as Working. 1br the Public). 
Table 7: 7: Arun DC Comparative Quality 'Rating' 
I Arun All Councils: Mean All Councils: Median 
Overall use of quality (1994) 6 4.44 4 
Overall use of quality (1995) 5 4.49 5 
Overall use of quality (1996) 6 4.86 5 
Corporate use of quality (1994) 6 2.68 2 
Corporate use of quality (1995) 4 2.38 2 
Corporate use of quality (1996) 4 2.55 2 
(Source Data: LGMB 1994; 1995,1996) 
The union at Arun is of moderate strength for a borough of' its size, with low to 
moderate membership levels, no full-time staffand with little active bargaining with the 
Authority. 
1) London Borough of Hackney Council (abandoned as full case study) 
In addition to the above Iour complete case studies. another -I lackncy 1101-01.1gh 
Council - was selected flor inclusion. While some research, including a number of 
interviews, was carried out - and was therclore ot'gcneral use in terms ol'understanding 
management agendas in quality policy areas and certain services - it bccanic an 
inadequate case study tor general comparison, as will now be explained. 
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Hackney is a densely populated inner London borough created in the 1965 re- 
organisation of local government out of the three municipal boroughs of Hackney, 
Shoreditch and Stoke Newington. The population of the borough is 192,479 (OPCS 
1994). Income levels in Hackney are low. Two thirds of households have a gross 
income of less than f 10,000 a year and only 15 per cent have a gross annual income M 
excess of f20, OOO. The average gross household incorne time of fll, 900 a year, 
compared with the London average of f 19,700. Some 48 per cent of Hackney residents 
rent from the Council and only 27 per cent are owner occupiers. Hackney has tile 
highest rate of unemployment in London at 25.5 per cent of the economically active 
population. The Borough is one of the most ethnically mixed in the UK, ethnic 
minorities making up 3' ). 6 per cent of the population. 
As a consequence of the above factors it is no surprise that Hackney is a safe Labour 
borough and has been associated with the NUL throughout the 1980s (though not to tile 
same extent as Lambeth, Islington or Brent). In 1996, however, the ruling Labour group 
split - effectively making the Borough a hung council (see figure 7: 5). 
Figure 7: 5: Councillor Composition Hackney LBC 
It is broadly representative of the NUL with its strong commitment to retaining services 
in-house. Trade unions were expected (and xvcre subsequently 60LInd to be) relatively 
strong in the authority and were consulted at policy level. I lackney was also, however. 
representative of a 'left' Labour council with difficult relations with in-house trade- 
unions. Lansley ct al (1989) note how, in 1983 "llackneY's lVans fin- leceniridistaion 
OUUIL; t: UdId. LOcai uovernment YearbOOK 
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were first blocked, and then killed off by the resistance of the workforce and the 
management to the radical changes proposed. " (p 112). 
Hackney's quality rating was comparatively high, as table 7: 8 shows. 
Table 7: 8: Hackney LBC Comparative Quality'Rating' 
I Hackney All Councils: Mean All Councils: Median 
Overall use of quality (1994) 7 4.44 4 
Overall use of quality (1995) 5 4.49 5 
Overall use of quality (1996) 8 4.86 5 
Corporate use of quality (1994) 5 2.68 2 
Corporate use of quality (11995) 3 2.38 2 
Corporate use of quality (11996) 5 2.55 2 
(Source Data: LGMB 1994; 1995,1996) 
TQM had been adopted at corporate and departmental levels. During the latter half of 
1996, a number of factors combined to make continued access difficult at the council. 
The first factor was a split in the ruling Labour group, which effectively removed 
political certainty that existed previously and focused unwanted attention onto the 
authority. In addition the union became embroiled in controversies stemming back from 
the 1980s, on top of it not being able to integrate its NALGO and NUPE sections very 
successfully. Finally, restructuring proposed by management and agreed just prior to 
the split, caused major upheavals in certain sections of the authority - including the 
areas under study here. As a consequence access - in terms of being able to interview 
reasonably openly and to conduct survey research, was severely restricted and Hackney 
was abandoned as unworthy of equal comparison as a complete study. 
Summary of Case Characteristics 
Within the five cases selected, then, a good mix of characteristics were included. In 
terms of structural type, authorities represented included English Districts, a 
Metropolitan Borough and London Boroughs. Types excluded were English Counties 
and, for reasons relating to structural re-organisation, Scottish, Welsh and English 
Unitary 'authorities. In terms of politics, cases included Labour, Conservative and a 
Labour/Liberal Democrat 'balanced' (hung) council. The selection included two 
authorities that experienced a change in control during the period of study, authorities 
of long standing single-party domination and an authority that was demographically 
very marginal. Ideologically councils varied from 'new-suburban right' to (post) 'new- 
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urban left' to 'pragmatic'. All authorities had a declared quality policy, but corporate 
approaches to CCT varied from being pro-actively in favour of outsourcing, to 
gpragmatic' compliance, to active hostility. Trade union entrenchment varied from high 
density with full-time officials and fully consulted over council policy, to medium 
density, with lay officials, to being under threat of de-recognition. Most of these 
characteristics are displayed in figures 7: 6 to 7: 8. 
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Figure 7: 6: Characteristics of Local Party Influences 
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Figure 7: 7: Local Party Influences on CCT Policy 
Party Control Level of Party Likely CC 
Entrenchment Policy 
Locally 
1)Direct Provision kney 
Established Labour N:. - 
2)'Mixed Economy' 
F3-)[Direct Provision 
Labour Marginal Labour 3our 
4 4) 'Enabling' 
-f5)'Mixed Economy' 
I 
Ex-Conservative Brent (1996/7) 
5)'Enabling' 
'Mixed Economy' V, 
Arun 
Established Cons. L 
abling' )Er Wycombe (1994/5) 
ýonservafive 
9)'Mixed Economy' 
Ex-Labour 
_ _ bling' [_- -f Iir ent(199F4 6) 
1 1)'Mixed Economy' 
Ex-Labour 
=L ý 
12)'Enabling' 
- 13)'Mixed 
Eco 
L =Ib -D em Traditional Liberal 14) 'Enabling' 
15)'Mixed Economy' 
Ex-Conserv/: a: tiv: e:: 
F:: ::: 
16)'Enabling' 
17)'Mixed Economy' 
Anti-Labour 
= 
Rwn 
::: ýu=ng 18)'Enabling' 
19)'Mixed Economy' Wycombe (1995-7) 
Anti-Conservative I 7______ _ 0)'EFnabling ] 
_ý2 
Methodolop, 
Figure 7: 8: Likely Relationship Between Local Authority and Trade 
Union(s) 
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The Use of Quality in Local 
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CHAPTER 8 
QUALITY IN FoUR AUTHORITIES 
This chapter presents the findings of research conducted in the four selected case- 
study authorities described in chapter 7. The findings presented here indicate the 
nature and background of the quality management policy pursued in each authority. 
Specifically, it describes the perceptions of senior managers responsible for 
implementing quality management policies, the reactions of other managers to the 
policies and the reactions of Unison officials to the policies. Because of the difference 
in the context and nature of the quality management policies being pursued in each 
case -a result of the different background issues involved in each case - different 
approaches to quality management policy emerged. As a result, the focus of research 
necessarily varied from case to case, as and where different agendas were raised. What 
is reported in this chapter reflects the opinions and perceptions of relevant local 
spokespersons on management and Unison sides. 
Broadly, some distinct differences were found, resulting from the different approaches 
taken towards quality and the position of the union in each case. Findings also 
indicate, however, a number of common themes. Table 8: 0: 1 summarises the case 
study characteristics and the quality policies being pursued, 'in relation to some of the 
criteria discussed in chapter 7. 
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Table 8: 0: 1: Case Study Characteristics 
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Brent Wycombe Newcastle Arun 
Authority Type London borough District Met. borough District 
Demography Urban/suburban Rural/suburban Urban. High Coastal resort. 
mix. High mix. Affluent. unemployment. Tourism oriented. 
deprivation. Ex industrial. Aged population. 
Broad ethnic mix 
Political Control Con (Lab 1996) Hung (Lab/LD) Lab Con 
Workforce 4,1051 6362 11,5193 5374 
Union Density Declined, Low, rising High Low 
stabilising 
Union- Conflictual. Consensus Negotiated Consensus 
Management 
Relations 
CCT Policy Favours 'Best value' Favours in-house Selective 
I outsourcing pragmatism outsourcing 
Quality Policy I Devolved Holistic Performance/PRP IS09002 Customer Care 
1 1993: (Brent Council Quality Review) 
2 1996: ME (Joint Staffing Watch 1996) 
3 1996: WTE (Joint Staffing Watch 1996) 
4 1996: WTE (Joint Staffing Watch 1996) 
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8.1: The London Borough of Brent Council 
Case Characteristics 
NSR Conservative controlled (1994-6) 
Favours contracting-out 
Conflictual management-union relations 
Post NUL Labour controlled (1996-7) 
Quality Policy 
a) The Quality Council 
The origins of Brent's quality strategy date back to budgetary crises in 1988. From 
this point 'infrastructural' changes were instigated to combat future financial 
problems and an internal review was set up, which reported after the political 
leadership had changed. In 1991 the Council launched the Quality Council policy on 
the back of the previous changes. 
The new Quality Council policy made a few ideological references to suit the new- 
right agenda of the new administration, including a commitment to a client/contractor 
split, and customer orientation. Nevertheless the Quality Council policy was produced 
in isolation from party political influence and the essence of the 'values' incorporated 
were essentially managerialist, including commitment to: 
" 'strong leadership" 
" 'Total Quality' 
" 'clear accountability' 
" 'total ownership' 
" 'simple direct communication' 
" 'maximum devolution' 
" 'strong staff development' 
The policy was driven by the chief executive, who 
"... was a skilful person at dealing with politicians. He had the political groups all 
signed-up to the Total Quality programme in broad terms. I don't know .. to what 
extent they were involved in discussing the nitty-gritty of it; I suspect ve? y little. " 
(Manager: Quality Unit) 
The Quality Council was launched to the entire workforce, at a conference centre, in 
199 1. Its new 'mission statement' was: 
The Use of Quality in Local Government 
To be quite simply the best local authority in the country. A local authority in which the 
community we represent and serve, and the staff we employ, have pride. We will 
concentrate on achieving excellence through Total Quality. (Brent Council 199 1) 
171 
A number of schemes were introduced to set the quality programme into action. First, 
a Total Quality programme was - set up. 'Quality facilitators' were trained and set 
about advising on improvement programmes at various council services. The role of 
the quality facilitators was sometimes more than just advisory, however, as was 
suggested by one senior manager: 
"... it was quite deliberately an attempt to go behind,... or go around, managers who 
weren't doing-the-business... The Quality Facilitators had that particular role. That 
created some tensions. It was a sensible strategy because, clearly, if we've got 
managers inplace who were not committed to quality - and notprepared to become 
committed to quality - then, in an organisation that where that's .. a founding goal, [they've] got to go. " (Senior Manager: Quality Unit) 
'Quality Time' was another initiative created at this time. The purpose of this was to 
set aside time for staff to be trained in various aspects of customer care - such as 
telephone manner and responding to complaints. The information and training, at this 
stage was generalised and basic, reflecting the universalistic assumptions of TQM 
methodology: 
"... in theory it's as usefulfor people who are delivering childcare services as it is 
IiI av for people who are doing noise pollution, for examp e, wh ch inherent yhe 
nothing in common apart from the fact that they're services to the community of 
Brent. " (Senior Manager: Quality Unit) 
Being pitched at this general level, however, it was not universally appreciated, 
particularly by staff operating in some of the more 'professional' services: 
" Some actually resented the training.. -I don't think that people that are earning f20,000 ayear, or something, need to be toldhow to answer aphone - there's ways 
ofdoing it. " (Team Leader: Business Unit) 
Devolution 
Running in parallel with the Quality Council, at this time, was a policy of 
decentralisation. From 1990 Council activities, then based in large departments, were 
divided into 150 units: 13 'core' units, 7 'commissioning' units and 130 'contractor 
businesses' (see figure 8: 1: 1). This process began in 1990 reaching its climax in 1992. 
At some stage between 1990 and 1993 decentralisation had changed to Devolution 
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and had become an organisational priority. The formal structure is illustrated in figure 
1: 1, below. 
Figure 8: 1: 1: Brent LBC Devolved Council Structure 
Core 
Commissioning 
Units 
Contractor 
Units 
Devolution added a structural dimension to quality, making Brent a virtually pure 
example of the 'enabling authority' model. Devolution was now seen as the key 
element in the Council's approach to quality. A commissioning manager put it that he 
believed that "... Devolution has been the single most important engine of the quality 
process". 
The nominal arrangement for ensuring that Brent's corporate quality requirements 
were met was through the contract relationship. Business Units would take 
responsibility for the method of service delivery, while Commissioning Units would 
set the outcome targets. 
One of the principal aims of Devolution was the 'empowerment' of unit managers. 
This was enabled by devolving budgets to individual units, shifting discretionary 
decision-making powers away from the centre to the level of the manager of the 
affected service. The scope of this decision-making was quite wide-ranging. It 
covered issues such as the choice of cleaning and maintenance contractors (i. e. 
managers were not compelled to use Council DSO services); the purchasing of 
equipment; and, significantly, issues relating to. hiring, firing, training and promotion 
of staff (though there were Corporate Standards that had to be complied with). 
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"Now I can say to a contractor 'come here tomorrow and if you're not here 
tomorrow don't bother coming' - and they're here tomorrow. So you've got the 
power to actually demand things andget best valuefor money" (Director: Business 
Unit) 
Managers were encouraged to adopt an 'entrepreneurial' attitude to organising their 
units and could be rewarded by being allowed to 're-invest' savings made from cost- 
savings made. 
C) BrentMark 
In 1993 the Quality Council policy was reviewed. The Mission Statement was retained 
in its entirety but its Statement of Values was appended to include 'value[ing] and 
empowerment ofstaff to go along with 'a quality service', 'an efficient organisation' 
and 'serving our customers'. 
At this time it was recognised that the Council required a mechanism that would 
enable it to maintain a corporate approach to quality, appropriate to the devolved 
structure that existed, as it was perceived that there were discrepancies between the 
best and weaker services. One of the executive directors was given the task of 
developing an approach to service improvement that would help remedy deficiencies 
in 'procedural competence' whilst providing a corporate framework for 'continuous 
quality improvement', and a Quality Development Unit (QDU) was set-up at the core 
of the Council. The result was BrentMark, which was launched in December 1995. 
BrentMark was a mandatory award scheme based upon the systemic requirements of 
ISO 9000, the customer-centred requirements of Chartermark and the training and 
development requirements of Investors in People (RP). All internal and external 
contractors would be required to be accredited to BrentMark. It was also, however, a 
conscious effort to ensure that devolved business units maintained their corporate 
identity. A problem with devolving management structures, not surprisingly, was a 
loss of relative power at the centre and there had been some concern, at the core, that 
some units had become too autonomous: 
44 
... people started to do UDI - which a devolved culture, of course, encourages - and 
that's not clever. There was a phase, in 199314, when the programme lost corporate 
direction... " (Senior Manager: Quality Unit) 
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d) Externalisation 
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At the same time as BrentMark was being finalised by management, councillors were 
preparing the next phase in their agenda. The priority remained on 'efficiency' and 
'effectiveness' of service provision - measured by relationship to cost - but now the 
targets became more specific. The priority changed to one of delivering 'year-on-year' 
cuts in council taxes by budget cuts and selling-off council activities - except for a 
much streamlined core. In this environment BrentMark had some credibility 
problems. Some Conservative councillors were wary, perceiving it as creating 
obstacles to their externalisation programme: 
"... ifthere is apoint where Members have to choose between the different agendas - 
if we can't actually achieve quality and regeneration and externalisation objectives 
- which one they'll choose? I think everyone's pretty clear that externalisation 
comesfirst" (Senior Manager: Quality Unit) 
The externalisation programme led to considerable anxiety among staff and managers. 
While some employee protection was now available through TUPE, and this may 
have had the effect of deterring 'bad' potential private sector employers in some 
cases, it could not allay the fears of staff in most services: 
66--people go out under TUPE. A year afterwards a lot of them are made redundant 
- or their conditions of service are reduced .. [T]o 
be innovative like we've done, 
You know; getting inspectors to accept hot-desking; work from home; all the 
computers at home, -faxes - but there's a willingness to do thatfrom staff. Ifyou say 
'well sod it. ' you're all out now and by-the-way we're going to cut your salary as 
well'. - they'll do the work but I don't think we 'd probably get the commitment. (Senior Manager: regulatory service business unit) 
Many managers, previously enthused by 'empowerment', were now feeling 'betrayed' 
by the externalisation project. Managers at regulatory services felt that externalisation 
was inherently problematic (if not potentially illegal) and there was a feeling, at the 
core, that by selling off strategic activities: 
"Ifyou cut the Core too much then you cut the people who are ahle to make things 
happen somewhere else and that's a risk It's certainly a risk that you could rely 
upon us in the Core heing aware of. " (Manager: Personnel Services) 
The accompanying year-on-year cuts to budgets were having a similar effect. At first 
managers felt able to absorb these as the financial benefits of cutting staff and 
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deregulating working practices could be passed on. These benefits, however, could 
only be passed-on while it was considered physically possible: 
"... the degree, now, of the reduction of the work-force and the extra work we're 
expected to do - the demand that's placed on us - is such that there comes a point 
where actual quality of service, now, will reduce. We've soaked-up lots of work - lots of extra demands being placed on us. We managed to take on extra work.. but 
they don't seem to accept there is a limit to howfar you can go with that. " (Senior 
Manager: regulatory service business unit) 
Retreat 
One significant element of management uncertainty was the politicisation of quality - 
the identification of the Quality Council programme with the Conservative NSR 
agenda of cutting jobs and services and of extemalisation - within the context of a 
very slender majority. This was recognised, particularly, by management within the 
QDU. It was anticipated, however, that much of the quality agenda had now entered 
mainstream Labour Party thinking and it was hoped that this would guide thinking, 
should political control switch: 
"At base level all of this stuff is completely apolitical, They all believe in customers 
being happy with services; they all believe in goodprocesses; they all believe in 
well trained staff, they all believe in good management - which is what this is all 
about. It's not ideological stuff, quality. But aýything can get caught-up in that kind 
of [cross-fire]. " (Senior Manager: Quality Unit) 
In 1996 leadership of the Council switched back to Labour. The immediate priority 
was the cancellation of the externalisation policy. Other than this the policy initiatives 
of the new administration were constrained by existing budgetary arrangements, and 
so the new administration had to prioritise. Within two days of the new administration 
taking office, the QDU and BrentMark were abolished. 
Policy Outcomes and Reactions 
Overall, the Quality Council had the effect of intensifying work regimes while 
simultaneously demanding additional commitment from staff, although important 
differences were detected between different service functions. While increasing 
efficiency could be used to enhance services at a static cost, the priority was to use 
efficiency gains merely to maintain service levels and reduce costs - i. e. staff. This 
responsibility had been passed down to local managers, working to budgets. This 
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situation was aptly described by one manager as follows: "I think that there's more 
pressure on staff. Success brings pressure. " 
a) Work Organisation 
The Quality Council policy made significant changes to the working environment at 
the council. Of the early initiatives, Quality Time was one which was seen, by senior 
management, as significant in changing the way staff approached their work: 
"I don't think we really anticipated quite how far reaching its effects would he in 
terms of empowering people and changing the way they behave" (Senior Manager: 
Quality Unit) 
Devolution meant that local managers were given a contract, some targets and a 
budget to work to, along with a high degree of discretion on most aspects of staffing. 
This 'empowerment' encouraged managers to improvise with working practices. 
Initially this did not necessarily lead to a deterioration in working conditions. In the 
case of one regulatory service, savings were made by allowing staff to work from 
home through 'hot-desking', therefore saving money on accommodation and time. 
However, in this case the savings gained were not fed into enhancing the service but 
into allowing the manager to "... reduce the number of inspectors .. still cover the work 
and do it quicker and cheaper than we could do it before. " 
For staff, the combination of local managers with greater discretionary powers and the 
same managers under increased pressure to reduce costs from a separate 
commissioning unit proved a powerful incentive to co-operate, or at least to be less 
uncooperative - especially in labour intensive areas of work where 'over-staffing' was 
perceived to be a problem. The effect, here, was that managers had greater control 
over making changes to working conditions: 
"... those people who aren't up to it, either they're gone, or they're on less money 
and there's always aproblem with that - Idprefer it if they were gone, but usually 
there's a choice ... and, yeah, there's a few people who aren't going to be happy 
about it, because they're beingpaid what they're worth" (Library Manager: ) 
Although it was generally managers who were made to feel 'empowered', there was 
strong commitment to pass this down to staff, in the form of 'functional flexibility' so 
that any member of staff could: 
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"... identify the problem and solve it at the same time andjeel that they're able to do 
that .. Id rather they have a go and messed it up than didn't have a go. 7hat's what I hate; people passfing] responsibility for things... In fairness people pursue their 
seyinterest - which is to earn more by having more responsibility and having more 
staff. " (Senior Manager: Arts & Community business unit) 
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Devolution also enabled unit managers to introduce 'flexibility' into employment 
contracts affecting hours and conditions. One manager compared this to arrangements 
before where: 
"... we might have had to employ someone who's paid at a certain, kind-of, rate after 
a certain number of hours, or got paid double always, at the weekend.. which 
becomes expensive. " (ibid. ) 
b) Culture, Commitment and Ideology 
A strong emphasis was made, in the Quality Council programme, on employee 
conunitment: 
'Our staff will have pride in the Council, will have confidence and trust in their managers 
and leaders, and will feel ownership of and involvement in the process of change and the 
provision of quality service. ' (Charles Wood: op cit. ) 
and 
'There will be no one working for Brent Council who does not understand its beliefs and 
ambitions and how it intends to progress. There will be no one who has not been directly 
touched by their ambition to succeed. ' (ibid. ) 
The aim was, within the context of a devolved structure, to maintain the benefits of a 
unified corporate culture engendering pride and loyalty to the wider organisation. One 
issue that was identified as a potential problem, initially, was that staff morale was 
thought to be adversely affected by the Council's image: 
$I .. i.. i . people can he limited by other people's perceptions of what they can ach eve 
f 
people assume that your organisation is bonkers - whether it's loony left or barmy 
right... - that can be demoralising"(Senior Manager: Quality Unit) 
At the outset, however, the Quality Council agenda aimed to harness this 'unfair 
reputation', as part of the rationale to motivate staff. As one senior manager 
explained: 
"If you think you're at the bottom of the heap there's no place to go but up. If 
you're knocking about the middle andyou've always been okay, it's difficult to get 
that head-of-steam goingfor a bigjump and being near the bottom was used 
deliberately as a spur here. So it can be used as an inspiration to people. " (ibid. ) 
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On the whole, commitment was partly enabled by harnessing employee attachment to 
a 'public service ethos'. The TQM rationale, however, did come into conflict with 
this: 
4C 
... people can also hide behind [the notion of public service ethos] because it means 
they can develop life routines that make their life easierfor a reasonable return and 
convince themselves that they are still motivated entirely by public altruistic 
leanings... " (Senior Manager: Arts and Community business unit) 
In other cases, the harsh finances proved an incentive for managers to rid themselves 
of less productive members of staff which, though more problematic, was sold to staff 
on this basis (rather than on, say, length of service): 
"When you're a small unit... everyone knows everyone else .. and therefore if you 
make decisions which are seen to be the only sensible logical way to deal with it - 
even though it involves personal.. misery for somebody, then people think 
that .. there'sjustice in the system. Ifyou'reforced to 
do it in a way where you, sort 
of, hang on to mediocrity; starve potential, then morale drops. "(ibid. ) 
VAiile 'attitudes' were considered significant - as, indeed they are within the whole 
TQM paradigm - there was also a hint as to the limitations of this in situations where 
attitudes and competence did not coincide. Managers were constrained, to some 
extent, by having to encourage 'appropriate attitudes', yet being unable to reward 
them. This seemed to have a stronger effect in areas of work where required skill 
levels - and thus labour market security - were lower. In such situations, competence 
could be more closely tied to 'attitudes' than to knowledge. 
64-you've got afew historical situations ofpeople who are basically a bit dim; who 
are trying their best and are being underpaid - and that's not nice, because these 
people are oying their best; it's not their fault, but the world has changed. The 
issue, in terms of working for a job in the private sector, is such that there are 
practically none that they are capable of doing and it's a rough old world - and 
that's not nice. " (Library Manager) 
'Unforeseen' Outcomes 
A number of the outcomes of the Quality Council policy were not explicitly planned 
by either the NSR ideological agenda or the managerialist agenda - even if they could 
be considered to be implicit in these agendas. In this sense such outcomes could be 
considered to be 'unforeseen'. These problems were, firstly, tensions between the 
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centre and the devolved units through Devolution and, secondly, the effects of the 
'downsizing' rationale on morale. 
a) Devolution and 'UDP 
One of the problems with devolving decision-making was the conflict caused by 
devolving the staffing decisions down to unit levels. From the centre, the problem was 
perceived as one of inconsistency: 
"There's always been quite a strong feeling that people belong to Brent even 
though they're devolved. Obviously there are always going to be people who want 
to be completely UDI and there will be times when theyfeel very part of Brent and 
times when theyfeel not so Brent. (Senior Manager: Quality Unit) 
Following the departure of the original chief executive - the 'original architect' of the 
Quality Council - the new appointee was not received well by some managers, who 
had different preferences for the replacement. The problem with the new chief 
executive was that he appeared to be reigning-in some of the powers handed to local 
managers through Devolution. Some of this was possibly due to controlling 'leaks' 
relating to externalisation and other sensitive political issues, but it was not always 
perceived as such by managers: 
"... his inclination is to be autocratic and to interfere with operational 
management .. There's investigations going on all the time so there's a climate of 
mistrust andjear and that means that what happens with management's models is 
that they cease to be lived-and-breathed by people in the organisation. (Senior 
Manager: Arts and Community business unit) 
'Doing a UDF at this point in time, seemed to be challenging the legitimacy of the 
whole idea of the council as a unified corporate, entity. Yet this was also a quite 
consistent bi-product of Devolution: 
it... there are people sitting at the Town Hall imagining that we're still one hig 
happyJamily - it aint gonna work, hecause we're not. " (ibid. ) 
One manifestation was that BrentMark - as a product of the council core - was seen as 
part of this centralising imposition: 
64-you can get a-development of, what I call, a 'quality-speak. Once it hecomes 
part of someone's career prospects - you get a sort of-lip-service which isn't 
necessarily what it's ahout" (ibid. ) 
The Use of Quality in Local Government 
This situation was somewhat paradoxical: there was resentment held about the council 
core for being too centralist, while simultaneously feeling threatened by 
extemalisation. Extemalisation posed other, financial, paradoxes as well. One of the 
thinly veiled intentions of the large budgetary cuts imposed from 1995 was to further 
reduce the staff base in all council activities. One of the consequences of this, 
however, was that redundancy costs, to be paid by individual units, favoured the 
retention of the more senior staff (because of TUPE). This had the effect of 
undermining local management discretion on hiring and firing: managers could not as 
easily reward the 'enthusiastic' and get rid of the 'unenthusiastic': 
"... Now that we have to pay all the redundancy costs that is now there - so you are 
handicapped.... You're told to run a business hut you're told to run it with shackles 
on thatyou inheritftom [another] organisation and that is aprohlem. " (ibid. ) 
"If I got in the situation where the decision is not based on ability hut based on 
what would be the redundancy costs - what is the cheapest person to get rid of - 
then I've got a big problem ... and that is something that I'm 
determined to avoid. " 
(ibid. ) 
b) Management by Fear 
As has been indicated, the background to the whole Quality Council project was the 
implementation of major staff cut-backs. In 1991 an employee survey reported 
(among generally favourable opinions about the programme) that 'The massive 
contraction of the Brent workforce and related organisational upheavals, have 
resulted in many people lacking any trust in Brent's future'. In 1993 the Quality 
Council review noted that, along with reducing the number of departments from ten to 
five, senior managers were cut by one-third and that central departments were 
'radically slimmed down' (Charles Wood: op cit. ). Staff-cuts were large and rapid, as 
the data in table 8: 1: 1 suggest. 
Table 8: 1: 1: Staffina Levels at Brent LBC: 1991 - 1993 
Year No of Staff 
Nov. 1991 7,500 
April 1992 6,500 
July 1993 4,623 
Sept. 1993 4,105 
(Source: Brent Council Total Quality Programme Reports 199-1. -1993) 
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This climate would have been the backdrop by which any success in retaining staff 
with 'positive attitudes' should be judged. Put another way, as one manager, said: "I 
think morale amongst the survivors is quite good'. The externalisation threat added to 
tension here. This was felt by managers: 
"There is a. x)micism people feel when they look at a council; which doesn't 
appear to value staff; which seems more concerned with keeping council tax down - 
but still professes to be concerned with quality. And so that's hard. - it's hard to sell 
a corporate model ofquality when peoplefeel that way ...... (Library Manager) 
6ne manager defiiied overall staff morale as declining after a general rise over the 
previous few years. In a diagram (reproduced in figure 8: 1: 2) he described morale as 
low during the 1980s (through the effects of the controversy surrounding the Council 
as a whole); then dipping lower as a result ofjob cuts; then rising sharply as a result of 
the Quality Council policy; and was now dipping as a result of uncertainty due to 
externalisation. 
Figure 8: 1: 2: Staff Morale: Brent LBC 
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(Taken from field notes: drawing reproduced directly from Manager's own sketch) 
Employee commitment to ideologically Unitarist conceptions of the work 
organisation, then, were underpinned by the structural changes to the Council. The 
ideological content, here, seemed to be the outward expression of commitment, 
through quality, as the positive face; and its negative corollary, compliance through 
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fear. This issue was most strongly stressed outside the regulatory functions of the 
Council, particularly where funding was discretionary - i. e. was not determined by 
statutory requirements of the Council's duties. This was made apparent by one unit 
manager: 
"Unfortunately there is an element offear in it. I sometimes have to really work on 
people to persuade them, when they've been ill, that they shouldn't take it as annual 
leave... Fundamentally it is to do with changing work culture. When Ifirstjoined 
Brent I almost had the received wisdom that I could be sick several times a year 
without it becoming an issue and I almost saw it as untouchahle.. Jt's to do with 
work culture change; it's to do with the idea of Quality Management - that people 
are no longer going to he allowed to get away with this sort of thing. I think 
commitment is part of it as well - gettingpeople to actually work together as a team 
and to , understand 
the impact of absenteeism for the rest of the team. " (Library 
Manager) 
Quality and Unison 
Tle changing work culture at the Council did not happen in isolation from the 
established trade unions. The presence of the union determined the nature of how the 
quality policy would be implemented and, conversely, the implementation of the 
quality policy made a reciprocal impact upon the position of the union within the 
workplace. 
a) Initial Responses to the Quality Council 
Unison's initial responses to the introduction of 'quality' into the Council agenda was 
favourable, in principle. A union official explained: 
"We don't, essentially, have aformal policy position [on quality]. I mean, what we 
generally arguedfor is that we are in javour of-good and decent public services. 
We're not particularly in javour of things being wasteful andjust doing things for 
the sake of it and we don'tparticularly have problems with the Council introducing 
practices to improve the quality - providing it's not to the detriment of staff... " 
(Assistant Branch Secretary: Unison) 
This favourable approach was short-lived, however. Because the Quality Council was 
simultaneously introduced with job cuts, the two were associated with each other. The 
lack of trust was compounded by a lack of consultation on implementation, on the part 
of the council. The Conservative administration took a decision 
"... that they were going to steamroller this through. Yhey hasically, formally, said 
they were still in consultation with the union, hut we'd he sent a committee report 
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the day before, or the day of, the committee - but had never been spoken to about 
it. " (ibid. ) 
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The union tried to organise a campaign against job-cuts, but official support was often 
hampered where members felt powerless, 'preferring to keep their heads down' - and 
quite often it was hampered by management 'drawing stewards into the process'. At 
this stage managers often saw union resistance as merely protecting 'vested producer 
interests': 
"I personally think that the public service unions were .. culpable in protecting inefficient, white-collar management practices. Perhaps, again, they were doing 
theirjob - which is to .. advance the interest of their members. In one sense they are, hut the corollayy of that is that by doing that-the interests of the wider community 
were not necessarily being served People were getting poor services. So that was 
the contradiction there... It's difficult... "(Senior Manager: Arts and Community 
business unit) 
The union's lack of active co-operation with the Quality Council, however, was not 
serious enough to make any effect on the overall progress of council policy in an 
atmosphere dictated byjob-cuts and competitive tendering: as one manager put it, 
"... [the unions] didn't agree with it and in a sense, I suppose, it's theirjob not to 
agree with it to some extent. But... at the end of the day the force of logic and 
economic necessity meant that these things happened anyway.... I think that the 
Union's position was initially to resist things - to try and preserve conditions as 
they were. But... if that had happened to me when I was putting in a Tender bid I 
wouldn't have been able to put in a competitive Tender bid. " (Senior Manager: Arts 
and Community business unit) 
One significant shift in the council's employment policy was in its attitude toward 
equal opportunities, moving away from its 'positive discrimination'/quota based 
policy into one that was incorporated within a managerialist rationale. Equal 
opportunities were now submerged into the 'quality' agenda within HP: 
talks about valuing and empowering staff, with commitment to development 
and IiP... towards getting the best out of all the staff. " (Manager: Human Resources 
Unit) 
While this did not remove the issue from the scope of trade union activities, it did 
remove the union from a pro-active position on equal opportunities policy. The shift 
in equal opportunities policy, as a whole, had been identified as a problem in 1993: 
,... staff surveys revealed a workforce that believes the changes being made are the right ones 
and that things are improving, but which has real concerns at the way the change process 
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has been managed in parts, and in particular a perceived lowering of the importance of equal 
opportunity policy. ' (Charles Wood. op cit) 
Performance related pay (PRP) for managers was introduced with Devolution. PRP 
was intended to work in conjunction with the new contract culture and fixed-term 
contracts that managers now worked under. Corporately the intention was for PRP to 
be applied to all staff levels, along with accompanying work appraisal schemes 
introduced as part of Performance Management. However, unit managers also had full 
discretion on this aspect and did not, in practice, make any linkage between staff 
appraisals and pay. 
b) Devolution and Collective Bargaining 
With Devolution, responsibilities for staffing shifted from the corporate level to 
devolved Business Units, with overall strategic decisions on staffing left to a small 
Human Resource Unit (HRU) situated at the Council core. Apart from providing 
guidance on issues relating to employment law, the main function of the HRU was to 
set nominal standards for employment practice. Corporate Standards set out criteria 
for employment practices introduced in devolved units: they needed to be declared 
beforehand and predictable. Policies had to comply with this minimum, but the detail 
was down to the individual unit. The HRU made audits and monitored units- though 
audits were intended to 'provide support rather than being an imposition' 
To this end the HRU issued Corporate Standards to define such issues as 
performance related pay (PRP), equal opportunities, flexible working practices and 
redundancy: 
'ý. -Ihe Standard on redundancy.... protecting the image of the 
Council as a good 
employer. So, in setting the Standards, we have tried to recognise that there is a 
dimension about the reputation of the Council; about the image of the Council; 
about wanting to be a place that's seen as .. attracting the 
best people... " (Manager: 
Human Resources Unit) 
The Corporate Standards were very much minimum criteria, setting out advice to 
units based on 'best practice'. For example there was a Staff Charter stating what staff 
should expect from managers and what mangers expect from staff and a statement 
about Council values: 
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"... we have an image on what our mission is; what our values are - about valuing 
and empowering staff - and we have some Standards as to how these are to be put 
into effect... " (ibid. ) 
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During this period, remuneration strategy deliberately related to nationally negotiated 
terms and conditions. This was seen as the best way of achieving equity throughout 
the Council - an important principle, despite Devolution. However, a strong emphasis 
was increasingly being made on introducing local variations to national agreements 
and, over the years, 'flexibility' had been introduced into national agreements along 
with 'local agreements'. It was, ironically, 'corporate policy', to seek localised 
staffing conditions. One of the HRUs tasks was: 
"... specifically to lookfor evidence that Business Units were exploiting, to thefull 
all the flexibility that is available and were aware of all the possibilities of using 
staffflexihilij)i" (Manager: Human Resources Unit) 
C) Derecognition 
In 1996 Unison's position was threatened further by derecognition. A series of 
disputes between Unison and Social Services were going to industrial tribunals and 
Unison, predominantly through the regional organiser, were publicising a number of 
these through the local press. A Conservative Councillor proposed that the union be 
de-recognised and was supported by a number of Councillors. From the point of view 
of the HRU, this was seen as embarrassing but would be a situation that would 
probably be resolved; and that day-to-day issues which previously involved the union 
were carrying on as before. From the union's point of view this was potentially very 
serious: 
"Our union was in a relatively weak position, in that we had no major' successful 
fights to stop the privatisation process. Steward organisation was deteriorating, so 
it was making it much more difficult to win arguments with people about how to 
fight... " (Assistant Branch Secretary: Unison) 
A demonstration was planned, speakers were brought in and a lot of publicity was 
generated. The demonstration had 'reasonable' support from the branch plus support 
from various outside branches. In the event, the issue was resolved by the change in 
administration shortly after. The actual campaign against derecognition, however, 
helped bring about 300 to 400 new people into the union "... and what was also 
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important - it wasn't just the numbers .. it also helped us build - firm-up -a lot of 
steivards". 
Summary 
The holistic TQM-type quality policy at Brent was very much integrated into its 
policy of using internal markets to streamline the organisation. The quality policy 
itself developed from the circumstances of a background of financial crisis; a change 
of political control to an aggressive new-suburban right administration and the 
appointment of a chief executive with the willingness, desire and ruthlessness to make 
drastic changes to the structure and staffmg of the Council. 
Quality was pursued through devolving operational decision-making to the managers 
of individual services. It was for managers at this level to demonstrate quality targets 
and specifications were being met within a strictly determined and shrinking budget. 
The outcome seemed to be that managers, at this devolved level, were broadly 
enthusiastic and did feel somewhat 'empowered', although the process of devolution 
had involved a 'shake-out' of those officers who had held on to the 'outmoded' ways 
of the past. The devolved managers seemed able to use their detachment from the 
centre as a means by which to ensure that workers fulfilled their roles within the new 
structure. Where a 'culture' was present, it seemed to be one motivated by an 
awareness that a local manager was able to hire, fire, promote, demote and train staff 
according to whether staff could be seen to positively contribute to that manager's 
targets - which were set by the power brokers at the corporate centre. 
This effects of this were not, however, uniform. The level of 'motivation-through- 
fear' was more marked in service such as Libraries - where demand for the services 
was intangible but where crude measured outcomes of customer satisfaction were 
easily obtainable - than was the case for regulatory services such as Environmental 
Health, Trading Standards or Economic Development - where quality outcomes were 
not easily definable. 
The Use of Quality in Local Government 
8.2: Wycombe District Council 
Case Characteristics 
" 'Patrician Conservative' controlled (1994-5) 
" 'Pragmatic' approach to CCT 
" Unitarian/paternalist view of trade union: consensual relationship 
" Labour/LibemIDemocmtcontrollcd(1995-7) 
" Increased consultation with trade union (1995-7) 
Quality Policy 
a) Quality Policy Origins 
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The origins of Wycombe's quality strategy can be traced back to about 1985. At this 
time the ruling administration at the council, being politically sympathetic to central 
government's rhetorical hostility to public sector 'red tape' and open espousal of 
private sector management methods, set-out to reform service provision at the council. 
With the advent of CCT a review of services was carried out to assess future roles in 
an 'enabling' environment. With this in mind senior managers set up a forum to seek 
out 'best practice' from private and other public sector organisations. The forum 
consisted of a panel of senior officers from each service. Direct outside influences 
included Windsor and Afaidenhead District Council who were operating a form of 
performance management; and TVindsor and Maidenhead Borough Council, from 
which Wycombe took some consultants. Following their advice Wycombe employed 
their OIAM Performance Management Officer. The outcome was a Performance 
Management framework in 1987. 
Performance Management 
Performance Management's basic aim was to enhance output by increasing the level 
of monitoring, assessment and accountability throughout the authority. This was to be 
achieved through setting performance criteria for departments, sections, teams and 
individuals and evaluating the performance outputs to these targets. It was oriented 
very much, then, to the government's '313s' approach to public management, and in 
particular, to organisational effectiveness. Through various corporate plans, the 
council's values were intended to filter though the organisation to a point where they 
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would provide a focus for employee's roles. The format for this is shown in figure 
8: 2: 1. 
Figure 8: 21: Formal Organisation of Quality at Wycombe Council 
I Survey I 
Mission Statement 
Strategic Plan Committee Plan 
Business Plan 
Individual Work Plan 
To enable Performance Management to be operationalised, certain changes were 
made to the authority. In terms of organisational structure, departments were 
rationalised and responsibilities re-designated into a smaller number of Directorates. 
In addition, the number of tiers in the Authority was reduced to four through a de- 
layering exercise. 
Another significant change introduced at this time was that of a performance related 
pay (PRP) scheme. PRP was seen as integral to Performance Management; it 
provided the link between strategic objectives and individual performance. Managers 
assessing staff were encouraged to 
... have the courage of their convictions. There is no advantage in taking the easy way out. Remember that your performance is assessed on the basis of your team. If you give your 
team the wrong message about their performance by refusing to face the issues, you will not 
achieve the improvements in performance that you seek from them and you will not meet 
your own objectives. (Wycombe DC Performance Management Handbook) 
In practice, though, this was not always felt to be so straightforward. Managers felt 
that some awards were better received than others. This problem was enhanced by 
employees disclosing their awards to other employees. Officially disclosure was not 
permitted but it occurred nevertheless and, as a result, it was being recognised that 
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there was an element of 'bad feeling' and resentment creeping in, possibly in conflict 
with the 'tearn-spirit' which was trying to be engendered. 
"If somebody. doesn't do very well.... it can be a driver to do better next year 
[although] that depends on them understanding... and agreeing with it .. but if they disagree with you .. andyou have made some -I wouldn't say 'wrong'decisions, but 
you're not quite on the ball about why - and they go away and instead of being 
motivated they're ... ?" (Senior Manager: regulatory function) 
C) Total Quality Services 
At the turn of the decade a new chief executive was appointed to the authority and 
introduced formal strategic planning based on marketing and public consultation. 
Every two years public opinion was to be researched and the council's 'values' and 
Mission Statement re-assessed. In 1995, for example, the council's Mission Statement 
was changed from 'Quality Services and Value for Money' to 'Caring Community, 
Thriving Economy, Healthy Environment and Paluefor Money'. 
The council's quality strategy continued to be developed around the Performance 
Management framework. There was no desire to operate a quality policy that was not 
integrated into the other management changes that had taken place. Quality, 
specifically, was driven at Wycombe by the Performance Management Panel, a 
Customer Care Working Party ("in limbo" at the time of research) and through a Total 
Quality Services policy. 
Quality, however, had a number of origins and goals. From Personnel it was about 
'hearts-and-minds' and of reinforcing the message of Performance Management, 
whereas for others it was concerned with operational processes where quality was 
about procedures. Two officers had been investigating the possible use of BS 5750 
(ISO 9000) and requested its implementation as part of preparations for CCT bids. 
Conservative council members had consistently refused, however, on the grounds of it 
being 'overly bureaucratic' and it was only after changes to the political make-up of 
the Council that ISO 9000 could be pursued by managers in selected services. 
Wycombe had also been pursuing Investors in People (IiP) and had achieved authority 
wide accreditation in 1992 (being only the third public sector organisation in the 
country to achieve this). Other quality awards sought included Chartermarks, notably 
for Building Services, Environmental Health and the Leisure DSO, ProLeisure. 
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The co-ordination of quality policy, then, had to be done with some care so as not to 
alienate managers in a variety of departments/directorates: 
"For us to 'beat the drum of quality'as an initiative in its own right would, in some 
quarters, have raised the criticism that Ilere's the Personnel Department again, 
looking at the management theory of the time' * So we .. started identifying ideas of 
quality through Performance Management on Total Quality Services which [sort of) 
reflected the, then, Mission Statement which had Quality Services as one of the 
three main elements. " (Senior Manager: Corporate Services) 
Policy Outcomes and Reactions 
a) Work Organisation 
Performance Management's most significant impact on working conditions was the 
introduction of monitoring for individual work routines: 
By linking the strategic and service objectives of the Authority to jobs and people 
Performance Management ensures that the corporate strategic plan is linked to individual 
objectives: if individuals achieve their objectives then the Authority will achieve its goals. 
(Wycombe Performance Management Handbook) 
Employees were given job descriptions stating duties and responsibilities, from 
6major areas of responsibility' down to the 'trivial detail' of tasks. Each job 
description contained up to six 'key tasks'. These were usually in the format: 'to 
monitor, control and deploy... '; 'to be accountable for... '; 'to be jointly responsible 
for ensuring...; 'to assist in... '. Objectives for individual performance were set out in 
Personal Action Plans, based on a Performance Review and by the objectives laid out 
in the Business Plan and ultimately the corporate Strategic Plan (as described in 
figure iv). 
"Y7zat was a deliberate move, in that we wanted to see the process as development- 
led i. e. working on a Performance Review process together with Performance 
Management identifying though Business Planning and Strategic Planning the 
areas that the Authority ought to be working on and trickling those ideas down to 
peoples job descriptions and work areas reflecting a single direction... " (Senior 
Manager: Corporate Services) 
Performance was measured in terms of indicators on quality, quantity, time and cost. 
The latter three were measured quantitatively whilst quality was seen as focusing on 
more subjective criteria and has been largely concerned with service delivery in terms 
of a 'customer-centred' approach. 
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By monitoring and analysing this sort of information you have the vital management 
information at your fingertips ... this means that you can manage more effectively. You have 
an early warning system about possible overspends, performance shortfalls, staffmg 
problems. Equally, you have a means of identifying saving, scope for identifying possible 
service enhancements, a means to recognise particular achievements as they happen. This 
information may then be fed back into the Monitoring process at the Division or Department 
level. (Wycombe Performance Management Handbook). 
Individual performance was reviewed at a regular interview. The interview was 
intended as a discussion where staff progress could be assessed and encouraged, and 
corporate objectives reinforced, although it was not (officially) a forum for PRP 
negotiations. Although the effect of performance measurement on the working 
practices varied according to the work involved, the monitoring processes themselves 
had some impact on working practices in their own right. This was particularly the 
case where output could be linked to the performance of generic 'teams'. The 
introduction of monitoring when combined with team-working, resulted in a dynamic 
for incrementally enhancing productivity: 
"... because team members were having to achieve that, I wouldn't say easily, but 
because that highlighted the fact that they were actually being monitored on those 
performance figures, we've now re-assessed that down to five working 
days ... Having said that, our average time is somewhere about two days... " (Team Leader: regulatory function) 
In terms of the impact of Performance Management, the departments 'furthest from 
competition' were the ones felt to be most hostile to Performance Management. 
"... one thing that I believe I have found in this Organisation is that those who are 
closer to competition are clearly more willing to take on new ideas and new 
: ec the ethos of Performance initiatives, and those new initiatives closely refl t 
Management 
.. Those further away .. are saying, 
'well, how relevant is this; we've 
always done this; these ['traditional'] procedures work for us; we like our 
hierarchies and it's comfortable; I know what I'm doing, etc. '. So there is a level of 
discomfiqrt, I would say, and between the people who are out to competition and 
between the people in Central Services who aren't so close to it. " (Senior Manager: 
Corporate Services) 
In the example of Food Premises each officer worked a geographical area, assisted by 
the use of a computer database which had not been available five years previously. 
Information technology had thus helped to provide information and to monitor 
performance. However... 
"... you rely, very much, on the officer in that district identifying his problem 
premises and perhaps spending his own, or her own, energies perhaps directed 
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where they thought best. With ýPerfbrmance culture' we have here, we're conscious 
of thefact that we need a broad view in respect of[all the premises]... and obviously 
if we don't meet our targets then something's gone wrong" (Team Leader: Food 
Premises) 
In this case, then, there had been a level of autonomy in the nature of this type of 
work. 
"We assess the risk to the public .. categorise into certain risk elements, or 
premises. Each officer is designated a certain number ofpremises..., 41though it's a 
yearly target we try to put these into monthly targets. Each officer is assessed on 
how well they are performing .. We get ftedback, monthly, as to how well they've done. We try and do that numerically and in graphicform as well. " (ibid. ) 
If, for professional staff, the perception of Performance Management may have been 
related to the degree to which discretion and autonomy of working conditions could 
be protected, for others - particularly the less skilled, more marginalised workers in 
the Leisure DSO - the limited amount of discretion in this type of work may have 
outweighed any perceived benefits or drawbacks in Performance Management: 
"It's very difficult to instil a sense ofpride, quality, into Leisure Assistants. They're 
ýYoung bucks'aren't they? Whether they're boys or girls; they're sort of eighteen to 
twenty... They've got the most boringjob in the world and we've looked at how we 
can improve the quality ofjob to instil a sense ofpride andpurpose into it. It's so 
difficult because you're hamstrung by regulations. The regulation says that you 
should not stay in this position any longer than forty-five minutes when you are 
watching the pool .. So what can you give to somebody other than walk around and 
make sure the building's tidy? ... You can't give them a project without taking them offshift, which is going to costyou a lot of money. That's the crux of it, - the rotation 
Patterns restrict the amount ofproject work they could do, or we could give them... " 
(Manager: Leisure DSO) 
if we could employ a robot to sit by the pool, with a magic eye... (Manager: 
Leisure DSO) 
V mean, the production-line, they're moving away from aren't they? They're 
moving to the Swedish system where you produce the whole car... to get satisfaction 
[through job rotation etc. ]? Well we do that. We've put them on reception and we've 
created the receptionfor them... " (Manager: Leisure DSO) 
b) Culture, Commitment and Ideology 
Although the Performance Management initiative was explicitly concerned with 
changing working practices at the council through direct monitoring processes. 
Importance was also placed, however, on changing the 'culture' of the authority: 
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"... I would say that... we have changedpeople's culture about these issues. Whether 
when you scratch below the surface .. whether you've changed that, I think that's a 
process that takes slightly longer. We've broken down the harriers, certainly. 
(Senior Manager: Corporate Services ) 
Quality, at Wycombe, was being firmly defined as a customer-centred project: 
"Customers is, again, a word that we use reasonably commonly around the 
organisation. I understand that in some local authorities people are not allowed to 
use the term customer, but we feel that we need to recognise who our customers 
are. " (ibid. ) 
The major demand for staff 'commitment' came in the form of 'customer' awareness. 
This was imposed partly through the effects of changing working conditions 
(particularly through peer pressure in teamwork) and explicitly through formal 
management schemes. 
Team-induced commitment was to be realised through ensuring that team 
performance was fed back to the team. This seemed to be successful in at least some 
areas: 
"... Last year we were having some difficulty in meeting the target.. There was a 
commitment by the staff to actually go out and do thefoodpremises so we actually 
met the target ... [This year] we're certainly lagging 
behind; we're well short. The 
officers ... agreed to go out in the evening and work Saturday-So they're improving 
their own performance by, perhaps, peer pressure. " (Team Leader: regulatory 
service) 
As for any resistance to these changes: 
"... there is a natural resistance, of course, when workloads get heai)4 to try and 
meet some of the targets... " (ibid. ) 
However, despite there being "always rumblings" about not being able to cope there 
had been little evidence of overt resistance due to the strong "peer pressure". 
While the monitoring and assessment processes, described in the previous section, 
involved some explicit assessment of employee commitment, a more rigorous format 
was thought to be found in the application of BP and Chartermark. In the case of BP, 
(external) assessors were explicitly looking for staff commitment: 
"[They're] loýking for commitment, attitude, culture; looking very much on the 
culture, the ethos of the organisation. Not so much that you've got the procedures 
in, hut its the t? ying to tease-out any signs of reluctance to give everything to the 
Customer" (Senior Manager: regulatory service) 
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Chartermark, in theory, had a similar agenda. In practice, however, applying for 
Chartermarks seemed to have had more to do with gaining credit for what was in 
place rather than being a catalyst for ftirther change. For managers in the Leisure 
DSO, for example, it was seen as a means by which public relations could be 
improved. Faced with some difficulties in motivating staff, however, the (successful) 
application was, in fact, top-down generated: 
"... here's Chartermark; here's something to hang quality on .. We were running a 
reasonable quality service .. so we put infor Chartermark . -Rather than bottom-up - because of the time constraints that we had - 'Phil' really had to have the thing 
together, doing most of the work on putting the application together and we worked 
on trying to getfrom where we were to where we needed to he to have any chance 
of winning... " (Manager: DSO) 
Staff perceptions at the leisure DSO indicated that the effect of the Charter Mark 
exercise did not have a great impact on changing the 'culture'. The six members of 
staff interviewed were one Duty Officer - whose job was to deputise for management 
on a shift basis, one was a part time receptionist, three were Leisure Assistants and 
one was a part-time Fitness Instructor - who had recently been promoted from 
reception work through achieving appropriate qualifications., Of the six only the 
receptionist was a member of a trade union. All of the Leisure Assistants had worked 
at the Centre for less than two years. 
On the general impact of Charter Mark, all those interviewed stated the positive 
benefits as being related to the general condition of the building and facilities. Three 
were unaware of the process involved apart from the fact that an external assessor 
came to the Centre and asked staff some questions. One Leisure Assistant stated that it 
had some effect on her job: 
"When Ifirst started I was just doing my own thing. Now it's just become a huge 
team-work - which is good - so I've got to know the management a lot better - office 
staff and that - which I didn't meetfirst of all. So we're all, sort of, really working 
together. " (Leisure Assistant) 
The Duty Officer, having had more involvement in the process, felt there were some 
effects: 
"Ifyou don't have things like Customer Charter and Investors in People and things 
like that, youjust come to work andyou're straight down the line, you don't think 
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'what can we do' * So it does help you think more ... you actually sit down and think 'right, this customer wants etcetera, etcetera" (Leisure Assistant) 
In general, however, staff did not feel any real effect as a result of Charter Mark: 
"All I can really getfrom it is a basic management point. - it'll obviously look good 
for them - having Charter Mark - and to tell you the truth I can't really see, from 
my point of view, what difference it will make .. I 
don't think it makes any difference 
to how the Sports Centre is run. " (Leisure Assistant) 
Indirectly, however, while Charter Mark did not seem to have a noticeable effect on 
enthusing staff (or pressurising staff) around the theme of customer awareness, it did 
seem to have a more tangible effect on work standardisation: 
"Ifyou lay yourself open and you've got apiece ofpaper saying 'we will keep to 
this; pool temperature will be at a certain et cetera' and it's not done, yoý're 
leaving yourself open to - they've got something to it can be a downfall of the 
job" (Duty Officer: Leisure DSO) 
C) Teamwork and 'work intensification' 
There were indications that - in addition to the intended 'attitudinal' effects on 
workers, noted above - the introduction of a 'teamwork' approach to working 
relationships were leading to an increased perception of 'work intensification' - as 
defined in chapter 5. While the use of teamwork was broadly accepted by those 
interviewed, comments often revealed that workloads were increasing as a result - the 
comments made by the Team Leader in the regulatory function, above, is an indicator 
of this. 
'Teamwork', at Wycombe, was implicitly introduced into employees'job descriptions 
as a part of the Performance Management framework: 
Me standard format of a Job Description at WDC singles out major areas of responsibility 
(i. e. key tasks) from other main duties, so that staff are aware of the areas in which their 
successful performance is essential to achieve their, and the teams, objectives. ' (WDC 
Performance Management Handbook) 
The effect that the team culture had on working practices, however, varied according 
to the nature of the work and subsequent interdependency between team members, 
and upon the monitoring processes that were available to measure team, and 
individual, performance (these issues will be more fully discussed in chapter 10). 
In one case, staff within a regulatory function were seeing increased demands on their 
services, year-on-year: for the year in question there had been an increase of 20 per- 
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cent above a projected 5 per-cent growth. In addition some professional staff got the 
feeling that: 
. -you're putting us in a strait jacket. There are targets that you ve got to 
achieve .. andyou've got to get those done and, you know, all the time pushing that. You do get that, .. But we have redesigned some of our systems to give people more 
space and to give more control over their job and that, clearly, is important 
otherwise .. you wouldn't need these people with expert training to do it. " (Senior Manager: regulatory function) 
There was a sense, then, that in some areas the ideological thrust of customer 
orientation was seeing signs of being undermined by the actual work effort required to 
fulfil it: 
"... someone said 'the Customer is king'.. and we had a score ofnought-to-ten: how 
do we think we fare on that? and someone said 'eleven, and everyone agreed 
ýYeah, eleven'l- we are going overboard with 'the Customer'.. But, then, looking at 
it at this division the feeling is that the balance of interests between the customer 
and staff.. is too weighted toward the customer. " (ibid. ) 
This issue was also implied with respect to the issue of appraisal. One member of staff 
at the Leisure DSO - bearing in mind that the general effects of Chartermark did not 
appear to be strongly felt - commented on the issue of appraisal: 
"When Ifirst started I wasn't particularly a hundredper cent about everything -I 
may have been lagging behind a bit - and then I got pulled aside and got told that I had to make an effort. 4nd I did and it's made me think about myjob and how much 
better I can dofor myselfand my work colleagues, because I was letting them down 
as well as myself 4nd Ipulled myself together " (Lcisure Assistant) 
Quality and Unison 
The union's position within the authority was determined by its relative strength and 
its historical relationship with the authority. It was described by its branch secretary as 
being 'very non-militant'. A number of factors contributed to this. Firstly, it was 
characterised by some general distinctions associated with district authorities (as 
opposed to metropolitan authorities): i. e. it had a small, predominantly white-collar 
workforce. The branch was, therefore, predominantly ex-NALGO prior to the Unison 
merger in 1992 and was not able to support any full-time staff or officials. Second, 
because the administration had been of a 'patrician' Tory hue the council tended to 
have a 'paternalist' attitude to the workforce and to union: NALGO had been seen 
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more as a professional staff association than a trade union. The union was involved in 
low-level consultation with council officers and councillors in the form of a Joint Staff 
Committee - thQugh meetings were rare. For managers, the union was seen as a useful 
conduit for channelling information to staff. 
The environment was not overly confrontational, then. This was illustrated by 
comments by both managers and by the union branch secretary. Membership of the 
union was about 230 - which was about fifty per-cent of the workforce. Membership 
had been increasing for a few years, following a large drop in membership in reaction 
to the (NALGO) national strike in 1987. Brief attempts were made, by the council, to 
set up a staff association to rival the union. This plan was very short lived as it was 
found that there was no interest and that no-one was prepared to get involved in its 
organisation. 
For these reasons there was a fair degree of co-operation when it came to CCT bids. 
The Conservative administration was not keen on national policy with regard to CCT 
and it was policy that services would remain in-house where possible. To this end, the 
union gained some concessions on this issue: union representatives were allowed to 
sit in on meetings where CCT bids were being made. 
a) Initial Responses to Performance Management 
Because of the background to council/union relations, the union was not consulted at 
the time Performance Management was being set-up, although some union views 
were taken into consideration at the implementation stage. In any event, the union did 
not have any fundamental objections to Performance Management, providing that it 
could be seen to be being fair towards staff. 
"... it wasn't really a question of us not agreeing with it, itjust was coming along 
and telling us about it. I suppose, to a certain extent, nobody was really that 
certain how it wouldpan-out anyway .. we've never really been a branch that really, 
sort of, totally disagrees with everything the Council did - you've probably got that 
in some places, but -we're very non-militant and we're willing to try things; see 
how it works out. " (Branch Secretary: Unison) 
Consultation also involved, on a less formal level, the involvement of union 
representatives in some of the team-based consultations with staff. In the case of 
Environmental Health these were fortnightly meetings. Meetings were intended to be 
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two-way in order that management could gain feed-back. Union involvement here, 
however, had been unofficial and was often used by managers to assess staff opinion 
or to legitimise changes: 
"... we haven't a very strong union culture here, hut we have union reps and we 
encourage them to talk to line managers, or they can talk to me at any time. They 
are recognised at Corporate health & safety policy and whilst we don't have a 
formal representation there, we do have a forum where departmental reps will 
come to thatforum and we will ohviously work things through. " (Senior Manager: 
regulatory function) 
b) Collective Bargaining 
In order to achieve much of the Performance Management agenda, traditional Whitley 
structures were affected. This was largely through the effects of 'de-layering and PRP, 
though not exclusively. Officially, the management linkage between pay and 
performance was 'high performance; high quality high pay'. To this end the council 
developed a 'fast-track pay scale' reflecting national pay bargaining structures with an 
element of local pay structures. 
"There is an option to move awayfrom those [Whitley pay structures] if that were 
necessary, but we've never chose to do so; we do stick to those. What we did do was 
reduce the number of scales that we recognise within the organisation, so the 
various levels within the organisation ... pay scales were widened. 
One of the steps 
were removed so people could move up the hierarchy faster. " (Senior Manager: 
Corporate Services) 
The council opted for roughly halving the number of increments between pay scales. 
Initially this proved popular because staff were enticed onto the scheme by upgrading 
all staff to the new (higher) increment grade. Problems were now being foreseen (in 
the union), though, in that whereas it may have taken ten years to have moved up the 
increments to reach a higher pay scale, now people were moving the increments 
faster, but then remaining static at the top of their scale. This was particularly thought 
to affect middle grades. 
C) Performance Related Pay 
PRP was awarded, by advice by the line manager, through information gained from 
the individual Performance Review, monitoring information and Personal Action 
Plans. PRP awards were made annually in April as lump-sum cash payments. Pay 
increments were not affected by the scheme unless performance was deemed to be 
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very bad. The award was intended to average at about three per-cent of annual salary, 
though it was possible, in theory, to rise up to ten per-cent for 'outstanding' 
performance. 
When PRP was first introduced it was found that appraisals were indicating that too 
much money was being paid (in relation to council wage budgets) and the scheme had 
to be changed, 'moving the goalposts' as the Unison convenor put it. 
"... there's not enough money topay them. So ... thefigures arefiddled, basically and the staff know that's what's happening. You also have the situation that some 
departments will mark very strict and so .. there won't be many people who will 
actually get any PRA You've got other departments that will mark less strictly 
and .. get six, eight, ten per cent and that, sort of, causes annoyance as well... People 
are not happy with this scheme at all. " (Branch Secretary: Unison) 
Where, initially, PRP awards were seen as a bonus by staff, increasingly they were 
being seen as routine. In this scenario awards of three per cent were seen as being the 
minimum expected. Where people were assessed as not exceeding their targets, they 
were being marked zero and this was thought to be contributing to a credibility 
problem for the whole scheme. In addition, there was also a residual feeling that 
appraisal could be unfair, as one worker commented: 
"Upstairs, when I was an ordinary Receptionist, it was very difficult because ... your leader changed. And I don't think they really knew what we did, to be honest. If 
you've worked hard and you've progressed and they say 'no you haven't; I don't 
thinkyou're doing that very well'it does: it demoralisesyou; it demotivates" (Staff 
member: Leisure DSO) 
As a result of this, PRP disputes were becoming a real issue with the union although, 
to date, the union had not been required to take any official stance on any disputed 
claim. 
d) Equal Opportunities 
One final area where the quality agenda seemed to be making inroads into traditional 
collective bargaining agenda, was in the area of equal opportunities. Based on the 
CRE document Racial Equality Means Quality, equal opportunities, in at least one 
directorate, was seen as being a 'driving' influence on employment practice. The issue 
of 'quality', it would seem, was the approach by which an issue deem6d to be a 
political issue, entered into the managerialist arena. In terms of service delivery this 
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would seem consistent with other aspects of quality: anti-discriminatory practice 
could be seen as compatible with managerialist notions of equity. Equal opportunities, 
however, had also come to permeate the quality agenda in the area of employment. 
Summary 
Quality at Wycombe, then, was predominantly linked to the issue of performance. The 
long standing political domination of the Conservatives in the authority had ensured 
that the 'neo-Taylorist' approach to quality favoured by central government 
throughout the 1980s (Pollitt 1990a) was readily converted into policy here. The 
policy that was used to pursue this linked individual job specifications, work rates and 
pay to measurable performance targets. In some areas this seemed to have the effect of 
intensifying work - particularly where work was organised into teams. Significantly, 
this seemed to affect regulatory work such as Environmental Health. Other areas, 
particularly in the area of Leisure, seemed to be able to pursue quality through work 
standardisation and an acceptance that, through the nature of the work involved and 
the terms and conditions of employment in this area, that staff could not be easily 
motivated. 
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8-3: Newcastle City Council 
Case Characteristics 
Metropolitan borough council 
Urban city. Ex industrial. High levels of unemployment and deprivation. 
Labour dominated: 'traditional' labour 
Hostile to CCT. Retained all services in-house. Corporate 
Union retains full bargaining and consultation recognition. Branch employs staff. 
Quality policy oriented around ISO 9002. Used for retaining CCT bids. 
Quality Policy 
Newcastle's quality policy was developed in conjunction with its CCT strategy in 
order to maintain a consensus among ruling political interests and the trade unions. 
Nominally the Council committed itself to a TQM approach to quality, but in practice 
the structure of the authority made this difficult. Although there were signs that the 
creation of client-contractor splits within the Authority were having some effect in 
strengthening the centre, the Council had a very departmentalised structure and each 
department retained a high degree of autonomy from the centre. The major 
departments were Chief Executive's Office; CityWorks (the DSO); Newcastle 
Personnel; Social Services; City Treasurers; Housing; Law and Mministration; 
Community and Leisure Services; Engineering and Environment and Protection. 
a) The quality framework 
In practice, then, the Council's corporate quality policy was pursued by the Chief 
Executive's Office in an advisory capacity. Council-wide quality policy was agreed 
through a Quality Services Sub Committee of the Council and the agreed general 
policy was laid out in the form of minimum standards that could be agreed by a 
consensus between departments. The Council's broad quality framework was based 
around a quality statement launched in July 1993. This quality statement focused on 
five elements. Firstly the Authority aimed to provide services that were responsive to 
the needs of the community, giving priority to those citizens with the greatest need. 
Second, it aimed to provide best value in the services it provided, through a 
commitment to regular review of service provision. Third, the Council aimed to 
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achieve quality services through the promotion of quality workers via the use of 
training. Finally, the Council aimed to pursue quality through what it termed, quality 
organisation, referring to a commitment to 'promote excellence in everything it does. 
Reducing mistakes and cutting out wasted effort... ' (Newcastle City Council: Putting 
People First July 1993). 
While the framework policy clearly reflected the need to maintain a consensus 
between party political, trade union and sectional interests within the Authority, it did 
nonetheless, contain the essential elements of quality as being a managerial concern: a 
commitment to review working practices, to (re) train staff and an early appliance of 
'best value' that was to become official Labour Party policy for local government. 
b) Quality and CCT 
This latter point indicates some of the external influences that shaped the quality 
policy. Influences included Labour Party interest in the form of its 'Quality Street' 
document and the increasing number of performance indicators being monitored 
through the then Prime Minister's Citizen's Charter initiative which, in the words of a 
senior officer, ýproved a great catalyst'. The most significant factor was, however, the 
pressures introduced as a result of CCT. 
The Quality Services Sub-Committee was initially set-up to look at contracts, how to 
incorporate quality into the contract specification and how to ensure that in-house 
quality could be raised to meet these higher quality standards. Previously, a series of 
'Service Guarantees' were introduced for various services. These were, however, 
made obsolescent when new legislation required the Authority to issue service 
specifications for all services (Local Government Act 1992) - which the Council did - 
though still as a part of the overall strategy for CCT. In 1993 a Quality Services 
Action Plan was set up, which 'fell on stony ground. Eventually the Quality 
Statement was agreed as being an achievable broad initiative for quality - internally 
and for service users. Along with the statement, a Quality Framework was agreed - 
based on the Quali4i Statement. From this the Sub-Committee produced two reports in 
1994 - with the intention of setting out good practice guidelines. In one it was 
recommended that management adopted quality systems as part of a TQM approach 
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to quality and include the systemic methods associated with ISO 9000, where 
appropriatc, and IiP as a mcans of rigorously applying training in Council 
departments: 
Quality systems are beneficial both in general as helping to improve the quality of Council 
operations and specifically in competitive situations. Total Quality Management and to an 
extent the components of the quality assurance standard (BS 5750, now known as BS EN 
ISO 9000) reflect several aspects of the City Council's commitment to quality: responsive 
services (in considering the fitness of the product - the service - to meet the needs of the 
customer), quality workers, and quality organisation. (Report of the Quality Forum for 
Quality Systems: Sept 1994) 
While many of the issues discussed by the Sub-Committee related to complaints, 
reception, customer service, training staff etc, the focus of quality in relation to CCT 
was concerned about quality in a wider context and the approach was therefore 
different. There were four strands here: financial probity, technical competence and 
ability, health and safety and equal opportunities (a newer fifth would be 
environmental policy). This began February 1994. They used what they could out of 
the Act - being wary of anti-competitive behaviour - and out of European legislation. 
Currently the guidelines was only to be used for CCT contracts but may be brought in 
for other contracts (equipment etc. ). The equal opportunities aspect of these guidelines 
covered service delivery and employment. It was noted that in terms of employment, 
guidelines could outlaw racial discrimination through the Race Relations Act 1976, 
but could not prohibit contractors who practised gender discrimination due to a get- 
out clause in Local Government Act from the Sex Discrimination Act. 
C) Quafity in Community and Leisure Services (CLS) 
CLS was seen by many on the Sub-Committee as the vanguard for the pursuit of 
quality management. This department was the only one in the Council to have a 
dedicated quality officer. and this was a policy which focused on TQM via ISO 9002. 
The Department's leisure DSO was ahead here and was seen by many in the Quality 
Sub-Committee as the model. It was the first multi-facility organisation in the world 
to achieve BS 5750 (now ISO 9000). While a number of other DSO units applied 
individually - Social Services had one accreditation - no overall strategy for 
accreditation was sought. 
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Quality policy in CLS developed from the policies being pursued in the leisure, DSO 
and was legitimised by the additional threat that could be posed by CCT in a quasi 
commercial operation. Initial inspiration came from a senior officer who had 
developed a strategy for the Leisure DSO as a part of his MBA. The quality policy for 
the entire department stemmed from this although, as will be seen later, was less 
straightforward when the, then, Leisure Department, incorporated the Community 
Policies section and the Children's and Young People's section from another 
department. The structure of CLS is shown in figure 8.3.1 below. 
Figure 8.3.1: Organisational Structure of CLS 
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Quality in the Leisure DSO followed a TQM rationale, according to one senior 
officer, although not based upon any one specific model. The policy was developed 
over an 18 month period and included 'awareness training' for all members of staff 
and more comprehensive TQM training for senior managers. Within this period the 
management systems of the thirteen centres were unified - in line with TQM and CCT 
bidding logic and a unified quality system was derived from this. From here it was 
decided to register for BS 5750 accreditation and became the first multi-function 
leisure facility in the UK to achieve accreditation in 1989. From 1995 the community, 
arts and library functions began the process of preparing for ISO 9002 accreditation. 
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The quality system was driven by the above mentioned senior officer, influenced by 
the 'Deming approach'. As part of this CLS examined other schemes. Chartermark 
was applied for at one stage and, while it was not awarded, managers felt that some 
benefits were gained from the process. In addition HP was looked into, to support the 
training element needs the Department. Again, while HP was not formally applied for, 
the procedural requirements were applied and 'about 95%' of the requirements of HP 
were thought to be in operation at CLS. 
As noted, then, CCT provided the biggest incentive by which to drive quality within 
CLS - particularly due to the quasi-commercial nature of much of the Department's 
output: 
"I think thefear of CCTmade everybodypull together and hang their hat on TQM' 
(Quality Officer: CLS) 
Following on from the successful accreditation of ISO 9002 in the Leisure DSO, it 
was decided to implement ISO 9002 in the other areas of the Department. One area 
where this proved a 'cultural shock' was in the Children and Young People's (CYP) 
section. 
Quality Policy Outcomes and Reactions 
One of the obvious 'outcomes' of the corporate quality strategy was that it did not 
develop corporately. Many of the reasons for this have already been defined - political 
priorities focusing on quality as a means to retain CCT contracts - but there were other 
factors as well. - 
a) Corporate responses to quality management 
One of the key obstacles was departmentalism. Some department managers saw the 
quality management initiative as a threat to their departmental and professional 
autonomy and successfully resisted the imposition of a centralised quality 
management strategy. This problem led to a further issue of the fact that there 
remained a number of definitions of quality, varying by service, department and over 
time. Tbis, while being recognised as somewhat inevitable in the general area of 
public services, was seen as being a further obstruction to developing a corporate 
strategy for quality. 
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Another issue was resources. The Authority had maintained relatively high levels of 
expenditure and staffing throughout the 1980s and was becoming acutely affected by 
budget cuts of up to Min (K. Bell: Trade Union News No 23 1995). Inevitably this 
affected middle management tiers. The Council, then, did not employ a dedicated 
quality' officer - the officer dealing with corporate quality did so as part of other 
strategies (e. g. CCT and equality). While elected members (councillors) were 
generally in favour - particularly those involved in the Sub-Committee, some were 
noted to regard the quality agenda as being too 'soft'. Conversely, it was stated by the 
senior officer responsible for quality that line managers were 'quite keen' on the 
quality agenda and that they were more motivated than senior managers were on the 
issue. Professionals were also reported to be relatively happy although, notably, this 
was within a context that they perceived that they would be able to interpret quality 
within their own professional context. 
b) Responses to quality management in CLS 
As the service department that pursued quality management vigorously CLS was also 
likely to have witnessed more coherent reactions to quality management. 
"To some extent work routines are possibly more regimented in that we now have to 
state what it is we do in terms of a daily operation and we have to, sort of, say this 
will be done on a four week cycle or a five week cycle, or whatever. Whereas 
before, if it got missed nobody noticed.. now staff, individually - doesn't matter what 
their job - need to be accountable for the work that they do... " (Quality Officer: 
CLS) 
C) CLS staff surveys 
In 1993 a staff survey was conducted by management to assess the attitudes of staff 
towards various quality issues. This was repeated, in a slightly 'modified form, in 
1996. The response rate in 1993 was 293. This was presumed to be a 100% return on 
the assumption that completion of the survey was mandatory. The response rate in 
1996 was 123, which was 51.3% of the 240 employees in CLS. The survey was 
concerned, primarily, with the managerial effectiveness of the policy. A summary of 
the responses is shown in table 8: 3: 1, below. 
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Table 8.3.1: Newcastle CLS Staff Survey (Summary) 
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Issue 
(1993) 
Response(%) 
(1996) 
Awareness of quality policy 52* 95 
Quality Policy has improved morale 
Quality is importanttvery important to me 98 100 
Quality as important/very important to management 83 85 
My service is important/very important to customers 94 79 
Customers would rate quality of my service highly 79 - 
Recognition of 'good customer skills/care'(imp/v- 
imp) 
95 97 
Involvement in decision-making on working 
practices 
93 - 
Involvement in'team activity' 79 72 
Regularity of quality meetings !5 monthly 
30 
a q'orly 
7 
or : i; monthly 
50 
k q'erty 
12 
orie-off 
18 
Feel that 'good performance' is recognised 83 always 
9 
mostly 
22 
sometimes 
31 
Feel valued by management 60 always 
14 
mostly 
25 
sometimes 
26 
Feel that manager listens and acts on staff views 45 always 
20 
mostly 
28 
sometimes 
31 
Happy with working relationship with colleagues 49 always 
19 
mostly 
30 
sometimes 
12 
Not received training and/or induction 69 26 
Quality Policy has improved staff morale - 
greatly 
4 
some 
I 
. 
28 
none 
46 
ý worse 
14 
toource: L; LZj -watt survey: 1993: 1996) 
From a management point of view, then, a number of positive responses to the quality 
policy emerged. Awareness about 'customer' issues seemed high, quality seemed to 
be an issue of rising importance (if measured by the increasing regularity of quality 
meetings at work and by the generally high - if declining - level of 'team' activity) 
and training seemed to have been improving. On issues involving morale, however, 
there were indications of some disquiet. Only 9% of respondents in 1996 felt that 
good performance was always recognised by management and only 14% that they 
were always valued by management; and while 28 per cent of respondents felt that the 
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quality policy had caused some improved in morale, 46 per cent felt no difference and 
14 per cent felt that morale had declined because of the policy. 
Quality and Unison 
The union branch at Newcastle was comparatively strong. Membership was high and 
the Branch could justify maintaining full-time officers and administration staff. The 
union had been able to mobilise workers for industrial action relatively recently over 
threatened redundancies in 1992 and again for a day-of-action in February 1995. 
Support was particularly strong in the manual sections of the main DSO and among 
Social Services staff. 
The Branch had developed a strategy and agreement towards quality management in 
con unction with management's commitment to retain all services affected by CCT i 
in-house. As early as 1992, a Branch discussion paper asserted that: 
A commitment to quality management is an integral and positive element of the Authority's 
managemen response to maintain quality of service delivery and will make a positive 
contribution to keeping services in-house. However, such a commitment cannot be carried 
out by one working group or Sub-Committee but must be a total one from all departments; 
to an agreed process to an agreed commitment to involve the community and user 
organisations in the broader sense. (Newcastle City Council Joint Trades Union Discussion 
Paper on Quality 1992 - emphasis in original) 
Crucially, then, the union branch clearly had a view that quality was not just a concern 
about customers and organisational efficiency. Quality management was seen as a tool 
that could be seen as legitimate if it was to assist in the retention of services in-house. 
The union was also clearly aware of its relatively strong position of influence here in 
that there was an awareness that management were keen to ensure that the union 
endorsed the strategy. The Branch was not wholly convinced, however, and to this 
effect had commissioned external advice and research on the issue of quality 
management - part of which provided the rationale and access for research here. The 
commissioned piece of research was conducted by Fitzgerald, Rainnie and Stirling 
and the report produced, concluded that the Branch was in danger of being 
undermined by the introduction of quality management and that it needed to develop a 
clear strategy on quality management (Unison 1996). Specifically the report 
recommended that the Branch should 
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make use of national and local trade union contacts on the issue 
foster dialogue between other trade union branches on the issue 
encourage discussion within the Branch membership on the issue 
develop an education programme for union representatives 
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The report further noted that as a prerequisite the union needed to strengthen internal 
communications within the Branch: 
The Branch has a well developed system of Departmental reps but it needs to develop 
mechanisms to strengthen the links between them at least to ensure that information about 
TQM and HRM is exchanged. The Branch will also need to consider whether these issues 
are currently being properly dealt with in terms of its own organisation and the formal 
negotiating structure. (Unison 1996) 
Finally the report suggested that 
... there is a need for a clear response from the branch as a whole which is then effectively 
communicated to reps. Without that the situation of piecemeal, ad hoc responses will 
continue to the long term detriment of the branch (ibid. ) 
a) Initial responses to the introduction of ISO 9002 in CYP (1995) 
An area of concern that was being raised within the Branch was the implementation of 
ISO 9002 in the Children and Young People's (CYP) section of CLS. In 1995 a group 
discussion with key ýtewards was arranged in conjunction with the Branch Secretary 
regarding the recent introduction of a provisional quality manual into CYP (see 
chapter 7). 
Branch representatives felt that a coherent strategy was needed to address the issues 
arising from introducing quality management methods that was not merely agreeing 
through ignorance, or flatly rejecting methods that may be seen as acceptable in the 
workplace. The Branch had commissioned a study ('Total Management Control') for 
discussion, pointing to some dangers for the Branch. 
One cause of concern was the appropriateness of an system-type approach to quality 
in the area of Youth Outreach work - which was now placed under CLS - whereas, 
previously it had operated as part of Community Education Services. As a result, CYP 
was having to fall into line with CLS quality policy, and this meant that CYP had to 
introduce ISO 9002. 
At the initial stages, stewards felt that the introduction of manuals had provided 
positive benefits to workers. The procedures had been written in draft form, circulated 
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and discussed. Where they seemed unworkable, or where conflict arose, the 
procedures were re-written. The scope of the procedures did not infringe upon the 
actual practice of play or youth-work itself, but were concerned with the identification 
of responsibilities and guidelines in non-normal situations: i. e. they provided 
guidelines for health and safety issues, maintenance, equal opportunities policy etc. 
Stewards reported that workers found this useful: staff were now able to identify 
exactly what was to be done and who was to be contacted in 'emergency' situations. It 
was also felt that the manual enabled workers to deflect blame where they may 
previously have been held responsible for events outside their control ('we know who 
we can pass the blame on to now'). It also emerged that the quality manual 
incorporated reporting and monitoring procedures for 'Customer Complaints' and for 
'Contractor Complaints' (i. e. maintenance - CityWorks, cleaning - DSO) - and was 
also thought to be capable of highlighting resource deficiencies (e. g. quality of 
buildings etc. ). 
One problem raised was that part-time workers and volunteers were not fully 
integrated into the review process. There was no clear consensus about how manuals 
and procedures could be updated after a final version was accepted (i. e. would there 
be any formal consultation with union, or would consultation be made through 
individual staff members). 
There was some concern (raised by one steward) that the emphasis (of management) 
seemed to be that of the 'management of the system, rather than the actual service 
provision'. It was further commented that the systernatisation of 'play' may lead to a 
reduction in the autonomy and/or discretion of workers. For example, having 
standards specifying how cleaning-up should be conducted removed the ability of the 
play worker to determine who should clean up: i. e. to allocate the task to the maker- 
of-the-mess - who may be a 'customer'. It was said here, though, that procedures were 
not that specific. Another steward noted that if 'customers' of his service were I youth, 
parents and councillors, the only 'customers' with any power were councillors - 
indicating that interests of each were in conflict - and that this was not reflected in the 
procedures. 
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At this stage, then, stewards were generally in favour of the new procedures as they 
were going at present. It was suggested that a future trade union bargaining point 
could be on the issue of preparation time being built into the system - especially for 
part-timer workers. In the case of youth-work it was suggested that 'output can't be 
measured' so the implications were likely to be less severe. 
b) Responses to ISO 9002 - immediately prior to the system launch (1997) 
At this stage, a manual had been introduced to the Play Section of CYP - though it 
was not accredited. One union member criticised the workers' 'lack of ownership' in 
the project - in that the manual could be revised without CYP workers' consultation. 
Another member noted that, although workers were initially told by management that 
CYP workers would write the manual, the draft that CYP workers wrote was taken 
away and re-written by management. These various manuals were then standardised 
and integrated into one manual for CYP as a whole - which was then to be applied to 
each appropriate section. 
The manual was also considered to be very mechanistic, in that it was overly 
concerned about procedures but not about relationships - reflecting some of the fears 
raised in 1995. Here the manual was thought to miss the most important aspect of 
6quality' in youth-work. 
In terms of the impact on work, quality manuals tended to have a different effect in 
different workplaces. For example, play-centres tended to be 'open access' and 
therefore the manual tended to have a greater focus on what facilities should be 
provided as a minimum. There were, however, implications for the increased scrutiny 
workers were expected to be subjected to. Monitoring of procedures were to be 
accompanied with 'non-conformance reports' if facilities were found to fall below the 
specified requirements. - 
"At the end of the day, if you audit the system and you give people a 'corrective 
action report'.. that doesn't take into consideration the individuality ofthe situation. 
Because if you haven't followed this procedure - you haven't done what you're 
supposed to do - you need to correct it .. you need to correct the situation to fit the 
procedure .. and it's used as aform ofsocial control... " (CYP Unison member) 
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Apart from this process being too mechanistic, it was also thought likely to pose some 
practical difficulties which could undermine the discretion of play workers, or even 
impact upon disciplinary procedures: 
" -if we mis-read something, orforget - it's a big manual - then in what way are we held accountablefor the things that are in black and while? That's my worry: will 
there be disciplinary action if I haven't conformed to that? There may he good 
reasons why I haven't. It might be a genuine error. - genuine errors do happen in 
any system, you know what I mean? And I have a genuinefear about that - although 
I don't know of that happening. I saw the manual, originally, as something to 
provide guidance. " (CYP Unison member) 
This was seen to be a problem, even from the point of view of those workers whose 
responsibilities it would be to ensure that procedures were adhered to: 
"And the rest of us are going around writing bloody cards out .. I wish Id never 
done the training. I did the training because I wanted to understand it and see how 
it could best be usedfor us. But now Ifeel like all I'll ever end up doing is going 
round slapping people into line and I'm not prepared to do that. " (CYP Unison 
member) 
It was also noted that there were certain aspects of work that it was difficult to 
proceduralise: while some issues, like health and safety, could be suitable, on other 
issues the problem lay in areas where workers had to make physical records to prove 
that things had been checked according to the manual. Here, while the manual 
indicated what form had to be filled-in, it would not guarantee that good quality work 
was being done. It was perceived that just because a building was opened on time and 
there were no accidents this did not mean that 'a good quality job' had been carried 
out. One Unison member commented that a more 'people oriented' approach to 
quality management may have been more appropriate in CYP: 
"*.. ISO 9000 is seen as an end in itself and I can understand the reasons why, 
because that suits the current management style .. whereas Investors in People is 
seen as anathema to that management style because BP is all about involvingfront- 
line staff. -so I suspect that ISO will be our standard, that will 
be this service's 
achievement, it's raison d'etre, etc. " (CYP Unison member) 
This was echoed by others: 
"I think it's more of apolitical tool than a professional tooL it has a certain kudos 
with the (Council) members... and keep holdingfor budgets and so on, you know, - 
protecting the service to some degree. " (CYP Unison member) 
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Despite the implied ability to clarify responsibilities - commented in 1995 - there was 
a perception that the manual revision procedure was somewhat confusing. While one 
person could be putting a change form in, somebody else may be putting a 'contra- 
change' form in because the system may have been working better, for them, as it 
was . ..... in theory there could be changes every week or every month and you would 
have to constantly re-read it to know where you are. " (CYP Unison member). Here, 
however, it was commented that some form of consent was therefore required: 
"I think there's got to be more of a, sort of, democratic element to changes. There's 
bound to be contentious issues, isn't there? ... People are going to have views and they're going to have different views. Then you've got to give people a democratic 
voice as a team. " (Alice: CYP Steward) 
From this it was mooted that the manual revision procedure may legitimately become 
a trade union issue: the notion of accountability and 'democracy' in decision-making - 
where the issues involved working practices - was considered important: 
Well I think there will be issues in the manual [that people will have a problem 
with] andpeople want to alter it. And if the system is that wejust say 'right we want 
to alter this' and go to one person to make a decision, then that's not democratic 
and that's bound to cause problems sooner or later isn't it? (CYP Unison member) 
Further, it was considered by one Unison member that some degree of 'democratic, 
sitting-down-and-discussing-of-the-matter and genuine agreement' was required 
when the manual was finally issued. This was an issue in which the Union could be 
involved - particularly as it had been felt that the writing of the manual had been taken 
out of the workers hands. 
There was a general feeling that the whole process was likely to de-motivate staff. 
Citing others' experience in the Leisure DSO, it was felt that the issue of quality was 
not adequately tackled by the ISO 9002 process, because quality ought, legitimately, 
to include issues of what services were required, rather than being restricted to how 
the service was being conducted, within pre-determined budgetary parameters. This 
was commented on by a number of members: 
mean, you can have a standard, but it doesn't have to mean anything - it can be 
as low as you want to make it. And that doesn't necessarily mean that what you're 
providing and what you're providing to that standard will be anywhere near 
addressing the needs of the people that you're providing it for. " (CYP Unison 
member) 
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"We sat yesterday, we had a workshop on how to fill informs. It was okay 'cause 
we've got a file that thick telling us how to fill in this one form" (CYP Unison 
member) 
"Yhe problem that the Council has got.. is that people forget about the internal 
customer - that's us. Yhey are totally pre-occupied with how the service is 
perceived by the external customer - except that in our case that means their 
customer, which are adults and councillors; it really should be young people... We, 
the deliverers of the service, have been more or lessforgotten. We're required to be 
mechanistic operators, just to ensure that we've got part-time workers in place in 
which ever section they're supposed to be in; that the building is safe and we make 
sure that wefill in all theirforms - that's about the level of our operation... " (CYP 
Unison member) 
"You can measure how manypeople came into the room but you can't measure how 
many went out at the end of that year, though, or their abilities. [Ibe numbers 
translate] in a way people understand - they can understand bums-on-seats. " (Joan: 
CYP Steward) 
Summary 
At Newcastle, then, quality policy was based around the structural organisation of the 
Authority which ensured that departments were relatively strong and autonomous 
from the centre. In addition, the relative strength of the union within the Council, 
combined with the political opposition from the ruling Labour Group in the Council, 
meant that quality policy was initiated by management around the broader context of 
retaining services in-house in the CCT process. Quality policy was officiall based y 
around TQM but in practice was being championed in one department - Community 
and Leisure Services (CLS) - where experience had been gained through 
implementing ISO 9000 within the leisure DSO. In the case of a newly merged 
section within CLS - that of Children and Young People - the implementation of ISO 
9000 was underway at the time of research and a quality manual was being 
introduced. The intention, initially, was to delegate responsibility for writing 
procedures to each section, but this was later dropped in favour of rationalising all 
procedures into one manual. Focus group interviews with stewards suggested that, in 
the case of workers in CYP, the implementation of an ISO 9000 quality system was 
not likely to herald an intensification of work. Concerns, here, related more to the 
effect of work standardisation, the removal of 'ownership' and professional discretion 
as a result of introducing quality standards. It did, however, indicate a strong 
The Use of Quality in Local Government 215 
possibility that, due to the union's strong position in the workplace combined with the 
perception that the quality manual would restrict some elements of professional 
autonomy, the quality manual could become a contested issue in which the union 
could have a legitimate interest and involvement. 
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8.4: Arun District Council 
Case Characteristics 
South Coast District 
Population elderly, dispersed, relatively affluent 
Conservative controlled: from patrician to NSR to pragmatic 
Has favoured contracting-out (VCT) at early stages. Competing to retain white 
collar CCT contracts 
Union density about 55% 
Quality Policy 
Arun DC's quality policy developed over a number of years in conjunction with 
external agencies - in particular the Audit Commission. The broad approach to quality 
was a customer care based model. Arun went through business-type approaches to its 
administrative processes relatively early. From 1974 there had been a general focus on 
service delivery, and around 19 84 a 'very dynamic' new chief officer/'chief executive' 
introduced a 'business orientation' to the organisation. From this came a number of 
schemes, the outcome being a customer care focus. 
a) Workingfor the Public 
Arun's quality policy was based around a customer care model, the main focus of 
which was an initiative known as Workingfor the Public. Set-up in 1987, the policy 
developed from the Council's then 'competitive approach to management' which 
embraced contracting-out (i. e. VCT) and followed a 3Es mentality, in line with stated 
ideology of the then Conservative government. At this stage Arun began working as a 
'test bed' for Audit Commission trials on the use of performance indicators. Working 
for the Public evolved from the idea that service effectiveness was to be customer led. 
This led to the idea of devolved decision-making. In 1987 a four year corporate 
strategy was launched on the issue of customer care, 'influenced by Clarke and 
Stewart's customer care ideas'. Workingfor the Public's stated aims were: 
" to serve the public more efficiently and effectively 
" to respond better to local community needs 
" to create public confidence and interest in the authority 
" to improve staff morale and commitment 
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The changes to the political leadership, within the ruling Conservative group, were 
significant for the development in the Authority's 'managerialist' outlook. 
Traditionally, while political control had always been Conservative the demography 
of the Borough had tended to shape the style of leadership: 
"The leaders of this council used to be retired-from-running-the-colonies types, and 
used to t? y and run the council in the same way. " (Senior Manager) 
This changed in the 1980s to a 'Wandsworth-style' NSR. From this, voluntary 
contracting out of DSO services was pursued (refuse being the most significant) and it 
was from this agenda that the Audit Commission oriented approach to customer care, 
described above, was pursued. The political leadership changed again, however, in the 
early 1990s, to a more 'pragmatic', perhaps 'Majorist' style. One senior officer 
described how the new leader was more in tune with the senior management of the 
authority because he was himself a senior manager with BUPA and was thus able to 
grasp the managerial issues faced with running a welfare-service oriented 
organisation: he 'talked the same language'. With this change came a change in the 
chief executive of the Council, and a change in emphasis on the issue of quality. 
Between 1992 and 1993 a stated political aim was for wider consultation with the 
public on Council strategy. The predominant focus remained one of customer care, 
although the style was now different: 
"... we were talking earlier about the 3Es - when I came to Arun in 1985 you'd hear 
a lot of talk about Arun as a business-like authority. I don't think you'd ever have 
heard anyone mention the word 'customer' But now it is common parlance. I don't 
thinkyou'll talk to manypeoplefor very long before they'll talk about the customer 
in one way or another because it Is just accepted that that's part of the 
Organisation... " (Senior Manager: Chief Executive's Office) 
Quality was defined as 'setting realistic but acceptable standards of service which 
people are entitled to expect, letting them know what those standards are, and how 
they can complain to the Council ifthose standards are not met'(Arun DC: 1989). 
Public consultations were carried out through telephone surveys, 'forum groups', 
meetings with 'key consultees', public question and answer sessions and staff 
consultation. The resulting document, ', 4chieving a Better Community', was produced 
from this exercise in 1995 and set out the Council's new priorities. Arguably, this 
exercise could partly be seen as a means by which to justify reducing or maintaining 
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existing levels of expenditure and services (through 'resource switching) through its 
prioritising low taxes as a 4customer concern'. However, some re-assessment of 
service provision was introduced within the scope of this consultation. Influenced by 
the geography and demography of the authority's population - i. e. ageing and 
unevenly dispersed - disability access became an issue. 
Within the framework of the Workingfor the Public policy, a number of initiatives 
were pursued. These included an internal review function being operated by a 
Workingfor the Public Group; the operation of an external consultation group - in the 
form of Customer Panels; another internal review group set up to make 
recommendations for internal re-organisation; an interest, at service level in externally 
audited quality schemes; and the operation, at workplace level, of performance 
monitoring. 
b) Workingfor the Public Group 
The Workingfor the Public Group (VvTG) has had, according to one of its leading 
participants, 'a coercing, cajoling, encouraging, bullying, nagging role' within the 
Authority. Its status was advisory, reporting to the Chief Executive's Office, but was 
capable of recornmending changes to service delivery and working practices in all 
areas of the Council: 
... what happens, basically, is that if a good idea comes up, or an initiative is being 
progressed, some of it is done independently of this group [and a lot is done by 
service departments themselves]. If we, as a group, tackle an issue then there are 
some things that we canjust get done; we will get done one way or another because 
we have a certain degree of decision-making .. [e. g. the previous weekend, -an open day was held on disabilities on the instigation of the WPGI (Member of WPG) 
Members of the WPG saw themselves as customer champions' and aimed to be a 
conduit to ensure that issues raised by 'customers' were fed back to the Council. This 
remit was one which encompassed a wide variety of issues within the community: 
"I mean that is a quite specific quality issue, actually, because the quality of care 
for people with disabilities - in terms of access to buildings, information, 
employment, education -you know ...... (Chair: WPG) 
"What we are - in all our particular roles - are genuinely in positions where we're 
responsiblefor service [needs ofl customers: or we're representing people who are 
customers. So that's theirfeedback. " (Member: WPG) 
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WPG had some responsibility for new staff induction and on training. - specifically on 
introducing new staff to Arun's corporate 'values' - with its key focus on Workingfor 
the Public. In practice, however, 'getting the message across' to new members of staff 
was not always conducted at an appropriate time; often induction took place after 
nearly twelve months of working - which countered the ideal of induction as a means 
of preventing 'bad habits' permeating working methods. . 
There was also an awareness by WPG group members that the improvements that the 
quality schemes set about had a tendency towards diminishing returns. Where initial 
improvements could be widely publicised, quality could be used to create a 
momentum, drawing staff into the process as a result. However, the combined effects 
of declining success-rates (in terms of high profile changes and improvements) and 
new staffjoining the organisation without prior knowledge of these changes, could be 
somewhat counter-productive in that the diminishing returns on improvements could 
prove as equally demoralising as initial gains proved 'empowering'. In recognition of 
this, the VvTG devoted time to maintaining the profile of customer care, by its own 
presence, its distribution of publicity within the Authority and through a number of 
'refresher courses' on customer care that it operated. There was a recognition, even 
here, though, that this could only achieve so much: 
". J think part of the problem was the fact that it wanted to engage eve? ybody - 
managers right down - and specifically, once you start involving people they 
wouldn't listen; they-know-all-about-it-anyway. They've got the tee shirt, they don't 
need a reminder... " (Member WPG) 
In terms of the management of quality, there were other motivators that were not 
initially recognised by WPG. One of these was CCT. In common with managers, in 
other local authorities, hostility that managers initially felt towards CCT subsided 
where it was seen as a catalyst in being able to make changes to staffing and working 
arrangements. The Council's 'customer care' policy was seen, partly, as being able to 
help deliver the contract to the in-house bidder: 
"... so clearly it is in the interests ofan in-house team to motivate its staff to improve 
customer services as one way ofgiving an edge in the dCT challenge. And I noticed 
that that's quite marked' (Senior Manager: Chief Executive's Office) 
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The CCT threat was also used, however, to reinforce Customer Care as a whole - to 
legitimise it and with it, the role that the drivers of Customer Care had within the 
authority: 
"... there is also a lot of emphasis on the customer side of things and what kind of 
service is given to the customer hecause I think there is a realisation that the in- 
house team will score most highly on the quality issue; on customer service and so 
on. " (ibid. ) 
The changes to staffing issues as a whole were also provided with a rationale through 
CCT. The perceived external threat posed by CCT was used as an indicator of future 
threats to which the organisation had to respond structurally. The most explicit form 
that this took, was in the form of the learning organisation agenda. 
C) A Learning Organisation 
Arun was pursuing a Learning Organisation agenda, - an agenda that took 'permanent 
organisational change' as its base assumption and message to the organisation. This 
model was seen as particularly appropriate because of the diverse nature of the local 
authority as an organisation - organisations of equivalent complexity in the private 
sector being far larger. 
The aim of the Learning Organisation agenda was to empower generic groups in 
favour of individuals and thus constituted a fundamental re-organisation of the 
Council's management structure. The programme was based upon a lengthy 
consultation process based upon co-opting managers from different departments in 
which to address key issues of long term significance to the authority. There were 
parallel internal and external consultations. Internally the aim was for wide 
consultation to take place, based on expertise, rather than seniority or hierarchical 
position; externally the aim was to consult with interested parties or groups. It was 
thus seen as an 'empowering' agenda. Fifty key managers, organised into ten 
'learning sets' were given the brief 'what is the long-termfuture ofthe organisation? '. 
The underlying assumption of 'permanent change' in the programme was underpinned 
by wider factors such as the changing nature of public service, demographic changes, 
the influence of new technology, and the organisational impacts of CCT. This 
gpermanent change' assumption was intended to shape the Council's approach to staff 
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recruitment, training and retention. Responsibility for career development within the 
Authority was not to be placed with the individual staff member: 
"If we take some bright-young-thing on tomorrow, there's no way Z or anyone else, 
could say 'keep your head down and in ten years time you'll be a principal 
[qfjI'cerj'- I mean thatsjust not the nature of life any more... " (Personnel Director) 
Training was, instead, to be self-determined through the Council's appraisal scheme. 
Employees would state their aims on an individual action plan, itself tied to the 
Council's mission statement, 'core values' and customer care policy. 
d) Other quafity methods 
Arun operated a number of other quality initiatives, though these all fell under the 
Working for the Public agenda, and followed a 'customer care' approach to quality. 
From 1996 Arun introduced Customer Panels as a means of accessing 'customer' 
opinions and feedback about service delivery, although it was recognised that such a 
self-selecting group could not be perfect, in terms of it being able to be properly 
representative of the Borough as a whole. There was also some interest in bidding for 
the Chartermark award scheme in certain services, although the Council had not 
participated at earlier stages. 
In terms of performance evaluation the Council was involved in formally monitoring 
complaints at an early stage (in collaboration with the Audit Commission). At the 
time of research, Arun was reviewing the variety of quality methods being used in the 
Authority. For example it was looking at whether there was too much focus on Audit 
Commission performance indicators (in consultation with the Audit Commission) and 
upon the appropriateness of the indicators being used. 
Another major catalyst for quality, particularly in terms of re-organising services, was 
CCT. Despite Arun opting for VCT for refuse collection in the early 1980s (ostensibly 
on a quality/cost rationale) CCT was not popular in some of the areas it affected in the 
1988 legislation - largely because of its affect on staff morale and the disruption it was 
likely to cause. The actual CCT process, however, was seen by managers as beneficial 
as it was able to 'fibcus people's attention on what their roles and. /unctions were". 
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Policy outcomes and Reactions 
a) Culture, commitment and ideology 
The central focus of Arun's Working for the Public policy was about re-focusing 
employee attitudes towards a customer-centred approach to work. Changing employee 
attitudes was pro-actively pursued by the Council: 
The value which this Council places on customer service has been continually emphasised 
and reinforced through training with the aim of improving staff morale and commitment to 
the service they are providing to the public (Arun DC Working for the Public Review 
August 1995) 
It was recognised by managers that staff were motivated by a 'service ethos', which 
could vary from service to service - in some areas being concerned about 'the public 
good', while in others having more tangible 'customers' where the activity was more 
commercial. A consequence of this was an explicit identification that managerialism 
was displacing traditional buro-professionalism. This was seen in the perceived 
demise in the status of professionals within local government to maintain standards. 
One senior manager noted that: 
"... some of the so-called professions have been, in a sense, de- 
professionalised .. Years ago, in a local authority, the top officers were the 
engineers, surveyor, the town clerk They're not any more. The emphasis is more on 
genuine managers. " (Personnel Director) 
It was not clear whether managers saw Customer Care as a response to this 
managerialist trend or as a cause of it. The two issues were, however, clearly 
identified as being linked. One of the more obvious ways in which staff attitudes were 
intended to be shaped was through the use of formal training programmes - 
particularly in the area of customer care. 
"Through NVQs, that's one of the ways - you know, through everyone talking to 
you, or those people talking to you - you just build up that number ofpeople who 
suddenly have seen the light" (Chair: WPG) 
This was also the area that the Learning Organisation was intended to have some 
impact. This, however, reversed the formal training logic in that it placed the onus on 
the individual to define their own training needs - although it was not clear how far 
this would practically be applied or what the budget limitations would have been. The 
aim here was to deliberately cut across formal lines of seniority. The Personnel 
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Director recognised that while some people were given 'a new lease of life' by this 
approach, others were unnerved by it. Opinion, however, according to the Personnel 
Director, did not divide by length of service: in some cases it was viewed positively 
by people who were previously not being served by the traditional training set-up. 
In addition to formal training there was a move towards. further entrenching the 
customer care ethos on staff. This was being pursued through the 'educational' role 
that the WPG had in shaping staff attitudes in the area of customer care. The quality 
message was even being extended to incorporate attitudes regarding internal customer 
chains as well as external, in line with prescribed TQM methodology: 
".. -theysay 'OhIdon'tdeal with thepublic'. yousay 'Well, it's customers'; 'Well, I don't deal with customers'. 'Well you're an admin. person aren't you? ', - 'Yes'; 
'Well, surely all those people you service are customers'. 'Oh yeah' - Ping! " 
(Member: WPG) 
b) Work organisation 
Although most of the initiatives at Arun have focused, primarily, on employee 
attitudes, this in itself affected work organisation. More specific changes to working 
practices - such as the use of performance evaluation - were introduced within the 
scope of this. The Council had a long-term relationship with the Audit Commission 
for the use of performance evaluation criteria. As such there have been long standing 
commitments to complaints monitoring. One manager noted that while he supported 
the right for members of the public to be able to seek redress, the lengthy procedure 
by which a complaint had to be dealt with often slowed down decision-making and 
thus adversely affected the quality of service in this respect. 
Other uses of employee performance evaluation have been in the form of telephone 
answering - where forty calls a month were aimed to be monitored for promptness, 
response, courtesy etc. In practice, however, there were some who were unhappy 
about the. standardisation of customer response in this manner - feeling that it removed 
discretion: 
"'Quality' is very much down to the individuaL Some people will always do a good 
job and provide a good quality of service. Some enforced 'Quality Management' 
instruments such as specific words'to he used when answering the phone often do 
not ring true. The enforced 'spiel'does not sound genuine, whereas a good member 
of staff using their own words for answering the telephone will often sound much 
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more genuine and at ease than a 'rehearsedpet spiel' There is good and bad in all 
walks of life, private and public. People are all different, some are good at giving 
service, others are totally indifferent. Good education and the appreciation of 
courtesy can enhance genuine quality management. Much of today's so called 
'customer' care and quality service is pure window dressing and bull. " (Survey 
response: Payroll worker) 
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Despite the general contention that the Council's general focus was on employee 
attitudes - and that working practices were more affected by this - there were signs 
that this focus was shifting to a more performance-based approach to quality 
management: 
"... the more I think about it, the more I start to think that ourjoh in awareness and 
so on, is actually over - as far as the blanket awareness... - but maybe now the 
driversfor quality are going to comefrom those, kind of, externalforces like CCTý 
like awards; like ISO 9000, - or whatever route... " (Senior Manager: Chief 
Executive's Office) 
C) Unintended consequences 
The attempt at re-shaping staff attitudes around a customer service ethos was 
explicitly bound up with staff morale as a whole. Thus, while CCT was found to have 
a coercive effect in enabling managers to implement changes in working practices, it 
was not capable of enthusing staff in the way that Customer Care apparently intended: 
"It gets quite interestingly, sort of, tied-up with staff morale - the customer care. 
We'vefound that at times when staffmorale has dipped-And now, I mean, there is 
concern in areas of the organisation'that are goingfor CCT.. And we have often 
found that when morale dips so does customer care, in our view. (Chair: WPG) 
and: 
"Sometime when staff morale is low the attitude is 'well, never mind the customer, 
what about us; what are you doingfor us? I- which is understandable... We actually 
have to be a little bit on-guard against it, don't we, because if we let it slip too far 
then it un-does some ofthe good work that we've done. " (Member: WPG) 
One response to this was for management to formally confront employees fears over 
job insecurity in the form of an employees' charter. This was intended to display the 
Council's commitment to its staff, using familiar HRM rhetoric, whilst reinforcing, 
again, the Customer Care message: 
"... one of the things we did backin the local government review times was produce 
an employee charter .. and we did that because we wanted to have a statement made 
that said, you know, 'employees matter. It was on two sides: this is what you're 
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entitled to as an employee, but this is whatyou need to give back to the organisation 
- so it's this two way thing. " (Chair: WPG) 
The balance, however, was clearly in favour of employee duty and responsibility 
toward the customer and where it was found that the WPG's remit moved into areas 
where the interests of staff and 'customers' were in conflict, then it was clear where 
the WPG stood: 
', '... we have to be careful that, although we may need to do some workfor staff in 
order to improve customer service, we have to always remember that, as a group, 
we're set upfor the customer. So knock-on effects arefine but if wefound ourselves 
going toofar on line that all we were doing really, wasfor staff then we might have 
lost our way a bit. " (ibid. ) 
Quality and Unison 
Unison membership at Arun was about 340 - which was approximately 55 per-cent of 
the work-force. Membership was made up out of a predominantly ex-NALGO branch, 
the main DSO which would have constituted an ex-NUPE branch having been 
contracted out a number of years previously. The relatively small number of members 
meant that the Branch was run by lay officials. 
Relations between council management and unions were 'consensual' and described 
by the Unison Branch Secretary as being harmonious: 
"We've gotfairly good employer-employee relationship, I would say .. We try and he 
a progressive union and protect 'the greater good, if you like" (Unison Branch 
Secretary) 
a) Unison and CCT 
Union-management relations, as a result of white-collar CCT, was somewhat 
ambiguous. CCT generated fear among staff affected and this affected the functioning 
of the union, in terms of the issues being dealt with as a result: 
"Stress is a growth industry here, some of which is related to possihlejob-loss and 
CCT... " (Unison Branch Secretary) 
However, as a consequence of CCT, union membership saw an increase and CCT was 
also attributed to be the cause of increased interest in the union in general. This was 
despite the Council having a policy of re-deployment and the employee charter to 
combat such redundancy fears. As an example, membership had grown in the 
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Revenues department, where CCT reorganisation was being carried out and where it 
was expected that between ten to fifteen people were to be re-deployed. People were 
seeing union membership as an insurance policy. 
On another level, CCT was also seen by the Branch Secretary as being a catalyst for 
increasing co-operation between management and the union, enabling management to 
make the changes it perceived were necessary to retain the work in-house: 
"... we have, as a branch .. adopted apolicy oftrying to protect the greater good; try 
and actually win the bid; try to streamline. Our critics argue we've gone too much 
with management, ifyou like, but there's other people'sjobs to protect too. So it's a 
no-win situation really. " (ibid. ) 
In many ways the union was acting as a conduit for management-staff 
communications. The union branch was self consciously being co-opted into the 
management's unitarist approach to reorganisation upon the promise of winning the 
CCT bid: 
"We have regular meetings - in fact we had one this morning - with the Chief 
Executive and Deputy - to tty and encourage staff to compete rigorously; alleviate 
their concerns andjears and t? y to be in it all together" (ibid. ) 
This was partly due to the historical relationship that the union had had at 'the 
Authority - the union being relatively weak and having no history of organised 
conflict with management over the years. This being said, the branch did participate in 
the 1989 national dispute and did not suffer membership loss as a result (in contrast to 
Wycombe). Some members did resign, but this was countered by new members who 
joined as a result of the dispute. Even here, however, it was recognised that the 
dispute was won in the large metropolitan boroughs and the branch at Arun retained a 
low profile. The membership of the branch were deemed to be generally low-profile 
and 'almost apathetic'. For example the Branch Secretary stated that members were 
only visible at the time when the pay review was due; and a recent AGM only saw 
fifteen members turn up. As a result there was a shortfall of workplace representatives 
overall (only twelve). 
Because of the above, the union was consequently not directly involved in any formal 
consultation with management about specific Customer Care policies - such as the 
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initiatives involving telephone answering response times. These were regarded as 
operational matters': 
"... they're not matters we'd expect to be consulted on ... we're a fairly progressive, forward-thinking organisation; we've got no problem with trying to increase 
efficiency to the council taxpayer. " (ibid. ) ' 
According to the branch official, union members were not particularly concerned 
about such issues, although the union had received some complaints from people who 
had worked at the Council a long time and were 'not keen on changes': such people 
were said to see schemes such as the phone answering initiative as a 'personal slight'. 
Consultation on broader issues took place through the Joint Staff Panel which 
consisted of executive members of Unison (although these used to be departmental 
representatives) and leading councillors. Issues of 'mutual interest' were discussed 
here: for example the next meeting was to be a meeting on the Employment Stability 
, 4greement, which would formally agree that the Council would 'endeavour' to re- 
deploy staff who would be displaced as a result of CCT restructuring. 
There was 'little contact' with the union at the national level, but some contact at 
regional level. Unison had provided speakers on CCT, in recent years, to reassure staff 
that the union was aware of the issue and 'knew how to deal with it'. The branch 
official often saw his role as being the contact for other professionals in the union 
(legal advisors etc. ). 
b) Unison and Workingfor lite Public 
The area in which the union had had most day-to-day dealings with the Council on 
Workingfor the Public was on the issue of appraisal. An appraisal scheme (Personal 
Appraisal and Learning Scheme: PALS) was an annual appraisal with staff members' 
individual manager. Here, individual performance over the previous 12 months was 
reviewed. Though this was not linked to pay, some people liked this and others did 
not. The problem lay with workers' individual relationship with their line manager. 
For those with 'bad' personal relationships withmanagers (estimated at about ten per- 
cent) felt that permanent informal feedback would be More appropriate. The 
formalisation of appraisal was thought, in these cases, to have possible detrimental 
effects on careers due to the permanent record of progress that would be held on 
The Use of Quality in Local Government 228 
record. Some (successfully) refused such appraisal, on the grounds that it was a waste 
of their time. 
PRP, itself, was dropped. It was not popular because of the problem of making it seen 
to be fair: e. g. in a section of three committee clerks, where one was the section leader 
- and where only the section leader was awarded a 12 per-cent PRP bonus, it caused 
bad-feeling. The union made representations, before and during its implementation, 
and made it clear that they were opposed to it as a principle. 
The union was invited to contribute to the Customer Panel but was not always able to 
find a delegate. In principle, though, the union broadly supported the Council's stance 
on quality. Partly this was due to the link between quality and CCT, as noted. Partly, 
though, it also reflected an acceptance, by the Branch, of management's paternalist 
unitarist approach to work organisation in general. As the Branch Secretary noted, on 
the issue of monitoring: 
"I happen to be aware because I do it [as art of my job] on the Performance Review 
Working Group which talks about customer care all the time so I know about 
telephone surveys .. and there's been no problem with the staff involved .. they 
actually think they do a goodjob and are quite happyfor it to be measured.. they do 
get letters commending them on winning various awards - or whatever - so, for 
them, it was apositive experience. " (Unison Branch Secretary) 
C) Bargaining Arrangements 
It was thought that the Learning Organisation agenda may have affected staff grading 
structures at some point - this issue was being covered by a management review. In 
the meantime, Arun was sticking to nationally agreed conditions in terms of pay and 
grading, though with local variations. Elements within the Learning Organisation 
agenda, though, tended to challenge some of these traditional grading structures in 
that status differences were squeezed. It was hoped that this process would be able to 
reduce pay differentials as well. While there would still be a need to ensure that 
progress was encouraged through wage increases, it was hoped that this could be done 
in an evolutionary manner by rewarding lower grades disproportionately. 
This has probably been due to the increasing emphasis on resource management, IT 
management and people management. People appointed to Chief Executive positions 
nowadays tend to have come from a finance background and they're all signed-up to 
The Use of Quality in Local Government 229 
strategic management. The CCT exercise proved that you didn't need a specialist to 
run a service: 
d) The Sounding Board 
Despite full recognition of Unison and, in words of the Branch Secretary, favourable 
management-union relations, The Chief Executive of Arun set up an alternative 
employee consultation forum - the Sounding Board. This was made up from 
representatives from each directorate, though not every service. This forum allowed 
the Chief Executive to bypass formal hierarchies and communicate with staff on a 
range of issues. 
"... I think that some managersfind the 'Sounding Board'a bit threatening, because 
-I mean - at the time when there was a lot ofproblems with the computers, you 
know, you got a lot of managers trying to solve this problem and then you've got 
some staffgoing straight to the Chief Executive via the Sounding Board and saying 
'this isn't workingý you know - it's been weeks and weeks and weeks and do you 
know what's happening to the customers in the mean time as a result of that... ' 
[but] It got it sorted' (Chair: WPG) 
In theory the Sounding Board was open to all staff and was supposed to be a staff 
forum. In practice, however, it appeared to be used to pursue management interests, in 
that it was predominantly used to pursue management interests. The VYTG usually met 
in advance in order to discuss the issues they wanted to raise with the Chief 
Executive. As a result, the agenda was able to be focused on 'customer' as opposed to 
employee agendas: 
"It is quite surprising that the agenda is, I would say, fifty per cent customer 
orientated. You would expect that ifyou had an opportunity to have a good old go 
that it would he mostly to the staffgripes. But most of the comments that comefrOm 
the staff to the representatives are things where they feel that customers [wi II 
benefifl. " (Member WPG Group) 
Summary 
Quality policy at Arun, then, had a long established background; the Authority having 
contributed and volunteered its involvement in various Audit Commission schemes 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. From this background, the Council had been 
pursuing quality management through a 'customer care' model of quality. Here, the 
Authority made a conscious decision to redefine its role as a provider of services 
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through re-defining local people as 'customers'. To this end a working group - the 
Workingfor the Public Group (WPG) was set up to redefine working practices in line 
with this. The VvTG had a wide remit and was able to question activities throughout 
the Authority, input into training and personnel practices as well as offering its own 
staff awareness campaigns. Out of the four authorities, then, Arun's quality policy 
was the one that relied most on an exclusively ideological approach. Quality was used 
as a means of 'adding value' to the services delivered through getting employees to 
see their work in terms of the customer's expectations of the outcome of that work. 
The union had historically had a low profile within the Authority and so none of the 
quality policy was considered as a bargaining issue. Latterly, however, union activity 
had increased a little, though this was more as a result of threats posed by white collar 
CCT. At this stage, and through the 'soft HRM' approach of management, the 
Authority had set up alternative channels of communications to transmit its message 
to staff. 
8: 5 Concluding Comments 
A number of distinctions emerged in the way that quality policies developed in each 
case. These differences reflected the different aspect of quality that was primarily 
being addressed. This, in turn, however, was affected by the pre-existing relationships 
between trade unions, management and the political leadership. In Brent the quality 
policy developed as a direct consequence of the financial, political and industrial 
relations crises that preceded it, allowing management a brief period where radical 
restructuring could take place. In Wycombe the quality policy evolved from the more 
4conventional', Unitarian approach to management, facilitated by a weaker trade 
union position. In Newcastle the quality policy that emerged was one which could be 
accepted by the trade unions, and which could be implemented without a need of 
coercion from the centre. As such the policy that emerged was unevenly implemented. 
Table 8: 5: 1 provides a summary of the overall findings. 
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Table 8: 5: 1: Quality Policy, Work and Industrial Relations - Case 
Summaries 
Brent Wycombe Newcastle Arun 
Quality Policy The Quality Performance IS09000 Working for the 
Council Management Public 
Policy Devolved; holistic Performance base Manual; working Customer care 
Orientation procedures 
Effects on High. Internal High. Functional Low/Medium. Job None. 
'Cutting waste' visibility created flexibility written tasks prescribed 
between devolved into job in manual; 
units acting as descriptions. liabilities defined. 
internal customer- Performance 
supplier chains. evaluated. 
Effects on output Low/Medium. Low/Medium. Medium/High. Low. Use of 
consistency and Increased Some attention to Manual ccustomer 
work attention to equity 'stakeholder' attempting to champion'within 
standardisation in regulatory issues in standardise work Authority to 
functions - regulatory routines in CYP. change working 
'stakeholder' functions. practices. 
analogy. 
Effects on High. Background High. (regulatory None. High. Official 
commitment, issues of functions) due to Introduction of corporate 
'service' and Devolution and increased pressure manual counter- commitment to 
'emotional texternalisation', to meet targets. productive in staff 'permanent 
labourl combined with None. (Leisure motivation change'. Use of 
job cuts inducing DSO) due to WPG to motivate 
commitment inability to and monitor staff 
through fear. motivate staff. commitment. 
Effects on union Mýixed. Large Mixed. General Neutral. Low Neutral/Positive. 
staff cuts and low activity, but membership, Introduction of 
Devolution growth in growing through manual creating a 
making membership - threat of CCT. bargaining issue 
organisation partly through of quality. 
difficult. Staff PRP scheme - 
cuts and seen to be 
derecognition divisive. 
threat re- 
invigorating 
steward 
organisation and 
membership. 
CHAPTER 9 
QUALITY AND WORKER ATTITUDES: SURVEY 
, 
CHARACTERISTICS 
This chapter describes the logistics, design issues and characteristics involved in 
conducting questionnaire surveys on staff in local authorities, on the subject of quality 
management, between November 1996 and June 1997. 
Survey Design 
The survey sample consists of all the trade union members in the case study 
authorities already studied by qualitative means (in this sense the sample was the 
population of the union involved - Unison - in each authority). 
a) Questionnaire design 
One basic questionnaire design was used for all authorities for the data presented 
here', although a hybrid version was used in the case of Newcastle to accommodate 
for the fact that only one department was being studied here - for reasons explained in 
chapter 7. 
The questions used in & questionnaire reflect the issues of quality management's 
effect on work-rates, 'commitment' and the impact on trade union activity'. The 
questions used (particularly the Likert-scale statements) were based upon paraphrased 
responses to questions raised in pilot study interviews. Other questions related to 
categorising information about respondents: these included department/service, length 
of service and level of involvement in the union. One important omission here, was 
grade. Grade was omitted because it was thought that this may have discouraged 
lower-grade workers from responding. In retrospect, however, this decision is seen as 
a mistake. Because Unison membership includes staff from all levels of the 
organisation - including the implementers of the policy. In at least one of the case- 
studies it was known that the chief executive received a questionnaire. Had grade been 
included, it would have been possible to have filtered out responses from likely policy 
A second version was also used for the study of stewards but response rates were too low for detailed evaluation. 
2 See appendix iii and v for questionnaire design 
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implementers. As such the results from the survey are likely to accentuate positive 
opinions towards quality management. 
b) Survey logistics 
Distribution of the questionnaires was arranged through direct contact with union 
branch officials at each council. Questionnaire sets were sent to the Unison branches 
for distribution to all members. Each questionnaire set included one questionnaire, 
one seal-able return-paid envelope (addressed to the Unison branch) and a covering 
letter of support from the Unison branch. The actual logistics of distribution, however, 
varied and was probably responsible for some of the differences in response rates (see 
table 9: 1). In the case of Brent, a list of members was supplied and the researcher was 
responsible for making up the questionnaire sets on site. In the case of Wycombe, the 
lay official carried out these tasks. At Newcastle, the union had administrative staff 
who were able to carry out the task, while at Arun, a membership list was provided 
and the researcher made the questionnaire sets and sent the batch of sets to the Branch 
Secretary for distribution. In the cases where Unison contacts provided assistance, a 
degree of control was lost in the accuracy of distribution. For example, in the case of 
Brent it was found first hand that membership lists were not fully up to date -a 
situation which is probably normal. This meant, however, that the exact number of 
questionnaires sent out was below the originally estimated membership levels. Where 
this situation was repeated at Newcastle - i. e. that the originally stated membership 
numbers for CLS were overestimated - too many questionnaires were issued to the 
Branch for distribution and, because distribution to members was being organised by 
the Branch office, the accuracy of the response rate was under-estimated. In addition, 
it was likely that questionnaires for Newcastle were sent out without a covering letter 
from the union branch resulting, probably, in a degree of confusion as to the purpose 
of the questionnaire and a subsequent lowering of the response rate. The loss of 
control at Newcastle was reversed in the case of Arun, where every aspect, apart from 
the actual distribution, was carried out by the researcher. 
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Table 9: 1: Survev resDonse rates 
Membership No Returned Date Sent % Returned 
Brent 800* 145 6/01/97 18+ 
Wycombe 230 44 14/10/96 19.1 
Newcastle CLS 240 50 21/10/96 20.8 
Arun 280 74 5/5/97 26.4 
(* exact membership figures not known - figure represents maximum possible) 
C) Sampling error 
Sampling error could not be calculated for the returned questionnaires. This was 
partly because of the above mentioned variations in the distribution and collection of 
questionnaires and partly because of the variation in the knowledge about the survey 
populations. In the case of Wycombe and Newcastle, where distribution was handled 
by the branches, no access to membership was available and so the population 
remained unknown. At Brent, access to the membership list did not provide any 
accurate information on the membership profile in terms of job functions, length of 
service, tenure etc. which may have provided a basis upon which to compare the 
returned questionnaires. In addition, direct access to the membership list, as noted 
above, merely confirmed the practical realities of lists themselves being inaccurate. 
While sampling errors could be calculated, however, the practical effects of this was 
reduced through the knowledge that the target samples were populations of Unison 
membership in each authority. While it is possible that there could have been a skew 
in the responses, it was possible to be assured that all Unison members had equal 
chances of receiving a questionnaire. 
Survey Respondent Characteristics 
Apart form the obvious distinction that could be made between workplace based upon 
the different employing authority, further distinctions could be made between workers 
that responded to the questionnaire. The most important distinguishing factor, after 
the authority worked for, was job function. 
a) Job function 
As has been noted in chapter 5, the labour process in local government is not a unified 
one, but constitutes a variety of work regimes ranging from professional regulatory 
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work to administrative work to manual 'blue collar work' to 'customer-service' type 
work in quasi-commercial set-ups. Perceptions of quality management are likely to be 
affected by its perceived impact on work-rates, autonomy, conditions and exposure to 
4customer demand'. A categorisation has therefore been developed to accommodate 
these workplace-based distinctions'. 
i 
Respondents covered a broad range of job functions 30 job descriptions or 
departments were offered. These have been recoded into four broad categories of job 
function representing the likely distinctions that may be experienced in work regimes 
within local government work. The categories selected have been informed by the 
job's relationship to external 'customers'. Here, then, regulatory functions are those 
functions deemed as being statutory, enforcement-type jobs whose 'customers' were 
almost indefinable. These tend to be professional type jobs and include services such 
as environmental health, trading standards and building regulations. The second 
category is social services/welfare type jobs. This type of work covers a range in 
terms of pay scale and professional status, but is unified by its relationship to 
identifiable service users who could, theoretically, be redefined as being 'customers'. 
People working in social services/welfare area of local government have been 
identified as having greater militancy than in other types of local government work 
(Miller 1996) and include social workers, youth workers and housing officers. The 
third type of work identified is that of internal administrative or support functions 
within an authority. Such functions may be clerical or manual but are distinguished by 
the lack of any contact with external customers to the organisation and were, whilst 
being insulated in this sense, are also the functions most liable to the threat of CCT. 
Job functions included here are planning, finance, IT support, clerical and personnel. 
The final category is that of staff working within a client service environment. These 
are staff in discretionary services that involves contact with the public. These jobs are 
likely to be involved in areas most susceptible to the pressures associated with direct 
ccustomer' contact. Such jobs include library work, 'One Stop Shops' and leisure 
work. A proportional breakdown of the respondents by these categories is shown in 
figure 9: 1, below. 
3 See Appendix A for the recoding schedule 
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Figure 9: 1: Survey Responses by Job Function 
236 
(All data: total cases = 313) 
A Further breakdown, shown in figure 9: 2, shows how the breakdown ofJob I'Linctions 
varies between authorities. While Wycombe and Artin have a relatively even spread of' 
a functions, both Neii, castle and Brent have a higher proportion ofsocial/, ývelf` rc related 
respondents. While a breakdown of the population is not possible through a lack of' 
data, here, both Neitýcaslle and Brent could be expected to have a higher proportion of' 
these types of workers as metropolitan/London boroughs respectively - district 
authorities do not operate social services and social services typically constitutes a 
high proportion of direct labour in local government. In addition, because Only CLS 
was being sampled at Nmcasile, most of' tile Job functions in this (1cpartinent are 
related to either leisure or to youth services (which also expla"Is tile high proportion 
of'client service stalThere). 
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Figure 9: 2: Respondents by Function and Authority (per-cent) 
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b) Length of service 
Another distinction that could be made between respondents is through length Of 
service. Where 'corporate culture' is considered important, \vorkers with lengthy 
service records are implicitly assumed to be more resistant to change - this Perception 
was articulated by managers in a number of' services In 11,01-c than oric 01, the case 
studies (see chapter 8). 
FigLire 9: 3 shows that length of service aniong resPOIldents IS diStribUted In MI 
approximately 'normal' manner around a mode aveRige Of betWeell 5-10 years 
service. It is not known how well tills distribution is representative ol'the work-l'orces 
as a whole as no inflormation was available to colliparc this. liccalisc of' this, the age 
profile has been used here merely to profile the respondents. 
There is a slight disparity between length of' service and the length of' tinic 
respondents have been in Unison (inode average being in ilic 10-20 years 
membership). rhis disparity probably reflects where people havc SwItched. lobs, cither 
within a local authority or between local aUthOrItICS. WhIlSt retaInIng 11111011 
nienihership throughout. 
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Figure 9: 3: Survey Responses by Length of Service 
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Where these length of service figures are Further broken down, it can he seen that 
there is considerable disparity in the length of service profile between alithorities - and 
this is statistically backed-Up by a Pearson value of 26.66 (significance 0.00866). 
Figure 9: 4 shows length of service, as the respective cumulative percentages within 
each authority. Here, respondents from Newcastle have the highest proportion ol' 
employees with a service ofless than 5 years, though With slightly more than average 
with over 10 years service. 
Figure 9: 4: Length of Service by Authority (per-cent) 
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(All data: missing cases = 3. XI ý DF = 12, Pearson = 26 65363, significance =0 00866, No of cells with 
minimum expected frequency <5 = 20%) 
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Figure 9: 5 shows length of service broken down by Job function. As can be seen by 
chi-square readings, there are no systematic statistical differences here, although there 
are some apparent differences. Administrative/support workers have the highest 
proportion of workers with under 10 years service. while customer service type work 
would appear to have the highest proportion of workers with between 10-20 years 
service - which is perhaps somewhat surprising given that 'service' work is often 
associated with younger workers. 
Figure 9: 5: Length of Service by Job Function (per-cent) 
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(All data: missing cases = 10. Z' : DF = 12, Pearson = 12,85855, significance =0.37941, No of cells with 
minimum expected frequency <5 = 20%) 
C) Union involvement 
The level of' involvement in union activity could also be regardcd as being a 
significant I`actor 'Ill determining attitudes towards quality management. While a 
CILICstion directly addressing union entrenchment and activisill x\as considered 
inappropriate (perhaps mistakenly), the issue has been addrCSSCd by the use 01' pl-OXY 
CILICStIO11S based upon lellgtil 01' tinle Ill the 11111011 and the attClldallCC 01' union 
meetings. 
In figure 9: 6 the diflercrit profiles of' length of' tinic in Unison IS colnparcd I)Ctwecll 
tile four authorities. 
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Figure 9: 6: Time in Unison by Authority (per-cent) 
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minimum expected frequency <5 = 15%) 
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Sorne statistically significant differences between authorities ernerge. I Icre, tile two 
district authorities have higher proportions of eniployees with over 20 years 
membership, although Wycombe also has the highest proportion of' respondents with 
under I year's membership. In contrast, Bi-ent has the lowest level of'respolidents with 
over 20 years membership. 
Figure 9: 7 shows how length of union inernbaslilp compares when distinguishing, 
betweenjob functions. 
The Use of Quality in Local Government 
Figure 9: 7: Time in Unison by Job Function (per-cent) 
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Here, while the differences qI)pear greater than the differences between authorities. 
they are statistically less significant. Respondents in regulatory services have tile 
highest levels of membership of over 10 years, although respondents in 
administrative/support functions have tile highest levels ofmcnibership of5 years and 
over. 
Table 9: 2 shows how the attendance ofunion filectings vfflic-'ý lIct"'C" milliontles. 
Table 9: 2: Attendance of Union Meetings (by Authority) 
(All) 
No (%) 
Brent 
No (%) 
Wycombe 
No (%) 
Newcastle 
No (%) 
Arun 
No (%) 
All Meetings 7 (2) 5 (3) 1 (2) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Most Meetings 35 (11) 12 (8) 1 (2) 4 (8) 18 (24) 
Some Meetings 77 (25) 32 (22) 5 (11) 17 (34) 23 (31) 
Rarely Attend 111 (35) 57 (39) 18 (41) 13 (26) 23 (31) 
Never Attend 77 (25) 36 (25) 19 (43) 16 (32) 6 (8) 
(no response) 6 (2) 3 (2) 0 
- 
(0) 0 (0) 3 (4) 
Total 313 (100) 145 (100) 44 (100) 50 (100) 74 (100) 
(All data. X, ` : DF = 12, Pearson = 43.1701, significance =0.00002, No ot cells with minimum 
expected frequency <5 = 20%) 
flerences, here, are again statiStIC, 111V Very SlglllllCIllt - \\Itll a I'C, 11-SOII VaILIC 01'0\'Cl' 
43 and significance valLIC of 0.00002. It' attendance at all nicetings Is used as all 
indicator of activism, Brew seems to be tile autilorltv \\ ith the Inglicst proportion of 
activists wilile Newcastle had tile lowest - IltllOLlgll L111,111talIVC CVILICIICC OIItlllICd III 
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chapter 8 indicated that while this shows an interesting coroboration of Brent Unison 
branch officials, this was unlikely to be an accurate reflection of the situation at 
Newcastle. Conversely, if 'non-attendance' of meetings is used as an indication of 
relative apathy towards union affairs, Wycombe would seem to had the highest level 
of 'apathy', while Arun would seem to have the lowest level. 
Table 9: 3:. Aftendance of Union MeetingS (by Job Function) 
All 
No 
Reg. 
No (%) 
Social 
No (%) 
Admin. 
No (%) 
Client 
No (%) 
All Meetings 7 (2) 1 (2) 4 (3) 1 (1) 1 (1) 
Most Meetings 35 (11) 8 (15) 12 (9) 11 (17) 4 (6) 
Some Meetings 77 (24) 15 (28) 31 (24) 13 (21) 15 (24) 
Rarely Attend Ill (36) 17 (32) 40 (31) 25 (40) 25 (41) 
Never Attend 77 (24) 11 (20) 40 (31) 10 (16) 16 (26) 
(no response) 6 (2) 1 (2) 0 (0) 2 (3) 0 (0) 
. 
Total (%) * --T 313 (100) 53 (100)1 127 (100) 62 (100) 61 (100)1 
(All data: jobs not declared = 10. X2 : DF = 12, Pearson = 11.86579, significance =0.45652, No of 
cells with minimum expected frequency <5 = 20%) 
In terms of union meeting attendance by job function, table 9: 3 indicates no real 
difference in terms of 'activists' although apparently social work/welfare functions 
seem, perhaps surprisingly, to have higher rates of 'apathy' than in other areas - 
having a higher than average percentage of members who 'never attended' union 
meetings. 
Overall the attendance of union meetings does not seem to reflect the relative levels of 
cactivism' at each authority reported in chapter 8. As such, using attendance of union 
meetings as a proxy measure does not seem to offer any real indicator of union 
activism overall and so has not been used further to assess relative attitudes to quality 
management. 
CHAPTER 10 
WORKER ATTITUDES TO QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
This chapter describes the findings of the survey research carried out on worker 
attitudes to quality management outlined in chapter 9. Survey data indicates a number 
of common perceptions about the effect of quality management initiatives on work 
rates, management legitimacy and trade union representation. Findings also indicate 
some variance in perceptions on these issues between authorities and, to a lesser 
extent, between job functions. Statistical distinctions, however, is difficult to establish 
in most cases - mainly because the sample sizes were too small to establish chi-square 
W) figures of association. 
The significance of the variance between authorities highlights the different 
circumstances in terms of political control; the type, size and demography of the 
authority; and of differences in the relationship between management and Unison in 
each case. These factors, then, affect management strategy in each case and contribute 
to the differences in the type of quality policy being pursued - as described in chapter 
8. These contextual differences, as well as providing the basis for the qualitative 
differences in quality management strateg ý, also constitute a significant difference in Y9 
the manner in which quality management is likely to be received by the work-forces 
in each case - as is highlighted in chapter 8. 
Brent, whose New-Right administration had aggressively been pursuing a 
decentralisation strategy along with outsourcing, had been pursuing a holistic quality 
policy based upon the empowerment of local managers in semi-autonomous 
contractor units. Quality management was pursued through imposition from the centre 
- as a condition of 'contract'. Wycombe, whose long-term Conservative administration 
had recently been replaced by a hung leadership of Labour and Liberal Democrats. 
This heralded a greater consultation with Unison than had been the case before. The 
quality policy being pursued here was based upon 'performance management'. At 
Newcastle (Community and Leisure Services - CLS) there had been a long-standing 
Labour administration which had a large workforce which was organised centrally. 
Unison was fully recognised and had full negotiation and consultation rights. The 
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quality policy being pursued here was procedure-based - largely around the principles 
of ISO 9000. Arun was a Conservative authority of long-standing. Unison was 
recognised and consulted as a form of 'staff association'. The quality policy being 
pursued here was of a 'customer care' variety. 
Because the research conducted on worker attitudes was based, largely, upon a 
standardised questionnaire survey, the findings presented in this chapter are presented 
in 'theme' order, rather than authority-by-authority, as in chapter 8. The themes that 
are addressed are those highlighted in chapters 3,4 and 5: These themes are, first, 
worker perceptions of the quality policy as a whole; second, worker perceptions of 
quality management's impact upon work-rates and productivity; third, worker 
perceptions of quality management's role in engendering commitment and the 
compatibility of quality management to a 'public service ethos; and fourth, worker 
perceptions on quality management's implications for trade union representation. 
Worker Perception of Quality Management as a Whole 
Before assessing the specific issues of the impact of quality management on work 
rates, workplace ideology and trade union entrenchment, some general findings will 
be discussed. In general, the survey data suggests that workers are generally aware of 
the respective quality management policies being pursued in their workplaces and that 
they consider that it has had some, although not a major, effect on working conditions. 
In general, workers are reasonably happy with the quality policy, but with some 
reservations in some areas. Significantly, opinion is divided on all these issues 
according to the authority worked at (and therefore the type of quality policy being 
pursued) and, to a lesser extent, by job function. 
a) Awareness of quality management policy 
The first important consideration, with regards to workers' opinion on the impact of 
quality management on work, is that of overall awareness of the issue. Given that all 
the case studies selected had a stated quality management policy, awareness could be 
expected to have been high. Based upon survey responses (where a score of I 
indicates complete awareness of council-wide quality policy and 5 indicates no 
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knowledge of any policy), awareness can be considered to be relatively high (see table 
10: 1). 
Table 10: 1: Awareness of Quality Management 
No Valid % 
Fully aware of management's Council-wide quality policy 117 38 
Aware that the Council has got a quality policy 114 37 
Only aware of management's quality policy in my service 40 13 
Only vaguely aware of any management quality policy 21 6.8 
Unaware of any management quality policy 16 5.2 
(All data: missino cases = 5) 
When these figures are broken down by authority some apparent differences emerge 
(see table 10: 2 and table 10: 3) 
Table 10: 2: Awareness of Quality Management (by Authority) 
Brent 
No (%) 
Wycombe 
No (%) 
Newcastle 
No (0/0) 
Arun 
No N 
Fully aware of.. policy 70 49.5 17 39.5 13 26 17 23.3 
Aware ... Councilhas ... policy 44 31 14 
32.6 18 36 38 52.1 
Only aware ... in my service 16 11.3 8 18.6 
8 16 8 11 
Only vaguely aware... 8 5.6 3 7 5 10 5 6.8 
Unaware... 4 2.8 1 1 2.3 1 6 12 5 6.8 
(All data: missing cases = 5. DF = 12, Pearson = 27, significance = 0.00771, numuer of cells With exp. freq <5 
30%) 
In Brent, where the policy was highly publicised and consciously linked to other 
aspects of work organisation, workers have the highest level of awareness: nearly half 
claiming full awareness of the council-wide policy. In contrast, at Newcastle only 
26% claim such knowledge, while 10% are 'only vaguely aware' and a further 12% 
claim 'no knowledge' about the quality policy. Chi-square values show that these 
differences are significant - albeit with some suspicion: X2 ý, with 
12 degrees of 
freedom, has a Pearson value of 27 with a significance of 0.00771, but has 30% of 
cells with an expected frequency of less than 5. To alleviate this problem, combining 
the 'only vaguely aware' and the 'unaware' categories provides a similar picture in 
figure 10: 3, but with more reliable statistical reliability. 
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Table 10: 3: Awareness of Quality Management (bv Authori 
Responses Adjusted 
Brent Wycombe Newcastle Arun 
Fully aware of .. policy 70 17 13 17 
Aware... Council has ... policy 44 14 18 38 
Only aware ... in my service 16 8 8 8 
Vaguely aware/unaware 12 4 11 10 
(All data: missing cases = 5. DF = 12, Pearson = 24.9876, significance = 0.00298, minimum exp. freq = 5.166 
Here, no cells now have an expected minimum frequency less than 5. This improves 
the significance value at the expense of a lower Pearson value. I 
Differences are also apparent when differentiating awareness of the councils' quality 
policies by job function but, here, such differences are less statistically significant - 
having a lower Pearson value of 17.9, with a significance of 0.116 and having 3 0% of 
cells with an expected frequency of below 5 (see table 10: 4) - and statistical 
significance is not improved through combining response categories. 
Table 10: 4: Awareness of Quality Management (by Job Function) 
(All data: missing cases = 12. X2 : DF = 12, Pearson z 17.9, significance a 0.116, number of cells with exp. freq -c5 
30%) 
No 
Reg 
(0/0) 
Social 
No (%) 
Admin 
No (%) 
Client 
No N 
Fully aware of .. policy 29 54.7 46 
36.5 16 26.2 23 37.7 
Aware ... Councilhas ... policy 15 28.3 44 
34.9 30 49.2 23 37.7 
Only aware ... in my service 5 9.4 21 16.7 
7 11.5 7 11.5 
Only vaguely aware... 3 5.7 8 6.3 6 9.8 2 3.3 
LUnaware... 1 1.9 7 5.6 2 3.3 6 9.8 
Those in regulatory functions seem significantly more aware of corporate quality 
policy than in other functions - with 54.7% declaring 'full awareness' compared to the 
average of 38%. In contrast, while nearly half of respondents in administration/ 
support functions have a general awareness of the policy, only 26% seem 'fully 
aware'. Responses from people in social/welfare functions broadly match the average 
- apart from them having a higher proportion of respondents whose awareness of 
quality management is restricted to work in their own area. 
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Respondents who claim 'no knowledge' of the quality policy have been excluded 
from (most of) the remainder of the analysis here. 
b) Degree of workers concern about quality management 
Related to workers' knowledge of the policy is their perception of the overall 
importance that the quality policy has on their experience of work. It is rccogniscd 
that workers' opinions about quality management, whether positive or negative, may 
not be a priority concern when considered among other workplace issues. The extent 
to which quality management is seen to be integrated into other aspects of work is an 
important factor in this. This issue is addressed in the survey through the responses 
given to two statements: 
' The qualitypolicy has not affected my concerns about day to day issues' 
'All this quality management stuff isjust afad' 
Responses were scored'on a five-point Likert scale (I being strongly agree/5 being 
strongly disagree). The distribution of the strength of agreement/disagreement can 
then be compared between authority and job function. Likert scale questions are 
considered to be valid tools of assessing opinion, particularly where questions are put 
in terms of contentious statements to which a clear response can be made (Moser & 
Kalton 1971). 
The response to the first question used here is shown in table 10: 5 below: 
1 Where respondents are excluded, here, caption states'excludes unawares'. Where 'unawares' are Included, 
caption reads'all data'. 
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Question 3: 6 (i) 
The qualilY policY has 1701 tý#ýClecl im, concerns aboul thiy to thiv II 
issues ' 
Scale Missing L1 
Brent 2 23 (17%) 12(9%) 39 (28%) 1 33(24%) 29(21%) 
Wycombe 0 7(17%) 9(21%) 11 (26%) 9(21%) 6(14%) 
Newcastle 3 14(31%) 7(18%) 13(29%) 3(7%) 4(9%) 
Arun 4 19(38%) 18(26%) 14(28%) 11 (22%) 2(4%) 
Regulatory 0 6(11%) 13(25%) 15(28%) 11 (21%) 8(15%) 
Social/Welfare 3 30(26%) 9(8%) 30 (26%) 28(24%) 18(15%) 
Admin/Support 3 13(22%) 10(21%) 17(29%) 8(14%) 8(14%) 
Client Services 3 12(22%) 14(25%) 13(24%) 7(13%) 6(11%) 
(job not declared) 0 2 0 2 2 1 
Total Cases = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. Per-cent = row per-cent. X' for opinion against authorityý DF = 12, Pearson 
= 34.1, significance =0.00065, minimum expected frequency = 5,94. XI for opinion against job functiow DF = 12, 
Pearson = 16.487. significance =0.1699, minimum expected frequency = 7,54) 
I lere, responses, shown in the shaded 'All' row, suggest an even spread of opinion. 
Where opinions are grouped by authority and. job function. however, ormlion appears 
more divided (significant deviations are shaded). Statistically, there is coils i derah le 
signi icaricc in tile differences between authorities here: X', with 12 degrees (F 
freedom, has a Pearson value of 34.1 with a sigilificancc ol'O. 0006S. I lere, opinions of 
respondents in Newcasile and -Irim are skewed, against the average, towards 
agreement, whereas opinions ofrespondents in Brew are skc\\cd, against the average, 
towards disagreement. While sorne apparent dif6crences can also be Observed between 
job functions oil tilis Issue, they are not statistical1v Significant, (X2, \k, ltll I-' degrees of 
freedom, having a lower Pearson value of' 16.5 MILI a significance ol'O. 17). 
In response to the second question. which "'Orc stl*01191Y sUggests tll. lt qualltv 
management is just a I'ad', opinion is, agaill, disPersed across tile Continuum, llloligliý 
this time tending to disagree with the statement (see table 10: 6). 
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Question 3: 6 (ii) -A/I this is jusl ý/ fild, 
agree disagree 
Scale Missing 1 2 3 4 5 
All 10 44(15%) 42(14%) 73(25%) 63(22%) 60(20%) 
Brent 3 25(18%) 21 (15%) 35(25%) 27(20%) 27 (20%) 
Wycombe 1 4(10%) 5(12%) 9(22%) 9(22%) 14(34%) 
Newcastle 1 22(18%) 15(18%) 24(25%) 12(21%) 11 (16%) 
Arun 5 7(10%) 8(12%) 18(26%) 18(26%) 12 (18%) 
Regulatory 0 4(7%) 10(19%) 11 (21%) 10(19%) 18(34%) 
Social/Welfare 4 27(23%) 15(13%) 29(25%) 24(20%) 19(16%) 
Admin/Support 3 6(10%) 8(14%) 14(24%) 16(27%) 12(20%) 
Client Services 2 7(13%) 6(11%) 18(33%) 12(22%) 10(18%) 
(job not declared) 
F- 
1 0 3 1 1 1 
I otal L; ases = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. Per-cent =row per-cent. X. - Tor UpIFIIUrI dydll)bL dUIIIU[ILY. Lir iz, rtlaftu[I 
9.37, significance =0.67, minimum expected frequency = 61, Xý2 for opinion against job function: DIF 12, Pearson 
17.94, significance =0.1 175, minimum expected frequency = 7,348) 
Distinctions between groups is less obvious here with. perhaps, those at 1J. 'I't-ombe 
Council and those people working in regulatory functions tending to disagree more 
than average, while those in social/welfare i'Luictions tending to agree more with the 
statement. Distinctions between authorities orjob functiolls 011 tills (Tillion. th()11911, 
are not statistically significant (X2 significance being 0.67 and 0.1175 respectively) 
This general ambivalence is Further illustrated when the responses of' the two Likert- 
scale questions are added together and the combined response scores compressed 
(score of 2-4 = 'agree', score of' 5-7 - indill'erciit, score of' 8-10 disagree). The 
revised responses are shown In I igure 10: 1. 
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The prevailing attitude seeins to be 'indifference' towards the negative notion that the 
quality policy has had peripheral effect on work. though slightly more feel that it has 
had 'no effect' than feel it has had a 'real effect'. There is sorne difference between 
authorities in this perception and at the 0.05 confidence level, is statistical1v 
significant (X2, with 6 degrees of freedom giving a Pearson value of' 15 with a 
significance of 0.02). Workers at Wj,, combe and Brew clearly perceive a greater 
influence of their respective quality management programmes than is the case at 
Neivctislle. 
Figure 10: 1: Effect of Quality Management on Overall Concerns at Work 
(r)er-cent of Authoritv) 
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As figure 10: 2 indicates, however, when differentiated by. job type, perceptions about 
quality management's effect on overall work concerns do not appear to differ and 
have no statistical significance. Those ill regulatory I, Linctions seem to have I higher 
than average perception that the policy had some 'noll, 111,11 ef , tlect', and 111glic" level of 
those Who thOLIght It had a 'real effect'. 'I-IJOSC ill Social Welfill-C 1111101011S, In Contrast, 
seem most divided between those who think that qwility Inall, 19cluent l1ad *no eflect' 
and those who think it had a 'real effect'. 
Allied to this issue, is tile overall impression oftlIC LIL1,111ty l)OlICy, \VlICtlICI- tile pOlICV 
is generally approved of or disapproved of. overall, workers tend to approve of the 
policy (figure 10: 3 and 10: 4). There are, again, sorne diflcrenccs bet\Nccn authorities 
Oigurc 10: 3) and, to a lesser extent, bet-ween job types (figure 10: 4), but tile 
differences in both cases are not statistically significant. . 41-im \\orkcrs tend to he the 
most happy with the policy and HýVcomhc workci-s the least happy. Similarly, workers 
in regulatory functions tend to bc flic most happy and those workcrs involved in 
social/welfare work the least happy. 
Figure 10: 2: Effect of Quality Management on Overall Concerns at Work 
(per-cent of Job Type) 
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Figure 10: 4: General Opinion of Quality Management (per-cent of Job 
Function) 
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(n = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. X` : DF = 6, Pearson = 10.303, significance =0.32653, cells with expected freq <5 
25%) 
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C) Unprompted views on quafity management 
Another insight into workers overall perceptions of quality management can be gained 
through the response to the final question on the questionnaire - which is open-ended 
and voluntary. The wording of the open question is as follows: 
"Please ftelftee to write down any other comments thatyou may have about the 
operation of 'Quality Management' in your workplace" 
The response rate to this question was not high enough to draw conclusions about the 
population of respondents as a whole. From a possible (estimated) population of 1550 
Unison members in the four authorities, 311 people, or 20% of the population, 
responded to the survey. Of these, 98 people, or 35% of the respondents, answered 
question 3: 8 (see table 10: 7). 
Table 10: 7: Resoonses to 'Open'Question (Q3: 8 
% of category 
(authority/job % of total 
No. of function) responses 
No of returned responses to responding to responding to 
questionnaires Q3: 8 - 
Q3: 8 Q3: 8 
Brent 145 50 34.5 50.5 
Wycombe 44 10 22.7 10.1 
Newcastle 50 22 44.0 22.2 
Arun 74 17 23.0 17.2 
Regulatory 53 15 28.3 15.2 
Social/Welfare 127 43 33.9 43.4 
Admin/Support 62 18 29.0 18.2 
Client Service 61 21 34.4 21.2 
Cob not declared) 1 10 2 20.0 2.0 
All 1 313 99 100 31.6 
Because no prompt was given for this question, however (excepting that the nature of 
the questions throughout the questionnaire would have had some leading effect), some 
provisional conclusions can legitimately be drawn from the answers that were 
volunteered. 
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If the responses are broadly categorised as being either positive, negative, or 
mixed/neutral views about the quality policy, negative views outnumber the positive 
views. Figures 10: 5 and 10: 6 show how these positive/neutral/iiegative opinions are 
dispersed as a proportion of all returned questionnaires. 
Figure 10: 5: Unprompted Opinions of Quality Management as Per- 
centage of Total Responses (by Authority) 
300 
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(All data. y. 1 : DF = 6, Pearson = 2.80925, siqnificance =0,83238, cells with expected freq <5 = 33.3%) 
In figure 10: 5 it can be seen that, overall, 111ost responses fall under the 'mixed 
views/neUtral' category. While, statistically, distinctions cannot be made between 
authorities on this, there are some observable differcilces between some authorities. In 
Neiveasile, lor example, while a high proportion Of respondents VOIL"Itcered all 
unprompted opinion (44%), the opinions expres-sed tend to I'all dISIM-0110111011atCly 
Under the *mixed views/neutral' category whi1c, in contrast, opinions from Bi-ent are 
disproportionately negative. 
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Figure 10: 6: Unprompted Opinions of Quality Management as per 
centage of Total Responses (by-Job Function) 
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(All data. Y, ' : DIF = 6, Pearson =3.786, significance =0.70561, cells with expected freq <5 = 33.39%) 
FIgUre 10: 6 shows how these unprompted opinions are dispersed when distinguished 
by. job function. In most cases, no clear distinction is apparent, except in tile case of 
respondents working in client service jobs - tlicjobs expected to be at the 'front line' 
of the service encounter. Here, opinion is skewed towards the negative with no 
positive comments made, 'ing -Inixed, oi- 'even' views and 1111", just over 20% haNi II 
having negative views. Statistical significance "I these (11ficrences Is, again, weak 
though. 
If tile responses to question 3: 8 are categorised di fferently. a di I'llerent distribution of' 
issues are presented- IK instead of' calegorising opinion on a siniple pn)-neutrakaimi 
basis, opinion is instead differentiatcd by issue, responses could he divided into nine 
categories. Viewed in tWs my, the catcgoriscd 1-CS11011SCS are diStribUtCd ilS per tlhIC 
10: 8. 
Cl,,,,, ( se-- Job "It de, I 
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Table 10: 8: 03: 8 Response Categories* 
Recoded Response No 
Total 
%(a) %(b) 
1) QM has not had any effect 27 8.6 27 
2) QM has concealed cut-backs 16 5.1 16 
3) QM is a good idea, but... 14 4.5 14 
4) QM has increased workloads 12 3.8 12 
5) QM is good/QM has improved services 11 3.5 11 
6) QM has empowered managers too much 10 3.2 10 
7) The union should be more involved with QM 5 1.6 5 
8) The union is too negative about QM 2 0.6 2 
QM is tied to CCT/outsourcing 2 0.6 2 
Total 99 32 100^ 
7o(a) = per-centage or au retumea questionnaires 
%(b) = per-centage of responses to Q3: 8 (unprompted comments) 
(n=99: unprompted opinions only. ) 
In this format, the responses reveal a different picture. For example, 27% of 
unprompted responses (or 9% of all respondents) state that they are not being greatly 
affected by quality management. This is sometimes expressed in positive terms and 
sometimes expressed in negative terms. Indicative opinions expressed here are: 
"The 'Customer care'policy exists but does not affect our section as much as some 
who have more direct contact with the public. We feel our general attitude has 
always been one ofassistance and co-operation with the public so the new 'system' 
has generally had little effect. " (Planning Engineer: Arun) 
"Unaware of it having any real effect. Colleagues seem to be more concerned 
about admin. matters, not service delivery. Same applies to management. As for 
councillors ... and union ... I am deeply cynical. 
" (Outdoor Youth Worker: 
Newcastle) 
"TheY are just words with little meaning in relation to staff' (Social Services 
Worker: Brent) 
"I believe it's just another fashion that will come and go like- many management 
Practices have in thepast. " (Planning Officer: Wycombe) 
Within this group of expressed opinion, however, some interesting differences again 
emerge between authorities and betweenjob types (see figure 10: 7, below). 28% of all 
staff at Newcastle (64% of all unprompted responses) express this 'lack of any 
impact' perception about quality management. This is exceptionally high when 
compared to the equivalent opinions in Arun (8% of all Arun respondents), Wycombe 
(7%) and Brent (3%). In terms of job types, those in client services express 'a lack of 
any impact' opinion most - at 16% of all client services responses, or 47% of 
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unprompted client service responses. This is in marked contrast to those in regulatory 
functions where this opinion is not expressed by anyone. 
The next most popular response, at 5.1% - or 16% of unprompted answers, is that 
quality management was being used to disguise cut-backs in staff or resources; or that 
4 quality' was being affected by cuts in resources. This view is tied moreto particular 
authorities than to job types. It is disproportionately felt in the two metropolitan 
boroughs, being the most frequent response in Brent (86/o) and the second most 
frequent in Newcastle (4%), yet is only expressed by one other respondent in both the 
other two authorities (Arun). 
Examples of these responses include: 
"I would like to believe that Quality Management is No. I- but I believe cost is No. 
I andfrom now on, always will be " (Benefits worker: Arun) 
"QM in the form of ISO 9002, has increased the volume of paperwork and not 
necessarily the quality of service. We are trying to produce a quality service in 
crumbing buildings caused by budget reductions. In addition we have less staff 
doing the work. " (Leisure worker: Newcastle) 
"A veneer tacked onto a declining service. Many of the packs were patronising and 
insulting and the belief that - despite cuts in services (in this case not buying any 
new books for two years) - all staff had to do was smile and say 'how may I help 
you? 'and customers wouldn't notice, seemed ridiculous. " (Librarian: Brent) 
The third most popular response, at 4.5% of all respondents and 14% of those 
volunteering an opinion, is that of a qualified acceptance of quality management as a 
general principle - but with reservations. While the balance of the opinion expressed is 
sometimes negative and sometimes positive, opinion here is that quality management 
could potentially be seen as acceptable in some form. This 'mixed' response is 
prevalent in two authorities (7% in Wycombe and 6% in Newcastle) and is the most 
frequent response among regulatory functions (8%). Some examples of responses, 
here, are: 
"On the whole I'm quite happy with QM working practices as they have helped my 
disorganised nature, although I have reservations on the amount ofpaperwork it 
can tend to generate. " (Leisure worker: Newcastle) 
"While there have been casualties in terms of many staff losingjobs or having to 
re-adjust to pay and conditions, the users of the local authority's services have 
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gained a much better service (mostly anyway) and better value for money" 
(Housing worker: Brent) 
"Quality Management is a good idea The problem is that Brent is a CRAP council 
with power-hungry people at the top who do not give a damn about anybody but 
themselves. " (Social Services worker: Brent) 
"Broadly agree with principle of performance appraisal hut appraisal is too 
infrequent. Once or twice a year not enough. Performance related pay does not 
motivate and often has a demotivating effect - it should he withdrawn. " (Planning 
Officer: Wycombe) 
The forth most popular response, representing 3.8% of all respondents (12%'of 
volunteered responses), is that quality management had increased workloads. This 
response is expressed by 7% of Brent workers (or 20% of unprompted responses at 
Brent - being the second most frequent response in this case). In contrast, this opinion 
is expressed by only one person in each of Wycombe and Arun and is not expressed at 
all in Newcastle. This opinion is also most felt among people working in 
social/welfare type work (being 9% of all respondents and 21% of unprompted 
responses). A selection of responses is provided below. 
"My grade has heen cut and my workload douhled" (Social Services worker: 
Brent) 
"In my opinion quality management isjust not working. Things ran more smoothly 
under the old system as we had more time with individual clients. Under this new 
system I have tofit in up tofour - sometimesfive -clients in the same time as I used 
to do two. " (Social Services worker: Brent) 
In contrast to much of the above, where approval is only given with qualification, 
3.5% of all respondents (or 11% of unprompted responses) feel that quality 
management in their workplace is unambiguously good. No clear distinction between 
authorities orjob types is apparent here. Responses here included: 
"It can only be a good thing. " (Outdoor Leisure worker: Newcastle) 
"Quality management motivates staff who are allowed to take on additional 
responsibilities if their achievements are recognised and rewarded - appraisal and 
PRP are essentialfor quality management. "(Environmental Health Officer: Brent) 
The same number of people giving unqualified approval, however, feel that quality 
management has been responsible for giving too much power to managers. This is felt 
by 3.2% of all respondents, or 10% of unprompted opinion: 
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"Just an excuse to inflate management pay while dismissing long-serving staff on 
weak reasons and lies. " (Corporate Services worker: Arun) 
"No job description. No job evaluation. If face fits, high salary. " (Education 
Officer: Brent) 
If these responses are combined with the 12% of unprompted responses stating that 
quality management had increased workloads, it could be said that 22% of 
unprompted responses convey the opinion that quality management has led to an 
increase of 'management by stress'. This issue has been considered separately through 
the use of specific questions in two sections below. The same is true for the issue of 
the union's role, where a fin-ther 2.2% of respondents feel that the union should be 
more involved in the process or that the union should be more positive about the 
'benefits' of quality management. This opinion, however, is restricted almost 
exclusively to workers in Brent which, when considered with the slightly higher than 
average unqualified support for quality management by some at Brent, suggests a 
degree of polarisation about quality management at this authority. A final response (2 
persons, both at Arun) consider that the issue of quality management is intrinsically 
tied to the issue of CCT. 
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Figure 10: 7: Unprompted Opinions (Recoded) as Per-centage of Total 
Responses (by Authority and Job Type) 
0 1) QM has had no 
Brent real effect 
112) QM concealed 
cut-backs 
Wycombe 
0 3) QM is good, but... 
Newcastle 
04) QM increased 
workloads 
Arun 
0 5) QM improved 
services/work 
Regulatory 13 6) Managers are too 
powerful now 
Social/ Welfare 
117) Union should be 
more involved with 
QM 
0 8) Union is too 
Admin/ Support negative 
0 9) QM tied to CCT 
Client Service 
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(313: unprompted opinions only. per-centage is per-centage of total responses for each group ie 28% bar in 
Newcastle represents 28% of all Newcastle respondents) 
Quality Management and Work Intensification 
In addressino 'general' perccptions workers haVC ý11)01[t (11.1ality lllallaýLýCIIICFII, ahOVC, 
some of the issues that the questionlialre Was spccilically targeting have heen raised. 
More detailed - and, perhaps. more representative - ol)[111011S Oil these ISSUCS are, 
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however, better addressed in more specific questions. This is the case for the issue of 
quality management's effect on work intensification. 
a) Quality management and work rates 
The first issue, here, is the degree to which workers feel that quality management had 
affected work rates. The application of quality management in any work environment 
has an implicit impact on work rates through its objective of improving the quality of 
output in relation to inputs - it is a value enhancing exercise. When placed in a non- 
commercial environment, however, the potential for improving quality is less clear 
than in a commercial environment - where the success of output performance can be 
measured in terms of increasing market share or revenue. In the non-commercial 
environment that local government work is involved in, improving quality cannot 
increase market share or revenue. Workers, then, are liable to find themselves in a 
situation of facing increased performance monitoring but are unlikely to be able to 
benefit from any increase in output quality. In addition, the nature of improving 
quality in public service type work is likely to mean an increase in the quantity of 
services being provided, responsiveness (or speed) of service delivery, as much as will 
be about increasing reliability of services. This all potentially amounts to quality 
management in public services being linked to the issue of productivity (see chapter 
5). 
Respondents were asked directly, then, whether quality management had affected 
workloads as a whole: 
"How has the introduction of 'Quality Management' (Q4 as a whole, affected 
work loadsfor staff in your serviceldepartment " 
Responses to this question are shown in figure 10: 8 and 10: 9, below. Overall, 
workloads are perceived to have risen 'a lot' by 31% of respondents and 'a bit' by 
34% of respondents. Workloads are perceived to have 'stayed the same' by 21% of 
respondents. Only 1.5% of respondents perceive workloads to have declined 'a bit' as 
a result of quality management and a mere 0.3% perceive workloads to have declined 
6a lot'. Within these overall figures, however, there is a great deal of differences 
between authorities (see figure 10: 15). 
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Figure 10: 8: Effect of Quality Management on Workloads (per-cent of 
Authority) 
While no statistical distinctions can be made between authorities - the sample being 
too small in some cases - leading to a 40% ot'cells with an expectcd fi-CLILICncy helow 
5 on the chi-square test. As can be seen, though, 01' the four authorities, workers at 
Brent and Wycombe perceive the greatest increase in workloads as a result of'quality 
management. In Brent, where the quality management Policy being Pursued WaS the 
most holistic and thorough-going ofthe four zuItilorities, 46-5'ýiý perceive workloads to 
have increased 'a lot' and 27% perceive workloads to have increased 'a hit'. At 
Wycombe - which had a perl'onnancc-based approach to quality -a smaller number 
perceive workloads to have increased 'a lot'. I lowevcr, a higher than average 46.5"/o 
of Wy, comhe respondents perceive that workloads had increased 'a bit'. These cases 
contrast with Arun where, despite nominal opinion still suggesting that workloads had 
increased 'a bit', have a higher rate ofi-csponses stating that workloads had staycd the 
sarne: only 13% perceive that workloads had increased 'a lot', 38'ý', ) perceive that 
workloads had increased 'a bit', but 29% perceive 'no change' to workloads. 
Differences betweenjob functions also display some variance - though not as marked 
as between authorities and, again. not by any statistica I importance (see I igure 10: 9). 
(n = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. X2 : DIF = 12, Pearson = 32.62972, significance =0.001 11, cells with expected freq <5 
40%) 
The Use of Qualiq, in Local Government 263 
Figure 10: 9: Effect of Quality Management on Workloads (per-cent of 
Job Function) 
Here, people working in regulatory functions perceive the greatest increase in 
workloads (37% 'a lot and 37% 'a bit) compared to those working in administrative/ 
support functions (22% 'a lot' and 39`/0 'a bit'). 
b) Quality management and productivity 
In addition to the direct question asked about work-ratcs, the responses to another two 
likerl-scale statements may be examined: 
Concern. lbi- Council customers is till vc/Y 's CouncilstiII1,11,110 
seem to he bearing the brunt qfil till' 
Management seems lo he a 9('/ 111(we work ow 
o 'stqf -rease in pai" V . 
1'wilhoul an int 
Responses to these statements are intended to show how closely workers leel that 
qUality management is associated with general 'prOLILICtIVIty' iSSIICS (i. e. tile (IMIntity 
or effectiveness of work done in a given tiniescalc and/or wage ratc). The responses to 
the first of these statements, relating to the ICVCI 01'CXI)OSIII'C StAT I'CCI ZIS il I-CSUlt 01' 
qUality management, is shown in table 10: 9, hclow. Shadc(l 11-cls silow tile Inore 
significant figures. 
40%) 
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Table 10: 9: QualitY Management and Productivity (i) 
264 
Question 3: 6 (iii) 
(, lbr Council cus/o/nei-s is till vei-i, well, but it'. %- Council , 0,1CO1,17 - 'it 
cill, stq#'whoseem to he hew-ing the bi-ma o/ 
agree disagree 
Scale MiSsing 1 2 3 4 5 
All 10 96(33%) 72(25%) 57(20% 30(10%) 27(9%) 
Brent 2 51(37%) 32(23%) 25(18%) 12(9%) 16(12%) 
Wycombe 1 18(43%) 11(26%) 7(17%) 3(7%) 2(5%) 
Newcastle 3 11(25%) 7(16%) 11(25%) 6(14%) 6(14%) 
Arun 4 16(24%) 22(32%) 14(21%) 913%) 3(4%) 
Regulatory 0 14(26%) 19(36%) 9(17%) 6(11%) 5(9%) 
Social/Welfare 4 50(42%) 19(16%) 26(22%) 11 (9%) 8(7%) 
Admin/Support 5 12(20%) 19 (32%) 12(20%) 5(9%) 6(10%) 
Client Services 1 15(27%) 15(27%) 10(18%) 7(13%) 7(13%) 
(job not declared) 0 5 0 0 1 1 
I otal Cases = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. Per-cent = row per-cent. X- tor opinion against autnorayý ur- =iz, tearson 
15.04847, significance = 0.2388, cells with expected frequency <5 = 20%. Y, 2 for opinion against job function: DF 
12, Pearson = 17.413, significance = 0.13472, cells with expected frequency <5 = 5%) 
Here, overall responses show a significant skew towards agreenmit. This suggests 
that workers may have been feeling 'squeezed' by the various demands made by 
service users, 'internal customers' and the attanime"t of perfornimicc targets by 
managers acting as proxy for 'custonlers. Differemes emerge, howcver, in the 
relative strength of agreement between authoritics and, to a lesser extent, between Job 
ftinctions. The strongest agreement is found in Brent and Nciivastle and the weakest 
in Newcastle and Arun. Agreement is also stronger In SOCIal/Wella"C "Ll"th)"S and 
regulatory functions than In adiiiinistrativc/sLippol-t I'Linctions. As the clil-sc, Lllll. c 
figures demonstrate, however, differences between authorities and. job function are not 
statistically significant. 
Responses to the second staternent, which relates to how closcly stalYperceive clualitv 
management is I inked to genera I prod LICt I VI I ý' I SS Lies, are sI io\\ ii in (a I-) Ic 10: M, he I()\\. 
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Table 10: 10: Quality Management and Productivity (ii) 
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Question 3: 6 (vii) 
()uuIiIv. MnagemenI seems to he u tneons hv which to get inon, 
woi-k out qfstqffirithout an increetse in pty, 
agree disagree 
Scale MiSsing 1 2 3 4 5 
All 10 95(33%) 75(26%) 60(21%) 36(12%) 16(5%) 
Brent 1 60(44%) 33(24%) 24(17%) 10(7%) 10(7%) 
Wycombe 0 12(29%) 15(37%) 6(15%) 9(22%) 0(0%) 
Newcastle 2 11(25%) 12(27%) 8(18%) 6(14%) 5(11%) 
Arun 7 12(18%) 15(22%) 22(32%) 11(16%) 1 (1 %) 
Regulatory 1 12 (23%) 18(34%) 13(25%) 6(11%) 3(6%) 
Social[Welfare 2 49 (42%) 18 (15%) 24(20%) 17(14%) 7(6%) 
Admin/Support 3 20 (34%) 18 (31%) 8(14%) 8(14%) 2(4%) 
Client Services 3 10(18%) 20(36%) 14(25%) 5(9%) 3(5%) 
(job not declared) 0 4- 
1 1 1 0 1 
(Total Cases = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. Per-cent = row per-cent. Z' tor opinion against autnority: ut- = 12, Fearson 
= 33.49534, significance = 0.00081, cells with expected frequency <5 = 15% Xý2 for opinion against job functiom DF 
12, Pearson = 21.01281, significance = 0.05019, cells with expected frequency <5 = 15%) 
Again, opinion is skewed heavily towards agreement witli the statement, suggesting, 
that workers are perceiving that quality management is being used as an efliciency 
tool more than as a tool to enhance value-added per se. As in the case ofthe previous, 
related, question this perception is highest at Bi-eid and at IO'combe - where 
performance monitoring was probably the most developed - and lowest at . 11.1117 and at 
Newcastle. On this statement, however, there is considerable statistical significance to 
the differences between authorities: X2 , at twelve 
degrees offreedom, giving a Pearson 
rating of 33.5 with a significance ot'0.00081, \kitli only 15% ofcells witli a 111111111IL1111 
expected frequency of less than 5. No clear differcliccs are apparent between . 1011 
functions. 
C) Quality managementand work intensification 
On the general issue of' work-rates and productivity, then, responses suggest that 
council staff perceived an increase in workloads, productivity and exposure to 
I customers' as a result of' quality rnanagCInCI1t. TIIIS IS I'L11-thCr I11US1rI(Cd 11' the 
responses of' the previously mentioned l1kcrt-scalC LjUCStiOI1S are C01111)HIC(l M"Id the 
The Use of Quality in Local Government 266 
cumulative scores compressed to provide an indicator of 'work intensification' i. e. the 
perception of increased impetus to increase or improve work. The responses to this 
derivative question is shown in figure 10: 10, below. 
Figure 10: 10: Quality Management and the Intensification of Work (per 
cent of Authority) 
600 
500 
400 
missing 
QM intensified work 
300 1 C] QM not affýted Workloads 
[jQM relaxed work 
200 
too 
00 
Brent vvyco, llbe W-1111- AFLIII 
(n = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. XI : DF = 6, Pearson = 7.979, significance =0.23966, cells with expected frequency 
<b =Ib. 1%) 
Here, then, the overall perception is of all i ntells, I-Icat ion of' work due to Lillallty 
management (49% in tile category suggesting work intensification had taken place, 
34% in the category suggesting no difference and IPo in tile category suggesting a 
relaxation of work). However, no systematic -statistical sig"ifical"Icc c, 111 
be 111, ldc of' 
the differences between authoritics here. although sollic (IM)"IT)II differences ellierge. 
Distinctions between authorities are most notahle, again. between Brew and 11), combe 
(56.5% and 57% 'intensification' respectively) and Neircusfle and Arun (41ý/O and 
35% 'intensification', respectively - and 16%o 'relaxation' at Neu, casilt, ). 
Differences betweenjob functions oil tills Isslic are shown III figure 10: 11, bclo\ý. 
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FigurelO: 11: Quality Management and the Intensification of Work (per- 
cent of Job Function) 
(n = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. X2 : DF = 6, Pearson = 2,9148, significance =0.81947, minimum expected frequency 
= 6.044) 
Here, 52.5% of social/welfare workers perceive an intensification 01, work and ') 1.41ý/o 
perceive no real change. Those in client service work appear split: 42! /'0 each 
perceiving intensification and no change. 
There is an interesting contrast between the responses to this isstic Ind to tile issue of' 
workloads, described earlier. While those in regulatory services t`eel that workloads 
have increased as a result of quality management, the"C is "o equivalent distinction 1,01, 
this group of workers on the issue of work intensificltion. 
'Public Service', Ideology and Management Legitimacy 
The second major issue being directly addressed here collccl*lls the ideological illipact 
of quality management. Quality inariagenient Is deeply rooted in inanagerialist 
assumptions about work organisation, in terills that place a high priority Oil iliallagcrs, 
being 'leaders' and 'enablers' of' workers and Oil the H11pOl-tauCC 01' CUltlVatIng all 
'appropriate' work culture. This is in contrast to more 'traditional I ýUSSI. 11111)11011S 01' 
I public service ethos' as the key motivating factor - even ifthis itsel f tends to nialli1cst 
itselfas paternalistic and is, perhaps, sOlneWl1at Mythical. Ali important coils I derat i oil, 
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then, has been to assess whether workers accept the legitimacy of quality management 
in their work - particularly in the adoption of 'customer' based approaches to work. 
Related to this is how supportive or hostile workers may be to any changing 
relationships with managers (increased performance monitoring, devolution etc). 
Another consideration was whether quality management contributes to a 
reinforcement of a unitarist ideology at the workplace. For these issues tile responses 
to the following statements were offered for levels of agreement/disagreement: 
Teýlbrmance appraisal tends to make peolVeftel more -valued- in their 
ivork' 
'Quality is an issue that both management and stq#'can come together on' 
. 
1'more say over their ovin ivork than 14as 
. 
1ýrs stqf 'Quality Management 
the case before' 
Responses to the first of these statements, relating to the legitimacy ofindividuating 
workers, are shown in table 10: 11, below. 
TablelO: 11: Quality Management and Workplace Ideology Ci) 
Question 3: 6 (iv) Tel-lol-monce e1ppi-elisol It, 11tiv to imike people 
kel moi-c -volued" 
in ilich- woi-k' 
- 
disagree agree 
Scale Missing - 1 
- 2 3 4 5 
All 7 52(18%) 72 (24%) 70 (24%) 45 (15%) 46 (16%) 
Brent 3 25(18%) 31 (23%) 34(25%) 16(12%) 29(21%) 
Wycombe 0 8(19-%) -T4 (331/6) 10(24%) 5(12%) 5(12%) 
Newcastle 2 9(20%) 11(25%) 10(23%) 7(16%) 5(11%) 
Arun 2 10(15%) 16(24%) 16(24%) 17(25%) 7(10%) 
Regulatory 0 6(11%) 19(36%) 13(25%) 10(19%) 5(9%) 
SOcial/Welfare 3 15(13%) 29(25%) 32(27%) 14(12%) 25(21%) 
Admin/Support 2 13(22%) 11(19%) 15(25%) 10(17%) 8(14%) 
Client Services 2 16(29%) 13(24%) 9(16%) 8(14%) 7(13%) 
(job not declared) 0 2 0 1 3 1 
(Total Cases = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. Per-cent = row per-cent. Xý for opinion against authority DF = 12. Pearson 
= 12.52341, significance = 0.40461, minimum expected frequency =6 632ý X` for opinion against job function DIF 
12, Pearson = 18.74475, significance = 0.09488, minimum expected frequency = 7,856) 
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Here. the overall opinion is neutral, skewing slightly toward agreement. While there is 
no statistical support for any systematic difference between authorities or. job I'wictimi, 
variations between job functions seem stronger than between authorities in this case. 
At Wycombe, where performance appraisal was the basis of quality nianagcnicnt, 
opinion is more strongly 'in agreement' than elsewhere. At Brew aiid Neivettsile, 
however, opinion follows the general pattern of 'mild agreement' - though at Brent, 
nearly as many people 'strongly disagree' (score 5) that appraisal makes employees 
more valued as feel 'neutral' (score 3). At Arun opinion is skewed toward 
disagreement - the most frequent response being 'mild disagreement' (score 
4) with 
the statement. In terms of Job functions people in regulatory funct, ons and cl,,,, t 
services tend to be -in agreement' whereas those in social/well'are functions tend to be 
, in disagreement'. 
Table 10: 12 shows the response to the second statement - advocating a unitarist 
approach to quality. 
Table 10: 12: Quality Management and Workplace ldeology_fiý 
Question 3: 6 (v) , 
011(ilitl, i, v ell, issite th, it both 4 Md -sit I// Coll cOHIC 
together oil' - 
agree disagree 
Scale Missing 1 2 3 4 5 
All 8 114 (39%) 80 (27%) 57 (20%) 19(7%) 14(5%) 
Brent 
Wycombe 
Newcastle 
3 
0 
2 
61 (44%) 
17(41%) 
11(25%) 
32(23%) 
12(30%) 
15(34%) 
25(18%) 
9(22%) 
10(23%) 
11 (8%) 
2(5%) 
4(9%) 
6(8%) 
2(5%) 
2(5%) 
Arun 3 25(37%) 21(31%) 13(19%) 2(3%) 4(6%) 
Regulatory 1 23(43%) 17(32%) 7(13%) 5(9%) 0(0%) 
SOcial[Welfare 3 45(38%) 32(27%) 23(19%) 7(6%) 8(7%) 
Admin/Support 3 26(44%) 13(22%) 10(17%) 3(5%) 4(7%) 
Client Services 1 4(7%) 1(2%) 
(job not declared) 0 2 2 2 0 1 
(Total Cases = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. Fer-cent = row per-cent X. - Tor opinion against aumority L-)r- ý iz, r-earson 
= 8.33606, significance = 0.75835, cells with expected frequency <5 = 30%. /, -' for opinion against job function DIF 
12, Pearson = 12.29652, significance = 0.42217, cells with expected frequency <5 = 30%) 
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Here. opinion is skewed significantly towards agreement. This suggests that quality is 
an issue which has harnessed worker support, at least in principle, and that therc is not 
a great deal of resistance to the legitimacy of (not necessarily unilateral) management 
decision-making for the organisation of improving service quality. While, again, not 
statistically significant, agreement is stronger at Breni and Wjvonibe than at 
Newcastle and Arun; and agreement is stronger in regulatory functions and wcaker in 
client services. 
Responses to the third statement on this issue, relating more to the 'empowerment' 
theme in quality management, is shown in table 10: 11 
Table 10: 13: Quality Management and workplace Ideology (iiq 
Question 3: 6 (viii) , 
Qutifliv Mulnýqemenl offi, i-s, %, 01, 'moresm- ovei- flicit- own woi-k 
Ilicin iivs ihe cuve befin 
agree disagree 
Scale Missing 1 2 3 4 5 
All 9 33(11%) 54(18%) 7726%) 64(22%) 55(19%) 
Brent 1 23(17%) 24(17%) 28(20%) 26 (19%) 36(26%) 
Wycombe 0 7(17%) 9(21%) 9(21%) 12(29%) 5(12%) 
Newcastle 2 2(5%) 10(23%) 9(20%) 14(32%) 7(16%) 
Arun 6 1 (1%) 11(16%) 31(46%) 12(18%) 7(10%) 
Regulatory 0 10(19%) 11(21%) 15(28%) 13(22%) 8(14%) 
Social/Welfare 3 7(6%) 20(17%) 32(27%) 23(19%) 33(28%) 
Admin/Support 3 9(15%) 12(20%) 14(24%) 13(22%) 8(14%) 
Client Services 3 6(11%) 10(18%) 14(25%) 14(25%) 8(15%) 
(job not declared) 0 1 1 2 2 
i otai Uases = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. Per-cent = row per-cent. Xý tor opinion against authority DF = 12, Pearson 
37.78995, significance = 0.00017, cells with expected frequency <5 = 10%. y. ' for opinion against job function: DF 
12, Pearson =1 7.78645, significance = 0.12233, minimum expected frequency 6.029) 
Here, overall responses suggests a largely neutral Opinion Oil tills Isslic - though 
tending towards disagrecinent. This SLiggests that workers arc 110, seellIg (111alltN, 
managcnicnt as an 'empowering' cxercisc. I lowever, there are sonic statistically 
11CI. C (Y2 -ces of 1'recdoin giving a significant differences between autlion ties, , at 
12 dcgi 
Pearson value of'37.8, with a sigilificance ol'(). 00017 with only 101,1, 'o ()I'cclls \\itli a 
111111111IL1111 expected fi-cqucncy ofIcss than 5). Opinioil jit (\\, Ilcl-c - ell, 1)()\vci*tiiei it 
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of managers was a key theme) seems polarised, having a higher than average 
frequency of responses in the 'strongly agree' and 'strongly disagree' category. At 
Wycombe opinion is more evenly spread. Opinion at Newcasile, on the other hand. is 
skewed towards disagreement, while opinion at Arun is - significantly - neutral. 
Distinctions between job functions are also apparent - though not statistically 
significant. Both administrative/support functions and client service functions tend to 
follow the average. However, there is sorne difference betweeri regulatory functions 
(agreement) and social/welfare functions (disagreement). 
In combining and compressing the scores for these three related Issues, a score for tile 
effect of quality management on workplace ideology can be constructed. I lere. a score 
of 1-3 indicates that the ideological content of quality management ('customers', 
appraisal, 'empowerment' etc) is accepted; a score of 2-7 indicates a neutral eff'ect, - 
and a score of 7-10 indicates hostility. The results are shown in figure 10: 12 and 
10: 13. below. 
Figure 10: 12: Legitimacy of the Content of Quality Management (per 
cent of Authori! y) 
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(n = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. x2 ý DF = 6, Pearson = 9.37692, significance =0.15346, cells with expected freq <5 = 
25%) 
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Overall, then, quality management has had a neutral effect on workers attItudes to the 
ideological content of quality management: 73% of respondents are categorised as 
perceiving a neutral effect, compared to 16% showing ail acceptancc of' the agenda 
and 6% showing hostility. The neutral perception is strongest in Netivasile (8 1 %) and 
the strongest 'acceptance' is at Wycomhe, at 26% - witli no responses In the 'liost, lty' 
category. Differences in opinions between authorities are, however, not statistically 
significant. 
Responses to this issue, by job function. are shown in figure 10: 13. 
Figure 10: 13: Legitimacy of the Content of Quality Management (per- 
cent of Job Function) 
Boo 
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(n = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. X2 : DIF = 6, Pearson = 4.88009, significance =0.55928, cells with expected freq <5 
25%%) 
I lerc, no clear distinctions are evident. tloL, gll those in regulatory and client service 
Functions have an apparent higher level of' accepting the legitimacy of' (lie quality 
management agenda in dicir work thall is the Case III tllc Other arcas. statisticaliv, 
however, the distinction is even weaker than betwcell author, ties. 
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1 
Quality Management and the Effect on Unison 
The effect that quality management may have on trade union representation is the 
third major issue to be addressed on the questionnaire. Issues discussed in chapter 4 
suggest that trade union activity may be affected by the introduction of quality 
management through the implicit (and often explicit) unitarist assumptions that 
underpin it. In addition, the introduction of quality management, on the back of 
broader managerialist changes within local government, have led to a decentralisation 
of collective bargaining arrangements away from the focal point of traditional trade 
union bargaining set-ups in local government. Quality management, &refore, has a 
potential to undermine trade union activity in the workplace through shifting the lines 
of communication between management and unions; and between management and 
workers. 
a) Quality management and trade union representation 
Workers were asked directly whether quality management affected their view of the 
trade union's role in representing their interests. The results are shown in figures 
10: 14 and 10: 15 below. 
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k, l - 4ve. r-Aumutis unawares. x- : ur- = 5, t-earson = jtO. ODZ)tO, bjYjjIIRd[IkV -U. VVV IU, IIIIIIJIJIUIII CAPUýLCU IIM4UC[RY 
= 7.358) 
'File overall response to tills qUestion is, perhaps IllISLlrpriSlllLjN', that Lilialltv 
management had not affected workers' perceptions oftlic unions rOle ('110' response.,,, 
being 73.6% of the total) although, a significant 17% responded 'yes' to tills question. 
There are statistically significant diff'crences between ILI(110i-ltlCS (Y, 2, at 3 degrees of 
freedom, gives a Pearson value of' 19.8559 with a signi I 'C"lice Of 0-000 18). The Illost 
resounding 'no' responses are from Neij, c. (, siIe (82%) - where the union \\as having 
sonic involvernent in the process - and Arim (87'ý'O- In contrast, the highest level of' 
I yes' responses are from Brent at the relatively high level (426'ýo. 
Figure 10: 14 Overall Impact of Quality Management on Trade Union 
Rpnrpqpntatinn lnpr-rpnt nf AjOhnriful 
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Figure 10: 15: Overall Impact of Quality Management on Trade Union 
Representation (per-cent of Job Function) 
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(n = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. X, 2 : DF = 3. Pearson = 2.27073, significance =0.51815, minimum expected frequency 
9.046) 
In terms of. job function, responses seem to be most divided between people working 
in social/welfare Jobs (69.5% 'no-, 21.2% 'yes') and those working in client services 
(80% 'no'; 14.5% 'yes). In this case, however, no statistical significance emerges. 
Ofthose that responded 'yes' to this question, it wits further asked \vIiat changes were 
perceived to have occurred to the union's position as a result 01' the Introduction of 
quality rnanagement2 . 
The results are shown in table 10: 14, bclokv. 
"Has QM affected your view of the union's role in representing your interests? " 
.......... 
2 There is a slight mismatch between those responding 'yes' to the previous question and those responding to this 
open question 
SocialANelfare 
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Table 10: 14: Reasons for Change in Perception of Union's Position 
Response No 
Union is weaker 10 
Union should do more for workers 5 
More bullying by managers 3 
More redundancies 3 
Union is too negative 3 
Union hasn't adapted to management changes of style 3 
More work; less staff/less time 2 
QM more effective than union 2 
Union not responsive enough 2 
Union been ineffectual 2 
Increased union/management dialogue 2 
Union should support QM more 2 
Management more authoritarian 2 
Union providing good advice 2 
Customers too powerful 1 
No consultation about work increases 1 
Unclear of what Union's position is on QM 1 
Union cannot assess unfair working practices 1 
More work for no increase in pay 1 
QM undermining union/collective bargaining 1 
Union not consulted over changes 1 
Different workplace, different rules 1 
Need more QM I 
Union more distant 1 
Total 53(18%) 
(n = 292. Excludes 'unawares') 
While there is a range of responses to the above issue, only three responses could be 
said to suggest that quality management has been beneficial to the union's position 
(two for 'increased union/management dialogue' and one for 'union providing good 
advice'). Other responses suggest, variously, that the union had been undermined, or 
that that the union had not been involved enough in the process of implementation - 
either through the union being 'too weak' in the first place, or through the union being 
too isolated from members' interests. 
b) Quality management and Unison's influence on specific issues 
Respondents were further asked to comment on how quality management had affected 
the role of union representatives on six specific issues: working practices, grading 
arrangements, health and safety, holiday entitlement, absenteeism and sickness. The 
responses are shown in figure 10: 16, below. 
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Figure 10: 16: The Effect of Quality Management on the Steward's 
Influence (Six Workplace Issues) 
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(n = 292. Excludes 'unawares') 
While the number of non-responses is high, here, the actual number of' responses 
Suggests that trade union influence has been reduced in these areas - in ternis of 
members' perception. On the average of all the issues combined, only abOLIt hall' 
perceive no change in the union's illflUence, whereas nearly three tinies as many 
people perceive a reduction in union inl1LICI1CC aS pCrCCivC an In Its IIIIILICIICC. 
There is sorne variation according to ISSLIC, 110\%C\'C, '. I l(IlidaY ClItItIC11"Icn, appears to 
be the trade Union ISSUe least afflected by the IntrOCILIC11011 01' L111,111ty 111,111agOnent, 
whereas working practices and grading arrangements appear to lie the issues 01, the 
most negative change In i1`1111-lenCe, and licalth and saletv seems to be the Issue that 
saw the most positive change in 111111.1clice - although even here, opinion is almost 
exactly divided between those perceiving Increased influence and those perceiving a 
redUced 11111LICIlCe. FIgUrCS 10: 17 - 10: 28 show liow opinions on unimi Influence on 
these Issues Is broken down by authority and joh tý'J)c- 
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Figure 10: 17: Change in Union Influence on Working Practices (per-cent 
of Authorities) 
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(n = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. X2: DF 6, Pearson = 36.66202, significance =0.00000, cells with expected 
frequency <5 = 25%) 
The negative impact of quality management on the union's influence oil working 
practices is most clearly felt at Brent, being tile most frequent response at 46.41YO. In 
comparison, the most frequent response in the other three authorities Is 'no change'. 
With 25% of cells with an expected frequency below 5 being 25% Ilor the chi-square 
test, however, no statistical significance emerges between authorities oil this issue. 
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The differences between job Functions on this issue is not as evident as between 
authorities. While people working in regulatory functions seem more prone to 
perceiving a reduction in union influence (34% Aess'; 5.7% 'morc') than in those 
working in client service type jobs (20% 'less'. 12.7% 'more') there is no statistical 
significance in these apparent differences. 
Figure 10: 18: Change in Union Influence on Working Practices (per-cent 
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Figure 10: 19: Change in Union Influence on Grading Arrangements (per 
-- -& -Z 
A .., Ll- - -: A: --% 
Again, negative opinion in Brent seems significantly higher than in other authorities 
(42% - again the most frequent response). In contrast only 4.5% of' respondents at 
Newcasile are so pessimistic. Again, however, the low overall response rate has made 
it impossible to attribute statistical significance to these differcrices: while a Pearson 
value of 38.9 with a significance at virtually zero has been obtained froni chi-square 
test, 25% of cells had an expected frequency ofless than 5. 
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There is less distinction between Job types, again, here - although. again, more of 
those working in regulatory functions see a declining influence (30.5% 'less', - 2.5% 
more') than those in client services (14.5% Iess', 10.9% 'niore'). Again, there is no 
statistical significance in these differences. 
Figure 10: 20: Change in Union Influence on Grading Arrangements (per 
cent of Job Function) 
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Oil this issue, statistical significance can be drawn from tile results (x2, with 6 degrees 
of freedom, gives a Pearson value of 38.4. with a significance ol* virtually zero). 
Opinion is clearly divided between respondents from Bi-em and tile other aUtI101-ItieS. 
Without the influence of respondents from BI-enj - who are, again, tile most negative 
in their assessment about the union's position at 26.1% - opinion in the ()the, - 
authorities suggests that health and sallety is all issue that unions had increased then, 
influence within the workplace as a result ol'quality management. At 11), combe. tills 
I positive' effect is the view of 21.4% of respondents (compared to 4.811/o 'llegative')-, 
at Newcasile 'positive' views are at 18.2% (compared to 2.5', '110 'negative')-, and at 
Arzin 'positive' views are at 22.1 % (compared to 2.9%). 
Figure 10: 21: Change in Union Influence on Health & Safety (per-cent of 
Authorities) 
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Differences of opinion on the health and safety issue are also statistically marked 
between job functions as well (X2, with 6 degrees offreedorn. gives it Pearson value of 
13.17, with a significance ol'O. 04). I lere, however, opinion secnis to polarise between 
social/welfare workers and administrative/support workers on the one hand (who are 
more prone to perceive a declining influence), and workers in regulatory Functions 
and client service workers on the other (who are more prone to perceiving all 
increased influence). In the case of client services 25.5% see the union's influence as 
increasing, comparcd to only 7% who see a decline. 
Figure 10: 22: Change in Union Influence on Health & Safety (per-cent of 
Job Function) 
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Trequency <ý ý41. t%) 
On this issue, opinions are not as divided as flor the other issues discussed, although 
the same general pattern emerges. Brew, again. has the highest level of' respondents 
perceiving a negative effect on the union although joined here, to a lesser extent, hy 
respondents from Wj, conibe. This compared, to respondents at Newcasile and Arun 
who are distinctly neutral about the issue. The sample size, again however. means that 
no statistical significance can be drawn 1rorn these differciiccs- 
Figure 10: 23: Change in Union Influence on Holiday Entitlement (per 
^^m* ^f Ammfk^r; +; ýý% 
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Figure 10: 24: Change in Union Influence on Holiday Entitlement (per 
r-z%n+ e%f lt%t% rl ine-+it%nl 
There is no apparent difference in opinions between job Functions oil tile issue of tile 
Linion's inflUence on holiday entitlement. 
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No statistical significance can be made again, here, due to a minimum expected 
frequency of less than 5 occurring in 25% of cells ill tile chi-square test. Apparent 
differences exist between respondents from ffi-ent. who are more liable to I`cel that tile 
union's role is being eroded by quality management on (lie issue of' absenteeism 
(32.6%). This compares to respondents in [vIvombe and Ai-im, who - marginally - feel 
that tile union's influence had increased. 
Figure 10: 25: Change in Union Influence on Absenteeism (per-cent of 
Authorities) 
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frequency <5 = 33%) 
The difference between Job functions on this issue is not great, again, and no 
statistical significance is attributable. ]'here is some similarity between responses 
from regulatory functions and social/well'are functions (who seem more prone to see a 
declining influence); and administrative support and client service functions (Who 
seem less prone to see a declining influence). 
Figure 10: 26: Change in Union Influence on Absenteeism (per-cent of 
Anh pling-tinnI 
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Again, on the issue of sickness, the overall distribution ofopinion towards feeling that 
the union is adversely affected by quality nianagenicrit is skewed by opinion at Bi-em 
(35.5%: 'negative effect'). The prevailing attitude, outside Bi-ent, is that quality 
management has had little effect, here. In the case of 11), combe. opinion tends more 
towards the feeling that tile union has gained influence (9.5% 'morc' comparcd to 
4.8% 'less'). Overall statistical Significance oil this Issue IS, again, I-CStI-ICtCd hN, tile 
sample size. 
Figure 10: 27: Change in Union Influence on Sickness (per-cent of 
Am 
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Figure 10: 28: Change in Union Influence on Sickness (per-cent of Job 
Function) 
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(n = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. )(2 DIF 6, Pearson 8.71466, significance =0.46402, cells with minimum expected 
frequency <5 = 43.8%) 
Di fferences between job functions on sickness are statistical ly 1 nsigin t [cant and even 
apparent differences are small. Again, however, regUlatOry and social/well'are 
ftinctions seern slightly more prone to seeing a declining Hilluencc ofthe 11111on than 
in administrative/support functions and client service Functions. 
C) Quality management and the union representative 
Another m4jor issue, fior trade unions, In tile setti"9 UP 01' LiUality Illailageillclit 
schemes, is tile possible effect that shifting decision-making channels may have oil tile 
legitimacy oftrade union representation at the workplace level (see chapter 4). As III 
indicator ot'llow the union was affected by the introduction ot'Lluality management as 
a legitimate representative ol'worker interests, tm) likert-scale stitenients \\ere posc& 
,I Vilh onalilY 'Wallagemoll, Mi I/ IeI, * V *. s W/h/ 10 fillk 
dirct-11.1, to stil// 1/1,1 b. 1pas's dit 
union' 
'Onalili, Afantýiýemcnl has enhanct'd dit, rOlt, Of /he union I -epresel I/a/ i ve ill the 
workplace' 
The first ol'these statements rel'ers to the axis oi'coniniunication I)ctNvccii workcrs and 
the union, between management and the union, and I)Ct\VCCII management and 
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workers - and to whether quality management has shifted that balance by increasing 
the channels of communication, in a unitarist fashion, between rnallageniclit and 
workers. Responses are shown in table 10: 15, below. 
Table 10: 15: Quality Management and Trade Union Representation (i) 
I Question 3: 6 (vi) 
I Scale 
'With Quality Management, managers lend to falk dirccily losiqlf 
and hYpelss //I(' unioll, 
I 
Missing 1112 345 
Brent 2 64(46%) 29(21%) 32 (23%) 16 (4%) 5(4%) 
Wycombe 1 18(44%) 15(37%) 7(17%) 1 (2%) 0(0%) 
Newcastle 3 9(20%) 9(20%) 17(39%) 4(9%) 2(5%) 
Arun 7 14(21%) 16(24%) 26(38%) 5(7%) 0(0%) 
Regulatory 0 16(30%) 21(40%) 10(19%) 4(8%) 2(4%) 
Social/Welfare 5 48(41%) 21(18%) 36(31%) 5(4%) 3(3%) 
Admin/Support 4 22(37%) 1 (221 15(25%) 4(7%) 1(2%) 
Client Services 4 18(33%) 13 (24* 17(31%) 2(4%) 1(2%) 
(job not declared) 0410 
Total Cases = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. Per-cent row per-cent. X2 for opinion against authorityý DF = 12, Pearson 
= 29.54479, significance = 0.00327, cells with expected frequency <5 = 35%, X. " for opinion against job function DF 
12, Pearson =1 3.42104, significance = 0.33919, cells with expected frequency <5 = 35%) 
On this iSSLie overall worker perceptions indicate that inanagelliclit/worker 
communications have been enhanced at the expense ol'union/worker communicatlolls. 
Differences between aLlthorities, however, Ippeal'S LlLlltC marked, though statistically 
not significant, again, clue to the sample size. Workers at 1h, combe - where 
perl'ormance appraisal had been the most systernatised - has the strongest levels of 
agreement. This is followed by workers at Brem - where management 'devolution, 
had been the most developed. In contrast, workers at Nciivast/c - where union 
involvernent oil the quality agenda had been relatively high - are the least strong in 
agreement. Finally, workers at Arim - \\-here concerns over quality management 
seemed tied to workers concerns over CCT, \\, here the union was Involved - are also 
less strong in their agreement. No statistical dit1crences exist hetweenjoh function oil 
this iSSLie. 
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The second likert-scale statement directly addresses the issue of' the steward's role 
following the implementation of quality management. In this case the statement was 
worded so as to suggest that the steward's role may be enhanced. Responses are 
shown in table 10: 16 below. 
Table 10: 16: Quality Management and Trade Union Representation (ii 
Question 3: 6 (ix) , 
()ualiýv A1IanQgCIIIeI7I heis enhwiced 1hc i-oh, of the union 
representoo . ve I. 11 /he 11,01-Aphice, 
agree disagree 
Scale Missing 1 2 3 4 5 
All 17 6(2%) 9(3%) 91(31%) 56(19%) 113(39%) 
Brent 5 4(3%) 2(1%) 34(25%) 22(16%) 71 (51%) 
Wycombe 1 1(2%) 3(7%) 15(35%) 9(21%) 13(31%) 
Newcastle 4 1(2%) 0(0%) 16(36%) 10(23%) 13(30%) 
Arun 7 0(0%) 4(6%) 26(38%) 15(22%) 16(24%) 
Regulatory 0 2(4%) 3(6%) 17(32%) 17(32%) 14(26%) 
Social/Welfare 7 3(3%) 1 (1 %) 37(31%) 18(15%) 52(44%) 
Admin/Support 5 0(0%) 3(5%) 20(34%) 9(15%) 22(37%) 
- 
Client Services 4 1(2%) 2(4%) 15(27%) 1 12(22%) T iI 1(318i'ý6)1 
(job not declared) 1 0 0 0 
F 
(Total Cases = 292. Excludes 'unawares'. Per-cent ý row per-cent. X. 1 for opinion against authority DF = 12, Pearson 
= 24.82766, significance = 0.01566, cells with expected frequency <5 = 40%. X2 for opinion against job function: DF 
12, Pearson =1 3.40477, significance = 0.34032, cells with expected frequency <5 = 40%) 
On this issue, opinion is in overall disagrecinent - though a rcasonably high 
proportion of opinion is 'neutral' (mode averages are shadcd I`Or authority and Job 
I'Miction sub-groups). A negligible aniOUIlt Of PCOPle CoIISI(ICI' tlWt CIL1,111ty 
management is likely to empower stewards. As has been the pattern elsewhere, 
respondents 1rom Bt-ent display the most pessimistic view of' the steward's position. 
Elsewhere opinion is I'airly unil'orm bCIIA'CCII MlthOl'ItICS 111d 
hCtWCCII j0h I'MICtIO11S. 
Statistically, however, no significant differences emerge. 
Responses to these two related statements call lie Combined to provide a general 
indicator of worker's feeling about the steward's relative position In the workplace. as 
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a result of the introduction of quality management' (score 1-3 indicating a 
marginalisation of the steward, score 4-6 indicating a neutral eflect, and score 7-10 
indicating an entrenchment of the steward). The results are shown in I IgUres 10: 29 and 
10: 30, below. 
Figure 10: 29: The Effect of Quality Management on the Position of the 
Steward (per-cent of Authority) 
As expected, overall responses indicate that quality unallagen en t had undermined tile 
position of the union representative at tile workplace (53.41VO inallse 38%, 
Linaffected'; 2.1% 'entrenched'). While opinion Suggesting that quality management 
had entrenched the steward is negligible in all cases, howcvCr. there is Some apparent 
-though not statistically significant - dit'llerences between authorities oil \\, hether 
quality management has marginalised, or not afflccted, tile steward. At Brew and 
Wycombe the most frequent response is that quality management had 111,11-ginallsed tile 
union (Brew: 66.7% 'niarginaliscd, 26.1% 'Ullaffccted'. 11 ývcolnhc: 5 7.1 (/' (') 
Iniarginalised'; 35.7% 'unaftlected'). At Newcasde and . -Irun, on tile Othel- 11MILI, tile 
most I requent opinion is that the role of the steward had been unaffected (Anin: 
Responses of the second statement were recoded to reverse the score to match the logic of the coding in the first 
statement 
33.3%) 
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55.9% 'unaffected'; 32.4% 'marginalised'. Newcusile: 50% 'unaffected', 40.9% 
I marginalised'). 
Figure 10: 30: The Effect of Quality Management on the Position of the 
Steward (per-cent of Job Function) 
There is less distinction between job functions, on this issue. While the gap between 
. neutral' and 'marginalised' opinions is smallcr I'Or i(iiiiiiiisti-, itix, e/stilil)oi-t workers 
and client service workers than for regulatory and social/wch'are workers, this is 
compensated for by the formers' lack ofany opinion Im 'entmichnient'. Dirfel-ellces 
here are, again, statistically insignificant. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented the findings oCa suiwey cmiducted to find out the opilljolls, 
of trade union members III four authorities. III particular the views were sought ou the 
impact that quality management had oii work-rates and productivity, on workplace 
ideology and management legitimacy; and ou the niarguialisation of' trade union 
activity. 
33.3%) 
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a) General findings 
Overall, responses indicate that workers have a high level of awareness of quality 
management, feel that it has had a 'nominal' impact on their work, but they are 
broadly in favour of the particular policy being pursued - with some important 
reservations. However, while workers are broadly neutral to the managerialist 
ideological content of quality management, workers feel that the quality management 
has led to an intensification of work, and that it was undermining the legitimacy of the 
trade union at the workplace level. Within this overall picture, however, there is 
considerable variance in opinion between authorities, and some smaller differences in 
opinion according to respondents' job function in relation to the 'customer 
relationship'. 
b) Brent 
Brent had the most far reaching and holistic quality policy of all the authorities 
studied. It also had the most polarised opinions of it. The level of awareness of the 
quality management policy is high at Brent - the highest of all the authorities 
surveyed. On average, Brent workers are in favour of the quality policy being 
pursued, at a level equal to the average for all the authorities combined. On the issue 
of quality management and work intensification, Brent workers perceive a higher 
level of work intensification than the average for all the authorities. Quality 
management does not seem to have a great deal of effect on workplace ideology, 
although there does seem to be slightly more polarisation than is the case in the other 
authorities. While quality management is thought not to have had an effect on the 
union as a whole, a higher level than average thought that it has had some effect. On a 
range of specific union issues, however, the union at Brent is perceived to have been 
negatively affected by quality management - more so than in any other authority. 
Workers at Brent also perceived that quality management has had a negative effect on 
the position of the union representative at work, to a stronger degree than in any other 
authority. 
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C) Wycombe 
Awareness of the quality management policy is, again, high at Wycombe, though no 
higher than the average level of awareness for all the authorities combined. The 
quality management policy at Wycombe, however, is the one which has had the 
highest effect on work as a whole. The overall approval rating of the quality policy at 
Wycombe is divided - showing the lowest level of popularity in any of the authorities. 
Work intensification, as a result of quality management, is perceived as being high at 
Wycombe. On the issue of workplace ideology, quality management does not seem to 
have a strong effect on attitudes, although more people's attitudes seem to be effected 
at Wycombe than in the other authorities. Quality management is, like Brent, not 
thought to have affected the overall position of the union. On a range of specific union 
issues, workers also perceive little change as a result of quality management - 
although the balance of opinion, in some cases, indicates an increase in union 
influence, here. 
d) Newcastle (CLS) 
At Newcastle, the level of awareness of the quality management policy is 
comparatively low, as is the perceived affects of the policy. Perception of work 
intensification, as a result of quality management is, again, high - though lower than 
the perception of work intensification over the four authorities as a whole. On 
workplace ideology, workers at Newcastle seem unaffected by quality management. 
On quality management's effect on the union in general, the overwhelming perception 
is that there has been no effect. On the range of specific union issues raised, the 
overall perception is, again, that the union had not been greatly affected. 
e) Arun 
At Arun there is a high general awareness of the quality management policy, although 
the general affect on work as a whole is comparatively low. The approval rating of 
quality management is high - having the highest levels of approval among the four 
authorities. Work intensification is perceived as lower at Arun, then in the other three 
authorities - with a higher level of respondents perceiving no change - although there 
are still more who perceive an intensification of work than perceive a relaxation of 
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work. As in the other authorities, quality management do not have a great influence on 
the issue of workplace ideology. The effect of quality management on the union as a 
whole is the lowest of all the authorities at Arun, and on a number of specific union 
issues, the overall perception is that little had been affected. 
0 Differences in perceptions by job functions 
There are some differences in opinions when dividing respondents according to job- 
function rather than by authority - although the differences are smaller, on most 
issues, than the differences that exist between authorities. 
In terms of the awareness of the corporate quality management policy there is no great 
distinction overall, although those working in regulatory functions seem to be the 
most aware. People working in regulatory functions also seem to feel the effects of 
quality management slightly more than people in other job functions. These people 
also give the highest approval rating for quality management, with those working in 
social/welfare functions giving the lowest - although the balance of opinion is still in 
approval, even here. While all job functions report increases in workloads as a result 
of quality management, people in regulatory functions are the most likely to perceive 
an increase in workloads and people in client-service work, the least. Despite this, 
there is no real differences between job functions from the consensus that quality 
management has intensified work. On the ideological impact of quality management 
at work, no real distinctions are apparent, again, although those in regulatory 
functions and client services have higher levels of accepting the quality management 
agenda than elsewhere. There are no real disiffictions between how people in different 
job functions perceive the effect of quality management on the union in general - 
although people in social/welfare functions perceive more of a change than others. On 
a range of specific union issues, however, there appear to be some differences. Those 
in regulatory and social/welfare functions seem more pessimistic about the effect on 
union influences than those in administrative/support functions and client services. 
CHAPTER II 
QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN FoUR AUTHORITIES: 
SUMMARY AND THEMES 
The previous three chapters described how quality management was implemented in 
four local authorities, the background to these policies and their outcomes - both 
intended and unintended - to the reorganisation of work and of union-management 
relations. This chapter will summarise these findings and draw together some of the 
common features present in all of the authorities, thereby identifying aspects which may 
be more generalisable in other local authority workplaces. In doing this, contingent 
factors common to all the authorities will be considered in order to identify common 
determining influences. These common influences include, (1) managerialism and the 
presence of a public service labour process and (2) managerialism and the presence of 
particular forms of employment relations practice in local government. More detailed 
discussion of the important aspect of how the labour process and employment relations 
relate to each other is the subject of detailed discussion in the concluding two chapters. 
Accounting for Differences 
The four authorities studied were chosen to reflect the differences that exist between 
local authorities. Differences, here, included geographical location, demography, 
authority status and the associated differences in the composition of the workforces in 
each case. Significant differences, however, were found primarily in management and 
trade union policy and the perceptions of workers. Because quality management was 
the focus of research, differences in management policy determined union policy and 
worker perceptions in each case. However, management policy on quality in each case 
was contingent upon management's perception, either explicitly or implicitly, of the 
likely union and worker response. Anticipated union response was based upon the 
latent strength of the union branch in each case and, in turn, union strength was itself 
based upon the assumed propensity of union members to take action of one sort or 
another. 
ManageriaIism and Local Government 
a) Differences in quality management policy 
298 
Nominally, all four authorities claimed to be operating a quality management system 
based upon the principles of total quality management (TQM). The differences in the 
actual quality management practices being implemented was, however, marked. In part 
these differences could be accounted for by the inherent difficulties in applying 
prescribed models to real scenarios and by the variations in managers' understanding of 
what constitutes 'pure' TQM. Such factors could not account for all the differences 
encountered, however. Brent's quality management policy was characterised by its 
integration into the political project of the Conservative administration (i. e. transferring 
political decision-making processes into managerial decision-making processes and 
curtailing the power of the union). Here, quality management was inseparable from the 
quasi-market structures of the reconstituted authority; by its unwitting participation in 
legitimising the policies that undermined the union through membership attrition; and 
through its role - given this background - in increasing the demands on effort from 
workers. In marked contrast, Newcastle's quality management policy was based around 
management's assumption that the union had to be appeased. In contrast to Brent, 
where quality management was used to reinforce the internal market, quality 
management was being promoted as a means to prevent the break-up of in-house 
service provision. Management faced a different situation at Wycombe and Arun - 
where union strength was low and had no history of confrontation. Here, quality 
management was introduced as part of a continuation of management policy, based 
upon the assumption of low levels of union opposition. 
Differences in union branch policy 
Union policy, in each case, was based upon the perception of branch strength, of the 
current state of management-union relations and of the union branch's understanding of 
what quality management entailed. At Brent and Newcastle, both branches had a 
history of activism and relative strength. At Brent, however, the branch had been 
affected by political and managerial challenges to its ability to defend its members' 
interests - particularly through redundancy and outsourcing, whereas at Newcastle the 
union's position was not under political challenge. Quality management, then, was 
(accurately) identified as being part of an implicitly anti-union strategy at Brent, while 
Managerialism and Local Government 299 
being identified as being a tool to prevent outsourcing at Newcastle. In Arun and 
Wycombe, the branches had had a low level of activism prior to the introduction of 
quality management and expectations were lower. In both cases, the branches did not 
have a formal policy towards quality management and accepted quality as being a 
legitimate managerial concern. Political changes at Wycombe, had enabled greater 
union consultation of managerial issues (including quality) In contrast, at Arun quality 
management seemed to have further isolated the union from dialogue with management 
as the primary focus of management-employee consultation. 
C) Differences in policy outcomes 
Quality management reduces 'quality' to indicators relevant to market relationships, yet 
the performance of public services is not readily converted to such criteria. For 
management to approximate such performance criteria, then, some discretion is 
possible and policy outcomes are liable to vary according to the choices made. In the 
four authorities studied, policy outcomes did not only vary as a result of the different 
agendas being pursued in each case, but also as a result of the unexpected outcomes of 
policy implementation. 
At Brent, devolving managerial decision-making led to the perception by some senior 
managers of a loss of coherence and consistency in the management of quality. 
Managerial quality policies are also liable to change as a result of overt or tacit 
resistance by workers. While there was little evidence of overt resistance leading to 
changes in quality management policy at the four authorities studied, there were 
indications that workers opposed aspects of quality management when it affected their 
work and, in some cases, that management modified its policy in order to deflect such 
opposition. At Wycombe, for example, opposition to performance related pay was 
resulting in an increased profile for the union. Conversely at Newcastle Management 
withdrew their initial intention to allow staff members to formalise their own work 
routines when progress was thought to be too slow. 
Such unexpected outcomes were the result of the contingent nature of managers' 
understanding of quality management and of the necessary adaptation required to 
implement prescribed quality management models to 'real world' public service 
workplaces. This was liable to vary by the policy agenda (i. e. by authority) and by the 
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nature of the service affected, particularly in relation to the existence - or lack of 
existence - of 'real customers'. This is discussed further, below. 
d) Differences between occupations and job functions 
Finally, differences in perceptions and behaviour could also be attributed to differences 
in the nature of work between different groups of workers. In chapter 10 these 
differences were crudely defined by their relationship to metaphorical customers: being 
either involved in regulatory work, welfare service provision, in administrative work or 
in direct contact with service users. While significant differences emerge in terms of the 
nature of work involved here, though, very little differences emerged between these 
different groups in relation to how they perceived the effect of quality management on 
their work and on their union. Differences in perceptions, on these two issues, were 
consistently more significant between authorities than between job functions. 
Common Factors: Managerialism in Four Local Authorities 
Notwithstanding the number of distinctions that existed between the four authorities, 
the research conducted for this thesis has highlighted a number of common themes. 
More detailed discussion of the outcomes of quality management on the labour process 
and on trade unions is made in the concluding chapters. Here, though, some of the 
common determining factors for these outcomes will be highlighted. Common 
underlying factors affecting the outcomes of quality management in the four authorities 
were discussed in chapters 2-5, in terms of their significance. Subsequent research, 
however, has proven these factors to be of significance in all authorities. The common 
factors that have underlined the implementation of quality management in all four 
authorities were all due to the pervasive influence of managerialism. That is, the 
pervasive tendency to transfer all decision-making processes into the domain of 
managers - who, because of their party political neutrality, are assumed to be neutral 
within the context of organisational political processes. This managerialist trend, 
described in chapter 2, was effected in all the authorities studied by common structural 
and ideological determinants. Structurally, managerialism was effected by the legacy of 
compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) while ideologically it was effected by the 
attempt to invoke some kind of 'customer-supplier' relationship into the public service 
workplace. 
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a) Managerialism and the legacy of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) 
The legacy of CCT proved to be a consistent factor in shaping the outcome of quality 
management policy in the local authorities studied. It did this structurally and 
coercively. 
First, prior experience of CCT, in all cases, had ensured that certain structural changes 
had taken place within the organisations. As a mandatory prerequisite for the tendering 
process, local authority organisations were required to separate policy and contract 
specification roles from the operational aspects of service provision (the client- 
contractor split'). The effect of this was to make managerial definitions of quality (as 
opposed to political or professional definitions) more appropriate to the contract-based 
structures of public services. Consequently, while making some overtures to the 
compatibility of bespoke quality management packages to public service environments, 
the ultimate appeal of quality management was in its commercial kudos. It is this that 
made it appealing for authority leaders, branch trade union leaders and individual 
managers who were keen to ensure in-house provision. 
CCT's role in legitimising quality management was also achieved coercively. A 
common feature in all authorities was managers' consistent use of CCT as an external 
threat by which to impose various forms of self-discipline on workers, in accordance 
with the new demands required by quality management. Whether or not managers 
approved of outsourcing public service - and most did not - managers reported that the 
tendering process had allowed them to make changes to workplace organisation that 
would otherwise have proven problematic. 
Through its effect on organisational structure and through its creation of an external 
threat, then, CCT legitimised the importation of commercial quality management 
practices into the public service arena. It remains to be seen whether this relationship 
may reciprocate: that quality management may entrench the structural changes imposed 
as part of CCT - though the logic, here, suggests that this would be the case. Such a 
situation may have a parallel at Brent, where the structural disaggregation of the 
organisation enabled a contract-based approach to quality; but where this contact 
culture, once instigated, then entrenched the disaggregated structure of the Council. 
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b) Managerialism and the ideoIogy of the customer 
In a number of ways, quality management formalised a change in the relationship 
between workers and service users. In some cases this relationship was tangible and 
structural - at Brent, customer-supplier relationships were imposed through contracts 
and internal markets - but in all cases the ideology of 'the customer' was imported as 
part of the quality management package. There were some distinctions - at Newcastle, 
managers were careful not to use the rhetoric of 'the customer' - but in all cases the 
quality management had the explicit function of promoting the greater inter- 
dependency of individual work routines through the implicit creation of customer- 
supplier chains. The success of this varied according to how insulated workers were (or 
could make themselves) from external 'customers'. Nevertheless, the intent to create 
such changes was explicit and, most importantly, workers were made aware of their 
relationship to external and/or internal 'customers'. 
The differences in the outcomes of these policies varied by the policy agenda being 
pursued and by the nature of the service affected. In the latter case, the quality 
management agenda was affected by how 'real' customers were in different public 
service encounters. Where customers were more metaphorical than real - such as in the 
case of regulatory functions such as environmental health, trading standards, weights 
and measures etc. - there was a need to modify either the 'pure' definition of quality 
relating to customers, or the need to modify the service encounter itself in order to 
make it applicable to the prescribed quality management format. In turn, this tended to 
be determined by an assessment of how quality management would be seen as being 
complementary to, or subversive of, professional autonomy and the 'public service 
ethos'. Where conflict of interest is still present, the decision as to whether the quality 
management forniat or the public service encounter is to be compromised was likely to 
be based upon the assumed power and influence of the specific groups of workers 
involved. These issues are further elaborated in figure 11: 1, below. 
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Figure 11: 1 Changing Quality Management or Changing Service 
Relationships 
Are'customers' real or 
metaphorical? 
Y N 
Use standard quality Modify quality management format or 
management format modify the service encounter? 
Contingent factors 
Strength and 
influence of union 
Strength and 
influence of 
occupational group 
poý 
... ...... . .... ...... 
Modify quality Modify the nature of 
management format the service encounter 
Of course, the above reflects the likely choices affecting management policy, rather 
than practice. In the case of management practice, outcomes are further affected by 
patterns of acceptance, deflection and resistance, regardless of the relationship to the 
metaphorical customer. In all cases, then, differences in the choices management make 
on the direction of quality management, are tied in with the nature of quality 
management's relationship to the labour process in public services - which is discussed 
in more detail in chapter 12. 
The 'Public Service Labour Process' in Four Local Authorities 
The existence of a public service labour process is, perhaps, problematic, given that the 
basic tenets of labour process analysis relate to the operation of markets. However, 
research conducted for this thesis has identified a number of consistent effects on the 
organisation of work in a transformed public service environment. The theoretical 
justification for including this in the wider debate about the labour process is made in 
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chapter 12. Here, however, empirical findings on the effects of quality management 
methods on the labour process will be summarised. 
Broadly, quality management had increased the workloads of workers in the authorities 
studied, though the extent of this increase varied in scope and scale according to 
authority (and hence the nature of the policy being pursued) and the service area. These 
effects will be discussed more fully in chapter 12. 
a) Quality management and organisational transformation 
One finding, consistent in all authorities, was that quality management was being used 
as the basis for some form of organisational transformation. At its base level, quality 
management is intended to transform workplace relationships (DuGay 1996), so it was 
no surprise to find some changes as a result of quality management. The 
transformations that took place were based upon structural changes - attempting to 
change workplace relationships through the regulation of working practices - and upon 
'ideological' changes - attempting to structurally change working relationships through 
imposing 'customer awareness' onto workers. In practice, both of these strategies were 
being attempted in support of each other, although the balance and the degree of 
success varied. At Brent, for example, 'attitudes' were deemed to be very important, 
but it was unclear whether attitudes towards customers were being changed 
independently of the structural changes that forced a greater awareness of contract 
relationships between services. At Newcastle, however, the formalisation of work 
activities through a quality manual was the means by which workplace relationships 
were intended to be transformed. 
b) Limits to the transformation of the labour process 
While quality management had a direct impact on the labour process, its effects were 
uneven. Because of the problems associated with applying market-based definitions Of 
quality to public goods, the effects on the labour process varied. The effects also varied 
according to the depth of management commitment to imposing such methods and 
according to how much workers' perceived these changes were compatible with their 
own 'public service' values. 
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Even where workers were deemed to be sympathetic to quality management in 
principle - as indicated by the overaH approval ratings in chapter 10 - workers were 
often hostile to certain aspects of quality management in practice. This was evident 
particularly where management attempted to regulate and standardise worker discretion 
- for example the reported hostility, in all cases, to standardising telephone answering 
procedures, reported in chapter 8. 
Quality Management and Trade Unions in Four Local Authorities 
While pre-existing relationships shaped the nature of quality policies being pursued, as 
noted at the outset of this chapter, the outcomes of these various agendas were shaped 
by the dynamics of conflict and consent in each case. Workers' expectations, based 
upon their prior experiences, determined patterns of conflict and consent. These 
differences were partly due to differences in the nature of work and the relationship to 
4real' customers (regulatory functions being relatively isolated; front-of-house reception 
staff being relatively exposed). Differences by work type were not great, however. 
Workers in social/welfare type work did not seem to be significantly more or less 
hostile to quality management than those in administrative work, despite the reputation 
of relative militancy associated with the former (Heery 1987; Miller 1986). Again, 
where significant differences emerged, it was between union branches: that is between 
union-management relations in each case - which affected union branch policy - and 
between union members' perceptions of quality management and its effect on their 
respective unions. 
a) Union-management relations 
In all cases, trade unions were recognised by management and management in all cases 
noted that the union was considered legitimate and that generally co-operative 
relationships existed between management and unions. However, some strong 
differences emerged beneath these claims. At Brent, for example, an unsuccessful 
attempt was made by the political leadership - probably against senior management 
advice - to derecognise Unison at the authority. Even before this, however, Unison 
branch officials commented that the union was being bypassed and business unit 
managers acknowledged that the restructuring of the authority, combined with the drive 
to achieve performance targets, was marginalising the union at the workplace level. At 
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Newcastle the union negotiated with management and management was keen to co-opt 
union support for its quality policy. As noted, however, management needed the 
external threat of CCT to legitimise quality management, and so quality management 
could not really be said to have been the product of equal distributive bargaining per se. 
The situation at Arun and at Wycombe were based upon weak bargaining positions on 
the part of the union an each case. At Wycombe the union was beginning to see 
increased management consultation after years of inaction and was becoming more 
involved in grievance issues relating to quality management. At Arun, however, the 
union was relatively inactive - to such an extent that management felt able to set up an 
alternative for management-staff communications. 
b) Union members' perceptions of quality management their union 
On face value, based upon the broad question posed in the questionnaire, union 
members' perception of quality management, in all authorities, was generally approving 
and did not see quality management as seriously affecting their union's ability in 
representing their interests at work. If this broad approval were accepted, however, 
what implications could there be for trade union strategy, given that union branches 
responded in different ways to different policies under different conditions? 
The 'face value' approval, then, should be treated with some caution. First, given the 
differences in quality policy, union-management relations and union branch policies, 
what did 'approval' amount to? Second, was 'approval' the approval of the principle of 
'quality' - with its associated honorific status - rather than quality management? Third, 
was 'approval' the approval of the principle of what workers understood to be quality 
management in its wider sense - rather than their own experience (as was intimated by 
one interviewee at Newcastle)? Upon closer examination, then, opinion was more 
complex. While the majority of opinion saw quality management as not affecting the 
union branch, more saw quality management as adversely affecting their union, than 
saw quality management as positively affecting their union. This balance was 
consistent in all authorities and in all occupation groups - although it was particularly 
strong at Brent. 
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Summary 
Quality management was a prominent policy in all four of the authorities studied. It was 
designed specifically to make some changes to the way in which work was conducted. 
In this sense it was wholly in line with the 'new public management' agenda for public 
service provision. In all essential characteristics, then, it was driven by a managerialist 
agenda which sees public professional autonomy as being inconsistent with efficient 
managerial decision-making; itself assumed to be the only efficient means of making 
decisions. In this scenario, public service trade unions are in an unusual position. 
Challenging the unions' legitimacy could prove costly for management - particularly 
where many management grades are, themselves, members. On the other hand, the 
logic of fully implemented quality management will tend to reinforce the managerial 
prerogative at the workplace level through the changes in the labour process, potentially 
distancing the union from their members at this level. Conversely, however, where the 
changes tend to affect the labour process at the workplace level, there remains the 
possibility of the workplace-based union representative to increase the profile and 
legitimacy of the union as a means of resistance to work intensification, work 
standardisation and 'management by stress'. 
The remaining two chapters of this thesis will explore these themes more closely, 
relating the empirical data presented in this section to the overall discussion about the 
public service labour process and employment relations in local government.. 
Section VI 
Conclusions 
CHAPTER 12 
QUALITY, MANAGERIALISM AND WORK IN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
In these concluding chapters, the effects of quality management on work and collective 
bargaining will be summarised and related to theoretical concerns about the labour 
process in public service scenarios, and to the issues facing local government trade 
unions. While the issues of collective bargaining and the labour process are clearly 
interlinked, the two issues will be summarised separately. This chapter will define the 
issues relating to how quality management affects work and the final chapter will 
define how these issues relate to trade unions and collective bargaining arrangements. 
Quality Management and Work in Local Government 
This thesis has been concerned with the effects that quality management practices have 
when introduced into the local government workplace environment. A number of inter- 
related research issues emerge as a result. First, the attempt to meet the apparently 
opposing objectives of (market oriented) efficiency and (public-service oriented) 
commitment in public service delivery creates a series of unique labour process 
characteristics. Quality in this scenario is intrinsically tied to the issue of productivity 
because enhancing the non-price 'value' of a public service often means increasing the 
quantity of service outputs; and, conversely, increasing the efficiency and effectiveness 
of a service simultaneously enhances the output 'value' of a service in relation to cost. 
The second issue to emerge is that while quality management methods are underpinned 
by specific managerial assumptions, they are not usefully defined as being part of a 
single unified project. Neither is quality management appropriately conceptualised as 
being within some Taylorian/Post-Fordist dichotomy; or within some Bravermanian/ 
Foucauldian continuum. Quality management operates on different levels of control - 
often simultaneously - and the rationale for what is trying to be controlled in each case, 
determines the effects on the labour process. Quality management methods aim 
variously to change work practices through work standardisation, the integration of 
processes or the cultivation of 'customer awareness'. In turn these objectives could 
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equally be termed, respectively, as deskilling, work intensification and 'management by 
stress'. 
The third issue is that while quality management attempts the degradation of work at 
these different levels, resistance is possible - and inevitable. The awareness of workers 
of their relative bargaining power within the workplace - which is variable over time - 
affects the limits of managerial authority at the three levels where quality management 
operates. Work-based knowledge and the tacit skills that workers possess are important 
factors here. First, quality management affects, say, professionals differently to semi- 
skilled workers. Second, The viability of the 'customer relationship' to a particular 
workplace scenario affects some workers more than others - so workers in a leisure 
centre are affected differently by quality management than workers in a regulatory 
service. Finally, the perception of employment security in any workplace is important - 
so workers in a 'discretionary' service with declining morale, such as a public library, 
are more likely to be affected than workers who are relatively unmotivated by career 
prospects. 
While the general intentions of quality management may be identifiable, the reality of 
the local authority workplace setting creates significant deviations from the prescribed 
management agenda. Most importantly this is because the actions and reactions of 
workers, as conscious participants, cannot be assumed to comply with a given 
managerial agenda. 
A Public Service Labour Process? 
An important outcome of this research has been in identifying key attributes of the 
labour process in public service work, despite the fact that the very notion of the 
existence of a 'Public service labour process' could be considered problematic in the 
first place. The labour process debate, from Braverman through to recent disputes about 
Foucaldian subjectivism, has primarily been concerned with the management of work 
in a commercial environment and, considering that the market imperative provides the 
driving mechanism for managerial regulation and re-regulation of work in labour 
process analysis, this is not surprising. However, despite the apparent legitimacy of 
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applying the logic of labour process analysis to work in the public sector (e. g. Walsh 
1995b) the nature of a 'state sector labour process' has not been directly addressed. 
In the initial debate, following Braverman (1974), the labour process is defined as being 
the application of technology to deskill workers in order to satisfy commercial ends. 
Here, the process of deskilling permanently transfers worker discretion into the hands 
of management, affecting the effort bargain through increasing management's ability to 
dictate the rate of work while simultaneously undermining workers' bargaining power 
in the labour market. Rather than being a particular managerial paradigm, then, 
Taylorism is identified as being the essence of all managerial logic within the process 
of capital accumulation. In the Foucauldian reconstitution of labour process theory, 
while any driving logic of capital accumulation is rejected per se, managerial attempts 
to harness worker subjectivity are still based upon coherent strategies (or narratives) 
based upon the interests of the organisation as perceived by managers. In all definitions, 
though, the labour process is initiated by management and is driven by the motive of 
profit; be this commercial success or commercial survival. 
If it is assumed that the organisation of public services in the 1990s was completely 
isolated from this imperative, then labour process analysis could be considered 
irrelevant. However, work in public services is not only affected by the broader 
mechanisms of the market, but the reconstitution of public services throughout the 
previous two decades has explicitly attempted to introduce market principles into public 
service work. 
Yet the fact that the nature of public services essentially remains public means that 
marketisation of public service labour ultimately cannot be achieved. So it is reasonable 
to assume that there is a labour process in public service employment, but that it will 
have some distinctions from the labour process in the private sector. That labour 
process analysis is of relevance in the public sector is not new. Braverman, in the latter 
stages of his work, is concerned with the effects of deskilling in administrative and 
clerical work -a theme that has been pursued by others (Crompton & Jones 1984). 
Indeed, the growth of the state in the twentieth century - and the subsequent growth of 
workers therein - is identified as being of prime importance to the increasing 
degradation of clerical work in the twentieth century. 
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While there is considerable variety in the constitution of 'work' in different public 
services, the coexistence of two counterposing imperatives create common 
underpinnings which differentiate work, here, from work in the private sector. First, 
'the market' cannot determine the quantity and quality of work required. Therefore, 
instead of the ultimate indicators of 'efficiency' being measured in relation to increased 
revenue, market share and/or profit, the production and distribution of 'public goods' 
remains inherently 'political' and discretionary. Second, and conversely, central 
government policy from the 1980s onwards has been geared to reining-in what was 
seen as over-employment in local government by transforming it into a pseudo-private 
sector. Driven by a mixture of new right populism and public choice theory, 
government policy aimed to impose the discipline of the market into a wide range of 
public services, while simultaneously cutting expenditure. Where privatisation was seen 
as inappropriate - as in public services - the emphasis shifted to introducing various 
forms of 'quasi-markets' (LeGrand 1990). 
While these changes were met with (anticipated) resistance from public service trade 
unions, the process was further complicated in local government by the obstruction of 
the local authorities themselves - the majority of which were controlled by political 
opponents. In some key authorities obstruction extended to some organised political 
resistance by the 'new urban left' (NUL) (Lansley et al 1989). To combat this, the 
vehicle for imposing markets in local authorities was driven by proxy through the 
imposition of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT). Here, workplaces were 
redefined as being 'purchasers' and 'providers' of services made transparent through 
specifications; providers then being required to 'compete' for contracts with external 
contractors under strict rules to prevent 'anti-competitive behaviour'. The vacuum 
created by the defeat of the NUL project by central goverment was the hegemonic 
domination of managerialism in public services; 'post-NUL' and 'New Labour' has 
variously accommodated and embraced this agenda. 
The combined effect of introducing quasi-markets with the ever-increasing financial 
constraints centrally imposed on local authorities has created unique - and lasting - 
effects on the organisation of work in local authorities. Work organisation is neither 
fully determined by political decision-making normally associated with public sector 
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management; nor, however, is it determined by any 'natural' consumer demand for 
public services. Instead, workers are expected to adapt their behaviour according to 
arbitrarily determined indicators of success, monitored and administered by local 
managers, despite there being no perceptible relation to the nature and amount of work 
imposed and the actual 'demand' by service users. While such mechanisms may 
provide some form of negative incentive for workers - i. e. the need to be seen not 
failing to meet minimum targets - the positive incentive associated with market 
definitions of success - financial reward - is not present. In this sense, the perceived 
failings of the performance related pay (PRP) system noted at Wycombe, were more to 
do with the inappropriateness of PRP per se, than of the particular manner in which it 
was implemented in this case. 
A labour process can - and does - exist in the operation of public services, then. 
Quality Management in Local Government 
An important outcome of the research conducted for this thesis has been the 
confirmation of the importance of organisational context to the study of employment 
relations. Critical to how quality management was received in the organisations studied 
here, was the set of contingent factors brought about by the developments in local 
government in the 1980s and 1990s. Such factors determined the expectations of those 
involved. The pre-eminent background issue here has been managerialism. 
a) Managerialism, quality and public service 
The presence of management has always been a feature of local government. The work 
and employment issues involved with management in local government are not new. 
Since the 1980s, however, the agenda for the organisation of Public services in local 
government has been shifted significantly by the advent of a new managerialism (Pollitt 
1990a; Walsh 1995a; Clarke & Newman 1997). Managerialism could be defined as the 
doctrine that resource allocation is most efficiently organised through commercial 
management practices. Despite rhetorical claims to the contrary in many of the 'new 
wave' managerial theories, managerial decision-making is a hierarchical process in all 
important aspects. The rhetorical difference in new wave theories is that managerial 
authority is claimed through such discourses as 'leadership' or 'entrepreneurship' rather 
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than through legal-rational terms. Managers are still, however, assumed to be neutral 
and to have no vested sectional interests. 
The origins of managerialism are found in New Right ideological and economic beliefs 
that informed Conservative central government thinking during the 1980s - coupled 
with purely partisan motives in a situation where Labour councils were controlling a 
large proportion of local government. At the core of the managerialist agenda has been 
the imposition of a more commercial approach to local government services - through 
legislation concerning local government financing and financial accountability and, via 
CCT of local government services, of a new contract culture within local government. 
Managerialism has increasingly become political consensus in the 1990s. For electoral 
and ideological reasons, official Labour Party policy has come to embrace the 
managerialist agenda. The re-evaluation of Labour Party strategy, away from the NUL 
agenda toward the language of partnership and consumer rights has meant a shift away 
from opposing CCT, to one of accommodation. Here, the emphasis is on 'best value' 
assessment of service provision and a strengthening of central government monitoring 
of local government service provision - increasingly in the area of quality. 
The managerialist agenda has directly affected employment relationships within local 
government. First, it has shifted the decision-making process away from political issues 
about resources toward managerial decision-making processes about economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness. This shift has changed the emphasis from 'what' services 
are offered - and in what quantity - to one of 'how' the predetermined services are run - 
service delivery; a shift in emphasis from 'products' to 'processes'. This shifts the focus 
directly onto the workforce because the priority has moved from the resourcing of local 
services to how well staff can meet the demands of the local tax-payer/consumer. 
The second, and equally important impact on employment, is that the imposition of 
quasi-market mechanisms in local government, as elsewhere, is chiefly about 
disciplining managers' and workers' expectations. This is not straightforward, however, 
because public services remain, in essence, divorced from any real market mechanisms 
and the imposition of quasi-markets is necessarily artificial. As was shown in chapter 4, 
the drive to make local government more efficient by making it 'more like the private 
sector' has most visibly been through shedding jobs. This does not motivate staff. An 
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additional problem for managers in this new environment is that - in contrast to 
commercial environments where improved organisational performance increases 
revenue, whereby some reward may be offered to workers - the linkage between output 
and revenue is not usually possible in public service provision. The 'traditional' 
motivation, here, has been through a- perhaps over-stated - 'public service ethos'. 
Tbough criticised by the New Right as being grounded in the preservation of restrictive 
practices; and by the NUL as an elitist preservation of status through bureau- 
professionalism, a 'public service ethos' remains a key motivation for working in a 
public service environment. Faced with such dilemmas, the quality management model 
would seem to offer local authority managers a useful means of a resolution to a central 
dilemma: the quality management agenda combines the issue of efficiency and 
effectiveness with that of service, making it attractive within local government in the 
1990S. 
Quality, as a concept, is inherently value-laden and, in the public sphere, this should 
make specific definitions an issue to be contested politically. The manner in which 
quality has been co-opted into the managerialist agenda, however, merely reflects the 
increasing marginalisation of political decision-making at the local state level (Pfeffer 
& Cote 1991; Kirkpatrick & Martinez-Lucio 1995b). Where the allocation of local 
services may previously have centred around choosing a balance between levels of 
local taxation and levels of local services; or between prioritising the levels of service 
in different areas, the managerialist political consensus now only values the attainment 
of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity of service delivery. Managers 
operating 'sound, customer-focused business practices' are assumed to be inherently 
neutral and untainted by the 'vested producer interests' that are associated with 
professionals; or by the short term agendas of elected politicians operating within a 
'political business cycle'. Elected political interests may officially set priorities but now 
local party policy is narrowly constrained by parameters set by central government and 
by the political consensus that exists to maintain this arrangement. 
In a public service environment, divorced from the usual indicators of success in a 
commercial environment (market share, profitability), quality management becomes 
intertwined within the broader issues of productivity, efficiency and effectiveness. Here 
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then, in a climate where pressure is permanently being placed upon local authority 
finances, where services have been subject to the commercial pressures of CCT - and 
now 'best value', quality management is inexorably tied up with the general managerial 
drive to reduce costs. This may be manifested as managing with fewer staff (where a 
high level of the 'costs' are to be found) or as increasing the output of existing staff. 
b) Quality management and the public service labour process 
Quality management, as a generic concept, is variously concerned with improving the 
efficiency, reliability, or effectiveness of organisational output - in relation to external 
customer demand. To do this, quality management explicitly aims to change, in some 
form, the way work is organised within an organisation. 'Quality management', 
however, can take a myriad of forms. Many critical examinations of the effects on the 
labour process of total quality management (TQM) and the like neglect this through 
taking prescriptive managerial texts and official corporate quality policy statements at 
their word. Here the tendency is to assume that such prescribed practices represent 
some unified rational project, able to co-opt potential worker resistance and turn it into 
compliance. 
There has been considerable critical examination of quality management methods over 
the 1990s. While this is welcome, there has been a tendency to treat methods such as 
TQM as representing some type of paradigm shift in the organisation of work. Too 
much credence has often been given to the claims made by the protagonists of such 
management approaches - particularly on the issue that they represent some form of 
post-Fordist departure from Taylorian management. While it is important to recognise 
the significance of a shift in managerial discourse, from an emphasis on routinisation 
and regulation of work, towards a greater emphasis on 'empowerment' and 'employee 
commitment', such claims should not be assumed to be true in either their outcomes or 
even in their own underlying logic. A closer examination of the content of different 
quality management methods reveals a number of conflicting objectives in the 
approaches to work organisation. Some of these objectives are seemingly anti- 
Taylorian in their approach, but others are fully consistent with Taylorist principles - 
yet such contradictory principles sometimes coexist within single quality management 
methods. The typology of quality management methods adopted as a result of the 
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research conducted here, is one which - without ignoring the issue - does not use the 
rhetorical relationship with Taylorism as its reference point. The approach, instead, is 
of assessing the intent of a particular quality management method with reference to the 
particular aspect of 'quality' it attempts to control. This is the basis by which the 
implications for work organisation can better be judged. 
At its base level all quality management methods, regardless of whether they claim to 
be Taylorist or anti-Taylorist, aim to ensure the consistency, reliability and 
predictability of output. The objective of ensuring consistency of output requires, a 
priori, the regulation and standardisation of processes. The implication here, then, is 
that quality management has a basic tendency to standardise work and the related 
labour process issue of deskilling is raised. This issue is most explicitly identifiable in 
quality system approaches such as ISO 9000 - where the stated objective is to codify 
work routines in a manner that can be audited by managers controlling the quality 
system. While the advent of quality 'cultural' approaches to management such as TQM 
aim to do more than this, they nevertheless aim to simplify and codify work routines in 
order to make them more visible to management scrutiny. This is justified by a desire to 
increase reliability and consistency of output which in a public service context is based 
around the principle of equity. In a neutral environment this could be seen as entirely 
legitimate. But no workplace environment is neutral. The standardisation of work 
routines implicitly empowers managers over workers through a tacit process of 
deskilling. 
The second level in which quality management operates is through the aim of 
enhancing the value of output in relation to cost. This brings the issue of productivity 
into the quality agenda and is associated with the integration of processes. Increasing 
the interdependency of processes makes it more possible to focus on inefficient 
practices and bottlenecks. This is the essence of kanban manufacturing (Oliver 1991; 
Wood 1989). It is also, in essence, the intensification of work: the attempt to 
permanently remove buffers (material, or time) from processes is, essentially, the 
process of permanently increasing the exposure of workers to end-consumer demand. 
This form of quality management is implicit in TQM, in the variety of approaches 
focusing on 'teams', and in performance-based quality management methods. 
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The third level in which quality management operates is through its attempt to 
'mandate' worker enthusiasm. Here, quality management takes on an ideological form 
whereby it attempts to engender commitment. This form of quality management has 
emerged, in one form, as a progression from the holistic forms of work intensification 
noted above - the rationale being that while quality and productivity gains can be forced 
onto the workforce through the design of the production process, further gains can be 
made by making workers participate in further increases. This can be seen in kaizen 
type continuous improvement schemes. It is also particularly relevant in the 
management of service type work. Value, in the consumption of services, is derived 
from the service encounter itself and so enhancing output value, here, presupposes the 
regulation of the service encounter itself. Clearly this may well involve previously 
mentioned work standardisation and work intensification as part of this process, but it is 
more concerned with the regulation of attitudes. Here the implication is of management 
by stress - whereby workers may feel pressurised to display 'appropriate attitudes' as 
the basis of their work. Relevant quality management methods, here, include 'customer 
care' schemes, Investors in People (HP) and the Charter Mark initiative - where 
management is assessed through its ability to prove how committed its procedures and 
workers are to customers. 
These three principal labour process objectives, then, are the foundation of quality 
management methods within a public service environment - although they should not 
be seen as operating in a mutually exclusive fashion. In any particular service or 
authority the emphasis may change and a combination of methods may be employed in 
any quality strategy - particularly where holistic methods such as 
TQM are being 
implemented - but the these three elements remain at the core. Figure 10: 1 provides a 
summary. 
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Figure 12: 1: Managing Quality in Public Services: implications for the 
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C) The use of quality management policies in local government 
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Overall, take-up of quality management schemes has been rapid in the 1990s. In 
chapter 3, it was shown that between 1994 and 1996, nearly all authorities operated 
some form of complaints procedure; around 70% of authorities operated some form of 
service charter; over 60% claimed to practice 'customer involvernent'; over 60% 
operated, or were planning to operate ISO 9000 at some level; and about 50% were 
using some form of 'teamwork' based work organisation. In addition, the uptake of 
Charter Mark increased from 19% in 1994, to 31% in 1996; and the take-up of 
Investors in People (IiP) increased from 39% in 1994 to 69% in 1996. TQM - the most 
holistic of all the quality management practices - was being taken-up by 75% of 
counties (11% corporately); 30% of districts (16% corporately); 81% of metropolitan 
boroughs (19% corporately); and 40 of London Boroughs (20% corporately). 
Local authorities, notwithstanding the equalising effect of managerialism, vary from 
each other and, significantly, from the organisational norms associated with quality 
management in the private sector. 
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First, the local authority setting provides a number of organisational complexities: the 
somewhat unfamiliar territory of the non-commercial operation creates some difficulty 
in making the seamless connection between customer, manager and worker; and the 
political decision-making process - although greatly diminished - still provides an 
important 'variable' in management choice. A quality management package offers 
possibilities that satisfy partisan political ends within the parameters of the 
managerialist mindset. It complies with the financial and policy-discretion constraints 
faced by a local authority; it can meet the increasing demands of central government 
monitoring of local government performance; it can offer managerial solutions to the 
threat of CCT; it is based upon the 'politically sound' practice of adopting commercial 
business practice; and it complies with the ideological fixation with redefining 
citizenship as an issue of 'consumer rights'. Second, pre-existing workplace relations 
between workers, management and trade unions affect management style and choice of 
quality policy. Third, local authorities vary by structure, services provided and, 
importantly, the demographic composition of the community that they serve. 
The choice of quality management policy could be expected to be influenced, then, by 
partisan priorities. While the 1980s NUL project failed politically, some legacies 
remain into the 1990s - particularly where compatible with the managerialist 
mainstream. Anti discrimination policies have seen widespread managerial adoption in 
the format of equal opportunities monitoring - this being compatible with managerial 
decision-making processes. Where positive anti-discrimination is pursued in the New 
Labour format, the emphasis is on the protection of the consumers of local services. 
Thus, where an ex-NUL interpretation of quality outcomes may have been aiming to 
retain high levels of local services, provided directly, with consultation with trade 
unions; a New Right interpretation may be one of contracting-out efficient targeted 
services for a low rate of local taxation; finally a New Labour emphasis may be on 
providing good value, efficient services - with partnerships between users, providers, 
the private sector and the voluntary sector. There are likely to be many permutations in 
between. 
While the influence of managerialism. has had the effect of creating some convergence 
between authorities, then, there are clearly significant problems in any assumption that 
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such an organisational setting may be comparable to the commercial environment that 
quality management was developed. While these circumstances provide the general 
context in which local government as an organisational setting for quality management 
is 'different', it also points to the variety that exists between local authorities 
themselves; differences between urban and town councils; differences between district 
and metropolitan authority functions; differences between Labour and Conservative 
administrations; and differences between strongly unionised councils and less strongly 
unionised councils. This study has confirmed the existence of such differences, which 
are summarised below. 
9 Brent's quality management policy was at the forefront of a large scale 
transformation of the authority. Consciously tied to a politicised management 
attempt to totally overhaul the organisational structure, the quality management 
strategy was a holistic, thorough-going strategy involving the creation of an internal 
market, contract relationships and selective outsourcing of services. The quality 
policy was oriented around a 'customer' ethos, was TQM inspired and was 
systematically geared around ISO 9000, Charter Mark and BP. In the process of 
these changes, the workforce was nearly halved over a period of six years. At Brent, 
'empowered' local managers - with their devolved budgets - were happy with their 
situation. The pressure for them to perform to targets and their discretion over local 
staffing decisions allowed them to bypass previously applied principles of 
promotion through length of service in favour of 'fast tracking' the newly favoured 
members of staff displaying more 'appropriate' customer friendly attitudes. There 
were constraints however. The re-organisation of the Council into a series of 
contractor business units further encouraged the NSR political leadership to force 
year-on-year budget cuts and outsourcing - leading to a pronounced drop in staff 
morale through fear of further forced redundancies. 
At Wycombe, the political leadership was more stable - although at the time of 
research control had switched away from long term Conservative control. The 
quality policy was one which evolved from its broad priority of Performance 
Management, which was based on the re-definition of employment contracts. This 
involved delayering the hierarchical structure of the organisation through 
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simplifying grading structures, the adoption of employment contracts which 
included performance targets, more 'open-ended' job descriptions and the partial 
use of PRP. While Wycombe were pursuing the attainment of certain award 
schemes and accreditations (IiP and Charter Mark - but not ISO 9000) the 
relationship between these various schemes was not seen as being part of a fully 
integrated strategy. The basis for quality was firmly rooted in Performance 
Management. 
* Newcastle was a strongly entrenched Labour administration. It had not been 
influenced, significantly, by the NUL agenda of the 1980s but had a track record of 
relatively successful retention of direct services up till the 1990s - where the 
financial squeeze from central government began to bite. Quality management at 
Newcastle was piecemeal, due to the weakness of the corporate centre, and the 
strength and entrenchment of the union within the authority. While all departments 
officially had a quality policy, then, only one fully pursued the agenda pro-actively. 
In this department - Community and Leisure Services (CLS) - quality was being 
approached in a procedural, systemic manner. The basis for quality was through 
ISO 9000 and, within the department, this was approached in a piecemeal fashion. 
At Arun the council had been piloting a number of Audit Commission schemes for a 
number of years. An entrenched Conservative administration with an ageing 
population - which affected the nature of services being provided, Arun's quality 
management policy was based upon a 'customer care' model. Here, there was a 
rhetorical attachment to the notion of 'permanent change' and the customer care 
policy was backed up with programmes of re-education and staff awareness. 
The Effects of Quality Management on Work in Local Government 
The different quality management policies adopted in the four authorities studied were 
all intended to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of work output in one way or 
another. The outcome of these policies, though, was dependent upon local priorities and 
worker and union reactions. Local priorities were themselves determined by the 
anticipated reactions of workers and unions in each case. Because of these differences, 
then, the priorities, perceptions and expectations of workers also differed in each case. 
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Workers' and managers' perception of the effects on working arrangements was 
determined mainly by the authority worked at - and thus by the nature of the specific 
quality policy being pursued. Here, then, the opinion of a professional worker in a 
regulatory function was closer to the opinion of a librarian in the same authority than to 
a professional in a similar job function in a different authority. 
This is not to say that there were not significant differences between job functions, 
however. In addition to the nature of the management policy being pursued differences 
also emerged which were workplace related e. g. differences between 'professional' 
workers; and differences between workers in regulatory functions and in quasi- 
commercial functions. Because pre-existing circumstances determined quality policy, 
the effects of quality management on work regimes were different for each case. In 
short the effects that quality management had on work differed according to the quality 
objective (work standardisation, work process integration or managing commitment) 
according to the strength of the policy being pursued, and according to the relationship 
of a particular service - with the related status and power of workers within the service - 
to external managerial scrutiny. 
a) Quafity and work standardisation 
In terms of applicability to service areas, work standardisation is applied most 
frequently in services where equity of service provision is deemed important (e. g. 
regulatory services), where health and safety issues are considered important (e. g. sport 
centres and day centres) and where staffing is based upon low paid, relatively unskilled 
work in a quasi-commercial environment (e. g. sports centres). 
In the case of regulatory services, much of the increase in managerial control was 
through the standardisation of administrative procedures for reasons of service equity 
and improved administrative efficiency. While this was partly tied up with an emphasis 
on 'customer care' - through a determination to improve communications with clients - 
the main manifestation for 'professionals', here, was the standardisation of 
administrative accountability. Among a broad range of regulatory functions 
(environmental health officers, trading standards officers, building control officers) 
across the four authorities this was pushed through via increased scrutiny required for 
customer feedback, the introduction of quality systems (RP, ISO 9000, Charter Mark) 
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and the use of IT to monitor administrative throughput. While this entailed a loss of 
autonomy over work organisation, it did not seriously restrict the professional worker's 
decision-making capacity in their core work activity: it did not fundamentally deskill 
professional workers in regulatory functions. 
The status of the professional has not been undermined by the overall managerialist 
process. The demystification - and hence the deskilling - of the professional's work is 
explicitly advocated by the protagonists of managerialism in order to wrest control 
from professional sectional interests. This was stated to be the case at Arun, where 
professionals' who had, in the past, occupied the most senior officer positions had been 
replaced by generalist managers. While quality management has been advocated to 
achieve this (Morgan & Murgatroyd 1994), the attempt to standardise the professional's 
work through quality management could be seen more as a symptom of this trend than 
a catalyst. 
In the case of sports centres - where workers were exposed to customers in a 
commercial sense (Clarke 1995) - regulation of work routines was based upon issues of 
safety. Many of the tasks involved - maintenance of equipment, checking of pool 
temperatures and chemical composition, and pool-side supervision - were mandatory 
functions, they were, nonetheless further regulated by the introduction of more detailed 
procedures. The profile of the people encountered working in sports centres was 
somewhat unique to the job. Leisure Assistants (LAs) were, by a large majority, young, 
with short service records, relatively unskilled, low paid, but strongly motivated by the 
fringe benefits associated with the work - i. e. their main motivation was through 
participation in sport. For managers this made it difficult to motivate staff. They were 
unable to motivate through making the job less routine; despite attempts to make jobs 
more varied through job rotation, managers conceded that the core activities involved in 
LA work was inherently boring. They seemed unable to motivate through career 
incentive; the age profile and turnover of staff indicated that LAs identified the job as a 
temporary phase in their careers. These factors make the other approaches to quality 
management less appropriate: as a 'service encounter' there is little scope for utilise the 
integration of inter-related processes to enhance value, and there is limited scope for 
using implied threats to job security and career progression through enforcing 
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customer-centred enthusiasm. Similarly formalising response (times and opening 
statements) for telephone answering in administrative functions, while outwardly 
concerned with 'customer- friendly attitudes', is in reality the standardisation of tasks. 
Workers who were affected by such initiatives resented the implied assumption that 
they were unable to conduct such a task according to their own discretion. 
While quality through work standardisation was applied in all authorities studied, the 
emphasis varied. At CLS in Newcastle, ISO 9000 was initially deemed appropriate for 
the use in leisure centres - for reasons articulated above - but was then further pursued 
in the operation of youth work day centres. While this was justified on the basis of 
providing greater service equity and ensuring health and safety procedures, it is likely 
that the pursuit of such a quality management strategy - rather than the use of more 
'cultural' approach - was based upon the desire of management to apply some universal 
methods of control in the vastly different workplace scenarios under its authority. As in 
the case of regulatory functions, standardising work routines for youth workers was 
restricted to peripheral areas of the main work activity - administrative, health and 
safety and maintenance procedures - rather than the intangible and wide ranging nature 
of the experience and skills involved in youth work itself. 
While the base logic of work standardisation as a means of controlling output quality is 
one of deskilling, in practice this method of control simultaneously increases exposure 
of managerial authority to the scrutiny of workers. By standardising formal procedures 
for all workers, workers are exposed to increased monitoring. But workers were able, in 
a number of cases, to use these procedures to formally highlight causes of problems. 
Rather than this being within the managerialist framework of quality - providing 
information that could be used to improve efficiency or value - it was often on broader 
issues - the lack of facilities/funding, bad working conditions, lack of political 
/managerial will etc. This had implications for the activities of the trade union - which 
is discussed further in chapter 13. 
b) Quality management and work intensification 
Quality management methods associated vvith the intensification of work have been 
enabled by CCT through the required structural reorganisation of local government 
departments as a prerequisite for contracting. Whether or not contracts were won in- 
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house or not, re-organisation increased the visibility of individual work processes to 
managers. While there remained a reasonable degree of variation between the councils 
studied who wished to outsource as a matter of policy (Brent), those who had been 
selective about which services would be outsourced (Wycombe and Arun), and those 
who were comfortably able to retain in-house service provision (Newcastle), managers 
in all cases acknowledged that the CCT process was seen as a positive catalyst for 
increasing managerial control over the labour process. Appropriate quality management 
methods involved, here, included TQM, performance-based quality management and 
the use of team-based working practices to meet work targets. The importation of 
quality management to supplement this tended to formalise and legitimise this process, 
the focus being one of increasing worker exposure to customers. Customer needs, 
however, are channelled exclusively through management. The sub-dividing of services 
into more identifiable cost-centres has, then, increased exposure of workers to 
managerial scrutiny. 
Quality through work intensification was central to the quality programme being 
operated throughout Brent. Brent's policy went beyond the organisational requirements 
of CCT and pursued quality vigorously through its devolved internal market structure. 
While there were notable differences between how this affected work in different 
services, all services at Brent were affected. Quality was defined and monitored 
centrally through contracts and while technology was deployed, according to the 
discretion of budget-holding managers, the catalyst for increased productivity was the 
awareness of performance targets, rather than the means by which monitoring was 
conducted. Large numbers of jobs had been shed as part of the wider managerial 
campaign and quality management was identified as being intrinsically tied to this. 
Quality'management became a key tool in identifying 'good' and 'bad' performers. 
Both workers' and managers' perceptions were sharply polarised about the legitimacy 
of quality management as a result of this - though many of the 'survivors' in favour had 
benefited from the removal of colleagues in 'fast tracking' promotions. 
Wycombe, while not pursuing devolved management, pursued the integration of work 
processes through the use of performance monitoring, work targets and the use of teams 
- although the use of tearns was uneven. The effects, here, did not result in such an 
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intensive work regime and did rely on a Taylorian rationale for some of the control of 
work (relating performance to bonus schemes). Despite this regime not being intensive 
as Brent's, however, perceptions that quality management increased workloads were 
less ambiguous, here, than in Brent - although not as strongly felt. 
The integration of work processes in the four authorities varied according to the nature 
of work involved in different services and this was most distinguishable in the 
relationship of work to external customers. This was exemplified by a senior Wycombe 
manager relating how those furthest from external customers were the least responsive 
to quality management initiatives. Conversely, however, integrating processes did have 
the effect of changing the content of jobs that were previously isolated from external 
customers. Where workers in central administrative/support functions would 
historically have been relatively insulated from external pressures, the creation of 
internal contract structures had some effects on removing such buffers. This was 
exemplified in Arun where the Workingfor the Public Group had a remit to engender a 
greater awareness of internal customers on the part of staff. 
Professional workers, while not the most exposed to customer and managerial scrutiny, 
saw the greatest increase in the integration of work processes as a result of quality 
management. The deployment of team-based working in conjunction with the use of 
performance targets for Environmental Health Officers was a case in point. Here, 
workers felt a tangible increase in demand combined with an increase in monitoring. 
Integrating work processes for professionals reaches its most holistic form in the 
creation of One Stop Shops. This is partly based upon the principle that administrative 
workers can be placed in direct contact with customers to be an identifiable conduit 
between members of the public and the wide variety of professional functionaries 
operating at a council. Exposure to external customers for those working directly on the 
One Stop Shops, of course, is total. 
C) Quality management, commitment and customer care 
Supplanting traditional assumptions of a 'public service ethos' with 'customer 
awareness' as the guiding motivation for workers in local government is problematic, 
although the intent is clear for the following rationale: public service ethos - as an ideal 
- is incompatible with managcrialism because it allows professional discretion that may 
Conclusions 328 
be used to the workers advantage at the expense of managerial objectives; customer 
care provides a rationale whereby 'serving the public' can be conducted in a format that 
places management at the apex of decision-making. In general, customer care policies 
are used where paying 'customers' can be identified. It is paradoxical, then, that such 
policies seem to be increasingly popular with managers of public services where 
customers are an abstraction, aside from at a conceptual level whereby workers are 
intended to identify service users as individual members of the public able to make 
discernible choices about using the service in question. 
Not surprisingly, then, while the rhetoric of the 'customer' was adopted by managers in 
all cases bar Newcastle, its practical effects on worker behaviour were greater in those 
areas where services were discretionary. Such services were leisure - where service 
users were identifiable and where increasing the number of users increased revenue - 
and libraries - where service users were identifiable, but where increasing the numbers 
of users had no impact on revenue. In both cases, effort was made on superficial issues 
- dress codes and the appearance of buildings. Here, then, the impact on the 'emotional 
labour' of workers was restricted to the outward displays of commitment (Taylor 1997) 
and, while displaying an increased capacity, on the part of managers, to dictate attitudes 
to workers, this did not seriously affect worker autonomy. Controlling attitudes was 
more sinister where the important extra-managerial factors determined workers 
perception of security at work. The marketisation of the council structure at Brent, 
combined with the discretionary nature of the Library service as a whole, provided a 
combined effect of introducing a high level of fear within the workplace, which was 
used by the manager in question to display outward signs of 'commitment' - 
manifested, among other signs, through the reluctance of staff to take sick leave, 
In contrast to this, staff at the sports centre at Wycombe - with a more acute relationship 
to customers - did not suffer the same levels of stress. The significant difference here 
was that the work of Leisure Assistants had low prospects - aside from the fringe 
benefits associated with sport. Here, then, implied threats - even with CCT - could not 
motivate staff - which was why work standardisation was adopted in its place. 
While the work of regulatory functions seemed more affected by the effects of work 
intensification than through the manipulation of 'attitudes', there was evidence to 
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suggest that professionals in this area are susceptible to some degree of stress - 
particularly where the issue of customer-oriented attitudes is tied to performance 
management, such as in customer complaints procedures. At Wycombe, for example, 
assessing commitment for KP in one regulatory function involved "... trying to tease-out 
any signs of reluctance to give everything to the Customer", and a manager in another 
noted that "... the balance of interests between the customer and staff.. is too weighted 
toward the customer". 
The managerialist pre-occupation with worker commitment has not occurred in a 
vacuum. Enforcing commitment upon workers is often legitimised through the 
'empowerment' of workers - encouraging workers to show increased initiative through 
increased delegation of decision-making. In theory, such delegation avoids loss of 
managerial control through management maintaining control of the decision-making 
processes themselves (e. g. kaizen, quality circles, suggestion schemes etc. ). In the 
context of public services, however, this becomes more difficult for management as 
operational decisions could become blurred with political issues (e. g. resources). In this 
event, delegation of decision-making was limited in the four cases studied. Devolved 
decision making at Brent, for example, was based upon devolved managers being given 
increased autonomy within pre-determined budgets. Such an arrangement legitimised 
hierarchical control through proxy of the contract by which services were performed. 
The intention, here, is to deflect attention from output quality, in terms of the quantity 
of services, to one of quality as effectiveness. Even here, though, such emphasis ignores 
the impact that background issues have in underpinning such 'commitment'. Showing 
4commitment' in the insecure local government working environment of declining job 
security and increased managerial scrutiny of performance is not 'empowerment' as 
much as management by fear: it belies the adage that 'you cannot mandate enthusiasm'. 
The emphasis on customer awareness was probably strongest at Arun. Here, though, 
while workers were constantly subjected to re-orienting their work as being only of 
value through a customer-supplier relationship, there was no real evidence to show how 
this actually affected work - Arun had been pursuing policies for a number of years and 
their was a higher degree of continuity here than at Brent. While there was an emphasis 
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on 'pennanent change' at Arun, there was continuity - unlike Brent where quality 
management was based upon constant upheaval. 
In the case of Newcastle, the effect this situation was reversed. Quality was addressed 
through work standardisation - as previously noted. Decision-making was not 
delegated, but work processes were codified through ISO 9000. Because commitment 
was not enforced through the contract mechanisms utilised at Brent, workers still felt 
able to express concerns about quality in a wider context - unconstrained by the 
managerial definitions of quality-as-effectiveness. This is not to say that workers at 
Brent could not - and did not do so; or that workers at Newcastle were able realise their 
concerns. Rather, it is greater scope existed at Newcastle to address issues relating to 
quality that were outside a managerialist agenda. 
Increasing pressure on workers to display increased commitment to customers and the 
organisation is intertwined with the general morale of staff in a given situation. 
Increasing pressure to perform in a relatively insulated job function, or in a more 
exposed job function, but where the expectations of that job are low, is unlikely to be as 
successful then where a job function is relatively exposed to external 'customers', 
where the job carries higher expectations and where jobs are threatened with funding 
cuts. Hence, libraries were more affected than, say, trading standards. 
A summary of the effects of quality management mechanisms on various services in 
relation to customers is shown in table 12: 1, below. 
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Table 12: 1: Potential Effects of Quality Management on the Labour 
Process in Local Government Service Functions 
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Quality Management's Effect on Work In Relation to... 
Relationship to Work Work Management by 
'Customer' Standardisation Intensification Stress 
Professional Ambiguous. Peripheral. Partial. Some Peripheral. Some 
Regulatory Work entails Affects admin. inteniTification increase in 
mediating functions ofjob; where team exposure to 
conflicting formalises chains working external clients 
ccustomer' of accountability. arrangements and some 
interests (general used in increase in 
public-vs-those conjunction with personal 
being regulated) increased exposure to 
performance individual clients. 
targets. 
Social/Welfare Ambiguous. Peripheral. None Apparent. None Avr)arent. 
Work entails Affects health & Increase in inter- Tacit resistance 
mediating and/or safety procedures agency to managerialist 
rationing and equity issues. relationships - co-option of 
interests of related more to professional 
4customers' social/welfare autonomy and 
(service users/ related legislation 'public service 
general public/ than quality ethos'. 
service users' management. 
families) 
Administrative/ Removed. Only 1jiph. Increased 11! Sh. CCT Limited. Some 
Support contact with standardisation of increased areas of increased 
Functions service users is response times exposure. High monitoring of 
in gatekeeper and formats exposure where 4 commitment': 
role. (telephone and functions telephone 
written) transferred to responses etc. 
'One Stop Shop'. 
Client Service: Exposed. Limited. Certain Limited. Work IEýh. 
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Implications 
In the public service organisation, quality management affects attempts to regulate 
work in three ways, all of which are based upon the intention to increase the 
accountability of workers to managerial scrutiny: work standardisation, work 
intensification and managing commitment. In all three forms quality is related directly 
to the issue of productivity, through the explicit connection made between service 
quality and efficiency, effectiveness and value for money. The difference between 
straightforward productivity and quality is that quality is imbued with unambiguously 
positive connotations and is more likely to be perceived as legitimate in a workplace 
environment where tight fiscal constraints are combined with a workplace culture 
motivated, at least partly, by a 'public service ethos' not found in the commercial 
sector. With these factors in mind, quality management in local government is tied to 
the broad issues of simply increasing work rates and with an ideological function of 
legitimising such increases in work. 
a) Quafity management, the labour process and Taylorism 
Discussions about the impact that quality management methods have on the labour 
process have been unduly linked to assumptions about paradigm shifts in management. 
Quality management, as a generic set of practices, however, do not fit with such 
assumptions. First, rather than representing its antithesis, the core elements of 
Taylorism. are comfortably embraced within nearly all the prescribed quality 
management methods. Moreover, contrary to Post-Fordist assertions, this Taylorian 
association cannot be dismissed as some historically anachronistic 'baggage' left over 
from Fordist organisational forms because the adoption of such Taylorist methods (e. g. 
the rapid take-up of ISO 9000) has been enabled by so-called Post-Fordist 
developments in local government. Second, a similar lack of dualism is absent from the 
way quality management deals with subjectivity, as compared to its predecessors. 
Foucaldian definitions place the managerial preoccupation with quality management 
methods as a move away from Taylorian control mechanisms toward subjectivist means 
of control - whereby workers are co-opted into a process of subjugation. Where worker 
subjectivity is attempted to be co-opted by management - in customer care practices, for 
example - worker compliance is strongest where external background issues are 
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mobilised to create fear within the workplace (e. g. a real threat to long-term job 
prospects). Moreover, the 'mandating of enthusiasm' in such circumstances, cannot be 
assumed to be any more than the outward displays of compliance - given the increased 
use of 'objective' performance indicators to assess commitment. In essence, the 
presence or absence of Taylorism is not a significant issue in the development of 
quality management in local government. Taylorism only seems to be of use as a 
rhetorical reference point by which managerialist proponents of quality management 
methods can claim a break from the past while simultaneously adhering, fundamentally, 
to the core elements Taylor prescribed for management. 
b) Quality and power relations in the workplace 
The manner in which quality management is deployed in the local government 
workplace is dependent upon an implicit recognition of the implied strengths that 
workers hold in particular work environments. First, the relative weakness of 
management is implied where workers may be able to deflect certain attempts at work 
regulation. Here, the workplace scenario determines what method cannot be 
implemented (e. g. the attempt to invoke 'commitment' in Leisure Assistants). Second, a 
recognition of how certain techniques may enhance managerial control over a 
previously autonomous labour process determines what is implemented (e. g. the 
introduction of teams and performance monitoring for Environmental Health Officers). 
Finally, the implementation of a policy that fails to enhance managerial authority has 
the potential of empowering workers and/or undermining management legitimacy (e. g. 
the formalising work procedures among youth workers at Newcastle and the 
antagonisms surrounding PRP at Wycombe). This last issue is taken up further in the 
following chapter. 
C) Quality, legitimacy and ideology 
The most distinguishing feature of quality management as a vehicle for managerialism, 
is its ideological content. In addition to the direct effect on work, quality management 
represents an attempt to redefine workers' conception of their work. At the general 
level, managerialism is underpinned by consumerist ideological assumptions whereby 
the effort bargain is shifted away from the workplace: rather than workers being 
motivated by an assumed psychological trade-off between effort and wages at work 
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(exemplified in Taylorism), the assumption in the new managerialism. is that workers 
are trading-off rights at work, in place of a perception of enhanced rights as consumer 
outside work. While this assumption of enhanced consumer rights is itself empirically 
unfounded, it is significant in the fact that it assists in the managerial re-definition of 
work (DuGay 1996. 
Introducing the 'customer' to the centre of the workplace is not only an issue of 
changing relationships, methods and functions, it is also about re-defining the nature of 
public service work for local government employees. In front-line work, the 
'empowerment' metaphor is ambiguously used to champion greater discretion for the 
frontline worker in decision-making simultaneously with greater 'choice' and redress 
by service users. This is ideological because the two are mutually exclusive: what is 
actually being advocated here is that the interaction of public service users and 
providers requires the external intervention of management to ensure probity, equity 
and efficiency. There is a paradox about the managerial conception of customer care. 
The customer care model of quality management represents, perhaps, Marx's concept 
of alienation in its ultimate form. Here, it is not enough for the market to separate the 
worker from his or her work. The customer care model requires the worker to 
consciously define the output of labour exclusively in terms of the customer's needs: 
work has no intrinsic value outside that end. Of course this aim remains an ideal-type, 
but it is more than a mere rhetorical concern about motivating staff - it is not merely the 
exhortation that 'the customer is always right', prevalent for many years as a slogan in 
many organisations. As a management model this ideological re-definition of work is 
expressed systematically through the hierarchical functions and procedures or 
management. It is paradoxical that this form of management should find itself being 
articulated in the operation of public services where customers are not readily 
identifiable. Where they are identifiable by some re-definition of the concept of 
'customer', their interests are often countervailed by other 'customers' - making the job 
of satisfying customer interests one of balancing between competing needs. In this 
sense, then, the use of the term 'customer' would seem to have more importance in 
disciplining workers than in satisfying the needs of the recipients of local services. 
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Recent studies indicate that quality management policies seem to be perceived as 
legitimate by workers (Edwards et al 1998) - whether or not such practices are 
associated with an increase in effort. To some extent, this is supported here - for the 
present. It would seem that managers are careful to associate quality management with 
the public service ethos that is more likely to motivate workers in this field. Legitimacy 
is also, perhaps, granted purely on the notion that quality management methods are 
being offered as something new. However, workers are conscious of an increased 
workload that accompanies quality management. The legitimacy of quality 
management in the longer term will rest upon how closely it will become associated 
with productivity in general and how long it can maintain its role as a catalyst for 
organisational renewal. 
CHAPTER 13 
QUALITY, MANAGERIALISM AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
, rhis chapter will discuss the collective bargaining implications ofquality management 
in local government. As has been argued throughout, developments ill collective 
bargaining are inter-related with labour process issues and botli these issues havc been 
determined by the wider developments in industrial relations and local government 
ýreform' frorn tile 1980s onwards. Ill addition, trades unions' experiences of' quality 
management in other sectors also provides a background from which the overall context L_ 
of this thesis can be drawn. Figure 1 3): 1 provides a pictorial relerence. 
Figure 13: 1: Quality Management, Work and Collective Bargaining in 
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It is possible that local government unions can learn from the experiences of trade 
unions in dealing with quality management in other sectors (and, indeed, of the 
experiences where quality management has been introduced without the presence of a 
recognised trade union). The differences in organisational context, however, dictates 
that many of the issues must be derived from public service trade unions' specific 
experiences in local government. Because quality management is relatively new to local 
government, this means that experience of local government trade union responses to 
quality management is, at present, very little. 
Quality Management, the Labour Process and Collective Bargaining 
Research for this thesis has been consciously conducted to incorporate the theoretical 
issues addressed in both 'labour process' and 'industrial relations' approaches to 
employment. The apparent gulf that exists between these approaches in many studies is 
considered inappropriate here. The organisation and control of work - i. e. 'the labour 
process issues' - is contingent upon the pre-existing industrial relations climate within 
the workplace in question. Quality management is qualitatively affected by, and has 
qualitative effects on, collective bargaining that would not be visible through a purely 
labour process focus. Such effects would, however, eventually contribute to changes in 
the labour process at some stage. In this sense, then a valid examination of the labour 
process necessarily requires an understanding of the collective bargaining arrangements 
at work. Conversely. the outcome of an attempted change to the local government 
labour process will affect the workplace and, by definition, the collective bargaining 
relationships within that workplace. 
The importance of recognising the inter-relationship between collective bargaining and 
labour process issues is the reason why the Foucauldian trend in labour process theory 
is rejected here. The Foucauldian approach to labour process theory attempts to 
theoretically atomise workplace relationships into issues of individual discourses. This 
does not, however, mean that the central concern of labour process theory - the 
organisation and control of work - can be ignored. Recent critiques of Foucauldian 
analysis, within the boundaries of the labour process debate, have highlighted the 
inadequacies of Foucauldian approaches in their theoretical inability to conceptualise 
worker resistance as being pro-active and independent of managerial strategy 
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(Thompson & Ackroyd 1995). Additional critiques have gone further in re-stating the 
importance of theoretically understanding the labour process as necessarily affecting 
workers in a collectivist manner: 
... we need to locate the debate on the nature of individualism and collectivism not only in 
terms of the contradictory developments emerging within the labour process but also with 
respect to a wider, engaging view of collectivism. (Martinez-Lucio & Stewart 1997 p5 1) 
Implementing quality management into local government, then, is both affected by, and 
has an effect on, the nature of collective bargaining. Implementing any managerial 
strategy necessarily involves the anticipation of worker reaction and in a unionised 
workplace managerial strategy is based around the anticipated reaction of the union - 
officially and unofficially. Conversely, because quality management has qualitative 
affects on the labour process, some effect on collective bargaining are also inevitable. 
a) The union's effect on quality management policy 
The pre-existing relationships between management, workers and trade unions 
influence the nature and manner of quality management policy being introduced. While 
this could be considered to be a truism in the general sense, there were clear indications 
of this in the four authorities studied. The power resources - or anticipated power 
resources - of workers could be said to be based upon the following (Batstone 1988): 
(a) the mobilising capacity of the union, (b) the willingness of members to act, (c) 
workers capacity to disrupt production (d) the scarcity of particular workers' skills and 
(e) their political influence. In each case, these power resources varied. 
At Brent, management-union relations were conflictual and based on low trust. The 
new right political administration saw the established trade unions as 'part of the 
problem' that afflicted the borough in its previous 'new urban left' guise. Even if 
management considered the 'Quality Council' policy as neutral, it was at the vanguard 
of its decentralising, market-led approach to reforming the organisation. The swift re- 
organisation of the Authority involved job-cuts and contracting-out and the union was 
faced with an uphill task of resisting the changes - especially where management were 
actively attempting to create a new vanguard of devolved managers with increased 
power over local staffing issues. Here the union, while agreeing with the general 
principle of enhancing service quality, were antagonistic toward the actual policy. 
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In Newcastle the situation was different. Here management were implementing a 
quality policy in a piecemeal fashion due to the relative weakness of the centre. Here, 
management required the support of the political administration - Labour - and union 
support. Here, the quality policy was less holistic and was legitimised through its being 
tied to an overall strategy of improving the competitiveness of services subject to 
compulsory competitive tendering. 
At both Wycombe and Arun union strength - in terms of membership - was lower than 
in the urban boroughs. Here, management and the political leaderships had imposed 
their quality management policies incrementally and in a paternalist fashion. Unions 
were consulted - but not negotiated with - from a position of relative strength on the 
part of management. 
The prior industrial relations set-up, then, determines the manner in which a quality 
management policy - or any management policy - is going to be implemented. The 
actual operation of quality management, however, sets about a new dynamic into the 
workplace which can further affect industrial relations. 
b) Quality Management, unitarism and union legitimacy 
Prescribed quality management methods challenge collective bargaining in the 
workplace through their unitarist organisational assumptions. Based upon the evidence 
and experiences in the four case studies, it is proposed here that quality management is 
capable of undermining the legitimacy of trade unions in the workplace in three major 
ways, described here as being overt, implicit, and covert challenges. 
First, and most crudely, the quality management agenda may be attempted to be used to 
co-opt worker commitment engendered through quality management to marginalise the 
union's role. Here, the union is seen as being an alien presence in the managerial 
imperative to 'give customers what they want', as the president elect of the CBI has 
recently commented: 
'We pride ourselves on our ability to recruit, train and educate our staff to offer customers a 
higher quality of service. A third party that comes between employer and employee can only 
interfere with that and hann our drive for quality' Clive Thompson, Chief Executive of 
Rentokil Initial and President Elect of the CBI (quoted in Observer 31/5/98) 
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This could be described as being the overt ideological challenge to union legitimacy. 
This was perhaps best seen at Brent, where the quality management process was, 
despite its rhetorical espousal of decentralisation, centrally directed and did not involve 
bargaining with Unison. At the latter stages the lack of management communication 
with Unison reached a point where the union was threatened with derecognition. While 
this was a political decision and quality management was not the issue of contention, 
the quality management agenda was at the forefront of Brent's image in terms of how it 
ran services and how it treated its staff. The overly aggressive stance toward the union, 
however, was largely unsuccessful. While a change of political leadership removed 
many of the protagonists from the confrontation, the local Unison branch also managed 
to use the derecognition issue to bolster its weakening steward organisation. While the 
use of quality management as part of an overt challenge to union involvement in the 
workplace is an issue in private sector service organisations to prevent union entry, in 
the already unionised local government workplace this would be liable to produce 
counter-productive consequences for management. 
The second challenge to unions through quality management is more subtle and is 
based upon structural changes that take place in decision-making channels, and is 
referred to here as an implicit challenge to union-worker-management lines of 
communications. The operation of quality management implicitly involves shifting 
decision-making processes and lines of communication. This is to be found in the 
rhetoric of 'devolved management', 'delayering' and 'teamwork'. This challenges pre- 
existing union-worker-management lines of communication to the detriment of the 
union. Despite the language of partnership, teamwork and worker empowerment within 
the prescriptive quality management literature, quality management methods are 
essentially unitarist in their organisational assumptions. At the highest level local 
government bargaining structures have been affected by a gradual shift from national 
Whitley-based structures to an increased use of localised agreements, opt-out, and 
localised flexibility add-ons. This has shifted the focal point of negotiation machinery 
away from where Unison's bargaining structures (and NALGO and NUPE before it) 
have been based for (Fairbrother 1996). While many of these shifts have been more as a 
result of CCT and increasing financial constraints placed upon local authorities by 
central government, there is a symbiotic relationship with these decentralising 
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tendencies and the direct applicability of human resource management and quality 
management methods being introduced more recently: quality management is made 
feasible by decentralisation and is likely to entrench such structures. In Brent, for 
example, the devolution of services was legitimised by the increased ability to deliver 
quality services through enabling local managers increased discretion over personnel 
decisions, while at Wycombe the drive for improving service quality was also tied to the 
need to 'delayer' - even if not uniformly applied in practice. 
At the workplace level, quality management's challenging of union-worker 
communications is more subtle and tied to work processes themselves. Evidence from 
other unionised sectors has shown how this has raised concerns about the undermining 
of steward autonomy. In the motor industry, spurred by the highly publicised 
competitive threat from Japan, UK motor producers sought to introduce what were 
considered to be the essence of Japanese management methods. Initially this was 
resisted, as in the case of Ford Motor Company's aborted attempt to introduce quality 
circles under the After Japan initiative in the mid 1980s. Here, trade unions 
successfully resisted what was considered to be a challenge to shop-floor 
communications between stewards and workers (Starkey & MacKinlay 1989; 
Wilkinson & Oliver 1990). In 1991 Ford workers were even capable of using the pan- 
European just-in-time system to maximum advantage in the 1991 strike. However, by 
the 1990s the overall balance had shifted in favour of employers. In 1991 unions 
representing Rover workers - considered to be the most militant in the 1970s - agreed to 
a 'new deal' whereby job security was traded for comprehensive 'flexible' employment 
conditions (IDS 1991). The effects of quality management on steward organisation at 
the four authorities studied was mixed. At Brent, devolution and externalisation created 
some problems for the Unison branch. Externalisation created logistical problems for 
the branch maintaining communications with stewards in outsourced units and 
devolution seemed to be creating a new vanguard of local managers with increased 
decision-making powers over staffing issues. It is unclear how the re-invigorated 
steward organisation following the de-recognition dispute bolstered local steward 
organisation in the medium term following the 'normalisation' of industrial relations. 
At Newcastle, steward organisation was relatively strong. Perhaps partly to do with this 
- and the relative weakness of the centre in relation to corporate departments - was an 
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inability to force a holistic quality management package uniformly throughout the 
authority here. Where ISO 9000 was being pursued in Leisure Services, however, the 
Unison branch actively involved stewards in discussing the issues raised. While the 
perceived impact of ISO 9000 was low among workers and stewards alike, there were 
signs that stewards were becoming involved in the process. Steward organisation at 
Wycombe and Arun was weak at the outset and so localisation of managerial decision- 
making - while having an effect on working conditions, did not affect steward 
organisation as such. 
The third effect quality management may have on union-worker-management 
combinations at work is tied directly to the effect of quality management on the labour 
process. This is termed, here, as being the covert undermining of the trade union's 
instrumentalist appeal. This is somewhat tentative. A loss of union legitimacy, here, 
could be caused by the combined effects of (a) a successful attempt to co-opt worker 
'loyalty' through linking quality management to the public service ethos, and (b) the 
general perception of declining union power in the workplace through its diminishing 
visibility. The logic is that the appeal for worker commitment and the structural 
reorganisation to accommodate quality management practices, combined with various 
practices themselves - teamwork, performance appraisal, customer feedback etc. - may 
have an effect of marginalising the union if steward organisation is weak. With a labour 
process that attempts to expose work visibility and performance monitoring, the trade 
union representative who is not locked into this process in some way is in danger of 
being excluded from the most critical aspects of workers' concerns at work. The logic 
of many of the quality management methods being pursued in local government is for 
workers to feel increasing stress over the expectations placed upon them. If the union is 
isolated from the workplace then the legitimacy of the union could lose instrumentalist 
appeal. Conversely if the steward does become involved in the process of quality 
management at the workplace level without support from the union branch on an 
authority-wide basis, the steward could be in danger of becoming 'captured' by 
management interests, counter to the interests of members, as Fairbrother (ibid) has 
noted. 
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Some of these issues were being raised in the authorities studied. At Arun, where 
steward organisation was weak, management were operating a staff feedback forum to 
address issues raised by the customer care policy being operated there. By management 
admission, this forum - which was ostensibly a forum for staff grievances - was being 
used as suggestion scheme for improving service quality. At Brent, this process was 
more a product of the increasing isolation of individual workplaces from each other, 
with the development of separate work regimes. While the union branch had reported 
improved steward representation following on from the de-recognition dispute, a 
number of comments from staff on returned questionnaires suggested that some staff 
felt abandoned by the union in the face of workplace related grievances. In addition, 
opinion of the quality management policy at Brent was more strongly polarised than in 
the other authorities studied. On the other hand, evidence from Wycombe and Newcastle 
suggested a different outcome to similar agendas. At Wycombe, despite its relatively 
weak steward organisation, the union branch appeared to be increasing its legitimacy as 
a result of management's policy of performance related pay (PRP). PRP, it seemed, was 
an issue that members felt that they required the support of independent advice - 
suggesting an enhancement of the union's instrumentalist appeal. At Newcastle, 
steward involvement in the process of implementing ISO 9000 indicated a perception 
that the union may have a legitimate bargaining role in the entrenchment of work 
practices required by the system. 
Union Strategy 
Trade union strategy in dealing with quality management in local government 
necessarily occurs at four levels. First, the strategy adopted at the broad trade union 
movement level determines the general climate in which industrial relations are 
conducted: second, national union policy (Unison, in particular) provides the basis upon 
which branch activity can take a lead: third, strategy at branch level is grounded upon 
specific managerial policy at the authority-wide level; finally - though not properly 
'strategic' the policies adopted at workplace level are grounded in specific labour 
processes involved. Strategy, or tactics, used at any of these levels are inter-dependent. 
Clearly the broad 'industrial relations climate' is determined by activities occurring at 
workplaces throughout the economy and successful branch policy could ideally be 
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transferred to other branches through national or regional networks in the form of 'best 
practice'. 
a) Labour movement renewal 
The general spread of quality management practices occurred during a period of trade 
union decline and this reciprocal relationship is not coincidental - not least because the 
introduction of such a unitarist management methodology into the workplace has been 
made possible by weakened trade unions. Explanations of membership decline have 
been as numerous as suggested solutions throughout the 1980s and 1990s: from cyclical 
explanations and the need to be able to demonstrate union bargaining power through 
industrial conflict, through to consumerist notions of worker fragmentation and the 
need to market unions as 'partners in industry' offering fringe benefits to members. In 
the meantime, membership has continued to decline. There are signs, however, that 
trade unions may be about to witness a resurgence. An obvious reason for this is the 
election, in 1997, of a Labour government, replacing the series of pro-actively hostile 
Conservative administrations that preceded it. The re-launch of the TUC, in the form of 
the 'new unionism' project is a sign of this renewed optimism. Based, largely, on the 
recruitment methods successfully adopted by the AFL-CIO in the US, 'new unionism' 
aims to reinvigorate trade unionism by becoming more inclusive and pro-active. While 
the general principle is welcome, some of the underlying assumptions within the 
strategy appear to embrace a 'social partnership' model of industrial relations: 
Inherent in the social partnership model... is the need to minimise industrial disputes; in this 
way employers and trade unions can help provide the basis for steady and sound economic 
growth by limiting any damage to other sectors of the economy. Those employers who 
inform, consult, and listen to employees and their trade union representatives, provide for 
good and fair conditions, including job security, are less likely to have disputes than those 
who see unions as an irritant. (TUC nd p 19) 
This approach may be an attempt to reassure employers in cases of recognition 
scenarios. It is also possible that the rhetorical embracing of a social 
partnership/stakeholder model may be political pragmatism on the part of the TUC in a 
period where a Labour government with an unprecedented parliamentary majority has 
been eager to distance itself from its associations with the trades union movement. 
However, the influences that have formed the basis of Labour Party thinking - 
particularly that of Post Fordism - have also been influencing the upper echelons of 
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trade union thinking. The flaws in Post Fordist definitions of current socio-economic 
trends have been discussed in chapter 2 and 4. A danger in trying to apply the logic of 
the Post Fordist vision for trade unions is that by abandoning collectivist definitions of 
work organisation in favour of a multi-agency 'partnership' model trade unions could, 
at a point where revival is quite possible, undermine the legitimacy of trade unions at 
the workplace. While the 'managerialist' drift in trade union strategy (Heery & Kelly 
1994) may be appealing to trade union members in a climate where conflict is 
perceived as futile, trade unions exist at the core to protect workers - through collective 
strength - from employers. The principle of collective bargaining challenges the 
assumptions of pure managerial decision-making and the underlying relationship 
remains conflictual for this reason. A broad union strategy that attempts to act as a 
conduit for managerial decision-making in the implementation of quality management 
is in danger of undermining its own legitimacy. Where 'managerialist' trade union 
approaches to membership decline may succeed in the short term, the tacit focus away 
from the workplace may ultimately undermine trade unions fundamental rationale as 
being able to defend the interests of workers through collective bargaining power, 
against the interests of (scrupulous or unscrupulous) employers. 
b) National union strategy on quality management 
Dealing with quality management on a national basis is possible only in as much as 
unions can offer broad outlines as to the dangers and opportunities that can be faced by 
local branches as a reaction to local managerial strategy. For good reason, Unison has 
focused much of its attention, nationally, to CCT. While the threat of CCT has been 
real, national government enthusiasm for CCT had been declining throughout the 
1990's. After the big impact CCT had on direct labour organisations, CCT for white 
collar services seemed less attractive to commercial contractors and the impact of the 
policy seemed to be offering diminishing returns of success. In this time however, 
union policy had developed into one of accommodating managerial strategy that 
offered increased chances of retaining direct local authority service provision on the 
part of its members. Further to this Unison has also been relatively active in seeking to 
retain membership and recognition deals with contractors. Here, again, the message has 
been one of co-operation and of providing a 'quality service': 
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"If they [local government service contractors] are going to be able to provide a good, quality 
service, they will need a good relationship with their employees. It also makes them more 
attractive in the competition for contracts, because the workforce is likely to favour a 
company that waves an agreement with Unison at them. " Keith Sonnet, Unison's head of 
local government (Guardian Society April 1998) 
With the change of government, however, the emphasis has shifted from CCT to 'best 
value'. This has effectively removed the 'compulsory' element from CCT but retained a 
principle of market testing and 'value for money'. With this there is likely to be a shift 
in emphasis away from merely reducing labour costs - though it does not preclude this - 
to one of increasing output efficiency. In removing the reductionist concern with cost- 
only basis of contract relations in favour of a more general 'value-added' basis of 
assessment, quality management comes further to the fore. Unison must respond 
accordingly if, as is being suggested here, an uncritical acceptance of quality 
management practices pose threats to the legitimacy of the trade union in local 
goveniment at the local level. 
One possibility for trade unions, nationally, is to challenge the managerialist 
appropriation of 'quality'. In representing workers in public services, Unison should be 
able to offer an agenda on public service provision outside the agenda and language of 
consumerism and 'value for money'. 
One of the 'unseen' dangers that quality management poses to trade union legitimacy 
is the ideological undermining of trade union legitimacy in the workplace - described in 
its various forms above. Nationally, public service trade unions need to move away 
from the implicit backing given to managerialist reorganisation of workplace relations 
in the name of 'quality' in order to win CCT contracts. With the threat of CCT now 
diminishing, it is now possible for unions to challenge managerialist definitions of 
6quality'; to recognise the inherently political nature of 'quality' in public services. In 
this, public service trade unions legitimately use their position as representatives of the 
providers of public services. 
C) Quality management and local branch strategy 
In chapter 4 the possibility of trade union renewal based upon localiscd responses was 
noted. Fairbrothcr (op cit) notes that while the deccntralising tendencies of 
contemporary public management have shifted the locus of collective bargaining away 
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from national and regional union set-ups, simultaneous challenges by trade union 
activists have also been made to the legitimacy of union branch structures. It is 
possible, then, to see where patterns of resistance to managerialism may emerge. 
Allowing union branches to develop strength at the workplace level - where members 
face the labour process consequences of quality management - may re-invigorate union 
branches. While recognising that the fragmentation to union branch structures should be 
avoided in order to ensure that localised union responses do not become co-opted into 
the management process itself, union branches can learn from workplace trade union 
responses to quality management. Because quality management methods vary, it is at 
the union branch level and at the workplace level where union strategy in dealing with 
quality management is grounded. 
While responding to specific managerial quality management policies makes union 
branch policy reactive, in addressing the 'political' issues of quality - noted above - the 
union branch can be proactive. Adopting a political stance on 'quality' provides an 
opportunity to link issues relating to levels of service provision and public safety with 
the issue of the working conditions of public employees - an issue excluded by the 
agenda of quality management. However, just as the managerialist use of quality 
management has been realised, ideologically, through its identification with the 'public 
service ethos' - i. e. that through quality management, managers are attempting to be 
identified as the sole guardians of the public interest - so the union is in a position to 
co-opt the public service ethos' s representatives of the self same 'public servants'. As 
Miller (1996) notes, public service workers' concerns at work include not only their 
own working conditions, but also their perception of service users' experiences: 
... whilst public service workers consider changes in the work place in relation to the impact on 
the labour process, they will have additional concerns arising from the nature of their work 
and their relation to it. Thus, because many are committed to collectively provided public 
services based on need, and to their human product, they are necessarily concerned, in a way 
that other white-collar workers may not be, in the detailed nature of any new policy, its impact 
on the service user, and the resultant quality of service delivery, along with managements' 
approach to other valued policies. (ibid p 196) 
Here there are opportunities for trade union branches to forge alliances with organised 
local service user groups. This allows the local branch to maintain a critical distance 
from managerially defined quality programmes. But the opposite is also true: if trade 
unions concede unqualified legitimacy to consumerist redefinitions of quality in public 
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service - particularly in 'customer care' models of quality management - the union 
would be contributing to the degradation of their members' work, because the 'value' 
of any work in such models, is only definable by the 'customer'. Within the context of 
public services - and particularly with local government - there is a real possibility of 
the trade union adopting a 'political' stance on the issue of quality. This adds a further 
dimension to the scope of union involvement. Here, the value-basis upon which 
6quality' is used to co-opt worker commitment to managerial objectives can equally be 
used by the union. The contradiction in utilising quality management as a bulwark 
against the public service worker's assumed self-seeking activities, while 
simultaneously deploying the same quality management to staff within the format of 
'public service ethos', can be challenged. 
Local trade union policy on quality management must be based upon a recognition of 
local realities. It would be futile to suggest that a local branch with low membership 
and weak steward organisation, facing a relatively mild form of quality monitoring by a 
paternalist management, should opt to oppose management based upon ideological 
objections to management's conception of quality. Local branch policy, though, should 
be able to base an approach upon a recognition of the fact that quality management, if 
ignored or passively accepted by the union branch, is likely to harm the longer term 
legitimacy of trade union representation in the workplace. Based upon the ICTU (nd) 
categorisations of trade union responses to new wave management - surnmarised in 
chapter 4- and on the scenarios and approaches adopted by local branches in this 
research, the following approaches to local quality management initiatives are offered 
(see summary table 12: 1). 
i. Outright opposition 
This could be considered to be a proactive stance on quality management. Where union 
organisation is strong and management legitimacy is weak, the union could 
unambiguously oppose the managerialist content of quality management initiatives. In 
practice, however, it is unlikely that any local authority trade union would find itself in 
this Position at the present time. No authority studied came even close. A stance of total 
opposition to - even the concept of - quality management in any other than the scenario 
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described above, then, would hold real dangers of isolating the union from decision- 
making processes involving the implementation of quality initiatives by management. 
I Sceptical involvement 
This stance could, again, be described as being proactive. Here, local union policy 
would be to promote the issue of quality but based upon a view of quality that is not 
tied to a consurner-centred approach that seeks to relocate the value of public service 
away from the public service worker. In taking an overtly (as opposed to implicitly) 
6political' view of quality, the union could endorse only those elements of quality 
management that meet with its own agenda. In this scenario the union could use its 
quality agenda within the general collective bargaining. While no authority branch 
studied followed this agenda, at Newcastle, their were indications that stewards and lay 
members in one section saw how introducing a quality system into the workplace raised 
issues for service users and for working conditions - and of the legitimacy of trade 
union involvement in such issues. 
This approach to quality management could be employed where union organisation is 
strong and where time resources allow for branch policy to be developed. This is 
largely likely only where the union branch is supported by full-time/part-time officials 
and staff. 
iii. Critical support 
This approach is the one that best describes the policies adopted at branch level at Brent 
and Newcastle though for different reasons. Being slightly proactive, although mainly 
reactive, this approach is one of adapting to managerial initiatives in light of more 
general issues facing the union and its members. This approach takes an agnostic view 
of quality management, approving of its use where presented as satisfying broader 
goals - principally this being co-operation with management against the external threat 
posed by CCT. As noted, however, future threats may come in the form of 'best value' 
- which would make more explicit use of 'quality'. In this case union branches adopting 
a policy of 'critical support' may need to adapt quickly to more proactive approaches 
such as that of scepticism, above. 
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At Brent, though sceptical about the intentions behind the various quality management 
approaches being pursued - for good reason - branch officials were being excluded from 
the decision-making process in implementation, leading to the branch being unable to 
discern what quality management practices could be accepted and which could be 
resisted. This was leading to stewards being outmanoeuvred at the workplace level. At 
Newcastle, a more proactive stance was possible at branch level through management 
wishing to keep the union on-side, integrating quality with CCT. At Newcastle, 
however, there were signs that, at the workplace level, a stance approaching sceptical 
involvement was developing, whereby stewards were becoming involved with the 
process of ISO 9000. 
iv. Passive support 
A policy of passive support could be described as being a reactive approach which 
accepts the legitimacy of managerial decision making - conceding 'quality' as not being 
a bargaining issue, in order to retain union legitimacy overall. The branches at 
Wycombe and Arun adopted this approach, stating the desire to be 'progressive' and 
'non-militant' about management initiatives. This approach may be 'realistic' in cases 
where union membership density is relatively low and where steward organisation is 
weak - particularly where there are no full time union officials - but there are dangers of 
the union losing legitimacy at workplace level. In these circumstances a union would 
need to consider the opposing dangers of (a) losing legitimacy at the workplace level if 
the union is seen to be passively supporting managerial policies which were responsible 
for declining working conditions, against (b) the danger of attempting to oppose 
managerial policy where involvement in the union was low. As quality management 
practices are becoming more widespread, union branches may need to consider taking a 
less passive view of managerial intentions in the use of quality management - as was 
beginning to be the case in Wycombe on the issue, in sporadic individual cases, of the 
use of performance related pay. 
v. No involvement 
A final approach, not found at any branch level here, is one of ignoring the issue 
completely. While this approach would not lead the union to be liable to become 
accused of endorsing management policy, it would - if the quality policy had real 
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effects at workplace level, lead to a divergence of workplace-level union reactions 
threatening the overall branch coherence. 
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Table 13: 1: Local Government Trade Union Responses to Quality 
Managemen 
Union Definition, Opportunities & Example at Authority - Example at Workplace Strategy Dangers Wide Level Level 
Outright Proactive. None. None 
Opposition Theoretically viable where 
union legitimacy is total and 
hostility to quality 
management is total. Danger 
of becoming marginalised if 
union cannot bargain at 
local level on issues relating 
to quality management. 
Sceptical Proactive. None. Newcastle: Stewards/ 
Involvement Involvement in wider workers 
in Youth work 
quality agenda, but with sceptical about 
ISO 9000, 
own agenda possible. At 
but able to highlight wider 
' ' 
workplace level, may be quality 
issues and saw 
able to entrench legitimacy possibility of making 
of steward. Danger of quality an 
issue for 
legitimising managerial negotiation with union. 
strategy. 
Critical Proactive. Brent: were sceptical, but ' 
Wycombe: union became 
Support Support of managerial not against 
'quality . involved with PRP issues 
quality policy but with full 
Management consulted tied to quality 
, bargaining of 
but not bargained on management policy. 
terms/conditions. Danger of quality. 
Maintained 
political' stance and being co-opted into strengthened steward managerial agenda by organisation. assisting in implementation. 
Newcastle: supported 
policy as part of strategy 
to retain CCT contracts. 
Consulted in negotiations. 
Passive Reactive. Arun: union consulted/ None 
Support Consultation with advised 
of managerial 
decisions. Union 
management. Where union organisation weak. is weak, offers possibility of 
union involvement. Danger Wycombe: union 
of 'capture' and consulted but no 
undermining legitimacy of bargaining. 
union presence. 
No Reactive. None Brent: No involvement. 
Involvement Ability to disclaim Some alienation of members who felt supportlopposition if policy abandoned by union. fails succeeds. Danger of 
total marginalisation if Arun: No involvement 
policy is fully adopted. 
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Final Comments 
While the overall focus of this thesis is critical in nature, there are a number of 
implications that arise that could be of practical use to the labour movement within the 
public sector. The election, in 1997, of a Labour government provides opportunities for 
both the labour movement as a whole and public sector workers in particular. While 
concerns have been raised within this thesis about the content of the 'New Labour' 
package, in relation to public sector reform and the re-appraisal of the Party's links with 
the trade union movement, strong links with both remain. While the 'New Labour' 
agenda is implicitly pluralist in its 'partnership' models of industrial relations, it is 
likely to provide a more favourable environment for trade unions than the pro-actively 
anti public sector and union-hostile approach of the previous Conservative 
governments. This in itself is an opportunity. The labour movement should be able to 
take advantage of some of the good will generated, here, though retaining a strong 
independent and critical capacity to proactively promote the interests of working 
people. 
In the rush to promote themselves to employers as 'responsible partners', trade unions 
should not take managerial good will for granted. Unions should take advantage of 
'partnership' where offered but should not assume that all employers will gravitate 
towards 'partnership/stakeholding'. Some of most financially successful companies 
have taken an explicitly unitarist line on employment relations (Dixons and Rentokil) 
without any adverse affects to their long term financial prospects, so it should not be 
assumed that the rhetoric of partnership will remain 'best practice' any longer than 
6corporatism' was in the 1970s or than the current vogue for 'empowering staff, 
6 entrepreneurial management' are likely to in the individualistic approaches to 
managing staff. 
Unions' attitudes to quality management practices should be based upon this principle. 
Where an employer is consulting with a trade union about a quality management 
policy, the union is likely to find benefits in being involved. Providing that the union 
can maintain some distance from actively supporting the implementation of 
management policy, union involvement can enable the union to learn about the 
processes involved and be able to develop its own quality agenda. Within the public 
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service environment, the trade union also has an opportunity to develop its own quality 
agenda based upon increased membership participation - itself informed by concerns 
experienced by the recipients and users of public services. 
Reflections 
In many ways the format of this thesis is constrained by the formal expectations of how 
theses are laid out. While empiricism has been explicitly been rejected as an 
epistemological approach here, the formal presentation may imply differently. The 
implied assumption, in the formal chapter structure, may appear to be an empiricist 
approach to research, being of the format; literature review, hypothesis development, 
methodology, empirical testing of hypothesis and conclusion formula. However, in the 
'real world' of research such a chapter structure makes for a logical means of presenting 
work in a relatively accessible and readable manner and could thus is considered 
legitimate. This is so because it is not being claimed that the actual process of research 
has followed the linear pattern that the chapter structure suggests. As noted in section 
IV, the theory, method and data used in this thesis developed over time: partly 
developed mid-range theory, informed by meta-theory, was used at initial empirical 
stages to inform more developed mid-range theory, in turn used to develop the tools, 
questions and scope of further empirical investigation. 
As an example of this, at the outset of this research an interest in assessing the impact 
of quality management in local government was informed by the apparent increased 
interest in these practices as a result of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) in 
local government. However, while further research more than confirmed the level of 
growth in quality management, a wider spread of influences seemed to be the cause. 
While one of these issues was undoubtedly CCT, further reading revealed that 
cmanagerialism' - as defined by Pollitt and others - seemed to be a more appropriate 
concept to define the whole range of issues facing local government changes. If the 
empiricist model of research was to honestly adhered to, then the structure of the thesis 
- as in, no doubt, most real research - would legitimately have to follow this line of 
hypothesis/assessment of hypothesis/antithesis structure. 
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Some opportunities were missed in this research. It is regretted that - due to local 
government re-organisation - none of the full case-studies could be conducted in 
Scotland - given that the research was being directed from Glasgow, and where the 
largest local authority in Europe was based. It is also regretted that the research in 
Hackney could not be completed to a satisfactory level to report as a full case-study. 
Some rich interview data was effectively lost as a result. Other regrets are, perhaps, 
more minor, though not insignificant. Given hindsight, certain aspects of questionnaire 
design would have been reconsidered. In particular it is considered, now, that omitting 
'grade' from coding information made it impossible to separate managers' views from 
workers views. Judging, anecdotally, by comments on returned questionnaires, there 
appeared to be a strong correlation between 'managers' and 'very strongly pro quality 
management' sentiments. Evidence of polarisation between managers and staff on these 
issues could have made very interesting additional survey findings. 
A vital contribution to this thesis was made by those people willing to be interviewed, 
by those people who responded to questionnaires and by the union branches that 
enabled me to conduct the survey of their members. While grateful acknowledgement is 
made, here, to those people, I additionally intend to 'give back' some of this research to 
(at least some) of those who contributed. For practical reasons, this feedback will be to 
the union branches involved, in the form of providing reports and summaries of the 
surveys. 
There are, as would be expected, opportunities for further research on the issues 
covered in this thesis. At the fundamental level the themes of managerialism, 
employment relations and local government are themselves dynamic - subject to the 
competing forces of historical precedent, shifting power relations and political trends. 
More specifically, however, some changes are likely to have occurred in the actual case 
studies involved in this research. It is known, for example, that a new chief executive 
has been appointed at Newcastle who has prioritised organisational restructuring under 
the theme of quality. It is possible that important changes will occur in contrast to those 
reported here. It may be interesting to revisit this - and other - authorities - to see what 
changes have occurred. Will a more centrally directed management quality strategy 
affect work in this scenario? How will management involve the highly entrenched 
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union? How will the union respond? How will workers respond to more 'cultural' 
approaches to quality? 
In any case, the events, attitudes and opinions reported here, remain valid testimonies 
of the situations in four authorities between 1995 and 1997, however situations may 
change in the future. 
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Background 
This paper presents some of the findings of research conducted in local government. It 
is concerned with the role being played by quality programmes in an environment of 
diminishing resources, declining job security and a political/managerial consensus that 
has sought to displace a public service ethos with a customer-led managerialist agenda 
(Pollitt 1990). 
a) Managerialism 
Managerialism is a set of beliefs and practices, at the core of which bums the seldom-tested 
assumption that better management will prove an effective solvent for a wide range of 
economic and social ills (Pollitt 1990) 
Managerialism has been driven by successive post-1979 governments inspired by new 
right beliefs about the nature of ihe public sector. While much of this has been 
inconsistent, one trend has been constant; the desire to constrain public spending by the 
use of financial management initiatives underpinned by a 'three E's' philosophy 
(Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness). In the case of local authorities, Central 
Government had to rely on a number of proxy measures to impose its agenda where 
authorities were controlled by political opponents (e. g. Audit Commission monitoring, 
capping, compulsory competitive tendering Citizen's Charter performance evaluation 
etc). This has all been designed to impose a cost-reducing ethos into the structure of 
local government and move the focus of decision-making away from the discretionary 
and political, towards the operational and managerialist. 
Underpinning the managerialist agenda at the outset was the assertion that public sector 
organisations were overly subject to coercion by organised labour and a major part of 
central government's managerialist agenda for local government was to impose 
'flexible' labour-market conditions, the intention being to undermine the bargaining 
power of organised labour. Most significant in this has been CCT, which has forced 
councils to re-structure services and functions into cost-centres in order to be directly 
comparable to commercial competitors. The CCT process was fine-tuned over a 
number of years to ensure that factors other than cost could not be used to award a 
contract. In labour intensive services such as the direct service organisations this meant 
downward pressure on wages and conditions, despite some protection being latterly 
available through TUPE (Rainnie 1994; Vincent-Jones & Harries 1996). 
With the collapse of the new urban left (NUL) challenge to Government policy in the 
late 1980's, the rump of the policy agenda that remained with. the 'post' NUL has been 
one that has converged with the new-right managerialist vision: the pursuit of customer 
value for money in public services. Concerted efforts have been made to lose the 
'loony-left' image associated with the NUL and New Labour wishes to be seen, 
primarily, as financially responsible: 
... residents will receive customer contracts setting out the standard of service to expect; when 
and how the service will be delivered; meaningful figures on how much the service costs; 
what to do and who to contact if things go wrong; a firm timetable and procedure for dealing 
with complaints and, where appropriate, paying compensation. (The Quality Commission - 
Labour Party Policy Directorate 199 1) 
Table i shows the effect that changes have had on total employment; rising between 
1985 and 1990. This rise between 1985-90 is high in the Metropolitan and London 
Boroughs due to the effect of the abolition of the Metropolitan Counties in 1986 and 
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the subsequent transfer of responsibilities (and personnel) to these Boroughs. Between 
1990 and 1995, however, employment has fallen back sharply. 
Table 1: Change in Total Employment 1985 - 95 
1985-90 1990-95 
All +6.9 -9.3 
% difference in number of County +5.1 -9.4 
Council employees (mean) District +6.5 -8.4 
Met's +30.2# -12.4 
LBC's +10.5# -18.6 
V figures incluce displaced statttrom transleroT serviceSTrOM ULU ano ivietropoman L; ouncils I gtsfj. 
Source Data: Local Government Yearbook 1985,1990,1995; Joint Staffing Watch 1985,1990,1995 (Dep't 
of Environment/Welsh Office) 
Table ii shows how the distribution of total employment has consistently being moved 
from full-time to part-time employment. 
Table ii: Full-Time Employment 1985 - 95 
1985 1990 1995 
All Councils 82% 80% 75.5% 
(All) 50% 49% 47.5% 
County (Labour) 54.5% 52% 51% 
_ (Other) 50% 48% 45.5% 
(All) 84% 82% 79% 
District _ (Cons) 84% 81% 75% 
% of all employees at (Labour) 86% 84% 80% 
Council who are full-time (Other) 86% 84% 79% 
(median) (All) 61% 59% 56% 
Met's (Labour) 63.5% 60% 57% 
(Other) 58% 54% 54% 
(All) 67% 62% 59% 
LBC's (Labour: ):: [ 76% 65% 59.5% 
(Others) 1 64% 60% 57% 
bource uata: LOCal Uovemment YearbOOK 1965,1 99u, i %wo; joinE waTring vvaicn 1 %000,1 totiv, I two (Uep't oT 
EnvironmentNVelsh Office) 
b) Quality Management 
Local government's interest in quality management has been due to a number of 
factors; 
it is derived from private sector management methodology 
it fits well with a 3E's approach to publk administration 
it is officially endorsed by central government; either directly in the case of the 
Charter Mark award scheme; as 'best practice' in the case of TQM; or as 
government sponsored as in the case of liP and ISO 9000 
it is 'customer' oriented 
quality is seen as universally desirable 
it is seen as being capable of 'empowering' managers over 'unaccountable' 
professionals 
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* it is compatible with 'new pLiblic management', currently in VOgLle 
Definitions of quality in managerialist methodologies such as total quality management 
(TQM) are based upon specific criteria developed for the private-sector In the post-war 
period. The basic definition of qualify here is that of a product's noll-price value 
characteristics. The enhancement of quality within a product or service could be seen as 
an enhancement of its valuefi)r inoney and is defined as its 'fitness for purpose' as 
perceived by the customer (Deming 1982). 
Data from an LGMB survey indicates that the prevalence of quality methods has 
increased (see figure 1). Upon this evidence. both Conscrvative and L'bour controlled 
councils seem equally likely to adopt such policies principally due to I convergence III 
party ideology on this issue. 
Figure i: Local Government Use of Quality Methods 
100 - 0% L/A's with 
90 - (any) Policy 
1994 80- 
70 - 
60 - 
11111% L/A's with 
50 - (any) Policy 
1995 40 
30 
20 
0% L/A's with 
10 (any) Policy 
0 1996 
C, 
0 a) -ýt 
.2 a) tE0 
4 -IC .2 CL 0 
ý,, V) 
m0E 4) 
0 a) =V-, U) 0 
CL L) E0 
a. 
CI) C L) I 0 (L t m L) 
Source dataý LGMBi 1994,1995,1996 
b) Quality, Productivity and Local Government 
In an environment where Success cannot be judged by increased revenue through 
increased market share, quality management works oil (1111'erent performance criteria. 11' 
the essential nature of such methodologies is to enhance Value added, however, LlUallty 
management methods could be seen as being used to cither enhance the output Of a 
service at no additional cost, or to maintain the level 01' a given SCI-VICC at a rCdIICCd 
cost. This, essentially, is now the nature Of the policy distinction between the two Illaill 
political parties oil local government. Both positions, however, have Hn pl lCat loll's 1'01' 
the issue of work intensification. In both cases work condUCted by Council Staff IS 
intended to be able to deliver better value for money. Given that illost of the \ýork 
involved in local government is labour intensive, and that productivity gains will not, in 
the current environment, be rewarded financially (because increasing productivity will 
not deliver increased revenue) quality management in I public service environ"Ic"t 
could be equated with work intensification. 
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TQM seeks to transform the aims and foci of an organisation. The key factor in this, in 
terms of transforming working practices, is the creation of customer-supplier chains 
within the organisation (Oakland 1993; Tuckman 1995). The creation of 'purchaser- 
provider splits' in local authorities, as part of CCT, has achieved much of this (Painter 
199 1; Shaw et al 1994). Walsh (1995) notes that, as a result of the pursuit of quality in 
local government, the burden of work has shifted through a greater emphasis on front 
line staff 'empowerment'. Linked to this there have been drastic reductions in staffing 
through increased 'flexibility' and a tighter control of absenteeism. This implies an 
increased 'management by stress' in local government. 
Table iii provides some tentative evidence of how these changes to full-time 
employment in local government could be seen in terms of productivity. Full-time 
employment as a proportion of the borough population (which could crudely be equated 
to the work-rate required) has consistently fallen, particularly from 1985 onwards. 
Table iii: % Change in Full-Time Employment (as Proportion of 
Population) 1985: 1995 
1985-90 1990-95 
All Councils -0.1% -14% 
(All) -2.8% -14.5% 
County (Labour) -0.4%* -12%* 
(Other) -3.5% -16% 
(All) -0.2% -12.5% 
% difference in number of full- District (Cons) -0.55% -15% 
time Council employees as a (Labour) -1.15% -10% 
proportion of Borough population (Other) 0.76% -14% 
(median) (All) 2.75%# -16% 
Met's (Labour) 1.79%# -16% 
(Other) 4.72%# -16% 
(All) 6.73%# -25%* 
LBC's (Labour) 5.44%#* -19%* 
(Others) 7.28%# -2ý%* 
* sample less than 1 0/missing cases>sample cases. 
# figures include displaced staff from transfer of services from GLC and Metropolitan Councils 1986. 
Source Data: Local Government Yearbook 1985,1990,1995; Joint Staffing Watch 1985,1990,1995 (Dep't of 
Environment/Welsh Office) 
C) Quality, Commitment and Legitimacy 
TQM-type approaches differ to classic Taylorist approaches in their more sophisticated 
approach to employee attitudes. Whereas Taylor asserts that instrumentalism (i. e. 
financial incentives) is the only means by which management can deter 'soldiering', in 
TQM, the management of 'culture' requires a greater ideological significance in that 
management legitimacy is seen as a function of 'leadership' and of its capacity to be 
able to generate employee loyalty (Tuckman 1995; Legge 1995). Deming (op cit. ), 
notably, asserts how peer pressure and 'pride of workmanship' can be used to bring 
dissent into line. All of this potentially challenges the more traditional motivational 
forms within local government - the 'public service ethos', which is based upon 
'professional loyalties. Morgan and Murgatroyd state: 
TQM is clearly subversive (i. e. its pyramid of status control) and its adoption would call for 
radical revision in these regards in its implementation in the public sector. of course, it is in 
any case true that the status or rank differentials of yesteryear have been considerably 
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modified, TQM or no TQM, but the point to be made here is that TQM application would call 
for modification to be designed-in, so that working relations recognise the needs of customer- 
supplier chains with full reciprocity of input to the quest for quality improvement. (Morgan 
and Murgatroyd 1994) 
d) Structural Re-organisation and Collective Bargaining 
The uptake of TQM in the 1980's occurred simultaneously with the attempted 
emasculation of trade union collective bargaining power. The introduction of similar 
methods into the highly unionised local government sector could be expected, then, to 
witness a number of tensions. 
Implementing TQM successfully into a local authority implies structural re- 
organisation of some sort. Through its focus on performance appraisal and devolved 
decision-making, TQM tends t6 shift the focus of collective bargaining to the local 
level. This may have serious implications for the bargaining structures that trade unions 
operate under in local government, which is based overwhelmingly, on Whitley-based 
national structures. Reldted to this is that TQM requires the 'delayering' of the 
organisation, possibly causing a by-passing of established lines of communications in a 
highly unionised set-up. Where stewards are by-passed on shop-floor decision-making 
issues, unions could find themselves isolated and could face legitimacy problems. For 
example, the attempt to introduce quality circles intb Ford Motor Co. in the 1980's was 
largely a failure because of the perceived threat that this posed for steward organisation 
(Starkey& McKinlay 1989 ) 
Methodology 
Research was primarily based on four detailed case study authorities. Research 
methods included the interviewing of managers, UNISON officials and on 
questionnaire surveys on the UNISON memberships in each authority. The authorities 
chosen were selected because of their (stated) high use of quality management methods 
and TQM (based upon LGMB Quality Initiatives Survey 1994). From these authorities, 
four were selected to represent differing political and organisational types. 
1. London Borough Council. Conservative 'new suburban right'. High profile quality 
policy linked to devolved cost-centre based management structure separating 
'commissioning' functions from 'contractor' functions. Large scale job losses. 
Relations between Council and UNISON have been hostile and membership has 
been falling. 
2. South East District Council. Hung council (Labour/Liberal-Democrat), though 
historically this has always been a Conservative borough. Operate quality policy 
based on 'Performance Management', which involves work appraisal, performance 
related pay and some use of team-work. UNISON has picked up new members 
following Council's new policy of direct consultation. 
3. South Coast District Council. Conservative. Approach to quality is a 'Customer 
Care' approach. Council has been long-term 'test-bed' for Audit Commission. 
Demography of borough contains one of the highest proportion of elderly citizens in 
the UK which has shaped some of the quality policy agenda (e. g. disability issues). 
A further two authorities were initially included but could not be considered as comparable here: one was subject to 
the 'reorganisation' in Scotland in 1996 and the other became problematic due to loss of access at [after stages - 
preventing the staff survey. 
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UNISON is low profile but has been recruiting new members through white collar 
CCT bids. 
4. Northern Metropolitan Borough Council. Labour stronghold and has been del-ined as 
an archetypal Tordist' council in its outlook to public service provision (centralised, 
all in-house provision). Quality policy pursued (Community and Leisure Department 
only) is quality manual based (ISO 9000). UNISON has high membership and 
density, has full-time officials with support staff. FLill consultation with ruling 
Labour group on Council. Quality seen as means by which to maintain 111-11OLISC 
services sub - ject 
to CCT. 
Findings 
Some issues were perceived universally, particularly on overall perceptions of tile 
quality policy, work intensification, and the likely effect on union organisation. In most 
cases, however, perceptions were dependent upon the context ofthe particular situation 
into which the quality policy was implemented: the recent employment and out- 
sourcing histories of the authorities, the position of the union within the authority, tile 
nature and type of quality policy being pursued, and the response of tile union to tile 
above factors. 
a) The Effect on Employment Practices 
Workers at the four authorities felt overwhelmingly that the introduction of' tile quality 
policy into their workplace had increased workloads (see figure 11) 
Figure ii: The effect of the qualitY policy on workloads 
0. 
30. 
20 
10 
0-M 
i ing incý. a lot incr. a bit not c ngced ded. a bit decr. a lot 
Affect of Q Policy on work loads 
On the related issues of increased staff exposure to 'custorner' demands and perception 
of quality management methods as general productivity tools, questions Were Set in tile 
11orm of statements and asked to respond on a five-point likert-scalc as to whether or nol 
they agreed. 'Fables 1 and n shows a high level of agrecinclit to tile assertions that 
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quality management methods are being used to over-expose staffto custorners and as a 
tool to increase work in rclation to wages (productivity). 
Table i 
Question 6(iii) 
'Colic-C1.17fin. Council clivoincrs is (I// ver ,v 
well, but it 's 
Cowicilv4iff whoscein to be been-ing the brunt qfil till' 
agree disagree 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 
Responses(No) 96 72 57 30 
Missing cases ý 10 
Table ii 
Question 6 (vii) to 
be 41 Ineems by which jo get 
more work ow q vvtlse ill pell" im 
agree disagree 
Scale 2 3 4 5 
Responses (No) 95 75 60 36 16 
issim, cases - 13 I 
The cause of this overall perception (increased work I oads/in anage men t by stress) varied 
according to the particular policy being pursued in each authority, but staff cutbacks 
and the increased paperwork involved in quality procedures \,,, cre aniong tile most 
frequent responses. Workloads were also affected by tearn-based orgailisation, where it 
was introduced as part of a quality policy. though this was somewhat haphazard: in 
some cases teamwork, in some form, was standard practice in certain services anyýý, -ay. 
Where teamwork did seem to have the most inipact was in regulatory functions, where 
the nature of the work tended to be more *professional' and accorded more sell' 
autonomy to workers. However, when linked with performance targets, tearnwork was 
simultaneously seen as increasing workloads, as was expressed by an environmental 
health (food premises) inspector: 
"... Lasl year we were havingsome tlýlficullv in inceling the farget... Acre was 
a commitment by the slqfflo actually go out and tit) I/le. fim(l premises so we 
aclually met the largel ... 
[This yearl we're cerfaitil 
, 
I, l(wging behilld'. wc, rc we/I 
short. The officers ... agreed 
to go oul in the evening and work 
they're improving their own pei. -fin-mance b, 1), perhaps, pCCr PITSMIrC. '" 
(Environmental Health Team Leader: South Fast Disti-icl) 
Under different circurnstances, the application of' quality methods in the Lonclon 
Borough case-study faced similar problems but, PCHIZIPS, at a 11101-C aCLItC ICVel: 
--the degree, no",, o 'the rethiction q 'the work- ve and the ex1ra work VV fin 
we're expected to do - the demand that's placed oil us - is slich that /here 
comes a point where actual qualiýy ofservice, now, wi/I reduce. 11'e'vesoaked- 
ip Iols ofivork - lois ofextra demands being phiced oil us. Wc managed to 
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lake on extra work .. 
but they don't seem to accept there is a limit to how lor 
you can go with that. " (Environmental Health Manager London Borough) 
b) Commitment and Public Service 
The above findings hints at how work rates can be tied in with aspects of'loyalty" and 
to 'public service ethos'. This issue proved a somewhat more difficult area. Provisional 
findings indicate that workers surveyed have tended to be in favour of the introduction 
of quality methods and, narrowly, feel more valued as a result of appraisal. In terms of' 
the broad issue of commitment and loyalty to the goals and legitimacy ofrnanagcment, 
results were ambiguous. For this the responses to the following likert-scale statements 
were used as indicators and the responses are shown in tables in - v. 
Table iii 
Question 6 (iv) 'Pei. -Ibi-mance apj)raisal fends Io make I)eoplefi, el mmv 
.. valited - in Iheir work' 
agree disagree 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 
Responses 52 72 70 45 
Missing cases ý7 
Table iv 
Question 6 (v) '()II411ilY is till issile //It// boill 111(milgelnellf tilldsla. 11 coll ( 0111t, 
logethei- on' 
agree disagree 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 
Responses 114 80 57 19 14 
missill" cases -8 
Table v 
Question 6 (viii) 
work th(in was Me ceise befinv* 
agree disagree 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 
Responses 33 54 77 64 58 
Missim-, cases =9 
In combining and compressing thesc responscs a broadly indiffercilt rcsponse is implicd 
(see figure 111) 
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Arguably this is not an easy issue to address clearly on a questionnaire. Responses from 
interviews, and individual responses indicated that the context of partICUIar issues 
shaped workers opinions to the broad Issue of 'commitment' and of management 
legitimacy. This was most apparent at the Lontion Boi-ough case-study, where 
'commitment' was often related directly to a Culture of tear within tile devolved 
workplace: 'empowered' managers even found this difflicult at times: 
-Unfortunately there is an element qfkar in it. I sometimes have to really, 
work on people to persuade them, when they've been ill, dial the ,v 
shouldn't 
lake it as annual leave... Fundamentally it is to do with changing work culture. 
When Ifirstjoined [this authority] I almost had the received wisdom 1hat I 
could be sick several times a j, ear without it becoming an issue and I almost 
savv it as untouchable ... 
It's to do with work culture change: it's to (10 With 117C 
idea ol'Quality Management - that people tire no longer going to he allowed 
to get awaj, with this sort ofthing. I think commitment is parl o/ it as well - 
getting people to actually, work together as a team and to understand the 
impact ofabsenleeism. fin- the rest of1he leam. - (Librai-y Mzinzigei-: Lon(ion 
BorOLIgh) 
C) Union Responses 
Trade union involvement has varied according to the historical relationship that the 
union has had in each authority. This has ranged from full negotiation, at semor 
political and chief officer level, on all coLHICII-wide quality initiatives (Norihern 
Borough); to the marginallsing of the union (through a lack of consultation) - and a 
subsequent attempt at derecognition. Survey results have strongly indicated that the role 
of' the union representative/shop steward has not been enhanced as a result of the 
quality initiatives (see table vi and vii; and figurc iv flor compressed result', ). 
Figure iii: Quality policy has reinforced mana-qement leqitimacv 
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Table A 
Question 6 (vi) 
With (blellit), H(III(Igen /('/I/, IncimWei-s tend io lulk dii-eci1v lo 
siqft und hvlwss Me union' 
agree disagree 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 
Responses 105 69 82 16 7 
Missing cases - 13, 
Table vii 
Question 6 (ix) , ()IIalin, II'lanagonclif 
hus enluinced /he I-O/e Offhe 1111ion 
i-epl-esentafive in thc workplace' 
agree disagree 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 
Responses 6 9 91 56 
M issim, cases ý 17 1 
Figure iv: Quality Management has Undermined the Position of the Union 
60 
50 
40, 
30- 
20- 
10- 
a- 01 MiAing airee in if. dis gree 
Q Policy has undermined the union 
In terms of' local variations OLIt-sourcing policy, iiiiioii-iiiiiiýigeiiiciit-coillicill()I, 
relations, union membership as well as the MItUrC 01' the aCtUal L111ality pOIICy I)CIng 
pursued were of great importance. In the Lotidmi Borough casc-stutk the union had 
been under serious pressure for a number ol'years. A counci I liostilc to the union, \\hich 
had been out-sourcing and breaking Lip tile structure of the authority and been making 
large cuts to the workforce (approximately 5W/o over five years) had had tile eflect of 
marginalising the union. In this case, the introduction 01' the LlUality policy \\', Is done 
with little or no consultation with the union. Vossibly as a result ofthis, some I INISON 
members' responses to open-ended questions Oil the survey Indicated that staff were 
Appendices 
liable to feel more exposed to bullying by managers and felt that 'the union was 
perceived to have lost touch with workplace issues. 
In contrast to the above case, the union branch at the Northern Metropolitan Borough 
had a wholly different relationship with the quality policy. The quality policy, here was 
being notional-ly supported by the union in that it was intended to ensure successful in - 
house CCT bids. Interestingly, though, because of the formalised nature of ISO 9000, 
there were some indications that the quality manual could be drawn into the broad 
collective bargaining environment. This was because formal quality manual revisions 
were required when working practices were changed and this involved some form of 
negotiation with staff and or stewards. 
Conclusions 
On the three broad issues discussed - the way that quality management affects work 
intensification, commitment, and union legitimacy - there were some elements that 
were strongly affected by local conditions, but also some issues that were commonly 
felt. 
Overall, the introduction of quality management has led to greater work intensification 
(by workload) but with ambiguous results on an increased sense of 'commitment'. The 
position of the union was universally seen as being likely to be undermined by the 
widespread use of quality management, although there were signs that union activity 
was shifting focus toward workplace. As Fairbrother (1996) notes, such a trend could 
signal the beginnings of renewal in public sector trade unionism. There were significant 
differences in the nature of trade union activity here, though. Where the authority had 
been subjected to major re-structuring and job losses (the London Borough) the union 
was severely undermined which affected the way in which the quality policy was 
implemented. This in turn affected staff exposure to increased pressure on performance 
and 'commitment' which in turn further weakened the legitimacy of the union as it was 
being seen as being unable to resist changes occurring at the local workplace level. In 
contrast, where the authority had had a long negotiating relationship with the authority, 
through shared political interests and high union membership and density, the quality 
policy being pursued was only partial in nature and, in part, it was seen as a means to 
an end. In this scenario, and because of the formalised nature of the policy being 
pursued, quality seemed to be emerging as an issue in which was legitimate as a 
bargaining issue for stewards. 
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APPENDIX H 
QUESTIONNAIRE VERSION I (STEWARDS) 
LoCAL GOVERNMENT AND QUALITY 
Questionnaire on the opinions of trade 
unionists to 'Quality Management' 
(1) 
This questionnaire is part of some research about the use of Quality 
Management' in local government. So far this research has involved 
assessing managers' opinions about the staffing issues raised by 'quality 
management'. This questionnaire is designed to find out whatstaff who are 
members of a trade union think. 
I am using the term 'Quality Management' as a broad term because 
Councils use their own terms for this (e. g. The Quality Council'; 'Quality 
Services'; 'Performance Management'; 'Customer Care'). I would 
therefore ask that when a question refers to 'Quality Management', that 
you 'translate' that into whatever the local term is at your workplace. 
This research is completely independent of the Council and of the Union 
and all your answers will be anonymous. Please be as frank as you like 
with your answers. While approval has been given by your union branch 
for this survey, none of the answers that you give will be traced back to 
you by either the Council or the Union. 
Please place your completed questionnaire in the addressed envelope 
provided and return it, sealed, either to your UNISON office or post it 
directly to me (the addressed envelope is freepost). 
Ian Roper 
Dept of Social & Economic Research 
University of Glasgow 
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What Council department/service are VOU based'? (c.,,. -social services': 
'Leisure' etc. ) 
.......................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................... 
2) How long have you worked for 
_the 
Council" (please tick box) 
underl year 
1-5 years 
5- 10 years 
10 - 20 years 
over 20 years 
3) How long have you been a Union Representative? (years/montils) 
....................................... I .................................................................. 
4) How many members do you represent? 
.................................................................................................... 
5) How aware are you of the COLIIICil management Is quality policy" 
(please tick one box only) 
Fully aware of management's Council-wide quality policy 
Aware that the Council has got a quality policy 
Only aware of management's quality policy in my service 
Only vaguely aware of any management quality policy 
Unaware of any management quality policy 
6) What do you think about tile Council's quality PoliC)"? (please lick one 
box only 
Happy with the policy in general 
Indifferent to the policy 
Unhappy with the policy in general 
Don't know 
(office use) 
El 
L1 
11 
Ll 
(please turn over) 
Appendices 
In your service/dcpartment. has the introduction ol"Quality 
Management' been combined with changes to employment 
contracts or working practices in any of the following areas'? (please 
tick all boxes that apply) 
Introduced more 'flexible' working hours 
Simplified grading structures 
Introduced more 'flexible' employment contracts 
Introduced performance related pay 
Introduced work appraisal 
Introduced 'team-working' 
Other (please note below) 
2) 1 low much are you in favour of thesc changes? (please tick box: I 
strongly in favour, 3= neutralý 5= strongly hostile etc. I I'you have no op I LIO 
not tick any box 
in favour hostile 
Flexible working hour-s7-ýý 
111213141 
Simplified grading structures 12345 
Performance related pay 1234 
ppraisal 1234 
Team working 1234 
'Other' changes 1234 
T] 
(office use) 
FFI 
(please turn over) 
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3) If 'teams' are used at your workplace... 
(a) ... how has it affected workloads for stall'? (please tick one box 
0111v) 
On balance, team-work has increased work loads a lot 
On balance, team-work has increased work loads a little 
On balance, team-work has not increased work loads 
On balance, team-work has decreased work loads a little 
On balance, team-work has decreased work loads a lot 
Not applicable: team-work not used 
(b) 
... 
has everyone's workloads been affected the same by 
teams? (please tick one box only) 
Yes, everyone has been affected the same by 'teams' 
No, some have been more affected than others 
Not applicable: team-work not used 
(please state what types of work have been more affected by 'team- 
work', if applicable) 
........................................................................................................ 
4) How has the introduction of 'Quality Management' (QM) as a 
whole, affected work loads for staff in your service/department? 
(please tick one box otilý 
On balance, QM has increased work loads a lot 
On balance, QM has increased work loads a little 
On balance, QM has not increased work loads 
On balance, QM has reduced work loads a little 
On balance, QM has reduced work loads a lot 
(please turn over) 
(office use) 
11 
- 
F1 
FTI 
F1 
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5) Has everyone's workloads been affected the same by 'Quality 
Management' (QM)? (please tick one box only) 
Yes, everyone has been affected the same by QM 
No, some have been more affected than others 
Unsure/No opinion 
(please state what types of work have been more affected by 'Quality 
Management', if applicable) 
......................................................................................................... 
Has *Qualitv Manauement' affected the role ofunion rcm, escritatives 
(office use) 
Ll 
EF1 
in consultation between management and stafr? (please tick box) 
I yes I ýnoý F1 
(if 'yes', please state in what way they have changed) 
................................................................................................... F Fl 
'? ) I las the introduction of 'Qualitv Management' alTected the role and 
influence of union representatives in any ofthe l'ollowing areas? 
(please tick appropriate box for each category 
reduced same increased 
u0 influence infl ence influence 
- 
Working practices 
1 1 
Grading arrangement-s- 
T I I 
Health and Safety 
Holiday entitlement 
Absenteeism F1 
Sickne s 
II 
(please turn over) 
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3 3) In your capacity as a trade union representative, have you been 
involved in any dispute on behalf of a member, about any aspects of 
'Quality Management'? (please tick one box only) 
Yes, more than 10 times 
Yes, less than 10 times 
Yes once or twice 
No 
(if yes, please state the general issue involved) 
........................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................ 
4) In what forms have managers communicated their 'QUality 
, ement' programme to employees? (please tick all boxes thatapplý) 
Manag 
I Staff presentation 
I Video 
Team briefings 
Through the union 
Haven't communicated 
5) What backup/support have you required from tIIC L1111011 011 tile iSSLIC 
of 'Quality Management'? (please tick all boxes that apply 
Advice from full-time official 
Information pack from the union 
Advice/discussion from other colleagues in the union 
Haven't required any support 
No support available 
In your capacity as a trade union representative, have vou been 
involved in general discussions/ineetings etc, , bOLIt ilSI)CCtS Of 
'Quality Management I? (plcase tick box) 
(a) ... with management 
(b) ... with members 
[: jjýTno 
(please turn over) 
(office use) 
IS 
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7) How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
(please tick box: I= strongly agree; 3- neutral; 5- strongly disagree etc. Do not 
tick a box for any statements that are not applicable to your own experiencc) 
(i) *The quality policy has not affected members' concerns 
about day to day issues' 
agree disagree 
112131415 
(ii) 'All this Quality Management stuff isjust a fad' 
agree disagree 
112131415 
-- 
(Iii) 'Concern for Council customers is all very well. but it's 
Council staff who seem to be bearing the brunt ofit all' 
I agree 
-F3 
disagree 
1112 -ý7L74 5 
v) appraisal tends to make people feel more 
valued" in their work' 
ý7a disagree 
1= 1231415 
(V) 'Quality is an issue that both management and staffcan collie 
together on' 
agree disagree 
112131415 
(Vi) 'With Quality Management, managers tend to talk directly to 
staff and bypass the union' 
agree disagree 
31415 
(Vii) 'Quality Management seems to be a means hy which to get 
more work out of employees Without all increase In pay I 
agree disagree 
112131415 
(Vill) 'Quality Management offers employees more say over their 
own work than was the case before I 
ý ree disagree 
1 27 13141 
. 
51 
(I X) 'Quality Management has enhanced the role ol'the union 
representative in tile workplace' 
n disagree] ee ý74.2 
13141 
Te 
(office use) 
LI 
LI 
LI 
LI 
7(1 
F1 
11 11 
L1 
LI 
(please turn over) 
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Please feel free to write down any other comments that you may have about the 
operation of 'Quality Management' In your workplace 
.................................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................... 
Thank you for your time 
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APPENDIX 
QUESTIONNAIRE VERSION 2 (LAY MEM13ERSHI 
LoCAL GOVERNMENT AND QUALITY 
Questionnaire on the opinions of union 
members to'Quality Management' 
(2) 
This questionnaire is part of a wider research project about the use of 
'Quality Management' in local government. Somejargon is used in this 
questionnaire, but please don't be put off. Here is a brief explanation of 
some of the terms you will come across: 
1) 'Quality Management': this questionnaire is being used in a number 
of councils. In each council a different term is used for various quality and 
customer care policies (e. g. sometimes it is 'Customer Care', sometimes it 
is 'Qual Services', sometimes it is '. The Quality Councir). Therefore, 
where you see the term 'Quality Management', the questionnaire is 
referring to the particular policy relating to quality or customer careatyour 
council. 
2) Other 
-jargon: where other 
jargon is used (e. g. flexible working 
practic ', 'Performance related p, 'work appraisar, etc. ) please just 
answer honestly. If you are not familiar with a term, it is probably because 
that practice is not being used in your council. 
While approval has been given by your union branch for this survey, none 
of the answers that you give will be traced back to you by either the 
Council or the Union. This research is completely independent. 
Please place your completed questionnaire in the addressed envelope 
provided and post it, internal mail, to the address shown. 
Ian Roper 
Dept of Social & Economic Research 
University of Glasgow 
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(office use) 
What Council department/service are you based'? 'Social serviccs'ý 
'Leisure' etc) 
.............................................................................................................. 
.............................................................................................................. F1 
2) How long have you worked for the Council? (please lick box) 
underl year 
1-5 years 
5- 10 years 
10 - 20 years 
3) 1 low long have you been a member of the Union? (montlis/years) 
11 
1 
.............................................................................................................. [: E I-low often do you attend Union meetings? (please tick one box only 
I attend all meetings 
I attend most meetings 
I attend some meetings 
I rarely attend meetings 
I do not attend any meetings 
5) How aware are you ofthe Council management's qUality poljcý' 
(nlease tick one hox onlv) 
Fully aware of management's Council-wide quality policy 
Aware that the Council has got a quality policy 
Only aware of management's quality policy in my service 
Only vaguely aware of any management quality policy 
Unaware of any management quality policy 
11 
11 
(please turn over) 
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6) What do you think about the Council's quality policy'? (please tick one 
box only) 
Happy with the policy in general 
Indifferent to the policy 
Unhappy with the policy in general 
Don't know 
In N our service/department. has the introduction ol'Quality 
Management' been combined with changes to employmen 
contracts or working practices in any of the follmving areas? (please 
tick all boxes that apply 
Introduced more 'flexible' working hours 
Simplified grading structures 
Introduced more 'flexible' employment contracts 
Introduced performance related pay 
Introduced work appraisal 
Introduced 'team-working' 
Other (please note below) 
(office use) 
F1 
EE 
(please turn over) 
Appendices 
2) How much are you in favour of these changes? (please tick box: I 
strongly in favour; 3= neutral; 5= strongly hostile etc. If you do not Ilave all 
opinion do not tick any box) 
in favour hostile 11 
If *teams' are used at your workplace... 
(a) 
... 
how has it affected workloads for stall'? (please tick one box 
only) 
On balance, team-work has increased work loads a lot 
On balance, team-work has increased work loads a little 
On balance, team-work has not increased work loads 
On balance, team-work has decreased work loads a little 
On balance, team-work has decreased work loads a lot 
Not applicable: team-work not used 
(b) 
... 
has everyone's workloads been alTected the sanic as a 
result of tearns? (please tick one box only) 
Yes, everyone has been affected the same by 'teams' 
No, some have been more affected than others 
Not applicable: team-work not used 
(please state what types of work have been more affected by 'team- 
work', if applicable) 
............................................................................................................. 
............................................................................................................. 
(please turn over) 
(office use) 
F1 
11 - 
F1 
F1 
F1 
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4) How has the introduction of 'Quality Management' (QM) as a 
whole, affected work loads for staff in your service/department? 
(please tick one box on]N, ) 
On balance, QM has increased work loads a lot 
On balance, QM has increased work loads a little 
On balance, QM has not increased work loads 
On balance, QM has reduced work loads a little 
On balance, QM has reduced work loads a lot 
5) Has everyone's workloads been affected the same by 'Quality 
Management' (QM)') (please tick one box only) 
Yes, everyone has been affected the same by QM 
No, some have been more affected than others 
Unsure/No opinion 
(please state what types of work have been more affected by 'Quality 
Management', if applicable) 
............................................................................................................. 
............................................................................................................. 
I las 'Quality Management' affected YOUr view OftIIC LIIIIOII', S IVIC III 
representing YOUr interests? (please tick box) 
yes no 
(if 'yes', please state in what way they have changed) 
............................................................................................................. 
(office use) 
EI 
11 
M- 
Ll 
11-1 
(please turn over) 
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2) Has the introduction of 'Quality Management' affiectcd the role and 
influence of union representatives in any of the followijig areas'? 
(please tick appropriate box for each cate, -ory) 
ireduced 
same increased 
influence influence influence 
Working practices 
Grading arrangements 
Health and Safety 
Holiday entitlement 
Absenteeism 
Sickness 
3) In what forms have managers communicated their 'Quality 
Management' programme to you? (please tick all boxes that apply) 
Staff presentation 
Video 
Newsletters 
Team briefings 
Through the union 
Haven't communicated 
4) What backUP/SLIpport have you required from the LilliOll 011 tile ISSLIC 
of 'Quality Management'? (please tick all boxes that apply) 
I Advice from full-time official 
II 
Information pack from the union II 
Advice/discussion from other colleagues in the union 
II 
I Haven't required any support II 
No 
(please turn over) 
(office use) 
1-1 
;I 
1ý ý, 
F1 
F1 
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5) Have you been involved in general discussions/meetings etc, ýIbOffl 
aspects of 'Quality Management'? (please tick box) 
(a) ... with management 
I yes 
(b) 
... with the Union yes n o)7 
6) How much do you agree or disagree with the following statemeWs 
(please tick box: I= strongly agreeý 3= neutralý 5= strongly disagree etc. Do not 
tick a box for any statements that are not applicable to your own experience) 
'The quality policy has not affected my concerns about day 
to day issues' 
agree disagree 
1123141 5_ 
'All this Quality Management stuff isjust a I'ad' 
agree disagree 
112131415 
'Concern for Council customers is all very well. but it's 
Council staff who seem to be bearing the brunt ofit all' 
agree disagree 
1ý- 213141 
0 V) Terformance appraisal tends to make people feel more 
valued" in their work' 
ýree disagre. 
1314 51 
-27 
(v) 'Quality is an issue that both management and stalfcan come 
together on' 
agree disagree 
1123141 5_ 
(vi) Qualitv Management, managers tend to talk (firectly to 
staff and bypass the union' 
agree disag ee 
11213141 
ý5 
(Vii) 'Quality Management seenis to be a nicans by which to get 
more work out ofemployees without an increase in pay' 
I agree disagre 
I 1_.. 123141 5ý 
(please turn over) 
(office use) 
F1 
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(office use) 
(viii) 'Quality Management offers employees more say over the"* 
own work than was the case before' 
agree disagree 
1112131415] 
F1 
(ix) *Quality Management has enhanced the role ofthe union 
representative in the workplace' 
agree disagree 
112131415 
8) Please feel free to write down any other comments that you may have about the 
operation of 'Quality Management' in your workplace 
I 
...... I .................................................................................................................................. 
......................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................... 
Thank you for your time 
Please put this form in the pre-addressed envelope pnwhkd and wuwn (Wwnml nmil) 
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APPENDIX iV 
QUESTIONNAIRE VERSION 3 (NEWCASTLE CLS 
STE 
LoCAL GOVERNMENT AND QUALITY 
Questionnaire on the opinions of trade 
unionists to 'Quality Management' 
(3) 
This questionnaire is part of some research about the use of Quality 
Management' in Local Government. So far this research has involved 
assessing managers opinions about the staffing issues raised by 'quality 
management'. This questionnaire is designed to find out whatstaff who are 
trade union representatives think. 
This research is completely independent of the Council and of the Union 
and all your answers will be anonymous. Please be as frank as you like 
with your answers. While approval has been given by your union branch 
for this survey, none of the answers that you give will be traced back to 
you by either the Council or the Union. 
Please place your completed questionnaire in the addressed envelope 
provided and return it, sealed, to your UNISON office via internal mail. 
Ian Roper 
Dept of Social & Economic Research 
University of Glasgow 
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(office use) 
What part of Leisure Services do you work'? (e.,,. 'Leisure Newcastle'ý 
Children's Services' etc. ) 
.............................................................................................................. 
.............................................................................................................. 
2) Flow long have you worked for Leisure Services? (please tick box) 
under 1 year 
1-5 years 
5- 10 years 
10 - 20 years 
over 20 years 
01 
3) Hoxk long have you been a Union Representative'? (montlis/years) 
.............................................................................................................. 
4) How many members do you represent? 
.............................................................................................................. F1 
5) How aware are you of Leisure Services' quality policy'? (please tick 
one box only) 
Fully aware of management's quality policy 
Aware that Leisure Services has got a quality policy 
Only aware of the quality policy in my service area 
Only vaguely aware of any quality policy 
Unaware of Leisure Services' quality policy 
6) What do you think about Leisure Services' quality policy'? (please lick 
one box only 
Happy with the policy in general 
Indifferent to the policy 
Unhappy with the policy in general 
Don'tknow 
11 
F] 
(please turn over) 
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Has the introduction of 'Quality Management' into Leisure Services 
been combined Nvith changes to employment contracts or working 
practices in any of the following areas? (please tick all boxes that apply) 
Introduced more 'flexible' working hours 
Simplified grading structures 
Introduced more 'flexible' employment contracts 
Introduced performance related pay 
Introduced work appraisal 
Introduced 'team-working' 
Other (please note below) 
2) How much are you in favour of the., 
strongly in favourý 3ý neutralý 5ý stronýl 
not tick any boxes 
working hours 
Simplified grading structures 
Performance related p7ay7= 
Work appraisal 
Team working 
I Other' changes 
;e changes? (please tick box: I- 
hostile etc. If you have no opnion & 
ýhýosti le Fi -nf a-vou r 
F TTI: ýýý 
F T-Eýýýý 
234 
2345 
FTIýýýý 
234i 
(office use) 
FTI 
(please turn over) 
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3) If - teams' are used at your workplace... 
(a) 
... 
how has it affected workloads for staft'? (please tick one box 
only) 
On balance, team-work has increased work loads a lot 
On balance, team-work has increased work loads a little 
On balance, team-work has not increased work loads 
On balance, team-work has decreased work loads a little 
On balance, team-work has decreased work loads a lot 
... has everyone's workloads been affected tile same as a 
result of teams? (please tick one box only) 
Yes, everyone has been affected the same by 'teams' 
No, some have been more affected than others 
Not applicable: team-work not used 
(please state what types of work have been more affected by 'team- 
work', if applicable) 
.............................................................................................................. 
4) Flow has the introduction of 'Quality Management" (QM) as 
-a whole, affecte I work loads for staff in your service/de artnient'. ) 
(please tick one box on]v 
On balance, QM has increased work loads a lot 
On balance, QM has increased work loads a little 
On balance, QM has not increased work loads 
On balance, QM has reduced work loads a little 
On balance, QM has reduced work loads a lot 
(office use) 
n 
El 
III 
(please turn over) 
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5) Has everyone's workloads been affected the same by 'Quality 
Management' (QM)'? (please tick one box only) 
Yes, everyone has been affected the same by QM 
No, some have been more affected than others 
Unsure/No opinion 
(please state what types of work have been more affected by 'Quality 
Management', if applicable) 
............................................................................................................. 
I las -Qualitý Management' allected thC I-OIC OfUlliOll I-CPI-C. Sentall\ C. 11 
in consultation between management and staff? (please tick box) 
yes no7: 
] 
(if 'yes', please state in what way they have changed) 
.............................................................................................................. 
2) Has the introduction of 'Oualitv Management' aft'ectcd the role and 
inflUence of union representatives in any ol'the 11611owing areas'. ) 
(please tick appropriate box for each catepry) 
reduced same Increased 
influence influence influence 
Working practices 
Health and Safety 
Holiday entitlement 
FZsenteeism -1 
Sickness 
use) 
El 
F7 
11 
ul 
Ll 
LI 
(please turn over) 
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3) In your capacity as a trade union representative, have you beei 
involved in any dispute on behalf of a member, about any aspects of' 
'Quality Management'? (please tick one box only) 
Yes, more than 10 times 
Yes, less than 10 times 
Yes once or twice 
(if yes, please state the general issue involved) 
............................................................................................................. 
............................................................................................................. 
4) In what forms have managers communicated dicir 'Quality 
Management' rogramme to 
Staff presentation 
Video 
Newsletters 
Team briefings 
Through the union 
Haven't communic 
5) What backup/support have YOU required from tile union oil the issuc 
ol"Quality Mana ement"? (pleLlse tick all boxes diat ý ý)IN) 
Advice from full-time official 
Information pack from the union 
Advice/discussion from other colleagues in the union 
Haven't required any support 
No support available 
6) In your capacity as a trade Ullion representative. liaw you been 
involved in general discussioils/mcclinýs etc, about aspects of 
*Quality Management"? (please tick box) 
(a) ... with management 
F-y-esT 
nol--ý 
(b) ... with members 
(please turn over) 
(office use) 
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7) How much do you agree or disagree with the lJollowing statements? 
(please tick box: I= strongly agree; 3- neutral; 5- strongly disagree ctc. Do not 
tick a box for any statements that are not applicable tO YOU own experience 
'The quality policy has not affected members' concerns 
about day to day issues I 
agree disagre 
2131415 
'All this Quality Management stuff isjust a fad' 
I agree disagree 
1-3 141 
_ýj 
for Council customers is all very well. but it's 
Council staff who seem to be bearing the brunt of', t all' 
ýýree disagree 
1 T- 125 
V) Terformance appraisal tends to make people feel more 
.. valued- in their work' 
Ereeý disagree 
1 
fff3 
1415 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
(vili) 
*Quality is an issue that both management and staffcan collie 
together on' 
disagree 
1 
F2 131415 
'With Quality Management, managers tend to talk directly to 
staff and bypass the union' 
I agree disagree 
1112131415 
*Quality Management seems to be a nicans hy which to get 
more work out of employees without al, increase in pay' 
agree disagree 
31415 
'Quality Management offiers employees more say over their 
own work than was the case before' 
I agree disag ý71 
(ix) 'Quality Management has enhanced tile role ofthe 11111011 
representative in the workplace' 
disagree 
L5 
(office use) 
LI 
LI 
Ll 
(please turn over) 
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Please feel free to write down any other comments that you may have about the 
operation of 'Quality Management' In your workplace 
Thank you for your time 
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APkNDIX 
QUESTIONNAIRE VERSION 4 (NEWCASTLE LAY 
MEMBERSHI 
LoCAL GOVERNMENT AND QUALITY 
Questionnaire on the opinions of union 
members to 'Quality Management' 
(4) 
This questionnaire is part of some research about the use of Quality 
Management' in Local Government. So far this research has involved 
assessing managers' opinions about the staffing issues raised by 'quality 
management'. This questionnaire is designed to find out whatstaff who are 
members of a trade union think. 
This research is completely independent of the Council and of the Union 
and all your answers will be anonymous. Please be as frank as you like 
about your answers. While approval has been given by your union branch 
for this survey, none of the answers that you give will be traced back to 
you by either the Council or the Union. 
Please place your completed questionnaire in the addressed envelope 
provided and return it, sealed, to your UNISON office via internal mail. 
Ian Roper 
Dept of Social & Economic Research 
University of Glasgow 
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What part ofl, elsure Serviccs do you \wrk? (e. g. Teisure 
'Children's Set-viccs'-e-tc. 
-) 
.............................................................................................................. 
.............................................................................................................. 
2) 1 low long have you worked I'Or Leisure Services? (plea e_ tick box) 
under 1 year 
1-5 years 
5- 10 years 
10 - 20 years 
over 20 years 
I loxv long have YOU heCll ýl IIIClllbCt' 01'111C 11111011? (iliontlis \eill-s) 
........................................................................................................... 
1 IONN OftCll (10 N OLI attend I Inion niectings'. ) (please lick one box onlý 
I attend all meetings 
I attend most meetings 
I attend some meetings 
I rarely attend meetings 
I do not attend any meetings 
1()\\ aware a rc wil of I, cIsII I-C serv ices, kjllý III po II Cý'. ' (1)[Case I ick 
Fully aware of management's quality policy 
Aware that Leisure Services has got a quality policy 
Only aware of the quality policy in my service area 
Only vaguely aware of any quality policy 
Unaware of Leisure Services' quality policy 
(office use) 
ý -1 1 
D 
II 
(please turn over) 
A I)I)Cll(l ices 
What do you think about thc 1.6-sureServices' quahlý pohcN? (picase 
tick ofic box onk. ) 
Happy with the policy in general 
Indifferent to the policy 
Unhappy with the policy in general 
Don'tknow 
I las the I iltroduct loll of 'QuallIN Mailai-, cilicill, into I clsilic scl\ We. " 
been combined with changes to cillp I 0\ [Ile II t-co I It rac Is or %wi-king 
-I practices in any ofthe following arc. is'. ) (pIcase tick all boxes thilt j1ppl\ 
Introduced more 'flexible' working hours 
Simplified grading structures 
Introduced more 'flexible' employment contracts 
Introduced performance related pay 
Introduced work appraisal 
Introduced 'team-working' 
Other (please note below) 
I low mucil ý11-e voti In Ilivour ol'these chanpes'. ) (tick bo\ I slfonýl\ III 
111\0LI1.1 ficiltral: ý sfronolv liostile etc. It wit ha\c no opinion do not lick 
j11% hm) 
in favour hostile 
Flexible wo rking hou 
- 
rs 1- 
1-2--j -37 -4 -1 51 
LS 
1 77p I ified grading structures 1213 
3- 4- 5 Performance related 
ppraisal 45 
Team working 12134 
'Other' changes 
1-1 2 1- -3 5 
(please turn over) 
1-1 
[I] 
I1 
II 
II 
EI 
Li 
[I 
Use) 
AN 
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I) If' * tcams' arc used at your workplace... 
(a) ... 
how has it aff'ected workloads llor stall'. 1 (picase tick one ho\ 
0111\ ) 
On balance, team-work has increased work loads a lot 
On balance, team-work has increased work loads a little 
On balance, team-work has not increased work loads 
On balance, team-work has decreased work loads a little 
On balance, team-work has decreased work loads a lot 
Not applicable: team-work not used 
(b) ... 
has everyone's \\orkloads bccn all'cocd the saille I. )\. 
tC, Illls'. ' (please lick one box onl. \ ) 
Yes, everyone has been affected the same by 'teams' 
No, some have been more affected than others 
Not applicable: team-work not used 
(please state what types of work have been more affected by 'team- 
work', if applicable) 
.............................................................................................................. 
.............................................................................................................. 
1 low has tile I III roduct loll of' as a 
\\11. olc, aff . ccled \\ork loads for staffm ýour sci-\ ice dcpartniciir. ' 
(please lick 011C 1)0\ 0111ý ) 
On balance, QM has increased work loads a lot 
On balance, OM has increased work loads a little 
On balance, QM has not increased work loads 
On balance, QM has reduced work loads a little 
On balance, QM has reduced work loads a lot 
F] 
11 
use) 
F-F-I - 
1-1 
11 
(please turn over) 
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5) 1 las everyone's workloads been al1jected the same by 'Quality 
MamjgcmcnC (QM)'? (please tick one box onIN) 
ýes, everyone has been affected the same by QM 
qo, some have been more affected than others 
Jnsure/No opinion 
(please state what types of work have been more affected by 'Quality 
Management', if applicable) 
.............................................................................................................. 
.............................................................................................................. 
I [as *Quafity Management' allected NO L11. \IC\\-o I' I 1IC-11111011--'-s-role 
represcming your interests? (Iflease tick bo\) 
yes no 
(if 'yes', please state in what way they have changed) 
.............................................................................................................. 
.............................................................................................................. 
.............................................................................................................. 
(office use) 
11 
FF 
11 
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(please turn over) 
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2) 1 las the Introduction ol'_Quality Manaj4cnIejlI'_, Ij'l'cc led (11C [-()IC and influence Ol'Union representatives 
-inI 
ny () I't lie 1'() 11 ng 11-cas'. 1 
(please tick appropriate box for each calcýpi\ 
reduced same Increased 
influence influence Influence 
Working practices 
Grading arrangements 
Health and Safety 
Holiday entitlement 
Absenteeism 
Sickness 
III WhZlt 1'01-111S 1MVe MaMiget'S COIII III Lill iCAted HICH' 
Management' programme to VOLI? (please tick all boxes that ap IN 
Staff presentation 
Video 
Newsletters 
Team briefings 
Through the union 
Haven't communicated 
4) What hackup support have ý oti required from the union on the issuc 
()I, I hialltv (I)ICXSC IICk ill ho\c,, that ippl\ 
Advice from full-time official 
Information pack from the union 
Advice/discussion from other colleagues in the union 
Haven't required any support 
No support available 
(office Use) 
LI 
Ll 
(please turn over) 
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5) 1 IM-C VOU becii involvcd in gcncral (ii. scils. siolls/Ilicetilig. ý_et_c. al-)Oill 
'IsPccts 01"QLIIlit)' MLIM19CIllelit"? (please tick bo\) 
(a) ... with Inallagellient yes no 
(b) ... With the 11111011 yes no 
1 10WIIILICh do you agrec or disagrcc with thc l'ollowing statenicilts? 
(please tick box: I stron',,, 1v aorce, ý -1 neutral: 5 strom-'k disa'-'rcc c1c. Do not I. - tick a box for any statements that are not applicable to %()III' 0\\I) C\I)Cl. lellcc) 
"I'lic quality policY has not aff , CCICd fily Concerns about day 
to day issues' 
agree disagree 
112115 
'All this Quality MZIMI. LýC111CIlt StUITISJU. St ýI fZId' 
agree disagree 
21345 
(111) 'Concern for COMICII CLIStOIlICI-S IS 111 VCI-ý' \\ell. bUt 'It's 
Cou I IC II Staff \\ 110 seen IIo he he'll-Ing t lie hrl II Ito 1' It aI I' 
agree disagree] 
(IV) PCI-lorIlIMICC Zll)l)I'ZIISJI MILIS it) make people feel more 
VZ1111CLF III their \\ork' 
a2ree disagree 
v) IS Ml ISSUC tlllt both IlIIIIZIgCIIICIIt dild NýLIH'C. 111 Come 
toget her 011' 
agree disagree] 
415 
(Vi) 'With Ollalltý Mallagc1licill, Inallagcl's IcIld to tall, dll-CCtlý lo 
stalfaild hypass the 11111,011, 
agree disa r 
-. --] 124 
(\'I[ 'Quallty MallagcIlIcIlt seems it) he a mcalls hy \\11icil to get 
more \wrk out ofcmploý ces \\ ilhout an inci-casc III Im. \ 
agree 
1112 13TZIýj 
(please turn over) 
(office Use) 
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LI 
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FF 
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(viii) 'QUalit) Management Ollel-S C1111)10ý CCS 11101-C -Saý'O\ Cl- their 
m, vii work than \\, as the ease hcf'orc' 
agme disagme 
11121TF415 
(ix) 'QLlalitý' Management has enNmcal the nic or We union 
rcprescntativc in the workplace 
agree disagree 
112131415 
(office use) 
Please feel free to write down any other comments that you may have about the 
operation of 'Quality Management' in your workplace 
......................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................... 
................................................................. I ....................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................... 
Thank you for your time 
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APPENDIX Vi 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (SAM 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION... 
Union/Branch: 
Address: 
Contact: 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
e-mail: 
I Date: fI 
ABOUT THE UNION 
Local Authority 
Union Membersh 
ABOUT UNION POLICY 
Local Union Policy on CCT 
Local Union Policy on Quality 
How did the quality strategy 
develop? (what influenced policy 
National Union policy, consultation 
with employers, political influences 
etc. ) 
Appendices 
ABOUT EMPOYERS AND i QUALITY 
Has the Union been involved in 
discussions with employers on 
issue of 'quality'? 
What level of consultation has 
the Union had on the issue of 
'quality'? 
Have there been any disputes 
with employers in relation to the 
issue of 'quality'? 
Appendices 
I ABOUT CCT 
Has the issue of quality been 
linked with the issue of contract 
tendering? 
Lill Roper 1 00 
.S I )CI%II-1111CIII OJ'SOCJýjj . 111ti I-k-01101111C R'C'lL'; IIVh 
I 
L-INIh Of( 
M-11 11 11) SNINS 
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
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APPENDIX Vii 
TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW (SAMPLE) 
At: Brent LB Council 
Date: 28/3196 
With: xxxxx 
Background: Interview conducted as part of session interviews arranged by 
Brent QDU. Basic Structure formed around formal interview 
schedule. 
Interview 
[First section of interview affected by recording errorsl 
IR: L. ] What sort of problems or obstacles have been encountered alona the wav? 
XX: "There is a fundamental one, which is the cynicism people feel when they look 
at a council - which doesn't appear to value staff; which seems more concerned 
with keeping council tax down - but still professes to be concerned with quality. 
And so that's hard. - it's hard to sell a corporate model of quality when people 
feel that way ...... 
"... it's very easy to turn round and say 'well if we're [over-stretched that's] 
even more reason to have Quality Time: you don't need money'- you know, it's 
quite easy to counter some of these arguments but it also can be quite evasive 
and self-serving to counter these arguments and there's a fundamental point 
there which is thatyou need to supportpeople -you need resourcing... " 
IR: Will that cynicism decline or will it remain? 
XX: "It's residual - because there's always the fact that this [Chartermark] is another 
medal; another gong, and of course it's a John-Majorism ... so - what can you 99 do?... 
", 4111 can do is to cultivate a culture - an ethos - which is about allowingpeople 
the opportunity to invest in values - which is to do with qualilyý which is to do 
with the London Borough of Brent - but which is not a Brent thing that people 
cannot respect. " [ ... ] 
[I wasn't managing here when the Quality Council policy was launched. ] I can 
chart the progress over the last two years and I know what I inherited - it was a 
mess. Why it was a mess, and whether that is something to do with tile 
corporate approach to quality, I'm not sure. 
IR: Is there a danger that with Devolution a manager will be able to get awaY with 
mistakes or bad management 
Appendices 
XX: [Sure - although some of it, here, was deliberate. It was a mixture of 
incompetence and mistakes. It's true that with a devolved structure there is more 
scope for a maverick to mess things up. ] 
IR: What happened? 
XX: It's a long story, but there's still an element, unfortunately, of sectarian politics 
around race "and the sad thing is, it doesn't matter whether it's Labour or 
Tory .. at the end of the day people are looking after their own ... power-base and 
- as has been evidenced over the lastfive years - these people are quite happy to 
change sides when it suits them. And so ... it's really [about getting] afair share - 
which isfair enough - in a way which is quite exclusive. For him, basically, the 
question is, you can't get rid ofhim - so he's moved around a lot" 
IR: What has happened to working practices and working conditions? 
XX: [In terms of then and now. ] 
"Fundamentally, there isn't the same sort of contempt towards customers 
because there was - no doubt about it. In the '80's libraries would have a lot of 
ad-hoc closures and there was a load of contempt and it was the idea that 
'we're in the public sector; we're under siege; we're under-resourced'... It's a 
lot easier tojust sink back into this sort-ofdefeatist approach about how under- 
staffed we are; how under-resourced we are and not really make the 
connection ... surrounding the customer. 
And people, now, have a greater 
awareness in terms of communications and [flexibility]" [interruption] 
Casualisation; flexible working patterns; reduced absenteeism... 
IR: ... Is reduced absenteeism 
due to motivation or fear? 
XX: "Unfortunately there is an element offear in it. I sometimes have to really work 
on people to persuade them, when they've been ill, that they shouldn It take it as 
annual leave. People say Y want to take it as leave -I don't want it to be 
recorded as sick. Fundamentally it is to do with changing work culture. When I 
firstjoined Brent I almost had the received wisdom that I could be sick several 
times a year without it becoming an issue and I almost saw it as untouchable 
[ ... ] It's to do with work culture change; 
it's to do with the idea of quality 
management - that people are no longer going to be allowed to get away with 
this sort of thing. I think commitment is part of it as well - getting people to 
actually work together as a team and to understand the impact of absenteeism 
for the rest of the team. " 
So ... we wear uniforms and the 
interesting thing is - as much as everyone hated 
the idea -I think there would be bit of disappointment by a lot of people if the 
uniforms were abolished-The ratio of those people who turn-up looking smart 
and wear the uniform almost with pride and those people who really hate it [is] 
well in favour of the people who wear it with pride. [There are some practical 
advantages with the uniform too -a lot of library work is physical]. 
.. Arts and Libraries 
had ... and annual staff awards-thing and it's really about 
employee-of-the-year; library-of-the-year; customer-service-of-the-year. 
Everyone hated it, but everyone went - and everyone wanted to win. It struck a 
chord, whether it was recognition; whether it was just competition - because, 
Appendices 
certainly, competition between libraries was very, very deliberately introduced 
as a way of motivating library managers - and, unfortunately, once we got onto 
the market testing situation there was just no value in competing against each 
other. And now that we're Devolved Business Units the residue that we're in 
competition against is antithetical; it's actually counter-productive. We need to 
co-operate with each other, not compete with each other... So what does this 
say? People take pride. That's what it's got to be about and I think that's 
fundamental to the whole quality programme in Brent - that we move away 
from being ashamed to work for Brent, to being proud to work for Brent. And, 
unfortunately, we haven't got to the stage where people here feel proud to work 
for Brent - but, hopefully, within the Library Service, people here feel proud to 
work for this library. 
IR: ... PRP isn't used here. How 
is that worked, given that the Human Resources 
Unit suggest that it is policy to move towards PRP: would PRP work against the 
'team-spirit' you are trying to foster? 
XX: It's Council policy for Business Directors to get PRP... It will be Council policy 
to encourage PRP in line with Business Units but the fundamental bottom-line 
is they all have to be paid for out of existing budgets - simple as that. So in a 
sense it's a joke... I feel a bit embarrassed by it... [I work weekends and 
overtime because I'm expected to do that for my salary. I leave when the work 
is done - that is the difference]. and people who've got that corporate, sort-of 
old-fashioned 'this-is-what-I-do; this-is-what-I-don't-do' [attitude] - either they' 
won't succeed in the job, they won't be able to stay employed in the job or 
they'll just be seen to be an inflexible person who is not prepared to put 
themselves out... If you've got a fair, meaningful [means of assessment] you can 
get a blanket assessment of everybody or, unfortunately, you do have to say 
'you deserved it and you don't' and perceptions of fairness will come out like 
that... 
I would like to be in a position to make those decisions, actually, because just as 
I am glad that I've been in a position, as a Devolved Business Unit Manager, to 
negotiate pay terms with people [ ... ] 
There's one member of staff here who's been here, now, a year-and-a-half. Part 
of the whole culture [with] new members of staff, in my opinion, are 
exceptional; they represent the future here - not just in the libraries, but in the 
Service - and they've brought to the place a vitality; a new enthusiasm; a 
freshness which has transformed the place along with people who ... have been here a while, who are experienced and committed... 
She has been offered three times, by three different authorities, jobs; jobs which 
you could say, from a purely professional point of view, she would be wise to 
take. What has happened is that she's gone to them and she's... asked them 
basic questions that she would ask here and I would give an answer. Because of 
their structure ... [i. e. having no devolved decision-making] the person taking the interview hasn't known the answers. Possibly, if [she'd] accepted one of the 
jobs, she'd have been working in a library where nobody in the library would 
have had nothing to do with the recruitment process [ ... ]. She's had me over a barrel three times, because she's an exceptional member of staff and what I've 
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been able to do is negotiate - and it's a problem [ ... because I judge her on her 
outputs rather than her seniority or grade etc. ]. What I've been able to do is 
motivate, reward and promote. 
"Andfor those people who aren't up to it, either they're gone, or they're on less 
money and there's always a problem with that - I'd prefer it if they were gone, 
but usually there's a choice ... and, yeah, there's a few people who aren't going 
to be happy about it, because they're beingpaid what they're worth" 
and "the only time it gets tricAy is when you realise that the overall quality of 
staff in this place has improved so much that that you've got a few historical 
situations ofpeople who are basically a bit dim; who are trying their best are 
being underpaid - and that's not nice because these people are trying their best; 
it's not theirfault, but the world has changed The issue, in terms of workingfor 
a job in the private sector, is such that there are practically none that they are 
capable ofdoing and it's a rough old world - and that's not nice. " [ ... ] 
IR: ... Is that due to budget constraints? 
XX: Oh, yeah. It's not through a matter of principle for me - it's to do with [reducing 
costs based upon a business plan] 
IR: Could [budgetary pressure to reduce staffl cause problems in the future? 
XX: It'll get harder and harder. 
IR: Do you think that will make it harder to motivate staff? 
XX: [ ... The budget constraints will stop me 
being able to implement changes 
proposed by staffl Sooner or later they'll stop having ideas. [ ... ] As long as the 
right decisions are made and the people who stay are rewarded [it will be all 
right]. 
"I've got into the situation where it's panic. If I got in the situation where the 
decision is not based on ability but based on what would be the redundancy 
costs - what is the cheapest person to get rid of - then 
I've got a big problem. 
Because obviously, if we've moved awayfrom the situation in the '80's - where 
the overall quality of staff was poor .. we're going to 
be under pressure to get 
rid of some of the best people ... and that is something that 
I'm determined to 
avoid. And the only way that I can avoid that is by being a really hard 
bastard.... andpre-empt and try and stay one step ahead. " 
It's just a grow-up time. None of us likes that. And anyone who does ... is sick in 
the head. To see fear in people sickens me in the stomach [ ... ]I had the situation 
where I had to brief the staff about reorganisation and I had to leave the 
room ... and that was 
just the saddest thing that has ever happened to me, working 
in this job. I just could not believe it - and that is it: "it's all very well being a 
Business Director and having devolved powers, but you're fucking-up people's 
lives ... 
having to accept the difference between some hard and cold reality and 
just doing thejob, as you understand it, to the best ofyour abilities - and doing 
it professionally. But at the same time you must keep something of yourself 
which feels that pain and which feels that frustration and anger because I'm 
sure when you stop -I feel angry a lot of the time, and frustrated... " 
[Interview ends] 
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330 Thurrock 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 1 4 7 7 3 0 3 
331 Tonbridge & 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 6 6 9 0 3 3 
Malling 
332 Torbay 2 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 
333 Torfaen# 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 N o 0 a 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 6 5 
334 Torfaen# 5 IB M 0 2 1 111 12 2 2 M 0 M 2 Z,, 0 1 K !0 
335 Torridge 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 
336 Tunbridge 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 6 5 ýi 1 3 2 
Wells 
337 Tynedale 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 (1 
338 Uttlesford 0 0 2 0 1 
339 Vale of 0 
Glamorgan# 
340 Vale of 0 
Glamorgan# 
341 Vale Royal - j j 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 2 2 2 0 2 - 0 0 0 o o 0 3 4 -1 
342 Vale of 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 4 2 3 
White Horse 
343 Wansbeck 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 5 4 4 -1 10 1-1 1 
344 Wansdyke# 2 Is 0 0 0 0 0 0 O E M O E M 2 0 M 0 2 0 
345 Warrington 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 8 1 4 5 
346 Warwick 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 6 9 9 3 0 3 
347 Watford 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 5 7 0 2 2 
348 Waveney 2 as 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 
a 1 1 0 8 10 M 2 4', 
349 Waverley 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 1 5 6 6 1 0 1 
350 Wealden 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 (0 7 6 6 1 0 1 
351 Wear Valley 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 
352 Wellingboro 0 0 0 0 0 
ugh 
353 Welwyn 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 8 11 
Hatfield 
354 West Devon 2 M 0 0 M 0 0 M 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 in 0 0 
Al 4 5 1 
355 West Dorset 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 6 9 7 3 2 1 
356 West Lancs 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 7 7 7 0 0 0 
357 West 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 4 4 2 0 2 
Lindsey 
358 West 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 11 1 1 0 
Somerset 1 1 
359 West 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 8 8 8 0 0 0 
Wiltshire 
360 Winchester 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1) !) 4 0 1 1 
361 Windsor & 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
13 2 2 2 :1 12 1 1 G 10 4 
Maidenhead 
0 1 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 
1 
:1 10 8 362 Woking 2 0 2 0 1 0 2 zz 
363 Wokingham 2 0 0 1 
I 
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 :1 0 0 0 
364 Woodspring 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 1 1 2 2 0 0 
# 
365 Worcester 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
366 Worthing 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 
367 Wrekin 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 0 1 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 8 11 10 
368 Wrexham 5 0 1 N o t 0 a 1 M E 1 2 31 0 M 1 M 1 M 8 
369 Wrexham 2 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 7 
Maelor# 
5 
370 Wychavon 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 6 8 6 
371 Wycombe 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 14 14 10 0 4 4 
372 Wyre 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 M 0 1 
373 Wyre Forest 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 
374 Ynys Mon# 2 0 1 11 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 
375 Ynys Mon# 5 1 M E ' 0 0 M 2 0 0 M 2 0 M 1 A li 7 
376 York# 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
3771 Barnsley 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 
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ningham 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 -0. 
2 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 0 2 2 8 14 14 6 0 
379 Bolton 3 X 0 0 1 1 Im 1 1 " 1 1 K 2 2 0 0 2 1 a 0 0 7 6 1 
1110 -1 
380 Bradford 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 10 10 10 0 0 
381 Bury 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 9 9 
1 
0 
382 Calderdale 3 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 7 2 
383 Coventry 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 10 7 0 -3 3 
384 Dudley 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 1 10 10 8 0 -2 -2 
385 Kirklees 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 9 9 2 0 2 
386 Knowsley 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 10 11 12 1 1 2 
387 Leeds 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 8 8 9 0 1 1 
388 Liverpool 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 2 0 2 2 0 1 1 5 9 11 4 2 6 
389 Manchester 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 4 7 9 3 2 5 
390 Newcastle 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 9 9 9 0 0 0 
upon Tyne 
391 North 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 8 9 9 1 0 1 
Tyneside 
392 Rochdale 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 7 9 10 2 1 3 
393 Rotherham 3 0 0 1 a 2 2 2 2 a 0 0 a 0 0 1 1 6Z 7 7 a 0 
394 Salford 3 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 7 7 6 0 -1 -1 
395 Sandwell 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 9 9 10 0 1 1 
396 Sefton 3 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 3 6 0 3 3 
397 Sheffield 3 0 0 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 1 11 12 11 1 -1 0 
398 Solihull 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 2 2 0 1 0 7 10 9 3 -1 2 
399 South 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 6 1 2 3 
Tyneside 
400 St. Helens 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 9 9 -1 0 -1 
401 Stockport 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 5 7 10 2 3 5 
402 Sunderland 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 i'l 11 11 o 
403 Tameside 3 0 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 S 
404 Trafford 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 
405 Wakefield 3 
f 
1 1 ý , 1 
1 0 0 0 0 
1 
1 1 (ý 
406 Walsall 3 2 2 4 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 14 1 
407 Wirral 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
408 Wolverhamp 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 9 9 -1 0 1 
ton 
; 
409 Barking & 4 'MM FM 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 
Dagenham 
410 Barnet 4 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 
1 
0 1 10 
; 
10 9 0 -1 -1 
411 Bexley 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
"a 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 
412 Brent 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 14 10 l:? 4 2 
413 Bromley 4 0 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 1 1 (i ý) 1) 3 3 6 
414 Camden 4 2 1 2 2 0 1 is 2 2 
0 2 2 0 0 1 1 a 10 1() m 0 0 
415 Corp of 9 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 9 3 9 6 6 0 
London 
416 Croydon 4 0 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 4 11 11 
417 Ealing 4 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 9 9 13 0 4 4 
418 Enfield 4 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 11 13 1 2 3, 
419 Greenwich 4 0 IS 31 0 0 0 0 N o 2 0 0 
420 Hackney 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 2 2 2 1 11 8 13 -3 2 
421 Haringey 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
422 Hammersmit 4 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 3 1 9 4 2 
h& Fulham 
423 Havering 4 0 - 
0 0 E W 0 E n 0 2 0 0 
424 Hillingdon 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 6 G (3 0 0 (0 
425 Hounslow 4 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 8 9 
426 Islington 4 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2, 2 1 2, 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 9 10 10 1 0 1 
427 Kensington 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 4 A 0 
& Chelsea 
428 Lambeth 4 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 6 8 
429 1 -ewisha m 
4 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 () 11 13 1 2 3 1 
430 Merton 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 8 1 hI "I 
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Newham 4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 Redbridge 4 1 1 0 1 
0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 o Richmond-u- 4 1 1 1 
Thames 
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 8 1 1 Southwark 4 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 a 0 0 Sutton 4 ,1 0 0 11 0 0 M 0 
1 1 2 2 2 6 9 8 1 Tower 4 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Hamlets 
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 8 7 8 -1 1 
0 
Waltham 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Forest 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 14 
14 13 0 -1 -1 Wandsworth 4 2 2 0 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 12 11 , 15 1-1 14 3 lWestminster 4 1 i , 
I 
.I .1 
12 12 2 2 12 1 1 1 
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APPENDIX iX 
SURVEY RECODES 
Code box ref 3&4 ('Department/Service') 
Code Response Recode 
1 Planning/Corp Services (3) Admin/Suppo 
2 Housing (2) Social/Welfare 
3 Leisure (4) Customer Service 
4 Welfare (2) Social/Welfare 
5 Finance/Tax (3) Admin/Support 
6 Building Regs (1) Regulatory 
7 Highways (1) Regulatory 
8 Environmental Services/Environmental Health (1) Regulatory 
9 Community Development (2) Social/Welfare 
10 Env, Tourism & Leisure (4) Customer Service 
11 Education (2) Social/Welfare 
12 Social Services (2) Social/Welfare 
13 Corporate (3) Admin/Support 
14 Legal (1) Regulatory 
15 Regeneration (1) Regulatory 
16 Trading Standards (1) Regulatory 
17 Housing Maintenance (3) Admin/Support 
18 Art/Culture/Museums (4) Customer Service 
19 Libraries (4) Customer Service 
20 Misc. Manual/Office (support functions etc) (3) Admin/Support 
21 One Stop Shop/Customer Services (4) Customer Service 
22 Children & YP (2) Social/Welfare 
23 Outdoor (2) Social/Welfare 
24 Staff Development (3) Admin/Support 
25 Print/Reprographics (3) Admin/Support 
26 ITITech. Support (3) Admin/Support 
27 Tourism (4) Customer Service 
28 Benefits (2) Social/Welfare 
29 Payroll (3) Admin/Support 
30 Engineering (3) Admin/Support 
Appendices 
Code box ref 21 ('... other changes to employment throl QMI) 
Code 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Skill/competence assesment 
Increased paperwork 
Introduced fixed-term contracts 
CCT related changes 
More empowerment 
Introduced group bonus scheme 
Reduced flexi-time 
Made staff more customer aware 
Private sector approach 
Changed work objectives 
Increased work loads/time 
Performance management 
More training 
More casual labour 
More competitive between staff 
Reduced Staff 
Improved communications 
Code box ref 30 & 33 ('please state what type of work has been affected... ') 
Code 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Froject worK/corporate worK 
Front-line services 
Middle managers/supervisor 
Professional work (e. g. specific to work) 
Delegated work (from managers) 
(Less time for) own work 
(increased) paperwork 
Admin. work 
Customer response work 
More data collecting 
More telephone work 
Compensate for other team members 
Increased workload 
Personal care affected 
More efficiency 
More performance targets 
Monitoring work by managers 
Less time 
Those involved with ISO 9002 
Created new quality function 
Less meritocratic 
More meetings 
More planning 
Lower level staff more accountable 
Outside working hours 
Problem solving 
Fairer redistribution of work 
Misc. job related 
Appendices 
Code box ref 36 ('please state what way (union role) has changed') 
Code 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
More work; less staff/less time 
Stricter job description 
Union disputing definition of QM 
Union is weaker 
Customers too powerfull 
No consultation about work increases 
Union should support QM more 
Management more authoritarian 
More bullying by managers 
More redundancies 
Union is too negative 
Unclear of what Union's position is on QM 
Union hasn't adapted to management changes of style 
Union cannot assess unfair working practices 
Union should do more for workers 
More work for no increase in pay 
In6reased union/management dialogue 
QM undermining union/collective bargaining 
Union not consulted over changes 
QM more effective than union 
Union not responsive enough 
Union been ineffectual 
Different workplace, different rulles 
Union providing good advice 
Need more QM 
Union more distant 
Code box ref 44 (Unions involvement in Q') 
Code 
1 
2 
3 
Res 
Changing request into order 
PRP dispute 
Disciplinary dispute 
